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Chapter 1. Styles of Thinking 
 
§ 1. Dawns of day 
 
Night is dead – we killed her 
 
To find traces of the night, we must travel far. Flying over Northern Canada, from 
one metropolis to the next, amidst endless darkness beneath, some sparkling 
lights may be discerned, twinkling anthropogenic stars radiating towards us from 
the freezing depths – craving for help almost, for communication. It is 
undoubtedly very dreary and cold down there. The sight invokes memories of a 
past we never experienced, when small bands of humans spent their lives in 
clearings of light and rudimentary comfort. Now, we are approaching the moment 
when one gigantic global network of light bulbs will cover the earth. We do not 
have to experience cold any more. In darkness, we no longer have to wait 
desperately for the dawn of day. The day has expanded further and further, at the 
expense of the night, and the latter has retreated into inhospitable areas, and even 
there she is no longer safe. Our artificial days have marginalized the night, thus 
depriving us of a basic experience. Notably city dwellers live continuously in 
“enlightened” environments. The night has been eliminated by neon flooding. It 
seems impossible to imagine that, until quite recently, historically speaking, night 
was still night (Lacan 1991/2001, p. 41). Night became memory, a reserve. We 
only see the immensity of the starry sky when we, temporarily and deliberately, 
by way of intermezzo, leave the metropolitan ambiance behind. As metropolitan 
novelist Michael Crichton phrased it: “Modern city-dwellers cannot even see the 
stars at night. This humbling reminder of man’s place in the greater scheme of 
things, which human beings formerly saw once every twenty-four hours, is 
denied them” (Crichton, 1988/2002, p. xii).  
The starry expanses, which inevitably invoke in us a sense of awe and 
admiration, have been erased. The morning likewise has died. We now decide for 
ourselves when the break of dawn commences. Now that daybreak has been 
transformed into an event of relative significance, as a consequence of clock-
time, it became all the more difficult to realise that, besides the normal dawns we 
know from daily experience, there are also moments of dawn of much greater 
significance. Terms like day, night and daybreak do not refer exclusively to the 
rotation of the earth around her axis, but also to human culture as a whole. 
Moments in history can be pointed out, when a new epoch, a new way of thinking, 
suddenly commences. 
 In Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, one of the first philosophical 
books I myself once read (and which therefore, for me at least, became a book of 
dawn, a moment of awakening), Hans Joachim Störig (1961) brought a cultural 
daybreak of this type, a philosophical dawn as it were, into the spotlight. About 
550 B.C., according to Störig, the world suddenly began to think. At different 
locations, in China and India for instance, but also along the shores of Asia Minor 
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and Southern Italy, on the edges of the Greek sphere of influence (Magna 
Graecia), the world became conscious of itself. In the West, a whole new mindset 
emerged that summoned humans to put an end to mythical thinking (i.e. the 
tendency to attribute changes and events to supernatural powers). Philosophers 
(itinerant sages) hit the dusty roads to articulate fundamental insights in the form 
of maxims, such as: “for every change, there is a natural cause” or: “truth is 
correspondence between thinking and being”. What was remarkable, however, 
was that this awakening was a worldwide phenomenon. Störig emphasises the 
global scope of the transition. The rise of Greek thinking was not a stand-alone 
event. Buddha, Confucius and Lao-Tse were contemporaries of Parmenides and 
Heraclitus, as were Jeremiah and Zarathustra. It was as if thinking as such 
suddenly came into existence (Jaspers 1949).  
 This event, that at several places on earth, more or less simultaneously, 
but independently and at great distances, consciousness suddenly seemed to make 
a leap, is so miraculous, Störig argues, that we find it difficult to consider this as 
mere coincidence (1961, p. 140). Especially because thinking, once spurred into 
action, never completely expired again and even managed to reach impressive 
heights in a short period of time. In Greece, mathematics was suddenly practiced 
on a remarkably advanced level and it was only a thousand years later that Greek 
thinking came to a halt. After a whole millennium, its spiritual energy finally 
seemed spent. As if a spiritual climate change had occurred that was to last for 
about a thousand years and then extinguished. Jacques Lacan, speaking of Greek 
thinking, likewise refers to this worldwide intellectual awakening as an 
exceptional event without precedent, but above all as a global event, a global 
“choir” that arose more or less simultaneously in various cultural regions (Lacan 
1991/2001, p. 100). In the history of thinking, of human culture, of consciousness, 
there appears to be a limited number of psychic daybreaks, moments of 




§ 2. Different times, different thoughts 
 
The way we experience, investigate and interact with reality has been subject to 
drastic changes in the course of history. The world of Plato was different than 
that of Jesus, that of Jesus different than that of Newton, that of Newton different 
than ours – this seems to speak for itself. Less obvious is how we are to conceive 
the dynamics of such changes. Are these changes occurring gradually, or can we 
pinpoint radical turns, punctuating periods of relative stability? Is it true that an 
increase of pace in the history of thought can be discerned, or is this an optical 
illusion? That is, if we have the impression that, in the distant past, things 
developed at a much slower pace than in the seemingly turbulent present, this 
might be due to the distance in time, so that we observe events with historical 




myopia – with the implication that the apparent stability or tenacity of processes 
in the past only exists in the eyes of biased beholders. 
 Styles of thinking can be discerned in the history of thought. The term 
“style of thinking” refers to the way we observe, manage, modify and interpret 
reality. “We” refers to human beings in general, although special attention will 
be given to certain spokespersons of this “we”, to authors and witnesses who 
articulated a particular style of thinking in a recognisable and convincing way, 
giving it a voice and a face: scientists, artists, politicians and other actors who left 
tangible and documented traces. The concept of style draws attention not to 
individual elaborations, however, but rather to the general momentum, the typical 
profile pervading individual words, gestures and actions. Each style of thinking 
builds on a grounding concept, a basic conviction, which expresses itself in 
particular ways of observing, deliberating, building and acting. During a certain 
period of time, a particular style manifests itself in a wide variety of cultural 
domains: science, philosophy, art, architecture, religion, politics, medicine, 
economics, sexuality, ethics, and so on. A style arises in a particular location, 
from where (after a period of incubation) it diffuses relatively quickly across a 
cultural zone, achieving dominance and persistence, although eventually every 
style is bound to expire. At a certain point, a style of thinking will be eliminated 
and replaced, although it may briefly resurge in later times. The beginning is a 
kind of mental leap, a moment of discontinuity – we recognize truly important 
transitions by their dramatic speed (Spengler, 1918/1923, p. 37). It is more than 
just a philosophical event, although philosophical insights may provide a concise 
articulation of the transitions at hand. This is how we could define the task and 
ambition of philosophy: to articulate or question the style of thinking of its own 
era in a convincing manner and to work-through its grounding idea, its basic 
conception, its key philosopheme. 
 This study is a thoroughly revised version of a previous effort to develop 
a styles-of-thinking perspective on human history, written in Dutch (Zwart 
2005a). Again, I will focus on three styles of thinking in particular, namely the 
Apollonian, the Magian and the Faustian style, building on Oswald Spengler 
book Der Untergang des Abendlandes (1918/1923), who borrowed his ideas 
partially from others. My use of his methods and concepts will be non-dogmatic, 
however, for the goal is not to duplicate or gloss his work, but to elaborate it 
further. The styles-of-thinking concept is a collaborative idea, developed by 
multiple authors and thinkers, and although Spengler’s elaboration proves very 
inspiring, I will not necessarily follow him in all details.  
 The basic idea of the Apollonian style entailed that a perfect geometric 
structure could be discerned in reality, conceived as cosmos. The world as cosmos 
(literally: order or ornament) consisted of concentric spheres at the macro-level 
and was composed of perfectly regular three-dimensional shapes (“elements”) at 
the atomic level. Σφαίρα is the Greek word for sphere or globe. Politics, ethics, 
medicine and art were to act in accordance with nature, seeking to realize this 
perfect, spherical, harmonious order in human existence. This basic idea largely 
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determined the way in which Greek (Apollonian) mathematics developed, for 
instance, but we also recognise it in the way in which leading Greek scientists, 
politicians and artists worked and acted. Thinking and acting were “affected” by 
Apollonian logic. Its basic phrase or philosopheme can be summarised as “Act in 
accordance with nature” (κατά φύσιν), which basically implied that one should 
act and think spherically, so as to foster harmony and balance. Political actors 
wanted to expand their “sphere of influence”, in a literal and spatial sense, 
working towards a final state of stability. The Roman Empire can be seen as the 
realisation of the spherical idea in the political domain, but the grounding 
Apollonian idea also largely determined the basic experience of space and time. 
The cosmos was a universe on a human scale, neither infinite nor immense. The 
Apollonian style held sway during a certain period in history, but was never 
undisputed. Every dominant style has to compete with antagonistic rivals: 
initially the Dionysian style, later the newly emerging Magian style of thinking.  
 The Magian style can likewise be summarised in a compact formula or 
philosopheme, namely: “Prepare thyself for the advent of the great transition (e.g. 
the coming of the Kingdom of Heaven)”. Individuals withdrew from the world to 
live a life of detachment, in order to optimally prepare themselves, via virtuous 
conduct, ascetic practices and spiritual exercises (preferably amidst equally-
minded peers) for the dawning of a completely different way of being, a wholly 
different world: a decisive event which, however, could not be actively brought 
about by the individuals involved. They basically had to wait for it to happen, and 
prepare themselves. The central theological category was the idea of grace. At 
the political level, Magian thinking produced the so-called two kingdoms 
doctrine, not unrelated to the concept of a double (a natural and a spiritual) truth. 
Important scholarly Magian practices were numerology, astrology and alchemy. 
In fact, Magian mathematics was numerology, Magian astronomy was astrology, 
Magian science was alchemy.    
 The basic formula of the Faustian style can be summarised as “Will to 
Power”. In the scientific domain, this energetic style of thinking manifested itself 
in the concept of the experiment: a research style which was decidedly more 
active, violent and aggressive than the contemplative, respectful consideration of 
the perfect κόσµος characteristic of the Apollonian style, or the adoration of the 
universe as a mystery, from where signs may speak out to us (considering the 
movements of stars and constellations as a divine alphabet), characteristic for the 
Magian style. Faustian scientists aim to control natural phenomena. Their will to 
know equals will to power: the desire to modify, adapt and exploit. At the political 
level, Faustian thinking fuelled the formation of nation states; and on the ethical 
level we recognise it in in the interminable conflict between duty and desire. 
 Finally, we reach the present. Now, the question will be whether, around 
the year 2000, we have entered a new era, a new, post-Faustian style of thinking? 
And if so, how to characterise its basic profile? In other words, our reconstruction 
of previous styles of thinking finally results in a diagnostic of the present. 
Ultimately, the significance of a historical retrospect resides in the conviction that 




a new style of thinking has begun to dominate our world of experience. We have 
changed, although we may not fully realise it as yet. Compared with, for example, 
the 1950s or the 1960s, the conditions for cultural development have dramatically 
altered. The nation state gave way to globalisation, while laboratories became 
entangled in global data networks. For many people, in the face of the current 
crisis, future prospects are becoming increasingly uncertain. The final chapter is 
an effort in philosophical anticipation, resulting in a prognostic foresight. 
 
 
§ 3. Epistemological epidemiology 
 
The style-of-thinking concept suggests that, in the course of history, abrupt and 
fundamental changes can be discerned in the way in which reality is experienced, 
investigated and depicted, moments in time when reality suddenly manifests itself 
in a completely different way. Each style has its own profile, elaborated in various 
domains and exemplified by various cultural expressions. A style is especially 
recognisable in basic mental functions, e.g. in the ways in which reality is opened-
up, perceived, categorised, measured, in the way scientists, artists and politicians 
allow reality to appear. A style of thinking begins as a local phenomenon, but 
may spread remarkably fast. The pattern of diffusion can be described in 
epidemiological terms, in the sense that individuals may act as “carriers” of the 
cultural epidemic, but also in the sense that a style of thinking can be latent or 
virulent. The (comparative) analysis of styles of thinking amounts to a scholarly 
practice that can best be described as epistemological epidemiology. 
 The emergence of a new style cannot be considered a mere effect of 
historical causes or influences. Rather it entails a radical rupture with the 
foregoing, an intellectual mutation, a quantum leap, a move away from previous 
forms of thought, a moment of openness and creativity, but also of despair, 
because the whole world suddenly seems out of joint. A new concept takes the 
floor to which contemporaries seem remarkably susceptible, an intuitive idea 
which suddenly seems remarkably convincing. Once introduced, the style begins 
to propagate through various routes. From a limited number of isolated hotspots, 
it reaches new plateaus. Initially, a style is something quite marginal, seemingly 
coming from elsewhere. Increasingly, however, the new intuition manages to take 
root in the folds and margins of the established mindset. Sooner or later, the new 
concept affects and is adopted by the socio-cultural elite. The spread extends in 
two directions: from below (as a spontaneous revolt) and from above (as a 
politico-cultural campaign). Although there will be fierce resistance, and 
sometimes even immunity, a new unanimity, a new consensus seems to evolve 
amongst a relatively large group of individuals. Something new and foreign 
suddenly becomes self-evident and is actively taken up by scientists, artists, 
philosophers and politicians.  
 Yet, the unanimity is never all-embracing. There will always be lingering 
discontent in the new culture, a desire for other possibilities, things that once 
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were, or thing that are still to come, cultivated by antagonistic authors, who 
perhaps are already preparing the way for a future style of thinking, as voices in 
the desert, or as nostalgic spirits, curators of a ruined past – or combinations 
(coalitions) of multiple forms of recalcitrance. What is important, however, is 
that, even in contradiction and resistance, the profile of the dominant thinking 
style is inevitably visible, so that they provide a photographic negative as it were. 
Each style, in other words, has its antipode, its inverse, its moment of antithetic 
negativity. Yet, critics unintentionally reinforce and unwittingly endorse the 
evidences of the ruling style, which remains their unescapable horizon.  
 The chronic friction or struggle between the dominant style and its 
recessive rivals may also become an introspective battle. Leading scientists, 
artists or politicians rarely identify themselves wholeheartedly with one specific 
style. Often it is possible to distinguish a different voice, a latent “alter ego”, in 
addition to the dominant (manifest) epistemological “ego” of the person in 
question. An epistemological unconscious may follow our intellectual activities 
as a shadow. Newton (whose case history will be discussed more extensively 
below) not only practiced modern (Faustian) physics and mathematics, but also 
devoted years of work to “Magian” practices such as numerology and alchemy – 
and he was not the only example. His case is typical rather than exceptional. In 
other words, the styles-of-thinking concept is not only of historical, but also of 
psychological (and biographical) significance. The internal conflict between 
styles of thinking can lead to symptoms of paralysis and “epistemological 
neurosis” (Zwart 2008, p. 20), but it may also, under certain circumstances, boost 
scientific or other forms of intellectual creativity. 
 How to identify a certain style or mindset? How can we analyse and 
characterise a style? Some provisional methodological guidelines can be 
formulated that will be elaborated further in the course of this book. The first 
methodological rule indicates that, in order to grasp the epistemic profile of a 
particular style, we must take a step backwards and return to the beginning, the 
moment of outbreak of the particular style, the decisive radical innovation, a text, 
event or practice that can be designated as the birth place of a style. We must 
retrace the original context of discovery because it is there that the new style can 
be found in its purest form, in statu nascendi, free from exploitation and 
contamination. A second methodological indication is that, to clarify the 
epistemological profile of a particular style of thinking (and to uncover its 
grounding idea), we must confront and compare it with other (former or later) 
styles (i.e. comparative epistemology). Thirdly, we need to pay attention to 
instances of resistance, to discontent in a particular style, because the spirit of the 
dominant style is present there as well. Unwittingly and unintentionally, critics 
likewise become infected by the basic evidences of the style they claim to attack. 
And a final provisional rule is that we should not limit our research to one cultural 
domain, but rather detect the profile of a particular style of thinking in diverse 
cultural manifestations, such as research practices, works of art, political 




institutions and literary genres. The manifestation of a style in one domain can 
help to clarify its specificity in another domain, and vice versa.  
 
 
§ 4. Oswald Spengler and the concept of style 
 
As said, Oswald Spengler (1880-1936) is a prominent spokesman for the style-
of-thinking concept, to which he devoted his impressive Decline of the West (Der 
Untergang des Abendlandes, 1918/1923), a book which describes the 
morphology of styles of thinking similar to how Alexander von Humboldt (1845-
1862) characterised the physiognomy (the Gesamtbild) of landscape types. In the 
history of the West, three epochs can be distinguished, Spengler argues, the 
Greek, the Arab (or Byzantine) and the Germanic period, and each epoch has its 
own characteristic style. While in biology “morphology” is defined as the study 
of the form and structure of organisms, Spengler’s ambition is to study the forms 
and structures (the basic profile or Gestalt) of cultures and civilisations as they 
emerge, flourish and decline in the course of history. His comprehensive analysis 
aims to discern consistent patterns in their rise, flowering and waning, resulting 
in a dialectical genealogy of worldviews. Every culture begins as a robust but 
small-scale phenomenon, which will inevitably reach a more extended plateau 
and develop into a full-scale civilization, affecting hundreds of thousands of 
people. In other words, every true culture tends to expand, to thrive, to urbanise, 
and to develop into a world culture. This means that a culture will migrate from 
its local context of discovery towards life on a grander scale, where great history 
is written and made. Ultimately, however, every style is destined to fall victim to 
exhaustion and decadence. The average lifespan of a style is one millennium. 
 The development of culture into civilization is an inevitable urge, 
comparable to the urge to grow in nature, Spengler argues. Apollonian thinking 
becomes civilization in the form of the Roman Empire. At the same time, Jesus 
of Nazareth already wanders along the dusty roads of a Roman province with a 
small number of companions to proclaim the advent of the Kingdom of Heaven, 
representing a different style of thinking, referred to by Spengler as Magian, a 
style that was experiencing its primal, budding, subliminal stage. However, when 
Paul addresses his letters to Christian communities in big cities, Magian thinking 
already began to civilise, i.e. to assume urban and global proportions. And when 
the Christian Church establishes itself as the “general” (catholic) faith, as the 
World Church of Rome, this seals a whole process. The spectacular pace in which 
Islam later conquers the Arabic world, according to Spengler, demonstrates that 
Apollonian thinking is no longer capable of putting up significant resistance 
against this subsequent exemplification of the Magian style. 
 For centuries to come, Christianity will remain Magian in character. At a 
decisive moment, however, in the wake of the year 1000, but notably in the 13th 
and 14th century, a Faustian impetus begins to affect the Christian mindset, from 
within as it were. The Faustian style begins to take shape in Gothic architecture, 
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but also in scholasticism, and this culture will gradually civilise as well. This 
process reaches its peak in the 19th century, in the form of the industrial revolution 
and the rise of the modern, technological age – the era of the machine. The 
civilization process materialises in the rise of world cities: Athens and Rome 
(representing Apollonian civilization), Alexandria and Byzantium (representing 
Magian civilization), and Paris, London, Berlin and New York (representing 
Faustian civilization). Immense metropolises reduce the rest of the landscape 
(including cities from previous epochs) to provincial areas. Inhabitants of 
Faustian metropolises become the urban working masses. Characteristic of 
civilisation, in addition to the rise of large urban centres, is the tendency towards 
imperialism, radiating from these immense centres – “Imperialismus ist reine 
Zivilisation”, as Spengler formulates it (1918/1923, I, p. 50). While culture was 
introvert, civilisation is extravert. Civilisation is driven by an irresistible drive 
towards expansion (“Drang zur Ausdehnung”). A civilisation tries to bring the 
whole world into its sphere of influence. I will now present Spengler’s 
compelling, but at times unsettling views in more detail. 
 Spengler’s panoramic vision sees history as a sequence of cultures, each 
of them driven by a grounding idea, emerging, propagating and dissipating like 
majestic waves, while in the course of time, each culture (commencing as a local 
phenomenon) inevitably evolves into civilisation (a global phenomenon). A 
culture’s grounding idea determines the possibilities of self-expression of those 
affected by it (I, p. 21). All cultural expressions convey one and the same 
principle or transformative idea, and world history is basically the actualisation 
(ἐνέργεια) and unfolding of a series of grounding ideas. The style of a culture 
reflects a way of being (“Daseinsart”, I, p. 405), erupting suddenly, announcing 
an unexpected transmutation. This moment of eruptive commencement can be 
discerned in the history of every culture, occurring without a visible cause or 
influence (II, p. 37). Spengler mentions, for instance, the sudden rise of Egyptian 
and Babylonian cultures, which he sees as completely unlike their predecessors 
(II, p. 40), resulting in a new style of living, and this involves a new language, a 
new technique of writing, and sudden population growth. Whereas archaic 
cultures were lost in immense natural landscapes, for Chinese, Egyptian and 
Babylonian cultures nature suddenly becomes a backdrop. The new style emerges 
as a revelation, a destiny, emanating from the primal symbol of this culture (I, p. 
506). For Apollonian thinking, Spengler argues, the basic symbol is the human 
body (σῶµα). For Magian thinking, it is the world-cavern with its gleaming 
ornaments. Finally, trunk-like pillars and pointed arches are the Faustian 
leitmotiv, pointing in the direction of its basic symbol: infinite space. The 
substitution of the Ptolemaic worldview by the Copernican heliocentric system, 
for instance, resulted in a dramatic widening of the spatial horizon. The words 
that are used to refer to the prime symbols of a culture (σῶµα, πνεῦµα, force, 
mass, Wille, etc.) are pure signifiers (“Wortzeichen”), evoking a very particular 
meaning, and basically untranslatable. 




A series of stages must be traversed by all cultures, in an ordered 
sequence (I, p. 3). First of all, there is the small-scale beginning, as we have seen, 
with its purity of style (I, p. 267). Then, there is the moment of joyous booming 
(“Aufschwung”), when the basic form is skilfully mastered. Gradually, we 
witness a standardisation of form types. The civilisation stage consists in 
conscious megapolitan planning. Contradictions inevitably arise, giving rise to 
hostility and resistance. And finally, there is an episode of self-destruction. These 
sequential stages basically follow a dramatic curve (Freytag 1863; Zwart 2017a, 
p. 230): from exposition (the sudden emergence of a basic form or symbol), via 
a rise of dramatic tension, we finally witness disruption, downfall and 
denouement. A common idea permeates all cultural domains: politics, 
mathematics, ornamentation, philosophy, architecture, drama, craftsmanship (I, 
p. 7). Thus, there is an affinity between the Greek city-state and Euclidean 
geometry, between differential calculus and absolutism, between contrapuntal 
music and early capitalism.  
There is no central privileged position: all domains are permeated by the 
same style, the same program, the same λόγος, whether it is art, religion or 
science, finance, book-keeping or the technology of heating. One single idea 
transforms the world-view of anyone affected by it. Civilisation is the fulfilment 
or finale of a culture, revealing its inevitable destiny. Civilisations entail a 
transvaluation of all values (I, p. 451), affecting and eliminating all rival forms. 
Every civilisation remoulds the forms of previous or marginalised cultures, with 
the help of technology, politics and industry. Civilisation puts an end to rural 
village life, resulting in metropolitan nomadism. In the end, however, the process 
of civilisation entails cultural self-destruction through megapolitan decadence, 
self-contempt and nihilism.  
This transition from culture to civilisation also explains what is 
happening today, Spengler argues. Take science, for instance, where small-scale 
experimental culture gave way to science as a global enterprise. In the era of 
Faustian civilisation, scientists become factory workers (I, p. 457), carrying out 
collective scientific projects, while the urban masses become increasingly 
sceptical and suspicious about science. On the positive side, however, Spengler 
notices how, in late Faustian civilisation, after decades of hyper-specialisation, 
research fields are now rapidly converging. This process of convergence 
remained unnoticed for quite some time, Spengler argues, because most 
philosophers are literati who no longer familiarise themselves with the actual 
progress and problems of the natural sciences. In the 19th century, physics and 
chemistry were alien to one another, but in the 20th century, they can no longer 
be treated individually, as is evident in fields like spectral analysis, radioactivity 
and thermal radiation (I, p. 553).1 The chemical elements evaporate into 
                                                             
1 “Die einzelne Wissenschaften … nähern sich mit wachsender Geschwindigkeit. Wir 
gehen einer vollkommenen Identität und Verschmelzung entgegen… Man hat diese 
Konvergenz nicht bemerkt, weil seit Kant und eigentlich schon seit Leibniz kein 
Gelehrter mehr die Problematik aller exakten Wissenschaften beherrschte. Noch vor 
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mathematical variables and complex relationships, while physiology is becoming 
indistinguishable from organic chemistry. Civilisation entails a shift from 
metaphysics to technology, supported by millionaires and wealthy funders, but 
mistrusted by the masses, and this is also visible in research, where states and 
companies finance large-scale research enterprises, notwithstanding widespread 
public discontent.  
This difference (between culture and civilisation) is also the difference 
between the Greek palaestra and the Roman circus, Spengler argues. While in the 
palaestra citizens themselves were the competitors, in the Roman circus the urban 
masses became a mass audience. Something similar applies to the art market, 
where artworks nowadays are no longer considered as ends in themselves, 
produced by tormented geniuses, but as products for the market. Faustian art has 
already fulfilled its mission, Spengler argues. After Wagner the composer, 
Baudelaire the poet and Van Gogh the painter, we no longer see artists with an 
inescapable vocation. Music, poetry and art have ceased to be spiritual necessities 
(I, p. 379). They become products of an art industry, where art is produced to 
meet the demands of an insatiable global market.   
It is no coincidence, Spengler argues, that Marx’s Critique of Political 
Economy appeared in the same year as Darwin’s Origin of Species (in 1859). 
Both documents articulate one and the same Faustian principle, the Will to Power. 
Whilst Magian desire was to know the future, Faustian desire is to shape the 
future. Faustian civilisation claims to be tolerant, but on closer inspection it is 
rigorously intolerant, overtly hostile towards all traditional cultures, marking 
them as provincial, outdated and doomed.  
The first wave of culture described by Spengler unfolds during the so-
called Achsenzeit, already mentioned above, five centuries B.C. Unfortunately, 
Spengler does not have much to say about what came before: archaic culture, 
although he does mention that archaic cultural forms (art, dance, music, poetry) 
were meant to adjure natural forces or deities (“Beschwörung”). Of the songs and 
dances of archaic cultures, hardly anything remains, however, and the little that 
remains concerns mostly the ornamental side. He does have something to say, 
however, about totem and taboo. Although these two words were derived from 
completely different parts of the globe (the term totem was adopted from the 
Ojibwa / Chippewa people of North America, while the term taboo came from 
Tonga and the Fiji Islands), they become interconnected. While totem refers to 
lineage, taboo refers to prohibitions. According to Spengler, these two 
dimensions of archaic culture also recur in later epochs. They are connected with 
being and thinking, with politics and secret cults, with agora and acropolis, with 
villa and shrine, with castle and cathedral (II, p. 137). After Columbus and Cook, 
colonialism unleashed unequal collisions between archaic cultures and Faustian 
                                                             
hundert Jahren waren Physik und Chemie einander fremd; heute sind sie einzeln nicht 
mehr zu behandeln. Man denk an die Gebiet der Spektralanalyse, Radioaktivität und 
Wärmestrahlung” (I, p. 553). 




civilisation, between shamanism and Faustian industry (e.g. Native American 
Indians in their resistance against the United States).  
Spengler has more to say about Egyptian culture, which he sees as a 
sublime precursor of Apollonian thinking, with its huge silent symbols. A 
pyramid is a huge, geometrical enclosure of a secret path. And indeed, according 
to Spengler, the basic Egyptian symbol is the symbol of the way. Egyptian 
existence is that of travellers travelling in one direction: towards death, and the 
sacred way leads through pillared rooms into the chamber of the dead, the 
processional march of the priests. Egyptian buildings are not temples but paths, 
enclosed by giant masonry. 
Apollonian, Magian and Faustian culture are the key protagonists of 
Spengler’s book. Apollonian culture as a concept was familiarised, although not 
coined, by Friedrich Nietzsche, as counterpart of its Dionysian rival. Although 
Spengler is clearly influenced by Nietzsche, his attitude towards the latter is fairly 
ambivalent. He sees Nietzsche as a romantic, exceptionally weak in mathematics 
(I, p. 472), who dwelled in a world of books and “did not dare to look reality in 
the face” (I, p. 48). Nietzsche adopted the Apollonian-Dionysian duality from 
Richard Wagner, a man of action, impact and boundless creativity, whom 
Spengler greatly admired. Wagner’s music addresses the grand challenges of 
Faustian civilisation, Spengler argues. The Ring des Nibelungen is about 
capitalism, Siegfried is a young worker, Fafnir a capitalist, and Brunhilde an 
emancipated woman (I, p. 480). It is no coincidence of course that Wagner’s 
contemporary Friedrich Engels was likewise interested in, and likewise wrote 
about, Siegfried and the Nibelungen-saga (Engels 1840/1962). Wagner explored 
the Apollonian-Dionysian conflict as a historical mirror to probe the Faustian 
present. Whereas Dionysian culture entailed intoxication (I, p. 246), Apollonian 
culture fostered temperance and κάθαρσις. And while Augustus represented the 
transition from Apollonian culture to Apollonian civilisation, Emperor Trajan 
(during whose reign the Pantheon was built) represented the turning point from 
Apollonian to Magian civilisation (I, p. 527). For Spengler, the Pantheon was not 
only a perfect geometrical realisation of the Apollonian idea, but also the first 
Magian cavern, the earliest of all Mosque (I, 274). The master-masons of the 
Pantheon were in fact Syrians, Spengler emphasises, coming from the East. 
Magian thinking arose in the time of Augustus, between Nile and Tigris, 
Black sea and South Arabia, resulting in typically Magian cultural activities, such 
as algebra, astrology and alchemy. Signature Magian items are mosaics and 
arabesques, caliphates and mosques, sacraments and scriptures. Magian thinking 
entails a number of key ideas, such as the millennial time-span which evolves 
from the creation of the world up to the advent of the saviour, so that calendars 
and horoscopes (determining the question when) are important Magian devices. 
Magian space is numinous and spiritual, and a key symbol is the Magian copula, 
creating a cavernous spatial experience inside. Actually, the Magian church is a 
convergence of two forms, combining an Eastern copula with a Western basilica, 
giving rise to a domed basilica (I, p. 282). The Magian dome is ornamented with 
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sparkling mosaics and arabesques, drowning the cavern in a seductive fairy-tale 
gloom. Another key Magian symbol is the enclosed magical garden. There is only 
one Magian God, so that Magian religiosity entails a duality, a profound tension 
between light and darkness. Moorish culture in Spain represented the apex of 
Magian civilisation, Spengler argues. 
The Magian-Arabian wave emerged during the first millennium and 
adopted the Greek language as its lingua franca. From Armenia to Arabia, from 
Persia to Alexandria, as Spengler phrases it, a uniformity of artistic expression 
could be discerned across religious borders, reflecting a homogenous depth 
experience: the cavernlike sense of space (“Höhlengefühl”). Although Magian 
architecture employed Apollonian means (e.g. columns), it did so to express 
something completely antagonistic. The interior is now far more important that 
the exterior and the copula encompasses everything. Columns have moved 
towards the inside, so that the Magian church is an inversion (“Umkehrung”, p. 
233) of the Apollonian temple. Apparently, around the time of Christ’s birth, a 
new sense of space emerged, which also expressed itself in the domed chambers 
of Caracalla’s baths. In the Magian world-cavern (“Welthöhle”), golden 
backdrops created an unearthly gleam. Magian thinking proliferates quite 
suddenly from East to West, seeing history as a drama of redemption. It is the 
world of alchemy and of thousand and one nights. In the copula domes of 
Byzantium and Ravenna, the Magian experience achieved its purest expression, 
while Islamic vehemence carried the development to its end, turning Hagia 
Sophia into a Mosque. Similar to the cults of Isis, Mithras and gnosis, the 
philosophy of Plotinus and other Neo-Platonists were Magian. Plato himself was 
already sensitive to ideas coming from the Magian East, as is noticeable in the 
Magian atmosphere of the simile of the cave, inhabited by Magian slaves, 
fascinated and spellbound by what they see and hear inside.  
The Romanesque culture of the early medieval period was a mixture of 
Magian and Faustian elements, Spengler argues. A battle was raging between 
established Magian motifs and unconsciously active new ones. The Carolingian 
Aachen Chapel, for instance, is no longer a Mosque, but not yet a cathedral either 
(II, p. 102). The great city of Byzantium exemplified the transition from 
Apollonian to Magian (II, p. 104), while the Crusades were Faustian offensives 
against their Magian predecessor. In medieval France, the battle between Magian 
and Faustian principles culminated in the Grail saga, and in the war against 
Catharism. Around 1000, Italy was still under the sway of the Byzantine taste in 
the East and the Moorish taste in the South. Yet, the golden backdrop would 
inevitably give way to perspective: the artistic technique which expressed the 
budding Faustian experience of infinite space. As a result, the temporal horizon 
dramatically broadened (II, p. 32). Joachim of Floris (c. 1145-1201) replaces 
Magian dualism with the concept of the three world eras. The polarised world of 
John and Paul (with the Apocalypse as the great negation) gives way to the idea 
of a third epoch: the negation of the negation. Joachim is the first thinker of a 
Hegelian stamp who shattered the dualistic worldview of Augustine and 




introduced a new style of thinking, seeing medieval Christianity as a third term 
(the age of the Holy Ghost), superseding the Age of the Father and of the Son 
(represented by the Old and the New Testament).  
There is no history of science as such or of mathematics as such, Spengler 
argues, and we can only meaningfully speak about the histories of Apollonian, 
Magian and Faustian mathematics (I, p. 60). Doric temples, Magian domes and 
Gothic cathedrals are mathematics in stone: they are basic forms, shaping a 
world-order. The Faustian cathedral is a forest (“das Wälderhafte der Dome”, I, 
512), a view which he shares with Hegel and Wagner. Organ music gives voice 
to yearning for the forest, and visiting a cathedral is both a religious and a 
mathematical experience. While a temple embodies Apollonian geometry, and a 
copula Magian mathematics, Nicolas Cusanus (engaged in Catholic diplomacy 
and one of the most influential personalities of his time) introduced two key 
principles of Faustian mathematics: the infinitely large and the infinitesimally 
small. Faustian mathematics studies things not as they are, but as they become 
and behave, with utmost precision, down to the thousandths of a second.  
The key principle of Faustian literature is the confession. All great 
Faustian artworks (the work of Dante, Goethe’s Faust, Hamlet, Tristan, Parsifal, 
etc.) are elaborate confessions. Goethe’s works are fragments of one single 
confession (I, p. 14, p. 173). And while every Rembrandt portrait is a biography, 
a Rembrandt self-portrait is a confession (I, p. 339). Thus, we notice a sequence: 
from nude statue (Apollonian), via enigmatic icon (Magian) to Faustian portrait. 
This is also reflected in Faustian grammar, Spengler argues, where the 
Apollonian sum gives way to the I am. The Faustian spirit remoulds 
(“umprägen”) its own grammatical material. The coming of the “I” (e.g. I have 
done in lieu of feci) inevitably results in a dynamic instead of a static (Apollonian) 
syntax, preparing the ground for the genre of the confession (I, p. 338). The 
grammatical “I” is a portrait in itself, Spengler claims.  
There is an obvious connection between Faustian music and infinite 
space, Spengler argues, as is exemplified by the organ fugues of Bach, the 
nocturnal sonatas of Beethoven and the infinitesimal tone-world of Tristan. 
Indeed, for Spengler, Faustian art culminates in Wagner, whose art works entail 
a musical bombardment, while he sees ancient Pergamon, with its towering altar 
and gigantomachia frieze, as the Apollonian counterpart of Faustian Bayreuth (I, 
p. 376). Wagner’s Ring is in the realm of music what the American skyscraper is 
in the realm of architecture. Wagner had to go to the limits, exploiting and 
spending his full energy and talent on his music. His motifs emerge from the 
deepest depths, are briefly touched by a flash of sunlight, and suddenly coming 
quite close, to vanish again in a distance of strings: a mixture of brutality and 
refinement. But we notice a similar space experience in the metropolitan poetry 
of Baudelaire, with its endless streets and avenues, and its synaesthesia of sounds 
and colours. While the key symbol of Apollonian art was the nude statue, Faustian 
art is exemplified by soaring cathedrals, in combination with the theology of 
dogmatism and the diplomacy of Absolutism. Faustian music is steeped in the 
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deep midnight broodings of Faust’s study, and one and the same atmosphere is 
discernible in Rembrandt’s etches, Beethoven’s tone colours and Wagner’s total 
works of art. Parsifal is a cathedral of sounds and voices. Everything Faustian is 
pervaded with the adamant will to overcome all resistance. Its counterpoint is the 
pastoral sentimentalism of shepherdess operas, Fragonard’s lush garden paintings 
and porcelain.  
Spengler devotes much attention to the “problem” of the Renaissance. 
On the one hand, the Renaissance seems a revolt against Faustian forest-music, a 
return of Apollonian temperance, endorsed by a select handful of elitist scholars 
and humanists. The Renaissance is anti-Gothic, but not genuinely Apollonian, 
however. The apparent Apollonian revival is an illusion, as is indicated by the 
fact that the Renaissance sense of space is dominated by the perspective. As a 
counter-movement, the Renaissance is vehemently anti-Gothic, but on closer 
inspection it is a contradiction in itself, for in the end the Faustian will prevails, 
and the Renaissance gives way to Mannerism and the Baroque, with its swelling, 
voluminous, powerful, muscular, restless, wrestling male and female bodies: 
counter-Renaissance pur sang.  
Spengler sees the Baroque as a continuation of the Gothic / Faustian 
principle, having become all the more powerful and explosive in its struggle 
against Renaissance contempt. It is an outbreak of discordance (“Zwiespalt”), 
comparable only to the Dionysian revival against the Apollonian world-
experience in ancient Greece. The Rabelaisian body celebrates the return of a 
Dionysian and medieval festive body. In Greece, this had resulted in the body-
squandering orgasms of Dionysus cults. Renaissance art proved a temporary 
mask, in accordance with the taste of the elite, a deceptive negation. Now, the 
swelling, obtrusive body was brought in again, consciously and deliberatively, 
against the flow, but conveying the primal strength (“Urgewalt”) of its Faustian 
depths. According to Spengler, the Renaissance is an illusory Apollonian 
intermezzo, emphatically anti-Gothic, but in a superficial manner and oblivious 
of its own true nature. The Faustian Real resurges in the Baroque, with its 
disproportionally large bodies. The Renaissance was a protest (“Auflehnung”, I, 
p. 350) against the Faustian West, but unconsciously the Faustian undercurrent 
was still very much alive (“der starke Tiefenstrom faustischen Kunstwollens, im 
Unbewussten der großen Maler”, I, p. 350). In reality, the Gothic tradition was 
never really interrupted. Swelling bodies conveyed a similar message as Jesuit 
propaganda, namely the ethos of the Faustian Will to power, through struggle, 
impact and proliferation, as expressed by the Faustian state, by Faustian industry 
and technology (I, p. 407). 
While Apollonian physics is statics, Magian physics is alchemy, with its 
mysterious substances, such as philosopher’s mercury, enabling a transmutation, 
– the completion of the great work. Secret procedures are performed in nightly 
cavernous rooms. Faustian physics involves both dynamics and distance. While 
Apollonian objects are conceived as form and matter, Magian objects are 
substances endowed with (visible or secret) attributes, but Faustian bodies are 




grasped in terms of force and mass. Faustian physics thinks in terms of “force 
field” and “Angriffspunkt” (“point of engagement”, I, p. 494). While Apollonian 
science is quiet contemplation, Magian science involves a moment of grace, the 
transmission of secret knowledge, but Faustian science is active, experimental 
science, starting from a working hypothesis. Apollonian physics sees atoms as 
miniature plastic forms, but Faustian physics sees atoms as vibrating and 
radiating wave-particles.  
The Apollonian cause is the causa finalis: nature striving towards a final 
situation of rest and balance. As to the Magian understanding of cause: the 
Magian sage in his cavern knows only one cause, God the Almighty (II, p. 293) 
and on this a priori conviction, all alchemical techniques are based. Faustian 
physics, however, sees nature as determined by causal relationships, an idea quite 
incompatible with the ancient idea of ἀνάγκη. While Magian formulae allow 
specially gifted individuals to perform miracles, the formulae of Faustian science 
provide mastery over nature (“Herrschaft”, I, p. 507). The physics of Faustian 
civilisation is basically a system of signifiers (“Kennzeichen”, I, p. 488, p. 535), 
allowing scientists and engineers to operate nature as if it were a machine. The 
Faustian effort to control nature with the help of signifiers (“eine Zeichensprache, 
der nichts anschauliches mehr anhaftet”, I, p. 544) remains an interminable 
process, however. Newton himself, for instance, was quite uncomfortable with 
the (Magian) idea of gravitation as action at a distance, and experienced profound 
“Unbehagen” while articulating it (I, p. 539). He was seized by this idea, and 
aspired to master it with the help of his famous formula. And although Julius 
Mayer’s sudden insight concerning the conservation of energy struck him like a 
numinous, paralysing religious experience (of the Magian type), this idea 
inevitably evolved into a rigid concept, cloth in scientific nomenclature.  
Ethics likewise reflects the style of a particular culture. Apollonian ethics 
is care for the Self, resulting in ἀταραξία and ἀπάθεια, and the ideal Apollonian 
master is “willenlos” (I, p. 399). The ideal of Stoicism is statuesque self-
management (I, p. 459), a situation of balance, a statuesque pose. The Apollonian 
“will” is merely inclination. In sharp contrast to this, Magian ethics urges us to 
lose ourselves, to forsake our own Self (τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ, Luke 14:26). While 
Apollonian ethics strives for self-mastery, Magian conceptions build on the 
distinction between soul (ψυχή) and spirit (πνεῦµα). There are many individual 
souls, but the spirit (πνεῦµα) is one and the same. All Magian believers have a 
soul, but they participate in the spirit. Thus, besides the individual soul as the 
form of the body, there is a cosmic soul or spirit, which we encounter in the 
compelling gaze of staring icons, in the big staring eyes of Magian portrayals of 
Jesus, the Virgin and the Apostles. According to Spengler, Spinoza was a late 
representative of Magian thinking, a stranger to the Faustian style (I, p. 395), 
elaborating a world-view with only one substance (God), while thinking and 
extension were regarded as God’s attributes.  
Faustian morality is the morality of the ego striving upwards, facing 
multiple conflicts between reason and will. The Faustian “I” towers up, 
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mimicking the verticality of high buildings, embodying the Faustian ethic of 
excelsior (I, p. 398). While Apollonian thinking saw the human individual 
primarily as a statuesque body (σῶµα), Magian individuals saw themselves as 
part of a pneumatic, spiritual “We”. For Magian thinkers, the Faustian conception 
of individuals as actively thinking egos would have been something 
incomprehensible. In a cavernous, fairy-tale ambiance, protected by amulets and 
talismans, Magian individuals were dreaming about mysterious lands, precious 
gems, treasure coves, God’s crystal palace, imprisoned apostate stars and the 
philosopher’s stone. The basic attitude was one of waiting, and the key question 
of the Magian cavern-world was: “when?”. Therefore, astrology (the art of 
determining this when) replaced the oracle (basically an advice concerning the 
present: how to retrieve a position of rest?). For Magian thinking, all stands 
written in the stars. The Apollonian world is a world at rest, consisting of bodily 
things (as mergers of matter and form). The Magian world is a cavern, where light 
dispels darkness. In sharp contrast to this, the Faustian world is infinite space, an 
infinite theatre of energy, force and mass, and the Faustian artwork takes the 
spectator into infinite space.  
There are three Aristotles, Spengler argues. The Apollonian Aristotle is 
the Aristotle who, in Ethics (1926/1982), argues that virtue equals temperance: 
the mean between extremes. The Magian (Arabian) Aristotle is the Aristotle who, 
in De Anima (1936/1986), hints at the conception of a world-soul (κόσµου ψυχή), 
while the Faustian (Gothic) Aristotle is the Aristotle of Physics (1958/1982), who 
developed a theory of impetus. These three Aristotles are fundamentally different 
(II, p. 67). Likewise, there are three Jesuses. The original Jesus was a Provincial, 
anti-Apollonian Jesus, a contemporary of the ancient cynics, an itinerant teacher 
whose sayings addressed the provincial lower classes of fishermen and day 
labourers. The Magian Jesus is the Jesus of the Apocalypse, seated on His 
eschatological throne during Judgement Day. And the Faustian Jesus is the Jesus 
of Jesuit exercises, of dogma’s and papal infallibility. Magian thinkers such as 
Paul and Augustine, Spengler argues, would reject all contemporary Christian 
theology as either incomprehensible or erroneous (II, p. 68). Faustian 
Enlightenment is anything but tolerant, for on closer inspection Faustian morality 
claims tolerance only for itself. Thus, during the Faustian era, the peaceful 
morality of Jesus (I, p. 441) was re-casted into a moral imperative, imposing itself 
upon everyone. While Christian morality initially directed itself only to those who 
wanted to accept this gift of grace (so that Magian preachers were like Magian 
physicians, offering their spiritual arcana to the willing), Faustian morality is like 
enforced vaccination. We may likewise distinguish three forms of atheism, 
Spengler argues: Apollonian, Magian and Faustian (I, p. 530). While Apollonian 
atheism is joyous and witty, Magian atheism is iconoclastic, and Faustian atheism 
is dogmatic and intolerant.  
For Spengler, the early history of Christianity reflects the transition of 
Magian (i.e. anti-Apollonian) culture to Magian civilisation. Jesus himself 
addressed a small-scale provincial audience of villagers and itinerant workers, 




but the bigger world of Apollonian civilisation filled him with contempt. The 
spirit of megapolitan cities was completely alien to him, this preacher from 
Palestine, and the Apocalyptic idea alone was real to him. The fishermen from 
Galilee lived far removed from Hellenism, Emperors, circuses and urban noise. 
Yet, these two incompatible worlds suddenly collide in one of the most 
compelling Biblical scenes: Jesus before Pilate. It is a clash between Apocalyptic 
(i.e. Magian) truth and Apollonian reality. Both worlds are profoundly suspicious 
and hostile to each other. Jesus’ statement that his Kingdom is not of this 
(Apollonian) world means that we have to make a choice: it is Apollonian politics 
or Magian religion, the one or the other. Such a phrase needs no glosses, Spengler 
argues. For Magian believers, worldly achievements are without lasting value.  
Two Jesuses can be encountered in the New Testament. On the one hand 
the ambulant preacher, equipped with sayings and proverbs, especially 
addressing the lower, powerless classes, advising them on how to survive 
Apollonian tyranny and conveying unreserved contempt for Apollonian 
architecture and politics (One cannot serve two master; Whenever someone 
harasses you, turn your other cheek towards him; Give unto Caesar what is 
Caesar’s; Be patient, only the salvation of the soul is what really matters; Give 
no heed to riches or poverty; Do not be anxious about tomorrow; etc.). On the 
other hand, we witness the Magian Jesus, proclaiming the dawn of the new, post-
Apollonian age, the advent of heavenly envoys, the last judgement, a new heaven, 
a new Jerusalem, betokening a world-change: the end of the present Aeon and the 
ascension of the redeemed Redeemer. Thus, on the one hand, we read about his 
teachings, on the other hand, we read tidings of Him. The itinerant anti-
Apollonian teacher becomes the Arisen: a Magian, Apocalyptic figure. The 
apostles themselves were simple folk frequenting the Temple, but John and Paul 
transformed the tale of Jesus into a Magian drama, and the whole world was ready 
to respond to their apocalyptic message.  
As Spengler phrases it, a strange excitement ran through the Aramaean 
countryside (comparable to what the Germanic world experienced around 1000): 
the awakening of the Magian soul. A moment of arousal, implying that existing 
reality suddenly lost its import. While Jesus had wandered from village to village, 
Paul brought the message to the cities of the West, to Corinth and Rome. While 
the synoptic gospels are predominantly about the anti-Apollonian Jesus (Jesus the 
Cynic, if you like), the gospel of John and the epistles of Paul are predominantly 
about the Magian Jesus, breathing the atmosphere of the world-cavern. The 
Gospel of John suddenly introduces the trinity concept, moreover, revealing that 
Jesus (λόγος) is only the second envoy, not the final revelation, for He is to be 
followed by the Comforter: an astounding Magian doctrine, proclaimed by Jesus 
himself, the final motif of this enigmatic book. What is unveiled here, quite 
abruptly, is the Magian faith concerning the coming of a new aeon, symbolised 
by the eye and the letter, giving rise to mysticism and scholasticism and 
proclaiming the return of the soul to God. This Magian vision is further 
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developed, through the systematic transvaluation of the texts of Plato and 
Aristotle, by Plotinus, Porphyry and other Magian thinkers.  
With the phrase “Give unto Caesar what is Caesar’s”, Jesus distances 
himself from the arch symbol of Apollonian economy: the coin (II, p. 610), a 
beautiful, spherical body, a merger of matter (gold, silver, nickel) and form (the 
imprint: a symbol, a stamp). While rural economy was basically barter, the 
Apollonian city was a money market, where life evolved under high tension. In 
Apollonian cities, slaves were likewise bodies treated as capital. When Jesus 
announces the destruction of urban architecture (Mark 13), this event will not 
primarily be caused by active demolishment. The envisioned fall of Apollonian 
cities was prepared by abandonment, depopulation and self-destruction. The 
archetypal Magian symbol in the domain of finance and economics is the 
treasure, preferable consisting of precious stones, and preferably hidden in a 
secret cave, conveying a static idea of wealth, completely antithetical to the 
Faustian (dynamical) style of money-making, which is based on credit, 
investments and exponential growth. The Faustian relationship vis-à-vis gold is 
articulated by Ibsen’s Übermensch John Gabriel Borkman, tormented by the 
sound of gold hidden in the mountains, idly lying in wait for a goldrush: a 
Faustian phenomenon pur sang, thematised by both Wagner and Marx. The 
Faustian principle entails a transition from a static to a dynamic (expansive) 
economy, exemplified by the Faustian firm.  
While Apollonian wealth was associated with contemplation, and 
Magian wealth with magical tricks (allowing poor provincials to become 
exceptionally rich urbanites overnight), Faustian wealth is closely related with 
technological inventions, with machines, with intercontinental travel and an 
exponential increase of production. Faustian money is not a coin, but a function, 
an upward curve. Likewise, Faustian steamers are mobile cities, travelling across 
oceans (II, p. 630), mobilis in mobile (I, p. 213). The first Faustian machines were 
already envisioned by late-medieval Gothic monks in their monastic cells (similar 
to Faust’s study in Faust I), but Faustian civilisation eventually entails a rigorous 
transformation of the world (as in Faust II: I, p. 557), giving rise to three key 
Faustian figures: the entrepreneur, the factory worker and the engineer. While the 
entrepreneur is the owner, and the worker the servant, the engineer is the “priest” 
of the machine. But the true “Herrin” (II, p. 634) of Faustian civilisation is the 
machine itself.  
Nowadays, machines are becoming increasingly less human, however, 
increasingly ascetic and esoteric, adorning the earth in a web of interactions (II, 
p. 630), giving rise to global networks of high finance. According to Spengler, 
the Faustian metropolis is inherently irreligious (I, p. 531). An interesting 
characteristic of civilisation, therefore, – and this includes Faustian civilisation –
is what Spengler refers to as “second religiousness” (“zweite Religiosität”, II 
382). After Enlightenment, rationalism and materialism, religiousness 
unexpectedly resurges once more (e.g. Swedenborg’s rational mysticism). This 




explains why Faustian civilisation is not only the era of industrialised warfare, 
but also of Lourdes, Fatima and immaculate conception. 
The profile of these three cultural styles may also be discerned in the 
history of writing. Apollonian culture tended not to pay much attention to written 
documents, favouring spoked language over written materials. The handwritings 
of philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle were not considered a relic. This stood 
in sharp contrast with the veneration of sacred script (as the word of God) in 
Magian culture. In canonical documents, Magian scholars were searching for 
secret indications and revelations, e.g. the cabbalistic obsession with letters and 
numbers. For Magian thinkers, the Faustian egocentric concept of intellectual 
property and copyright would have been absurd, because it is the spirit who elects 
its authors (II, p. 303), while inspiration was seen as a gift of grace. At first glance, 
this veneration for ancient script was also adopted by Faustian culture, and a 
gothic illuminated book of gospels looked like a little cathedral. A typical 
Faustian invention, however, was book printing, Spengler argues. He sees a 
definite connection between gunpowder and printing, moreover, between printed 
books and guns, and the Faustian printing press resulted in a bombardment of 
readers by intellectual artillery. During the 19th and 20th century, an intimate 
relationship evolved between warfare and the press. Faustian civilisation gives 
rise to a third language type, besides the scholastic and courtly idioms of 
monastery and castle, namely the language of the urban bourgeoisie: utilitarian, 
megapolitan, intelligent, practical and precise, culminating in stenography as a 
writing technique employed in offices and companies.  
Although Spengler notably focusses on Apollonian, Magian and Faustian 
culture, he aims to develop a global rather than a Euro-centric view of history, 
encompassing all continents. As to Chinese culture, for instance, Spengler argues 
that its basic symbol is the way, but now conceived as Tao. The Chinese way 
wanders through the world, and its space experience is reflected in Chinese 
architecture, which is basically garden architecture, with hills, canals, ponds, 
stones, roofs, gates and bridges in various positions. The world is a garden, but a 
Chinese garden, e.g. a palace garden, a forbidden garden, a park-scape where 
garden design, biology, psychology, sculpture and architecture come together. 
This is also noticeable in Chinese painting, with its attention to ornament and 
detail. The Russian symbol is different again, Spengler argues: the limitless plain, 
from which a wooden church with multiple domes suddenly arises. Spengler is 
also fascinated by Aztec civilisation, with its highways and multi-lingual 
population. The Aztec city of Tenochtitlan was comparable to Augustinian Rome, 
he argues. Yet the development of Aztec civilisation was brutally and deplorably 
disrupted by Faustian expansionism. 
It is the task of philosophy to articulate the principle of a particular culture 
in a concise and comprehensive manner, but this does not mean that philosophy 
is always up to its task. Notably during civilisation, philosophy tends to regress 
into an academic specialty. By philosophy, Spengler means “effective 
philosophy”, not academic trifling. At its highest, philosophy may absorb the 
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entire content of an epoch, Spengler argues, realising it within itself and then 
passing it over to be developed further: a role played by Hegel for instance. 
Preferably, philosophers should not be university professors, however. Rather, 
they should be politicians, managers, organisers, like Bonaventura, Cusanus or 
Leibniz, individuals with a real standing in actual life, intervening effectively in 
higher politics, or advancing the development of technology with their 
compelling ideas. Spengler considers it impossible to be a genuine philosopher 
without a solid awareness of what is happening in research areas such as 
mathematics, physics and governance science. We must not confuse philosophy 
with lecture-room jargon. For Spengler, notably Nietzsche failed as a philosopher 
because he was too much given to romantic “Schwärmerei” (I, p. 45, p. 444, p 
446), withdrawing into his private world of words and images: too much of a 
Romantic to face the real-life challenges of metropolitan existence. Nietzsche 
was exceptionally weak in mathematics (I, p. 472), while given to dramatization 
and absorbed in inner experience, so that his aphorisms failed to achieve what he 
himself referred to as “der großen Stil des Denkens” (I, p. 472). Even in his own 
field, philology, he only knew the elite ancient world of bookish existence, and 
despised and feared the real practical world (I, p. 32), both in antiquity and in his 
own epoch. The real Rome, the city of masons and engineers, was beyond his 
comprehension. This compared unfavourably with the impact of precisely those 
Christian thinkers “grand style” (“Christen großen Stils”) whom he despised so 
much, but who were actually far superior to him, such as Luther, Loyola, Teresa 
of Ávila or Pascal. For Spengler, even George Bernard Shaw was a more 
important philosopher than Nietzsche, because he realised that the Faustian 
Übermensch was exemplified by multimillionaires and industrial tycoons (I, p. 
480), men of action with a global impact, whilst Nietzsche himself still associated 
the will to power with Renaissance daggers and poison.  
Philosophy begins as metaphysics, Spengler argues (I, p. 471). 
Subsequently, as culture evolves into civilisation, philosophy becomes 
increasingly urban and self-critical, until it finally reaches its ethical period, in 
which megapolitan existence become problematic for itself, while thinking 
becomes a profession (I, p. 474). We notice a similar evolution in drama: from 
staging profound insights via episodes of self-criticism, diatribes and propaganda 
(p. 463) towards mere moralising debate. A similar development affects gender 
relationships. While Dionysian women were dangerous, self-sufficient nomads, 
Apollonian women were matrons forced into passivity, sitting in front of their 
looms, waiting for their husbands to return. The Magian woman is a powerful 
mother, who reigns the splendid cavern-world via her sons. Finally, during 
Faustian civilisation, Spengler argues, the battle of the sexes eventually gives the 
floor to the emancipated woman of Ibsen’s dramas, to American women and 
Parisiennes: professional women, metropolitan nomads who fully belong to 
themselves again.   
Let this suffice as a summary of Spengler’s views. Although Spengler 
counts as a prominent spokesman, the styles-of-thinking concept is not the work 




of one particular author. Various thinkers – e.g. Carl Gustav Jung, Gaston 
Bachelard, Jan Hendrik van den Berg, Michel Foucault, Peter Sloterdijk – 
contributed to its elaboration, and the latter actually based his Sphären-project 
explicitly on Spengler (Sloterdijk 1998; 1999; 2004). There are important 
predecessors, moreover, such as Kant, Hegel and Husserl. We are dealing with a 
tradition, albeit without name; a school of thought, without any formal status. 
Thus, this study is not meant as a commentary on the work of one particular 
author. Following in the footsteps of this tradition, my aim is rather to contribute 
to the development of the style-of-thinking concept as such.  
 
 
§ 5. Kant’s introduction 
 
One of the key precursors of the styles-of-thinking concept is Immanuel Kant 
(1724 - 1804). In the foreword of the second edition of Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781/1975), published in 1787, he discusses two historical turning points, where 
decisive insights emerged that fundamentally changed the established way of 
thinking (Denkart), enabling completely new forms of intellectual inquiry. The 
first “revolution” came about five centuries BC in ancient Greece, Kant argues, 
making Greek (Euclidean) mathematics possible. Traditional (artisanal) 
mathematics consisted in applying sets of rules whose validity had been proven 
in practice. Greek mathematicians introduced the concept of rigorous 
mathematical demonstration. This idea emerged more or less simultaneously at 
different locations, independently, and was introduced by Thales in the East and 
by Pythagoras in the West. Thales was able to prove that the angle of a triangle 
defined by a semi-circle is a right angle. This insight was not dependent on 
empirical perception or practical experience, and the right angle was not 
approximately, but exactly 90˚. Carpenters, surveyors and architects had been 
aware of Pythagoras’s theorem, of course, but as a rule of thumb. Now, this 
theorem becomes an element in a whole edifice. An abstract formula is a priori 
valid, independent of empirical confirmation. A relationship between lines (3: 4: 
5) is converted into a relationship between surfaces (32 + 42 = 52), a mathematical 
operation undertaken by Apollonian reason. It exemplifies a change in style of 
thinking, an epistemological rupture between practical experience and 
Apollonian geometry.  
 At first, this intellectual practice remained unwritten. Masters and 
students devoted themselves to mathematical exercises verbally and interactively, 
playing (as it were) with sticks and pebbles in the sand. In the context of these 
academic intellectual practices, a new science developed. When Euclid composed 
his famous handbook entitled Στοιχεῖα (“Elements”, circa 300 BC) it was a 
systematic summary of the results of the intellectual work of generations. How 
should we envision the beginning of this new mathematics? How did Greek 
mathematicians at a certain point discover this royal road leading to true (i.e. 
Apollonian) knowledge? According to Kant, we cannot answer this question with 
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certainty because this chapter from history is too sparsely documented. Maybe, 
“someone” (someone like Thales or Pythagoras) experienced a sudden, decisive 
illumination, Kant suggests. Suddenly, someone had an enlightening experience 
(“ging ein Licht auf”, p. 22), and a whole world of possibilities “lighted up”. 
Where predecessors and contemporaries were still groping in darkness (Kant here 
uses the phrase “bloßes Herumtappen”), a great mind was apparently able to take 
the first decisive step. And in this first step, the whole of Greek mathematics was 
already implied and outlined. Everything else, all the thirteen books of Euclidean 
mathematics, was basically elaboration – more geometrico. The one decisive step 
was the insight that we should not derive mathematical propositions from 
practical experience, but that we should rather build on an a priori understanding 
of what a line, a surface, a triangle or a circle is. Humans do not dwell in an 
empirical environment alone. Human cognition adds a whole dimension of 
intelligibility to our world of practical experience. And it is here that 
mathematical reasoning proceeds and feels at home.  
 Kant locates a second moment of revelation at the beginning of 
modernity, represented by researchers such as Galileo (mechanics), Torricelli 
(statics) and Stahl (chemistry). They also were suddenly enlightened, Kant 
argues. They also fell under the sway of a fundamental (and fundamentally new) 
insight: the insight that science, despite its empirical moment, must be regarded 
as an experimental, but not (strictly speaking) as an empirical endeavour. 
Deduction is at least as important as induction. The decisive insight of the new 
style of thinking is the idea of conducting an experiment: putting your ideas to 
the test. The researchers in question understand, according to Kant, that human 
reason is actively present in empirical objectivity, that reason encounters itself in 
its concepts, models, experimental designs, and so on. Experimental researchers 
analyse the outcomes of a rational practice of intervention.  
 This was different in antiquity. Greek scientists thought and acted κατά 
φύσιν, they adjusted themselves to nature. Their Apollonian theories were 
expected to reflect the harmonic structure of the cosmos. Now, a dramatic turn 
occurs. Human thinking it no longer oriented towards nature, but forces nature to 
manifest itself in accordance with a format that is determined by the investigator. 
Experimentation means active perception, preceded by intervention, setting the 
conditions, defining the scene. That, according to Kant, is the basic idea, the 
basic, quasi-self-evident conviction, the fundamental a priori of the new 
(Faustian) style. Instead of observing nature in a passive manner, humans now 
force nature, in the context of an experiment, to answer our questions. The natural 
scientist is no longer a student who patiently follows nature’s moves, listening to 
what nature may offer on her own accord, but rather a judge who forces nature to 
respond. This is the basic revolution taking place during the dawn of modernity, 
and thanks to this crucial insight, centuries of groping around finally give way to 
real (Faustian) science, so that the royal road to true knowledge is opened up. In 
this understanding, in this disruptive beginning, everything else is already 
decided and anticipated. All the rest is merely working through. Scientific 




observation is guided by a grounding idea which determines how objectivity is 
constituted and how observations are made. In Critique of Pure Reason, however, 
the process of knowledge production is still conceived as something abstract and 
pure, independent of actuality and historicity. This dramatically changes in the 
work of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) who envisions the 
development and self-edification of consciousness in the course of history.   
  
  
§ 6. Hegelian dialectics 
 
Hegel sees the history of consciousness as a succession of stages (1807/1970). 
Every stage has a style and profile of its own. These stages do not see themselves 
as mere moments or episodes, of course. Rather, they tend to see themselves as 
final, and that is a good thing, because a style of thinking has to take itself very 
seriously in order to develop its strengths to the full. It is the philosopher who 
discerns dialectical patterns emerging in the history of thought and who 
recognises that every stage is a moment (both necessary and temporary) in a grand 
dialectical unfolding. The spirit patiently works through all these modes and 
episodes of thinking: an immense intellectual achievement. Looking back on 
history, we only tend to notice brief summaries of the abundant cultural richness 
which these styles of thinking managed to produce. 
Currently, we are witnessing another moment of transition, the coming 
into existence of a new era (Hegel 1807/1970, p. 18). The spirit is abandoning the 
world it had hitherto inhabited and is preparing the ground for a real 
transformation, a qualitative leap. The symptoms and forebodings of this 
widespread upheaval are omnipresent. A new daybreak is about to illuminate the 
features of a renewed world. Initially, new ways of thinking arrive on the scene 
in a fragile and unfinished form. While the wealth of previous experience is still 
present, the appearance of the new style seems unarticulated and unimpressive. 
It still lacks general intelligibility and seems an esoteric practice, in which only a 
limited number of individuals are actively involved (1807/1970, p. 19). It remains 
a carefully guarded, sectarian possession, as only the grounding concept has 
emerged, which still needs to be elaborated. Only a limited number of adepts are 
captured by it, literally, for, as Hegel emphasises, in the term concept (Begriff), 
the verb greifen (to capture) resonates. This concept sets them apart from others, 
from the rest of humanity, as a sect, cultivating inwardness. In the early stage, the 
new idea is extremely vulnerable. It lacks precision and its possibilities have not 
been fully realised. Yet, in due course, the novum, the new concept will become 
increasingly exoteric: accessible and convincing to everyone, affecting 
everybody, more or less (p. 20), unfolding into a highway of thinking, readily 
available for everyone to use. The new concept will also provide guidance to 
scientific research, which will henceforward be conducted in a completely new 
manner, on the basis of this new grounding idea.  
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 Thus, Hegel is a crucial protagonist of the style-of-thinking concept. 
Research practices are guided by an allegedly self-evident conviction. This 
conviction or grounding concept has to be developed into a self-conscious idea, 
giving rise to an elaborated system of thinking, based on a pervasive truth and on 
a logic of its own. As long as a certain style of thinking, a certain mode of 
explaining maintains its dominant position, consciousness is primarily involved 
in a conversation with itself as it were (thinking as Selbstbefriedigung, a 
Selbstgespräch mit sich, 1807/1970, p. 134). The system clings to its guiding 
idea, fearing the new truth that already announces itself on the horizon, in the 
folds and margins of mainstream discourse, but as negativity, as a destructive 
intellectual epidemic, whose positive moment still has to be developed. 
Eventually, the persuasive force of the new idea will overcome most of the 
resistance, and the new spirit will expand into a productive force. Initially critical 
and negative, it will assume responsibility for the whole world and will learn how 
to realise and maintain itself, taking possession of the socio-cultural landscape. 
Then, the grounding idea has succeeded in realising itself, feeling securely at 
home in reality. The grounding idea has upgraded the socio-cultural ambiance. In 
actual reality, the new rationality is firmly at work (1807/1970, p. 179). A basic 
congruence has been established between being and thinking.  
 Tensions and conflicts will continue to erupt, of course, but at this stage 
they are often due to a lack of self-understanding and self-reflection. 
Enlightenment, for instance, attacks religion as a form of superstition and self-
deception, as something utterly irrational, thereby making two fatal mistakes. 
First of all, it obfuscates that religion is actually an intellectual practice, involving 
immense amounts of intellectual labour. Infected by the same inquisitive spirit, 
modern religious institutions are investing increasing amounts of time and 
resources in research. Moreover, Enlightenment itself is not a purely rational 
endeavour either, far from it. Enlightenment is fuelled by a grounding idea: the 
Faustian Will to power. Enlightenment itself is a religion more or less, an 
ideology of you like, bent on eliminating its ideological rivals, so that appeals to 
“rationality” and “criticism” function as powerful instruments of exclusion, as 
instances of violence, meant to silence rival voices. It is the vocation of 
philosophy to discern the grounding idea at work in such a struggle.  
 The transition Hegel is referring to, is the transformation and expansion 
of Faustian thinking from an esoteric practice (conducted in monasteries, 
workshops, private laboratories, etc.) into a global principle of change, a force on 
the global scale of world civilisation. Once the resistance of the final remnants of 
the Magian mindset has been broken, the new style reveals its true form. Now it 
becomes clear that, for Faustian thinking, the world has only instrumental value, 
and should be exploited by “autonomous” individuals. Humans themselves 
likewise fall prey to exploitation and the Will to power: Faustian individuals use 
others and are themselves exploited by others (“1807/1970, p. 415).  
 
 





 In the course of his oeuvre, Hegel describes a series of styles. First of all, 
archaic thinking. By means of certain words and gestures, shamans try to implore 
the inscrutable powers of nature and to move them to pliability, hypnotising 
nature as it were (Hegel 1969). It is a powerlessness form of power over nature. 
Cults corresponding to this form of religious experience usually result in 
collective states of stupor or frenzy. 
 But then the spirit awakens. In ancient Egypt, according to Hegel (1969), 
the mind becomes an architect. Egyptian architecture produces immense crystals: 
geometrical structures consisting of straight lines and smooth surfaces, such as 
pyramids and obelisks. A lifeless architecture, whose buildings are not built for 
the living.  
 Ancient Greek religion is the religion of beauty (Hegel 1969). At a certain 
point, Dionysian frenzy gives way to the god of the philosophers: the god of the 
heavenly spheres. The spherical god of Parmenides and Plato suddenly takes the 
floor. Apollonian religious experience expresses itself in spherical geometric 
thinking: a pre-eminently scientific style of thinking, based on ancient Greek 
geometry. And when Plato, in his dialogue Politeia (1930/1999), outlines the 
contours of an “ideal” state, he actually captures the grounding idea of Apollonian 
thinking: the geometrical spirit of his era.  
 Faustian thinking is extensively discussed in Hegel’s oeuvre. Faust 
himself is the self-conscious, scientific individual who distances himself from 
established knowledge (1807/1970, p. 270). Goethe’s Faust, according to Hegel, 
stages the conflict between an ambitious but disappointed scholar on the one hand 
and accepted knowledge on the other, between discontent in established discourse 
and “die Lebendigkeit des Weltlebens”. In Faust’s view, existing discourse falls 
short because it does not grant us any real power, but rather confines us to the 
scriptorium, the library. It is an impotent form of knowing and Faust desperately 
wants “hinaus”. He desires to conquer the world, as an ersatz for traditional 
scholarship (i.e. Magian book reading and Apollonian contemplation). Hegel 
analyses the birth of Faustian thinking in the dialectic of Master and Servant, 
which will be discussed below, in the chapter devoted to Faustian thinking. 
 Hegel (1970) distinguishes three types of textual historical sources. First 
of all, sources written by authors who share the spirit of the time in which the 
events took place. Secondly, sources composed by learned scholars to whom this 
no longer applies. Now, there is a contrast between the zeitgeist of the historians 
themselves and the spirit of the times recorded by them. Past events are now often 
criticised from a normative or political perspective. Their ideals and values are 
negated. The third form of history, however, is the philosophical one. Although 
historical philosophers are considering epochs whose spirit they no longer share, 
they nonetheless aim to capture the idea at work in the recorded events. A basic 
logic can be discerned, a basic “energy” of history, and the aim of philosophy is 
to come to terms with it. Although the logic thus disclosed represents a different 
stage in the history of reason, we can still recognise the inherent consistency of 
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its grounding idea. But this requires a lot of work. We have to traverse a whole 
historical field in order to determine the guiding idea that allows us to 
contextualise events.    
 According to Hegel, world history moves in one direction: from East to 
West (1970, p. 134), following the sun’s trajectory as it were, meandering and 
bifurcating like a grand river of ideas. The history of thinking began in the East, 
in China and India, following complicated pathways through Persia and 
Mesopotamia, Egypt and the Middle East, and spreading into Greece and Italy, 
from where medieval Europa was reached. During the Faustian era, the centre of 
gravity shifted towards North-Western Europe, migrating from there to the 
United States.2 Whereas the Dionysian principle originated in the East, as 
Euripides’ Bacchae explicitly indicates, Apollonian thinking arose in ancient 
Greece. The subsequent style of thinking, equalling what Spengler refers to as 
Magian thinking, was at home in the Roman empire and in Byzantine and Islamic 
civilisations, while Faustian culture reflects a Germanic mindset. Although Hegel 
does not use Spengler’s labels (Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian, Faustian), their 
profiles are easily recognisable in Hegel’s characterisations.   
 To characterise the Dionysian (“oriental”) mindset, Hegel often uses the 
word “Taumel” (furor, µανία, frenzy). The cults of the great oriental goddesses 
(Astarte, Kybele, Diana of Ephesus) adhere to the principle of losing oneself, of 
being transported into sensual, sexual (Dionysian) frenzy (p. 238). In Greece, 
Hegel argues, this principle incarnated in the bigender deity Dionysus, 
accompanied by a train of female devotees. Euripides’ Bacchae provides an 
exemplification of this principle κατ’ ἐξοχήν, although we may also recognize it 
in Richard Wagner’s Parsifal (the Kundry persona) and in Richard Strauss’ 
Salome. Frenzy in the aesthetic and religious domain is connected with despotism 
in the political domain.  
 The Apollonian (“Greek”) concept of harmony and stability established 
itself in collision with Dionysian disruption coming in from the East, Hegel 
argues. In imperial Rome, the Pantheon (1970, p. 139) represented a moment of 
transition, as a polytheistic assembly hall was transformed into a monotheistic 
dome, thereby representing the dawn of what Spengler refers to as the Magian 
era. This transition, the eruption of Magian thinking, occurred precisely when 
ancient (Apollonian) civilisation reached its apex and the Roman world became 
an Empire. From now on, Hegel argues (concurrent with the principle of Magian 
thinking outlined above), a divide was introduced between the worldly and the 
spiritual, between mundane reality and the Kingdom of God. Yet, when Julius 
Caesar decided to turn his attention the North-Western Europe, he was already 
looking ahead to a future epoch, grounding the theatre where Germanic (Faustian) 
                                                             
2 Here again, we notice a movement from East to West, from East Coast to West Coast, 
one might add. And in the course of the 21st century, China is likely to become the next 
station of thinking, so that history has moved full circle. But this will be addressed more 
fully in the final chapter. 




culture was to evolve: in regions which were destined to become the centre of 
world history from the “high” Middle Ages onwards (p. 379). 
 Besides the (westward) direction of cultural proliferation, what is also 
important is the manner in which cultures spread. The spread of a particular style 
of thinking is not a gradual, continuous process, but rather something which 
unfolds in a wave-like manner, Hegel argues. The term Renaissance for instance 
literally refers to a resurge of Apollonian thinking which, according to Hegel, is 
intimately linked with the rediscovery of Plato in Western Europe, in the wake of 
the Fall of Byzantium. Hegel also emphasises the importance of repetition (p. 
380). Through repetition, something which at first may seem an accidental 
deviance (triggering resistance), is destined to become increasingly plausible and 
real. Step by step, by insisting on it, time and again, a new idea is bound to 
become something inevitable, something which becomes confirmed by 
subsequent events (p. 380). Like Rome and Paris, a style of thinking is not 
produced in a single day, and eventually, scepticism and negativity will be 
overcome by affirmation and adoption.  
 According to Hegel (1970), the spread of what Spengler refers to as 
Magian thinking entails a particular dialectics of its own. The initial starting point 
(the first moment) is a paradisiacal situation, when all the world is a park. The 
disruptive event, the fall from grace, however, is an inevitable turn. An 
irreconcilable rupture now unfolds between the mundane and the divine. Sacred, 
enchanted, mysterious spaces are created (e.g. domes, magical gardens, 
hermitages) where the divine can already be experienced and enjoyed under 
earthly conditions.  
 A different dynamic applies to the spread of what Spengler refers to as 
Faustian culture. Now, the guiding spirit of history is forced to determine its own 
conditions, Hegel argues, and to actively transform its environment. Enchantment 
is replaced by labour, and divine rapture by a state of reason and justice. The 
(initially “Magian”) concept of the fall becomes incorporated in a Faustian 
dialectic, where it assumes a positive function. The fall from grace necessitates 
activity and labour, thereby unleashing history as a long-lasting effort of the spirit 
towards self-edification (p. 389). The spirit needs negativity and resistance to 
engage in this process of self-production.  
 Visiting a cathedral in a philosophical manner (via κατάσκοπειν) implies 
that we see this immense artwork (this total work of art) as a concrete affirmative 
answer to a challenging conflict. A cathedral exemplifies the dialectical concept 
of ἐνέργεια (realisation, actualisation) on a rather high level of complexity and 
elevation. The original idea is realised in such a way that chronic resistance (e.g. 
the principle of gravity) is overcome via relentless activity. The natural, cyclical 
flow of thing is interrupted by an upward trend. The cathedral negates the 
(decidedly “Magian”) idea that there is nothing new under the sun.     
 Hegel’s philosophy of history presents a comprehensive portrayal of 
what Spengler refers to as the transition from Magian to Faustian thinking. With 
remarkable frankness (παρρησία, p. 395), Hegel tells us, Jesus preached his 
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message of withdrawal from all worldly ties, looking upon existing reality and its 
laws, rules and values with utter indifference. The validity of the worldly 
(“Apollonian”) principle was nullified. In his revolutionary speeches, Jesus 
summons his audience to follow him in his abrupt transvaluation of all values. 
From now on, the spirit withdraws from the mundane world and can only be 
encountered within the Christian community, the Christian church. Here, the 
Kingdom of God maintains itself in a counter-world. In Islam, Hegel tells us, the 
devotion to the One entails an even more radical negation of all otherness. 
Although the true faith adorns itself in beauty and knowledge, all other forms of 
beauty and knowledge are relentlessly eliminated.  
 Finally, we recognise what Spengler refers to as the Faustian principle in 
Hegel’s portrayal of the actual realisation of Christianity, i.e. the enormous task 
of creating a Christian world, thereby sublating the divide between the spiritual 
and the mundane. This requires a different (Faustian) attitude, for which, 
according to Hegel, the Germanic people of the North were destined to become 
the carriers. On the individual level, it entails a fierce internal struggle (“Kampf 
mit sich selbst”) between duty and desire, between reason and passion. For Hegel, 
the Crusades may count as the decisive turning point between Magian and 
Faustian thinking (“Punkt der Umkehrung”). From now on, the West shifts its 
focus of attention and begins to invest its (Faustian) energy in the occidental 
realm. In Southern France, the campaign against Catharism, with its fanatical 
(“schwärmerisch”) ideas of purity, led by Saint Dominic and his order of 
Dominicans, was actually a struggle of Faustian Christianity against a tenacious 
reviving version of Magian Christianity.  
 Faustian scientific activity started in theology, resulting in the elaborate 
theoretical edifices of scholasticism. Here again, mendicant orders played a 
decisive role as “spiritual armies”. Faustian thinking became the dominant 
principle in architecture (cathedrals), in theology (scholasticism), but also in 
politics, resulting in the drive towards the establishment of nation states. Hegel 
especially mentions “Machiavelli’s celebrated work The Prince” in this respect. 
Although it has often been thrown aside in contempt, Hegel argues, a profound 
consciousness of the necessity of the formation of modern states is at work here, 
and the author establishes the principles on which a state can be founded, given 
the circumstances of the times. The means which he proposes are the only 
efficient ones, and perfectly justifiable, as the feudal nobility, whose power was 
to be subdued, could not be handled in any other way. No progress in politics 
without relentless struggle.  
 According to the Faustian principle, humanity should not be freed from 
labour and servitude (“aus der Knechtschaft”), but rather through labour and 
servitude (“durch die Knechtschaft”). Discipline can have a liberating, 
emancipatory impact. It is an indispensable moment in the process of self-
edification of the Servant struggling against the Master.  
 An important step in intellectual history was the discovery of the printing 
press as the “desideratum of the age”. Intellectual needs and technological 




innovation mutually stimulate one another, Hegel argues. Rather than seeing 
technology as either cause or effect, Hegel’s philosophy of technology 
emphasises a dynamic of entgegenkommen between the intellectual and the 
technical (1970, p. 490). The intellectual and the technological are mutually 
affirmative and responsive to one another: technical applications make their 
appearance when their urgency is experienced (“das Technische findet sich ein, 
wenn das Bedürfnis vorhanden ist”, p. 491). And now, the Faustian break of day 
(“Morgenröte”) firmly announces itself. From this moment onward, Hegel 
argues, history has no other work to do than to actively build its principle into the 
world. Faustian thinking is destined to realise itself. Labour is no longer looked 
down upon with contempt, but is valued in an affirmative manner. Magic and 
contemplation (i.e. Magian thinking) give way to a new mode of thinking, which 
is active and explanatory (i.e. Faustian thinking, p. 522), giving rise to science as 
a system of causal laws. In the practical realm, duty and the will are now the 
crucial concepts and in politics, the French revolution was a Faustian event par 
excellence, as reality became drastically transformed and governed by rational 
thought (p. 529).  
 In short, in their understanding of history, Hegel and Spengler basically 
convey one and the same idea, as the two most important spokespersons of the 
style-of-thinking concept. But others have added to it as well. In the next section, 
the contributions of others authors will be discussed, starting with Nietzsche.   
      
 
§ 7. Other elaborations: Nietzsche, Husserl, Foucault and the 
sociological turn 
 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was already mentioned as an important 
precursor who, in Beyond Good and Evil (1980, KSA5, § 23) presented his own 
thinking as a “morphology” of the Will to Power. In The Birth of Tragedy, his 
first philosophical publication, written when he was still active as a philology 
professor, he distinguishes the Apollonian and the Dionysian style, concepts 
which he borrowed from Richard Wagner. The latter introduces them in his book 
Art and Revolution (1849, p. 10), but this conceptual pair also constituted a key 
topic in the discussions which evolved between the composer and the philosopher 
during the years of their collaboration (Magee 2000, p. 296; Zwart 2012). The 
Apollonian style aspires harmony, right measure, self-control and 
proportionality. The Dionysian counterpart, however, is characterized by a desire 
for transgression and ecstasy, for turbulence and excess. The Apollonian style is 
bent on individualisation, while the individual is bound to perish in Dionysian 
furor. However, as Nietzsche himself points out, these two concepts actually 
belong together; they reflect and complement each other – like ego and alter ego, 
like the right-handed and left-handed aspect of Greek culture. It was precisely in 
the chronic struggle with the Dionysian antagonist that the Apollonian style 
developed its profile. The Dionysian mentality is like the dark, diffuse 
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background against which the clear, Apollonian style stands out. The concept of 
the Dionysian becomes meaningful as the contesting, subverting “other” of the 
beautiful Apollonian hegemony. For Nietzsche, however, this struggle primarily 
pertains to the field of art. It is a chronic duality between two natural forces, 
manifesting themselves in two basic forms of art, namely (Apollonian) sculpture 
and (Dionysian) music (§ 1, p. 22). 
 Although Nietzsche’s distinction as such is highly valuable,3 his 
elaboration and interpretation of Wagner’s concept is nonetheless at odds with 
the style-of-thinking concept for various reasons. In the first place, Nietzsche 
focusses on one domain, namely art (contrasting sculpture with music) and seems 
to regard Greek culture either from the perspective of Apollonian sculpture or 
from the perspective of Dionysian music. But a style of thinking manifests itself 
in all domains, as we have seen. According to Nietzsche, sculpture is essentially 
Apollonian, while music is essentially Dionysian, but a styles-of-thinking 
approach rather suggests the very opposite, namely that there are Apollonian and 
Dionysian forms of sculpture, and Apollonian and Dionysian types of music. 
Pythagorean music, for example, with its desire to mimic the harmony of the 
spheres, was decidedly Apollonian, while Wagner’s total works of art stand out 
as sublime exemplifications and concretisations of the struggle between both 
principles, enacted under Faustian socio-cultural conditions. A similar struggle 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian principle can also be found in Greek 
politics, as well as in Greek physics, for example in the form of the struggle 
between the spherical (Apollonian) universe of Plato and Aristotle (the 
academics) and the (Dionysian) universe of the atomists. Moreover, from a 
styles-of-thinking perspective, we are not dealing with an “eternal” struggle, as 
Nietzsche phrases it, but with phenomena which pervade a particular culture 
during a certain period (ancient Greece). Modern (Faustian) art, for instance, can 
no longer be conceived in terms of a struggle between Apollonian and Dionysian 
forces. Whoever extrapolates a Greek problem to modern (Faustian) conditions, 
disavows the importance and disruptive significance of the Faustian principle, of 
which we will come to speak.  
 Perhaps Nietzsche, as a philologist, was too engaged with the world 
(more exactly: the words) of the ancient Greeks, paying too little attention to his 
own world and time. Significant in this respect is his own introduction to The 
Birth of Tragedy entitled “Attempt at self-criticism” (Versuch einer Selbstkritik) 
where he explains how the genesis of this book coincided with the Franco-
German war. While the Faustian principle was demonstrating its disruptive 
dominance, Nietzsche was wandering in the Alps, pondering over aesthetic 
problems in ancient Greece.4 He was briefly involved in the events, as a troubled 
                                                             
3 For Spengler, there is something comical in the figure of the timid, spectacled, 
bourgeois professor of philology, scion of a lineage of pastors, praising Dionysian 
frenzy. 
4 “Während die Donner der Schlacht von Wörth über Europa weggingen, saß der 
Grübler und Rätselfreund, dem die Vaterschaft dieses Buches zuteil ward, irgendwo in 




medical orderly, but proved unable to live up to this brief exposure to Faustian 
reality. Nevertheless, his way of reading, paying attention to phenomena of 
struggle and birth, and to the productivity of struggle, contain valuable 
contributions to the development of the styles-of-thinking concept. We will 
reconsider Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy below (§ 9), focusing on his 
understanding of Euripides.  
 Another important contributor to the styles-of-thinking concept is 
Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938). In 1935 he argued, in a famous lecture, that the 
European sciences (physics first and foremost) were facing a crisis, a statement 
that at first invokes amazement because, during the first decades of the 20th 
century, physics had actually been extremely successful. Relativity theory and 
quantum physics had been trailblazing, imaginative developments. Husserl’s 
crisis does not concern the achievements of science as such, however, but their 
meaning for human existence. Notably during the Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment, he argues, science had developed a pronounced moral profile. 
Science had contributed to the humanization of human existence. But now 
science had become neutral: applicable for both positive and negative purposes. 
In order to understand the full scope of this crisis, Husserl argued, we must return 
to the beginning, and he located the beginning of modern (Faustian) thinking in 
the work of Galileo. In this way we can grasp the basic, quasi-self-evident 
conviction, the “Selbstverständlichkeit” that motivated modern science and 
grounded a style of thought. This grounding conviction (seemingly self-evident) 
has become something obvious to us, but it was a remarkable and alarming insight 
when Galileo articulated it for the first time. We must rediscover its original 
strangeness as it were.  
 Husserl is not speaking about Galileo as a historical figure, however, as 
Husserl is not interested in concrete historical or biographical details. Galileo for 
him is an icon, a prototype, an advocate of a particular style of thinking, an 
inaugurator of this style. The basic idea introduced by Galileo is that we gain 
access to the world via mathematics. However, his mathematics had undergone a 
profound development. Traditional practices of measurement and calculation had 
always been adjusted towards the natural environment. Galileo’s mathematics, 
however, had become detached from its original world-orientation, its 
“Bodenständigkeit”. Pure mathematics was the result of a lengthy process of 
abstraction, giving rise to an axiomatic system that was subsequently applied to 
concrete phenomena. This allegedly “pure” science was driven by the will to 
dominate the earth. Applications of the new principle enabled a powerful 
mathematical grasp on things. Galileo forced reality to speak this new 
mathematical language.  
 To understand the current situation, conceived as a crisis, i.e. as a decisive 
moment, a turn, we must return to the beginning, Husserl argues, the original 
                                                             
einem Winkel der Alpen, sehr vergrübelt und verrätselt, folglich sehr bekümmert und 
unbekümmert zugleich, und schrieb seine Gedanken über die Griechen nieder” (1980, 
KSA 1, § 1, p. 9). 
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articulation of the basic conviction that inspired this style of thinking which, via 
the efforts of Galileo and others, managed to become the dominant style, the very 
style which Spengler characterised as “Faustian”. Via this step backwards, we 
can come to terms again with the primal conviction, in its original form, and we 
re-experience its boldness. Moreover, we will become sensitive to the violence 
entailed in this powerful, Faustian form of mathematics. 
 Another important contributor to the styles-of-thinking concept has been 
Michel Foucault (1926-1984). It may seem remarkable to move from Husserl to 
Foucault so easily, given the fact that Foucault, notably during the 1960s, 
emphatically rejected Husserl’s work. His Words and Things (1966) was actually 
meant are a polemics against Husserl. Yet, the styles-of-thinking concept remains 
a common ground they share, beyond their differences, although Foucault 
represents a completely different take. According to him, the history of thinking 
can be described in two ways: in the traditional manner, as the history of great 
authors (e.g. master thinkers and their epigones), but also along the lines of the 
archaeological method, namely as the history of anonymous discursive 
formations. In the latter case, the author’s status barely counts, and this already 
points to a difference with Husserl, who focusses on one particular individual, 
namely Galileo. For Foucault, however, Galileo’s voice was one among many, 
and all contemporary voices count as exemplifications of a particular style. 
Beyond the many disputes concerning specific issues arising among voices of a 
particular epoch, there is a common vocabulary, a common language.  
 Foucault is interested in discourse, rather than authors. Not he or she 
speaks, but it speaks (“es spricht”, “ça parle”), in the sense that we are spoken, 
and that discursive styles proliferate via us. This is how Foucault (1969) intends 
to describe history, by signalling the emergence and disappearance of discursive 
regularities and by analysing the discourse of a particular period with the help of 
remarkable changes in the ways in which reality is described, analysed and 
categorised. For an archaeologist, all potsherds or coins discovered in a particular 
layer are in principle equally interesting, and Foucault likewise assumes that in 
all texts or textual fragments belonging to a certain discursive formation, the same 
set of regularities (the same discursive style) can be discerned. Within a certain 
layer, all texts seem similar, while there are striking differences between the 
layers. That is: in the archives of knowledge, the archaeologist discerns 
stratifications. Within layers there is spontaneous unanimity, between layers 
abrupt discontinuities abound. There are ruptures in style, while the lingua franca 
of a cultural ecosystem may suddenly be eliminated. 
 Archaeology is a methodological ideal which Foucault not always fully 
realises in his studies (Zwart 1995). He often makes concessions in the sense that 
he does seem to pay special attention to prominent thinkers such as Socrates, 
Descartes, Bentham and Freud. Some textual fragments are more equal (more 
typical) than others, as it were. Thus, Foucault discovered a relatively unknown 
text from Jeremy Bentham about an architectural structure called the Panopticon, 
meant to facilitate surveillance in various social practices (in penitentiary and 




educational institutions, in psychiatric hospitals, in factories and so on). 
Subsequently, in a broad array of sources, well known and less well known, he 
discovers this same panoptic idea, as a very fundamental way of organising and 
monitoring the social realm. We may notice a basic congruence between the 
style-of-thinking approach and Foucault’s discursive archaeology. A particular 
event or document may serve as a moment of commencement, deserving special 
attention. Prominent authors are not seen as geniuses, but as seismographers of 
their era. In their texts, significant changes often become visible for the first time 
and are articulated in a clear and concise manner (clair et distinct as it were). 
 Besides philosophers, sociologists have also contributed to the styles-of-
thinking concept. Ludwig Fleck (1896-1961) has had an important role in 
propagating the concept of thinking style, especially among sociologists and 
historians of science. The publication in which he introduces the notion is a study 
dedicated to syphilis and the Wasserman test (1935/1979). All concepts in vogue 
during a certain period, according to Fleck, reflect the same style. A particular 
theory can only survive in a particular cultural environment if it is fashioned in 
accordance with this style. Style is a certain tendency or willingness to perceive 
the world in a certain way, a receptiveness to thoughts and concepts that are 
responsive to the prevailing style. Style is a collective phenomenon that depends 
on social reinforcement. Fleck’s study has decisively influenced Thomas Kuhn 
(1962), whose famous publication contributed to Fleck’s rediscovery, although 
Kuhn does not speak about style, but uses the term paradigm instead.  
 Although this line of research is certainly inspiring, the philosophical 
concept adopted in this monograph differs from the ideas of Fleck and Kuhn in a 
number of ways. The difference is first of all a matter of scale in the sense that 
the overarching Faustian style (for example) gives rise to a whole series of 
“paradigms” (styles in the sociological sense). Also, while Fleck and Kuhn focus 
on scientific research, the styles-of-thinking concept is considerably broader, as 
we have seen, involving all domains of culture. Finally, Fleck and Kuhn argue 
that almost if not all aspects of language and thinking should comply with the 
reigning paradigm. Our understanding of style is less restrictive. Even when the 
dominant style reaches its climax there is resistance, while elements of abandoned 
styles may temporarily resurge (as the return of the repressed) at a later time, 
under radically changed conditions. 
 Historian Alistair Crombie (1915-1996) also deserves to be mentioned in 
this respect, because he distinguishes six styles of thinking in the history of 
European science. Besides postulation (Greek Apollonian mathematics) and 
experimentation (Spengler’s Faustian style), he also distinguishes hypothetical 
modelling, taxonomy, probabilistic and statistical analysis and historical 
derivation. This approach was taken up by authors such as Ian Hacking 
(1982/2002; 1992) and Chunglin Kwa (2011). Starting point is the idea that 
various scientific ways of knowing have emerged and stabilised in the course of 
history, entailing particular methods, types of objects and criteria of truth 
(Sciortino 2017). The focus is on methods and techniques of scientific enquiry, 
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however, rather than on grounding ontologies, and on science and technology, 
rather than on the human lifeworld in the wider sense. Hacking (1992) lists a 
series of different uses of the term “style” in connection with science, ranging 
from fairly personal to increasingly general uses, such as the “Galilean” style, the 
“Newtonian” style, the style of a particular laboratory, the style of a social 
network, or thought collective, up to the style of a discursive formation (e.g. 
Foucault) or style in the Spenglerian sense. According to the “Spenglerian” 
approach, adopted in this study, a style of thinking is a fundamental and enduring 
way of being-in-the-world, allowing reality the emerge in a certain manner, not 
only discernible in research practices, but in all other realms of culture (art, 
politics, religion, sexuality, etc.) as well. Thus, whereas the Spenglerian concept 
is decidedly more comprehensive, we should acknowledge similarities as well, 
for instance when it comes to emphasising continuity between medieval 
experimentalism and modern experimental science (Crombie 1952/1959; 
Crombie 1953).  
 
 
§ 8. Methodology: discerning styles of thinking 
 
The ambition of the styles-of-thinking approach is to understand a particular 
epoch from within, to enter the tableau as it were, as an effort in retrieval. We 
need a point of access, e.g. an art work or a building, and in addition we need a 
guide, e.g. an author. Primary sources are produced by authors who were 
contemporaries, still sharing the same spirit and adhering to the same style of 
thinking, participating in the same cultural ambiance. In most sources, however, 
there is a tension between the world of the subject (the author) and the world in 
which the recorded events took place, as Hegel already pointed out (above).  
What exactly is it that we aim to recover? A particular mood, a particular 
experience? Yes, but ultimately, our aim is to discern the epoch’s guiding idea, 
its philosopheme, its grounding conviction: an a priori insight which develops 
into a full-fledged style. First, there is an initial moment when this guiding 
conviction is articulated in its original form, often in a secluded location (e.g. 
Plato’s garden, or the apostle’s cenacle). Subsequently, the philosopheme begins 
to spread, begins to realise itself, facing opposition, conflict and resistance. Its 
validity is challenged and questioned. Via this moment of negativity, however, 
the grounding idea will gain in precision, discreteness and strength. Finally, the 
basic conviction realises itself in a tangible, affirmative manner, giving rise to 
cities and landscapes, buildings and practices, artworks and experiments, 
institutions and schools, enabling and encouraging individuals to speak and act. 
The style of thinking is the “energy” of an epoch in the Aristotelian sense of 
ἐνέργεια, the idea that is actually at work, as an effective and activating source 
of inspiration. Its basic logic reveals itself in a drastic reorganisation of the socio-
cultural environment. It is the spirit (νοῦς) which governs the world during a 
particular period and by which this world is made, to some extent. The world 




becomes a theatre where the guiding principle is self-consciously enacted, and 
where it proliferates to verify its validity (its truth). Experiences of mismatch, 
insufficiency or frustration cannot refute the guiding principle as such. Rather 
they function as indications that some obstacles still have to be removed, that 
more effort is still required. The guiding, creative and affirmative principle will 
never be fully realised, however. Resistance will never completely subside. Even 
during periods of maximal dominance, other recessive (rival) principles remain 
active, as countervailing powers, visible in instances of recoil.  
Initially, the idea is allegedly pure, but also disconnected. It has to be 
adopted, both individually and collectively, to realise itself through human action, 
giving rise to contradictory experiences of success and failure. Yet, precisely 
when resistance seems eliminated and the final moment of full realisation seems 
at hand, a new, equally bold and disconcerting idea already announces itself.  
 The guiding idea, the spirit of the time, realises itself in particular 
practices, in specific events (such as political decisions or scientific discoveries) 
or in specific works of art. For us, they provide exemplifications of the guiding 
idea, points of access to explore the spirit of a particular epoch, allowing us to 
enter a particular ambiance and to explore it from within.  
A drama may play this function (Euripides’ Maenads as a window into 
the Dionysian world) or a building (the Pantheon as a window into Apollonian 
existence). Eventually, the guiding principle creates, governs and organises a 
whole world. To understand a particular epoch means to grasp its guiding 
organising thought. This guiding thought (initially quite abstract and diffuse) 
needs externality, resistance even, to realise itself, and to become increasingly 
discrete. In the confrontation with other ideas, it becomes clear that, although the 
principle may seem self-evident, a particular worldview is actually entailed in it. 
It overcomes resistance and acquires concreteness by incorporating and 
materialising itself into a work, be it a building, an institution or an artwork. The 
principle is affirmative and productive, but struggle is needed to realise and 
express it. The ultimate expression of a guiding idea is a civilisation, a world 
order. But even a civilisation is still in need of concrete exemplifications to 
become tangible and readable. Concrete exemplifications also materialise the 
tension between the realisation and its guiding ideal. They exemplify the idea, 
but never fully or completely.  
Thus, the guiding idea is an active, energetic principle, evolving into a 
style of thinking, realising itself via individual and collective activities of 
concrete human beings. Their activities contribute, directly or indirectly, to the 
realisation of the idea. Dialectically speaking, whereas the guiding idea initially 
emerges as an abstract principle, hard work is required to develop it further and 
to overcome resistance, allowing the idea to fully realise itself. Even if individuals 
focus on their personal interests and needs, they may nonetheless contribute to 
the realisation of the guiding principle. There is a spontaneous adherence, a 
collective conversion and convergence if you like. The principle encourages and 
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enables human beings to act in a certain manner. We never write or act in a socio-
cultural vacuum. 
Whereas daily experience tends to foreground differences of opinion, we 
underestimate the basic unanimity at work in daily practice and discourse. We 
fail to realise that we are actually and collectively under the sway of an a priori 
view, although some may be more content with it than others. Rather than being 
confirmed by experience, this idea, this ideology makes is possible for us to gain 
experience at all. The basic objective of a styles-of-thinking approach is to 
recognise and capture the guiding idea of a particular epoch, including our own. 
The aim is to see how a particular ideology is always already at work, also in our 
own era: the shared ambiance that is noticeable and audible in books and movies, 
behaviours and buildings, conferences and conversations, determining the way in 
which our deliberations are enacted, our questions and answers are phrased.  
To recognise this, we must follow the discourse of a particular epoch as 
literally as possible and from an oblique perspective (Zwart 2017b), focussing on 
the how, the phrasings, the shared discursive style. Humans are wired to think in 
a certain manner. Should we interpret distant events and utterances in terms of 
our own style of thinking (e.g. judging history from the point of view of, say, neo-
liberalism), we fail to recognise the collisions that are unfolding, the 
gigantomachia that is raging: the struggles evolving at a fundamental level, not 
between political programs or specific artistic ideals, but between incompatible 
styles. In every initiative or enterprise, a particular style of thinking is always 
already at work.  
In order to recognise this, we need to develop an oblique perspective 
(intentio obliqua), enabling us to acquire a comprehensive view. When studying 
historical figures, we are not so much interested in what they do or what they 
believe, but rather in how they act and how they believe. The Greek term for this 
is κατάσκοπειν, adopting a side-ways position, a view from within as it were, in 
order to study a particular practice, subculture or scene. Being there, so to speak, 
albeit as an outsider. Our intention is to study a particular artwork or discourse or 
institute in such a way that we are reviewing the style of thinking at work in it, 
exemplified by it.  
When Pentheus follows Dionysus to investigate the Maenads, this is what 
he intends to do: κατάσκοπον µαινάδων (979). But the case of Pentheus also 
shows that there are risks involved. Self-analysis is an important prerequisite. We 
have to know ourselves (we have to probe our own style of thinking) in order to 
be able to appreciate the styles of thinking we encounter, while by studying other 
styles we deepen our self-understanding. Pentheus fell victim to his endeavour 
because he failed to recognise that the conflict between two styles of thinking 
(Dionysian versus Apollonian) was also an internal struggle, raging in his own 
psyche. By framing the Dionysian as other, he failed to come to terms with his 
own desire, proving more susceptible to Dionysian thinking than he was willing 
to acknowledge, – but this will be explained in more detail in the next section. 




To summarize: in the course of its history, a grounding idea gives rise to 
a style and is adopted as a guiding principle: tested, elaborated, affirmed and 
verified, until it is abandoned and deserted, giving the floor to a novel idea, so 
that a wave-cycle starts again. Although there are periods of astonishing bloom 
and apparent supremacy, previous styles of thinking may manifest themselves 
temporarily again, as a return of the repressed, as intermezzo, in opposition to the 
new, offensive style, as “Renaissance”. And yet, this recurrence will always be 
tainted with what it aims to oppose. What is high noon from the perspective of 
Apollonian thinking, moreover, appears as dead of night from a Magian 
perspective. The transition from the Magian to the Faustian style occurred shortly 
after the year thousand, which explains why the term “Middle Ages” is 
emphatically absent in Spengler’s vocabulary. He sees this label as profoundly 
mistaken. As if, during this extended period of time, nothing of significance 
happened. What is known as the Middle Ages, covers two completely different 
periods, namely the Magian epoch (the “early” Middle Ages) and the Faustian 
period (the “high” Middle Ages). 
Spengler aims to develop a global framework which also includes 
Chinese, Indian and Mexican cultures. This study has a more limited scope, 
focussing primarily on Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian and Faustian ideas, not 
because other styles are less important, but because of my scholarly limitations, 
for these are the cultures which I am able to experience “from within” to some 
extent. If Hegel is right, however, that the course of world history moves 
Westward, China is likely to become the next station after Silicon Valley, so that 
history has moved full circle. In Chapter 6, I will try to amend my Eurocentric 
bias somewhat and broaden the scope into a more global view. 
How to explore a style of thinking, notably an extinguished one? How to 
enter a lost world of thoughts? History moves from past to present, but as scholars 
we move in the opposite direction, vade retro, from present to past, starting with 
the remnants, so as to reach out to the idea which once inspired their construction. 
We begin as illiterates. For those who aim to gain access to Dionysian, 
Apollonian and Magian thinking, notably the primary sources, some basic 
knowledge of Greek and Latin is a must. If we start with an intuitive 
preconception, it will usually prove misguided. Misguided preconceptions must 
be sublated via a thorough confrontation, forcing us to explore alternative 
possibilities or even to reject our initial view. Via such experiences, we may reach 
a more comprehensive understanding: validated and verified. Flashes of insight, 
acquired along the way, become incorporated into a coherent view.  
When we are studying a particular style of thinking, we are at the same 
time studying our own style of thinking, deepening our own self-understanding. 
Gradually it dawns on us that what initially seems foreign and other, may actually 
be part of our cultural memory. Should this not be the case, we would be overtly 
unable to enter these distant worlds. In order to meaningfully confront Dionysian, 
Apollonian, Magian or Faustian thinking, we must to some extent become 
Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian and Faustian ourselves. We must recognise 
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ourselves in the Dionysian, Apollonian, Magian or Faustian mindset. As Hegel 
once phrases it: “Nur der Geist erkennt den Geist” (1970, p. 394). Only insofar 
as we are able to experience the conflict and incompatibility of the Dionysian and 
the Apollonian principle, we are able to appreciate Euripides’ Bacchae, and only 
insofar as we are able to experience the conflict and incompatibility of the 
Apollonian and the Magian principle, we are able to understand the spirit that 
gave rise to the Pantheon in Rome. We are able to deepen our insight into 
Dionysian or Apollonian thinking because we already know these worlds to some 
extent. When visiting the Pantheon for the first time, we may feel strangely at 
home in such an ambiance. We should not necessarily see ourselves as utter 
strangers to a particular logic. There may be a basic affinity to begin with, 
something to work from. Still, it requires hard work to comprehend an artwork 
from within. This is the difference between reading and rereading, between 
sightseeing and κατάσκοπειν.   
How to determine the profile of a particular style of thinking? A method 
is not readily available. Building on Hegel, Spengler and others, it will have to 
be developed along the way. Nonetheless, some methodological guidelines can 
be provided. A style of thinking entails a grounding idea (a philosopheme) which 
articulates itself in the form of a concise slogan or summons: “Live in accordance 
with nature”; “Prepare yourself for the turn” (“Forsake this present world); 
“Existence equals will to power”. A style of thinking is a grounding idea which 
realises itself in social, cultural and intellectual practices, and embodies itself in 
buildings, research programs and artworks. A style of thinking fosters religious, 
moral, scholarly or artistic practices and proliferates, affecting both “subjects” 
(active human individuals) and “objects (tools, artworks, monuments, 
landscapes, institutions, and the like). By realising and embodying itself, it 
demonstrates its validity, its inspirational force. It commences as an ideal and 
realises itself in the real, but never exhaustingly. The idea or ideal is never fully 
realised, never fully identical with the real. It remains a critical norm, giving rise 
to the experience of “not yet” (nondum). Therefore, we must discern the ideal in 
the real, the rational in the inchoate. A grounding idea affects the whole. It is not 
restricted to particular practices, but infects all aspects of human civilisations.  
 To recognise the grounding idea, we will focus on specific objects of 
enquiry, particular intellectual practices or artworks, concrete exemplifications, 
speaking out to us as mouthpieces of a whole world. A grounding idea not only 
allows individuals to understand their world, but also to shape, transform and 
interact with it. Apollonian geometry sees itself not merely as an intelligent tool, 
but as the self-conscious awareness of a natural order which can effectively be 
brought to the fore with the help of Apollonian geometry. Magian astronomy (i.e. 
the effort to determine the opportune moment) is in tune with a world which 
emerges as an ambiance for pilgrimage. And the Faustian will to power 
experiences its driving “will” (its willing drive) not only as something which 
works internally (as a subjective urge), but also as the guiding force through 




which nature shapes itself. A genuine artwork is self-made to some extent, 
namely as the realisation of the idea that is guiding human creativity.   
 A style of thinking cannot be captured merely by reading the sources. 
We must go and visit the things themselves. Take a work of art like Raphael’s 
fresco The School of Athens. We may study the technical papers, the technical 
details, but should also be sensitive to how we are summoned and affected by it. 
A work of art calls out to us. An important truth or insight is conveyed by it, 
shared with us, entrusted to us. The artwork’s expressiveness is the primal 
moment. It is that which forces us to have a closer look. Our analysis remains a 
dialogue. In principle, all artworks belonging to a certain style convey the same 
idea. Instead of being “disinterested” observers, we should opt for confrontation. 
Notwithstanding the body of scholarship that has been accumulated, there is 
always a knowledge deficit, a lack of understanding, an omission, a neglect, 
something which remained unsaid. The meaning of the artwork is never fully 
exhausted. Research means recovering the logic of Apollonian, Magian or 
Faustian thinking in such a way that we allow ourselves to temporarily become 
Apollonian, Magian or Faustian to some extent. It entails an exercise in 
revivification.  
 The end result of such a process is tested experience. An artwork 
becomes a point of entry into a lost world of meaning, so that we begin to feel at 
home in this lost world to some extent. Somehow, this world is still alive, as part 
of our cultural memory (Assmann 1992). Since the advent of modernity, we have 
been negating the pre-Faustian past. These previous forms of existence are not 
completely lost to us, however, and may still be retrieved. Scholarship and 
“objective archaeology” may be complemented by “inward expeditions”. The 
novel Carmen by Prosper Mérimée, for instance, begins as the report of an 
archaeological expedition, aimed at pinpointing the exact location of the battle of 
Munda, which allegedly took place in what is now Andalusia. Gradually, 
however, the novel becomes something rather different: the retrieval of an 
obfuscated way of being-in-the-world, marginalised perhaps, but never 
completely barred. The author becomes a time-traveller as it were, discovering 
remnants of a lost culture in the folds and margins of modern civilisation. 
Likewise, while reading Tacitus’ Germania, aspects of it may resurge in later 
epochs. Wagner operas may function as acoustic archaeology (Zwart 2012), 
aimed at retrieving forgotten Celtic and Germanic, Magian and Faustian 
soundscapes. Only as carriers of cultural memories can we meaningfully relate to 
Mérimée’s Carmen or Wagner’s Ring. 
 This phenomenon, that we, outsiders, may still recognise the Geist 
which realises itself in a particular cultural ambiance, has been thematised as 
“cultural memory” (Halbwachs 1950; Assmann 1988). A similar idea is at work 
in the novels of Jack London. We must deepen our understanding of such 
phenomena along the way, by actually practicing this type of enquiry. We seem 
strangers in unknown worlds, but at the same time we are drawn towards its, 
returning natives as it were. We must bracket our 21st century convictions to 
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become sufficiently sensitive to the sounds, colours and gestures of the world we 
are entering. The once so captivating grounding idea may still be recognisable for 
us, as we make our questions and interpretations more precise. Let this suffice as 
a guide to help us reconstruct the zeitgeist of past epochs. In the next section, this 
methodology will be put to the test, using an ancient Greek tragedy as a window 
into a lost world.  
 
 
§ 9. A methodological exercise: Dionysian thinking                   
 
In Birth of Tragedy, Friedrich Nietzsche (1980, KSA1) confronts the balanced, 
rational, Apollonian principle with its destructive, de-individuating Dionysian 
rival, as we have seen. Greek tragedy, he famously argues, staged a struggle 
between two aesthetic styles, represented by Apollo and Dionysus as the divine 
patrons of Greek theatre. From an Apollonian perspective, measure, 
intelligibility, harmony and self-restraint enable us to manage our passions 
without eradicating them. The Dionysian alternative remained very much alive 
as cultural backdrop, however, so that Greek tragedy entailed a temporary 
exposure to it, in the safe enclosure of the theatre, a dramatic crucible as it were: 
a dramatic containment of that which horrifies us (Gish 2016).  
According to Nietzsche, Greek understanding of art did not express itself 
in concepts (Begriffe) but in powerful images (Gestalten), e.g. Apollo and 
Dionysus, representing two incompatible principles: measure versus excess, 
individuality versus intoxication (Rausch), self-knowledge versus frenzy 
(Taumel), rationality versus the irrational. Greek tragedy enacted a collision 
between these principles, so that Apollonian harmony was challenged by a 
disruptive intrusion of Dionysian celebration. The subsequent dominance of 
Apollonian rationalism, represented by Socrates and his school, resulted in the 
death of tragedy, Nietzsche claimed. For Nietzsche, Richard Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk represented a return of the repressed, a reinvigoration of the 
ancient contest. I will come back to Nietzsche’s interpretation at the end of this 
section. First, I will reread Bacchae as an agonistic force-field, a fascinating 
drama which allows both ancient and contemporary audiences to observe how 
the battle between the two styles or principles is acted out.  
Bacchantes are female followers of Dionysus, whose passions have 
become “unregulated”, from an Apollonian point of view. From a Dionysian 
perspective, a somewhat different type of choreography emerges: Maenads 
celebrate a Dionysian, rather than a formless pattern of expression. They 
abandoned their homes to live as nomads in the hills and mountains outside the 
city walls, exulting in “lustful” behaviour (again: from an Apollonian 
perspective). At first sight, they seem idyllic, peace-loving, pastoral creatures, 
living in harmony with nature in the sense that, during ritual dances, they become 
one with nature (with their mountainous ambiance), to such an extent that all 




things seem to move as one single being. Yet, their devastating aggression can 
easily be aroused.  
Dionysus explains in his prologue that time has come to take the stage 
himself. He has adopted a human form, posing as an oriental androgynous 
“Stranger”, a priest and follower of the god, so that the audience from the very 
beginning sees two persons, sees double as it were (Saban 2003), confronted with 
two personae: man and god, “Stranger” and “Dionysus”, actor and director. 
Dionysus takes the stage to confront Pentheus, a fanatic youthful devotee of 
Apollonian thinking, a guardian – φύλαξ – well-trained in apollonian logic. By 
staging Dionysus as his antagonist, Bacchae becomes meta–theatre (Segal 1997): 
a theatre about theatre as such, a dialectical art form exploring the dynamics of 
truth and illusion, combat and surrender. The purpose of Dionysus is to reveal 
himself. The sheer impact of his presence, in combination with his psychological 
and dramaturgical skills, will drive Pentheus, the god-opposing (θεοµάχος) ruler, 
into intoxication and surrender, not by punishing Pentheus directly, but by 
bringing the obfuscated, Dionysian aspect of his personality to the fore, thereby 
exposing him as a divided subject.  
I will reread Euripides’ dramatic masterpiece Bacchae or Maenads as a 
case study. To discern what is at stake, we must approach the drama in such a 
way that we ourselves may witness the scene from a position of proximity. We 
must closely study the events, as literally and physically as possible. Indeed, had 
we been there (712), we might have fallen under Dionysus’ demonic spell 
ourselves. How to achieve this, how to allow this collision (skilfully staged by 
Euripides) to become our experience? How to become eye-witnesses ourselves?  
Although it remains a challenge, requiring a combination of hard work 
and sensitivity to available materials (to be handled with utmost consideration), 
some methodological guidelines have already been provided above. First and 
foremost, although the use of translations as auxiliary materials is obviously 
allowed, and even inevitable, it is prerequisite to consult the original text as well 
and to familiarise ourselves with the exact wordings, the idiosyncrasies of the 
language, as intimately and bilingually as possible. We must spell the primary 
sources to the letter, word by word, especially the crucial passages.  
As indicated, King Pentheus is an Apollonian, iconoclastic youngster 
who brashly denies the existence of the god (δαίµων) Dionysus. He refuses to 
acknowledge the force of the Dionysian principle, thereby arousing the god’s 
outrage. Pentheus, voicing enlightened Apollonian rationality, wants to cleanse 
the city of Thebe from “Asian” superstitions. He wants to rid it of Dionysian 
frenzy (µανία). The most unsettling symptom is the unruly behaviour of Theban 
women, many of whom already left their homes to join the Maenads, a tribe of 
marauding female nomads, living in the wild mountains, dancing and chanting in 
honour of the new god, while honouring Aphrodite as lesbian lovers as well (225). 
Their erotic-religious furor seems impossible to contain. The upsetting influx of 
foreign ideas is noticeable inside the city walls as well. Even grandfather Cadmus 
is about to join the festivities. He has given in to the effeminate trend, carrying a 
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thyrsus in his hand: a ritual spear worn by Bacchae, as a sign of loyalty to the 
god. Although wise old Teiresias advises Pentheus to turn “bacchant” himself 
(313), the latter proudly refuses to give in to this pandemic craze and its pestilent 
rites. He boldly refuses to submit himself.  
A gender dimension is clearly involved in this, for he notably refuses to 
become the servant or captive of women who, according to his (Apollonian) 
logic, are supposed to serve him. He refuses to accept a drastic reversal of roles, 
where he, a male, would suddenly be supposed to serve his female servants 
(δουλεύοντα δουλείαις, 803). He is determined to fight the Bacchic pestilence, 
which is turning women into hunters, hunting down and capturing men, like 
beasts (1204), armed with thyrsus-staffs as javelins, catching them in their nets 
(847). Roles are reversed as women force armed men to flight (764), but Pentheus 
firmly intends to defend the Apollonian principle of harmony and stability which, 
for him, logically includes the systemic subjection of women, something which 
is considered “natural”: legitimised by the Apollonian understanding of nature. 
He intends to avert the disruptive threat as a guardian (φύλαξ) of his principle, by 
capturing and re-domesticating the transgressive Maenads, putting a stop to their 
nomadic lesbian love-making (958). But his Apollonian understanding of nature 
as a balanced harmonious order suddenly finds itself confronted with a 
completely different manifestation of nature.  
Like an experienced stage director who carefully dresses his actors (Segal 
1997; Mueller 2016), Dionysus cleverly leads the antagonists into a “mighty 
clash” (εις αγώνα µέγαν, 973), a gigantomachia between two incompatible 
interpretations of nature, with dire consequences for inter-gender relationships. 
Step by step, we witness how Dionysus lures Pentheus out of his safe Apollonian 
entourage and into the trap prepared for him. Pentheus becomes emasculated and 
de-domesticated, robbed of his identity. This entails a series of role reversals. 
First of all, Dionysus himself, arriving from a journey through Asia with his train 
of wildly dancing and chanting women (who perform their revelling rituals 
preferably at night), has assumed a mortal human shape (µορφή, 4) as a prophet 
of the god. The most dramatic reversal, however, involves Pentheus himself.  
Instead of guiding others (into battle, calling them to arms, as was his 
original intention), he allows a suspect stranger (Dionysus) to become his guide. 
Subsequently, he allows himself to be transformed from a male into a woman (εἰς 
γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς, 820), clad in the attire of a Maenad. For in order to secretly 
approach them and study their idyllic, bird-like lovemaking, he must 
paradoxically become very much like them. He adopts their outfit, acquires their 
shape and form, as a true “daughter of Cadmus”. Indeed, he becomes a Maenad 
in a remarkably convincingly manner (πρέπεις δὲ Κάδµου θυγατέρων µορφὴν 
µιᾷ, 917). Allegedly, he does all this to enter the Maenad’s mountainous world 
and spy on them, for that is what he intends to do: to spy them out (πρῶτον εἰς 
κατασκοπήν, 838). 
The apex of conversion and reversal is Pentheus’ “coming out”, when he 
literally steps out of the palace to enter the scene, properly costumed in Maenad 




garb. Rather than serving as a “contraceptive” or immunisation device, the 
maenad costume singles him out as prime target (Giegerich 1998), while 
Dionysus now overtly controls the situation. Instead of seeing Maenads, he is to 
become one himself, ritually dressed and carefully prepared to serve as sacrifice.  
The transformation is so convincing, and the experience of exposing 
himself to the gaze of the Stranger so intoxicating, that he suddenly sees 
everything double: two suns, two cities of Thebe. The Stranger now seems like 
an intimidating bull to him (912, ff.), indicating how vulnerable Pentheus has 
become, although Dionysus explains that he now finally sees things as they truly 
are. Whereas Dionysus is deified, Pentheus is enslaved. While being hustled out 
to catch the Maenads, he is in bondage himself. His symptom, seeing everything 
twice, may indicate his revelling intoxication, but it also reflects a moment of 
metamorphosis, as he finally allows his feminine alter ego to manifest itself, as if 
he is combining male and female (or Apollonian and Dionysian) sense organs, 
replacing one set by another.  
For Pentheus, the very experience of wearing the Maenad costume instils 
frantic desire (Mueller 2016). No sooner has he been dressed up, or he already 
tosses his head backwards and shakes loose his carefully coiffed hairlocks. Fully 
dressed up as a Maenad, he asks Dionysus whether he now really looks like 
Agave and her sisters, as if Dionysus is holding up a mirror for him and Pentheus 
is exulting in his likeness to the god’s most exquisite followers. We see two 
Agave’s, the original one and her feminised copy. Under the sway of the 
Dionysian principle, Pentheus’ identity and individuality become fluid and 
morphed. The former guardian now wants to be mistaken for a woman. Under 
the demon’s spell, the despotic ruler acts like a coquette little girl, for instance 
when he asks Dionysus whether he now will become as strong as a real Maenad, 
while in reality he has become completely helpless: no match at all for a fearsome 
Bacchante. His religious scepticism, which apparently had been over-
compensating a secret longing for transgression, has been swept aside by the 
dizzying effects of his effeminate dress. The Bacchic cult is a “queer” religion, 
involving masculinised females and feminised males, turning women into 
huntresses while the emblem of hoplite masculinity becomes a childish coquette, 
concerned with his looks (Theodoridou 2008). 
Seeing that he has utterly lost the struggle for power, the “wrestling bout” 
as he phrases it, Pentheus now fully surrenders himself to Dionysus. He is 
completely in the demon’s hands and fully belongs to him (σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακείµεσθα 
δή, 934). His mind (φρήν) is drastically reset. The cross-dressing becomes an 
initiation rite, a rite of passage, and he experiences a full conversion into a 
completely different way of thinking (µεθέστηκας φρενῶν, 944). Dionysus now 
fully and literally possesses him and Pentheus encourages him to do whatever he 
likes with him (Powell 1990). For Dionysus, having seduced Pentheus into 
dressing up and surrendering himself to him, indicates that the decisive step of 
the initiation rite has been successfully completed (Mueller 2016). Now, he will 
guide Pentheus through the city (to have him mocked and humiliated) and up to 
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the mountains. Someone else will bring him back: Agave will lift him high up 
and carry him effortlessly in her arms (944), and Pentheus is thrilled by the 
prospect, exulting in utter powerlessness and helplessness.  
When he summons Pentheus to come forward and reveal his renewed 
self, but also later, when Dionysus, with surprising ease, hoists him into a tree, 
Pentheus is actually called Penthea (913, 1070), as if the metamorphosis has 
already been successfully completed.   
In all these instances of transformation and role reversal, the Greek 
wording is important, literally emphasising what is actually happening. Pentheus 
transfigures and migrates, from one particular ambiance (the city of Thebe) into 
a completely different one (a mountainous wilderness), but also out of the world 
of males, into the world of women (εἰς γυναῖκας ἐξ ἀνδρὸς) as we have seen, 
assuming a female form (µορφή) as camouflage, in order to spy on the Bacchantes 
and to approach them as closely as possible, literally and figuratively: to study 
them without being seen. But this role reversal (from male to female) leads to a 
series of dramatic additional reversals. Instead of defending the Apollonian order 
by opposing the threat (his initial impulse), he is seized by the sudden desire (813) 
to stalk their encampment and witness their drunken, entranced, erotic rituals. 
Driven by voyeuristic desire to see a “primal scene” (Greco 2016), he becomes 
utterly exited over the idea of secretly spying on the Maenads (κατάσκοπον 
µαινάδων, 979) with passionate curiosity. Initially, his motive is to acquire 
strategic intelligence, but it soon becomes evident that what he really desires it to 
witness erotic activities, as a first introductory step towards becoming one of 
them. Under the sway of this scopic drive, he allows himself to be clad in female 
attire (ἐν γυναικοµίµῳ στολᾷ, 979), giggling, with curly long hair, neatly dressed 
up in a woman’s robe by Dionysus, who acts as his tire-maiden, so that heroic 
readiness gives way to travesty and parody. The stage becomes a psychic retort, 
a vessel (Saban 2003, p. 29) for conducting radical metamorphosis. Cross-
dressing is not merely a more or less comical and temporary change in outward 
appearance. Pentheus has emptied himself for the god and now, bereft of his 
previous (masculine, Apollonian) characteristics, he has become a kenotic subject 
in a psychic experiment, ready for a reconfiguration into the Dionysian mode.  
He abdicates as king, but as Apollonian individual as well. He is both the 
target of the intervention and the initiated adept, an assistant to the god, curious 
to know whether he has convincingly altered in the right direction, whether his 
outward appearance concurs with his psychic experience of transmutation 
(changing gender, but also adopting the Dionysian mood). Pentheus, now very 
pleased with his costume, asks Dionysus whether he walks and stands like a 
woman, while Dionysus carefully arranges his curls, skirt and posture, alluding 
that a special fate awaits him. Dionysus also provides him with protocol 
instructions: how to hold and handle his thyrsus, how to wear his coif. With his 
long and perfumed hairlocks, Dionysus is a bigender transvestite himself: “not at 
all a wrestler”, as Pentheus initially characterises him (455), although eventually 
he confesses himself to be the weaker wrestler of the two. Initially promising 




Pentheus to secretly lead him through Thebe, Dionysus actually exposes him to 
ridicule, morphed into a female shape (γυναικόµορφον, 854). And instead of 
spotting Maenads, Pentheus himself is the one who is being spotted. Instead of 
targeting them, he himself is the one who is being targeted by them, so that the 
hunter (initially determined to “hunt” these women down from their hills and 
“trap them in iron”, 228, 231) becomes their prey. Dionysus lifts him into a tree 
for optimal view, positioning him in an optimal seat from where he may enjoy 
the spectacle. As spectator, he assumes that he will remain himself unseen. The 
stranger has guided him to a scene: a performance (θεωρία, 1047), a 
gigantomachia between rival worldviews, but at the crucial moment the stage 
director disappears from view, so as to allow the action to unfold. Rather than 
seeing them, the women discover Pentheus soon enough, seated in his treetop, 
wherein he is now trapped. Angry Maenads tear his fir tree to the ground with 
brute physical force.  
In a previous dialogue with Dionysus, Pentheus agreed that he should not 
try to gain victory over these women using physical strength (ου σθένει νικητέον 
γυναίκας, 952), but now, as soon as he falls from the tree, Agave physically 
attacks him, brutally clutching his left arm in both her hands, setting her foot 
against his ribs, like a skilled wrestler, and furiously tearing his arm out of its 
joint. After this humiliating defeat, which leaves him helpless, other Maenads 
quickly join in to finish him off, while the rest of them cheers aloud. His body is 
torn to pieces and Agave triumphantly impales his severed head on her thyrsus-
point, crowning it as it were. She then demonstratively carries her precious war 
trophy across the mountain scenery, even taking it home with her, with the 
intention of fixing it against the palace wall (1239), as a winners’ prize or hunting 
spoil. When Agave regains her Apollonian senses, re-entering the Apollonian 
ambiance as it were, she greatly repents her deeds, but these cannot be undone. 
As mater dolorosa she now carefully pieces together his scattered bodily remains 
as partial objects in their proper order (the compositio membrorum scene).     
To follow closely what happens, to enter the scene, we must closely 
follow the text, until we ourselves are caught in the act of spying on the Maenads, 
albeit without submerging into this Dionysian world completely, that is: without 
really becoming Pentheus, sharing his fate. Contrary to Pentheus himself, we are 
both insiders and outsiders. Still, for a brief moment in time, the drama allows us 
to enter the Dionysian ambiance, so as to partially live up to our methodological 
adage of being there. It is as if this same fate could have (or should have) befallen 
us, trespassing into these forbidden realms, while refusing to pay our respect to 
the god. Euripides’ drama allows readers and audiences to visit the Maenad world 
and to experience the Dionysian mood: the violent and furious Dionysian logic, 
the Dionysian principle, which enables or forces these women to act, and forces 
Pentheus into submission, overpowering him and even tearing him apart. The 
brief, uneven wrestling match between Pentheus and Agave, their battle of the 
sexes, is actually a clash between two principles, two styles of thinking. By 
robbing Pentheus of his guiding principle, Dionysus knows that, in a bacchantic 
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setting, he will not stand a chance against his female foe, perfectly adapted to 
these unfamiliar surroundings. The drama, culminating in an intergender 
wrestling match between Pentheus and Agave, is actually a battle between two 
philosophemes, each of them giving rise to two completely different styles of 
thinking and acting, namely the Apollonian and the Dionysian style.  
These styles are incompatible, but contrary to Nietzsche’s interpretation 
the Dionysian principle is not counter-rational per se. It is only from an 
Apollonian perspective that the Dionysian mode strikes us as irrational. On closer 
inspection, it has an irresistible logic of its own, as demonstrated by Euripides’ 
tragedy. What is wisdom for some, is folly for others. For Teiresias, siding with 
the Dionysian principle, Pentheus is a fool speaking folly (µῶρα γὰρ µῶρος λέγει, 
369), while wise insights seem sheer folly to a fool (480). Cadmus adds to this by 
pointing out that Pentheus’ rationality is actually the opposite of wisdom, from a 
Dionysian perspective (φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς, 332). While Dionysus has kept 
his reason, he claims that Pentheus has lost his (σωφρονῶν οὐ σώφροσιν, 503). 
Whereas Dionysus sees Pentheus as “strange” (δεινός, 971), Dionysus, the 
stranger, is depicted as even more “terrible / strange” (δεινότατος, 861) to 
disbelievers. Both interpret the conduct of the other as an unacceptable insulting 
insolence (ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, 247).  
While Pentheus believes he is doing his Apollonian duty, Teiresias 
accuses him of being a bad citizen (κακός πολίτης, 271). The drama enacts the 
various steps in the process of initiation or conversion, luring Pentheus out of his 
familiar Apollonian ambiance and into the Dionysian wild, where he is exposed 
to a style of acting and thinking which he experiences as intoxicating. While 
Pentheus interrogates Dionysus, their dialogue seems remarkably reminiscent of 
the famous gospel scene mentioned above: Christ before Pilate, two protagonists 
representing colliding principles, and therefore unable to understand each other. 
When Pentheus asks him whether the stranger can actually see his god, the latter 
replies affirmatively. My god is right beside me, he claims, although you, being 
impious, cannot seem him (502), while “I can see him seeing me” (ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, 
470). The exact phrasing is important here, for seeing or conversing with a god 
is a privilege of the initiated: only true believers can experience the god’s 
presence, only they discern how god is looking at them and after them. Only they 
experience themselves as standing in god’s field of vision. Only the initiated are 
sufficiently gifted and enabled to experience the existence of their god. To 
Pentheus, the last of the unconverted as it were, this experience is initially denied, 
until he undergoes his dramatic and fatal transformation. When the stranger, who 
actually is Dionysus, is miraculously freed from his dungeon (much like Saint 
Peter), he can indeed rightfully claim that he freed himself, effortlessly (αὐτὸς 
ἐµαυτὸν ῥᾳδίως ἄνευ πόνου, 613). While Pentheus suffers dismemberment 
(σπαραγµός), as a typical, Dionysian punishment, Dionysus arises from the 
grave. This is only a temporary outcome, however. The struggle will continue.     
Bacchae is not only about gender and power, but also about knowledge. 
Dionysus tempts and plays with Pentheus’ desire to see, in the sense of θεωρία: 




watching the forbidden spectacle. He exploits Pentheus’ desire to spy upon the 
secret Bacchant rites from a vantage point of Apollonian enlightenment, like a 
scholar almost, aiming to see clearly and distinctly, giving in to his desire to 
fathom the unknown. Pentheus wants to gaze upon the worshipping Bacchants 
with rational precision, without being seen himself, allegedly a form of 
espionage. He wants to explore the terrain in preparation of a military operation 
against them: his “rationalisation” if you like. His risky escapade (his 
scopophilia) is legitimised as part of a campaign, launched to restrain the oriental 
craze with military force. Yet, instead of counteracting the Dionysian threat, 
Pentheus, the “theoretical hunter” (Gish 2016) goes native and is captured by the 
Bacchants as their ultimate prey.  
The encounter with the Bacchantes is a play inside a play, not enacted 
but vividly narrated (ενάργεια). The vividness was so overwhelming that 
spectators of Greek tragedy had the experience of taking part in the events 
themselves. By witnessing the fight between two well-trained verbal gymnasts 
(Pentheus versus Dionysus, 492) and by observing (κατάσκοπειν) Pentheus 
observing the Bacchants, we ourselves become involved in the dialectics, where 
roles become dramatically reversed until the architecture of Apollonian 
rationality collapses. Dionysus is the winning competitor (αντίπαλος) in this 
verbal-dramatic wrestling contest, and wrestling (πάλη) is a key metaphor in 
Euripides’ tragedy – although the actual wrestling (in the literal, physical sense 
of the term) is relegated to Dionysus’ female retinue, so that the Dionysian 
principle regains its dominance.  
Let us now reconsider Nietzsche’s view on Euripides Bacchae. As said, 
Nietzsche adopted the idea of a tragic rivalry between Apollonian and Dionysian 
principles from Wagner, but a number of problems are entailed in his subsequent 
handling of these ideas, and his elaboration has been considered problematic from 
the very outset. Notably because, as soon as he actually applies these principles 
to the Bacchae of Euripides, one of the most impressive works of Greek tragedy, 
he confusingly seems to spoil Wagner’s conception. According to Nietzsche, 
Euripides was a one-sided “rationalist” in the Apollonian sense, someone who 
(again: according to Nietzsche) had wanted to eliminate the all−too–powerful 
Dionysian element and to rebuild tragedy as a purely Apollonian world-view. 
Towards the end of his life, that is: when he composed Bacchae, Euripides 
himself posed the question whether the Dionysian principle should exist at all. 
Should it not be eradicated from Greek soil? Of course, we should, the poet says 
to us, Nietzsche argues, if only it were possible, but the god Dionysus is too 
powerful. His most intelligent opponent, Pentheus, is unexpectedly charmed by 
Dionysus and organises his own destruction. Euripides actually sides with 
Socrates, Nietzsche claims, although he uses dramatic dialogue rather than 
Socratic logic as his means of expression. This is a remarkable view indeed, and 
my rereading of Bacchae explicitly contradicts Nietzsche’s interpretation.  
Whatever may be said about Euripides, he is decidedly not a one-sided 
Apollonian Enlightener, as Nietzsche seems to be suggesting. Rather, I presented 
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Bacchae as a dialectical confrontation between two styles of thinking, between 
the Dionysian and the Apollonian worldview, rereading Euripides’ tragedy as a 
magnificent dialectical highlight. Would it have been possible for Euripides to 
compose this tragic masterpiece at all had he not been conscious of and sensitive 
to both poles: Apollonian clarity and Dionysian celebration? Why did Nietzsche 
revert to such a binary way of thinking, identifying Euripides’ own position as a 
playwright with the principle of rational enlightenment, instead of seeing 
Euripides as someone who profoundly exposed himself to both dimensions, 
exploring their incompatibility on stage? Nietzsche’s characterisation of 
Euripides as a rationalist – Nietzsche’s relapse into binary thinking – is both 
remarkable and disappointing, given the way in which Euripides stages the 
conflict between Apollonian enlightenment and Dionysian celebration, a basic 
collision which becomes sublated into tragedy. Even his hero Pentheus is far from 
“straight”. What the drama reveals is that there is a Dionysian side to the latter’s 
personality as well, making him susceptible to infection. Whether Socratic 
immunisation proves a more viable strategy will be further explore in the next 
chapter (Chapter 2).  
As to the compositio membrorum scene, something similar befell 
Euripides’ text as such. A Byzantine text entitled Christus Patiens contains a 
great number of lines taken from Euripides Bacchae, notably from lost portions, 
as spolia so to speak, botched together as a collage of quotations. This points to 
a continuity between the Dionysian an the Magian, between Dionysus and Christ, 
and many parallels can indeed be discerned between them: both are good 
shepherds, both are benevolent young gods, associated with wine. Nonnus of 
Panopolis authored Dionysiaca, an extended tale featuring Dionysus and the 
Bacchants in their battles against Indians, but he also composed a hexametric 
Paraphrase of the Gospel of John, featuring Jesus as the god of love and wine 
(Cavero 2009; Shorrock 2011). This will be taken up in Chapter 3, in my 









Chapter 2. Cosmonauts: Apollonian thinking 
 
The grounding idea of Apollonian thinking is that reality is a perfect geometric 
structure, a κόσµος, whose order and harmony can be discerned via 
contemplation. Cosmos literally means order or ornament in ancient Greek. This 
conviction is not the result of empirical research, but an a priori, self-evident 
truth which precedes research and allows certain forms of inquiry to unfold. It is 
the starting point, not the result of Apollonian (Euclidean) geometry, elaborated 
by Euclid in his manual Elements, but the same idea also guides Apollonian 
astronomy, and we find the same conviction at work in Apollonian architecture 
and Apollonian politics. To establish a well-proportioned polis, Plato argues, we 
must first of all determine the optimal number of citizens (1926/1994, 737C) and 
how they should be distributed into sections. The basic schema starts with a 
population of 5,040, a number that is optimally manageable because it can be 
divided into numbers (2, 3, 4, etc.) up to 10 (737E). Law-making and leadership 
require insight into geometric proportionality, i.e. knowledge of the right number 
(ἀριθµός). The number 5,040 allows for numerous subdivisions, depending on 
the situation, in the sense that warfare, for instance, requires a different 
distribution than what is required in times of peace. The number 5,040 is obtained 
by multiplying 1 * 2 * 3 * 4 * 5 * 6 * 7. The ratio of societal classes (aristocrats, 
artisans, slaves) should be proportional to arrive at a natural situation of stability, 
harmony and order.  
Like Apollonian politics, Apollonian ethics is an ethic of proportionality: 
the middle course (the golden mean), the right measure, while Apollonian 
medicine regards health as a state of harmony and balance, for instance between 
bodily humours or fluids. We will further explore the profile of the Apollonian 
style by allowing two famous artworks to guide us. First of all, the Pompeii 
mosaic depicting Plato’s Academy, also used by Peter Sloterdijk in his analysis 
of spherical (Apollonian) thinking (1999). Secondly, the School of Athens: 
Raphael’s fresco in the Vatican Museum.  
 
 
§ 1. An intensive idyll  
 
In 1998 and 1999, Peter Sloterdijk published the first parts of his Spheres trilogy, 
and in 2004, part three was added. The second part (1999) is entitled Globes and 
opens with a Prologue – “An intense idyll”. Here, he discusses a famous Pompeii 
mosaic, now in the Archaeological Museum of Naples, depicting a meeting, a 
philosophical exchange of ideas. The concentrated attitude is striking. It is as if 
an idea, a fundamental thought suddenly overwhelms the scholars involved, as 
Sloterdijk phrases it. The artwork immortalises a common fascination (“eine 
gemeinsame Bestürzung”). A fundamental insight enforces itself upon them: 
something which had never been thought before. Little is said: it is a silent and 
contemplative form of conversation. These thinkers, apparently, are facing a 
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fundamental truth which is revealed to them and seems to exert an irresistible 
intellectual appeal. What the artwork makes visible, according to Sloterdijk, is an 
exceptional event (1999, p. 14), a moment of commencement. A collective 
enthusiasm engulfs them. And the object of their contemplative admiration is a 
geometrical sphere (σφαίρα), representing reality as a whole. This perfect, ideal 
object of thought is both honoured and investigated (“verehrende Forschung”).  
What is depicted here, according to Sloterdijk, is the reformation of 
thinking which took place in Plato’s Academy, the transition from proverbial 
wisdom to rational thought. The mosaic captures the birth of a philosophy that is 
fundamentally similar to ancient Greek geometry: a rationalistic philosophy – 
more geometrico. Only those who are trained in geometry are allowed to enter 
Plato’s philosophical garden. On the mosaic, these philosophers (“academics”) 
bend in astonishment over a sphere, as if studied for the first time. An intellectual 
shiver permeates them. They are confronted with a new insight which will 
dominate philosophy for centuries to come, the Apollonian conviction that a 
perfect geometric structure can be discerned in the universe as a whole, 
intellectually at least. This perfect structure is not an empirical phenomenon, but 
an intellectual idea. It becomes visible in the perfect spatiality of a sphere, as a 
model of the cosmos as a whole.  
Seven philosophers gather around a central sphere, a decisive moment, 
according to Sloterdijk, a commencement in the history of thinking, hovering on 
the boundary between discourse and cult. They stare thinkingly at the sphere of 
being, symbolising the κόσµος, the God of the philosophers – the God who spurs 
us into thinking. This globe is an object of admiration, but also of careful analysis, 
and measured with precision. Mathematical proofs and logical syllogisms are 
formulated. The artwork visualises the Apollonian piety of thought, the devoted 
intellect. A form of spatiality (the ancient κόσµος, conceived as a series of 
concentric spheres) is uncovered via contemplation. It is, according to Sloterdijk, 
a Pentecost of thinking. A new point of departure propagates among intellectuals, 
an intimate but powerful thought manifests itself – a decisive experience. A 
common consciousness unleashes its intellectual activity. From now on, they are 
to devote their lives to studying the spherical truth or whole, the spherical cosmos. 
A logical community begins to taken shape, a counter-community, for the time 
being, in opposition to the pre-Apollonian Dionysian culture still prevalent at that 
time. But it is the beginning of a new thought that will soon conquer the world. 
These scholars form a πόλις of thinkers, a mundus academicus, in preparation of 
the political realization and implementation of this idea.  
The mosaic immortalises the moment when a thought “illuminated”. 
Perhaps they experienced this Apollonian momentum for the very first time. Or 
maybe it was a ritual celebrating an insight that was already proliferating, so that 
the participants commemorate an event that occurred in the past. In any case, this 
artwork depicts the moment when, in the words of Kant, mathematics becomes 
science – Apollonian science, to be exact. In geometry, human reason 
emancipates itself from practical experience. Philosophers-mathematicians look 




away from empirical reality to contemplate mathematical constructs, first and 
foremost the perfect sphere. From this moment of commencement onwards, 
immortalised by this mosaic, the spherical idea begins to flourish and spread 
throughout the world. Soon, this idea will also take root outside this intimate 
circle of philosophers. It becomes ubiquitous, and can no longer be ignored. 
According to Sloterdijk, the power of the Apollonian idea is exemplified 
by the Pantheon in Rome, the Apollonian paradigm building par excellence. 
Spherical thinking has finally established its rule in this edifice, erected between 
115 and 125 A.D. as the first truly spherical construction on earth (1999, p. 435 
ff.), a form of architecture which captures the Apollonian truth in stone. The 
Pantheon symbolizes the moment when the whole world becomes absorbed into 
the Roman sphere of influence – literally. The world finds shelter in the spherical 
space of the Roman power dome. The pantheon is shaped like a sphere because 
it aims to absorb and encompass the whole world, as the spherical nucleus of a 
spherical empire, extending from this geometric center. That explains why there 
is room available for all the gods, even forgotten or unknown ones. The thought 
of the sphere underlies, motivates and legitimates Roman imperialism. 
The Pantheon embodies spherical, Apollonian building, dwelling, 
thinking. While the Greeks contemplate the heavenly spheres, practical Romans 
apply spherical geometry to the political and religious world – translatio 
philosophiae ad Romanos. Apollonian understanding of Being as a whole is 
explicated in a “pan-theological” manner. The Pantheon is a product of 
constructive thinking and exemplifies pre-Copernican spatiality. The sphere has 
materialised into a building: the concrete ovum of the pax romana, a replica of 
the κόσµος in the form of a spherical cavity that provides foreign peoples and 
their deities an entrance ticket into the Roman Empire. In the Pantheon, empire 
building, cosmological awareness and political theology converge. 
 
 
§ 2. The School of Athens 
 
The mosaic of Pompeii, commemorating the beginning of Apollonian thought, 
was made in the First Century A.D. when Apollonian culture was already at its 
peak. The mosaic looks back on its context of discovery, Plato’s Academy, 
located in a sports park, just outside the walls of Athens. However exuberant and 
impressive this image is, the viewer is not really involved in this thought event, 
from which we are separated by such a huge temporal distance.  
There is another artwork, however, which emphatically aims to re-evoke 
Apollonian thinking and bring it back to life as it were: an interactive artwork 
that invites the spectator to engage in a lively discussion with philosophers 
depicted large as life – the fresco The School of Athens by Raphael in the Vatican 
Museum – an impressive expression of a neo-Apollonian Renaissance, rendering 
the idea of the world as κόσµος plausible again, but under drastically changed 
conditions. The spectator is invited to participate in this celebration. It is a 
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retrospect that forms part of a cultural campaign aimed to rehabilitate the 
Apollonian style. Greek philosophers and scientists are depicted as if they are 
contemporaries, of each other and of the Pope who ordered the artwork to be 
made. In reality, these scholars lived in different times at different locations. They 
are united by the artist in an imaginary, utopian location. The Renaissance Pope 
wanted to consider himself one of them. This reunion of heroes does not result in 
a consensus sapientium, however. Some Dionysian dissidents disdainfully 
withdraw from the academic conversations at the centre. 
Raphael (1483-1520) produced his masterpiece between 1509 and 1511. 
What he portrays is not so much a school as a battle between two schools. What 
becomes visible in this artwork is the struggle between two Greek styles of 
thinking, the Apollonian and the Dionysian style. The Apollonian style dominates 
the artwork, its protagonists control the scene and the fresco mainly depicts 
Apollonian teachers and students. Most scholars are engaged in verbal forms of 
inquiry, although there is also some reading and writing going on. Plato and 
Aristotle are involved in a debate at the centre of this utopian intellectual 
microcosm. Plato carries his dialogue Timaeus, while Aristotle carries his Ethics. 
In both books, Apollonian philosophy is connected with Apollonian mathematics. 
Ethics, however, is also the book in which Aristotle explicitly engages in a critical 
debate with his teacher (1926/1982, I vi. 1). 
Other protagonists of Apollonian thinking are also represented. Socrates, 
the founder of Apollonian logic, literally thinks with his fingers: Human beings 
are mortal; Socrates is a human being; ergo: Socrates is mortal. Euclid teaches 
math using a wax tablet, and Ptolemy teaches astronomy using a sphere. 
However, rival Dionysian thinkers are also represented, demonstrating disinterest 
by turning away from the main characters centre stage. Heraclitus, Epicurus and 
Diogenes proclaim the idea that reality is a capricious, chaotic Dionysian feast, 
while tangible things are nothing but clotting and disintegrating atoms, under the 
influence of love and hatred. To articulate this truth, Epicurus developed a 
Dionysian physics, entailing a mathematics of its own, based on the concept of 
clinamen, i.e. spontaneous deviations giving rise to atomic swerve (Serres 1977). 
First and foremost, however, Dionysian thinking is developed through poetry 
(Zwart 2014a). Heraclitus (in the foreground) distances himself from Apollonian 
debate by writing a poem. And Epicurus (on the left, crowned with grape leaves) 
is writing a didactic poem about nature. For the Dionysian style of thinking, 
nature is not κόσµος, but unfathomable and uncontainable. 
The artwork itself is one of the highlights of the Renaissance, the 
temporary rebirth of the Apollonian ideal, albeit under Faustian conditions. The 
ambiance has changed: the sports park has been replaced by a palace. The 
Apollonian revival aims to distance itself from late-medieval Gothic culture, but 
only partially succeeds in doing so. The fresco unequivocally radiates a Faustian 
Will into power. The building in which the Apollonian deliberations take place 
is, – much like nearby Saint Peter’s dome – a hybrid edifice, a coniunctio 
oppositorium, combining Apollonian desire for harmony with Faustian craving 




for height, gravity and perspective. The Apollonian style is engaged in a 
polemics5 with Dionysian thinking (voiced and enacted by Heraclitus and 
Epicurus), but also with Faustian thinking. The Baroque and its basic geometrical 
idea, the ellipse (the mathematical symbol of a world with two focal points: 
rationality and religion, science and the Church) is already quite near: a heavy, 
expansive, Faustian reclamation of Renaissance tendencies.    
  
 
§ 3. Nostalgia for Plato’s Academy 
 
However impressive Raphael’s fresco as artwork may be, the image of the 
Academy it conveys is quite misleading. Such a location has never existed. 
Raphael positions Plato, along with his followers and rivals, in a fictitious, 
idealized environment. Apparently, he imagined the Academy to be an immense 
theatre for education and research, an ideal university. The architectural ambience 
of the philosophers’ conversation reflects the Apollonian thinking style, but in a 
mature version – as civilization. His vision of Plato’s school is decidedly 
anachronistic. At the time of Plato, Apollonian thinking was still culture: a small-
scale thinking practice. How should we imagine the Academy? Let us try to return 
to the beginning, the context or discovery. 
The Pompeii mosaic offers a more faithful image than Raphael’s fresco. 
Seven academics gather together in an outdoors location. There is silence and 
concentration. In the background we notice a park (near a stream), a tree 
(probably a plane-tree), a sundial and a city. The teacher teaches mathematics. 
With his stick, he demonstrates the geometric properties of the sphere. The 
Academy was situated in a park landscape. Apart from buildings of modest size, 
there were facilities for physical exercise. Such conditions favoured speculation 
and reflection, in contrast with the public, metropolitan locations in the city 
centre, where Socrates preferably hung about. 
Plato’s scholarly practice differed from that of his teacher Socrates. The 
latter was decidedly a city dweller, and the same was true for many of his 
contemporaries, the sophists. They practiced their intellectual pursuits in the 
centre, where public meeting places were located, primarily the market square 
(ἀγορά). Plato’s first encounter with his mentor took place near the theatre of 
Dionysus, amidst a metropolitan crowd. Plato himself became an agoraphobic 
philosopher who wanted to escape the crowds. The elite began to eschew the 
public squares and baths. Philosophers played a key role in this exodus away from 
the bustle of the city centre. The centre had become too noisy for scholarly debate. 
                                                             
5 That Plato’s and Aristotle’s works have been retained, while the Dionysian legacy 
has largely been lost, is no coincidence. Texts were vulnerable and scarce, and 
competing schools were out to destroy the output of rivals (Cf. “Platon soll alle Bücher 
des Demokrit haben aufkaufen und verbrennen wollen” (Stenzel 1972, p. 60). 
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From Socrates, Plato had learned dialectics. On his travels to Southern 
Italy he picked up mathematics and became acquainted with Theodorus of 
Cyrene, teacher of his renowned colleague Theaetetus. In the dialogue named 
after him (Plato 1921/1996), we indeed encounter Theodorus as a maths teacher 
tackling the hazardous problem of √2 from an Apollonian viewpoint. The 
dialogue stages a conversation between Socrates, Theodorus and Theaetetus. 
Socrates (Plato) informs them that many young people travel to Megara to receive 
math training – he had been one of them. Shortly after his return to Athens, on 
his fortieth birthday, he founded his school (387 BC). Socratic dialectics and 
mathematics constituted the elementary principles of knowledge.  
Plato founded his school in a park north of Athens whose name referred 
to a statue of the hero Academus. Although there were some buildings, including 
a µουσεῖον (school and library), it was primarily an open walled area with olive 
trees and plane trees, a campus (= field). The park served as a gymnasium, a 
facility for physical exercise, supervised by a γυµνασίαρχος. The location was 
not only used for sports, but also contained shrines and graves of prominent 
Athenians, while religious festivities such as torch parades were organised there 
as well. In short, Plato and his followers had to share the park with other visitors 
and users, but it was a considerably quieter and more pleasant spot than the urban 
spaces within the city walls. Diogenes Laertius (1925/1972) describes the 
Academy as a beautiful sports park with trees and fountains (for shade and 
cooling), located alongside the road leading from the Athenian Κεραµεικός 
(pottery) district to the North. Pausanias remarks that several sanctuaries like this 
could be found along Athens’ main roads. He describes the Academy as a leafy 
sports park near a river (1971, p. 83): a nice place to be, a perfect meeting ground 
for aristocratic youngsters interested in physical and mental exercises, away from 
the hustle and bustle – to the extent that this was possible in metropolitan Athens. 
In 1966, the sanctuary was uncovered by archaeologists. They found large 
numbers of tablets used by students. Plato lived on campus as it were, among his 
students, and was buried not far from the main site.  
The desire to distance themselves from the crowd must also be 
understood in socio-political terms: away from the masses. Conservative 
Athenian aristocrats assembled there to express their dissatisfaction with the 
democratic regime and to discuss what the ideal education should be for future 
leaders. The curriculum would build on mathematics. Athens had not been able 
to realise its political ambitions as world-power on the rise and Plato attributed 
this to deficient mathematics. This traumatic experience led to a craving for an 
“inner reconstruction” (Jaeger 1959, II, p. 2). In their sports park, Plato and his 
friends evaded the depressing climate of every-day political practice to ponder 
over questions concerning ideal politics and the good life. Mathematics was 
regarded as a basic intellectual pursuit. Above the entrance of sanctuaries, 
inscriptions usually could be found, such as “Only the honourable ones are 
welcome here”, and above the entrance to the Academy there was a similar 
caption indicating that only those who were well-versed in mathematics should 




enter. Other intellectual exercises were considered impossible without a sufficient 
grounding in maths. Plato worked closely with leading mathematicians such as 
Eudoxus and Theaetetus. Eudoxus was poor and lived in Piraeus. To attend 
Plato’s lectures, he had to walk eleven kilometres twice every day. He became 
famous for his work on the astronomical globe and on propositions (Book V of 
Euclid’s Στοιχεῖα), while Theaetetus was responsible for the five regular 
polyhedra (Book XIII). 
In Πολιτεία (“Republic”), Plato (1930/1999) provided an outline of the 
formation (παιδεία) for the guardians of the ideal state. As Werner Jaeger (1959) 
emphasised in his tripartite study, mathematical education was the core of the 
Apollonian training program that Plato developed. In fact, the ideal education that 
Plato outlines, reflects his own academic practice, albeit on a grander scale. In 
other words, in order to get a clear picture of how Apollonian practices in Plato’s 
Academy were actually conducted, Πολιτεία should be consulted first and 
foremost, because it provides the blueprint of Plato’s own school. Plato wrote his 
dialogues to advertise his program and to ridicule and discredit his opponents and 
rivals. They are literary documents conveying Athenian “urbanity” (Hegel 1971b, 
p. 25), notably the competitive debating practices, their style, complexity and 
pace. The “intramural” education, conducted within the walls of the Academy, 
were probably more formal and systematic in nature. Aristotle, when he mentions 
Plato, refers almost exclusively to the more philosophical dialogues, such as 
Republic and Laws, closely related to the verbal (esoteric) educational practices 
in which he himself participated for many years. 
Plato’s dialogues were intended for the outside world. Whoever had 
found his way to the Academy would discover another, more “esoteric” Plato 
(Wippern 1972). The humorous and playful style would give way to the 
seriousness of mathematical research concerning numbers and geometric figures. 
Important concepts such as the soul or the good were mathematically defined. At 
one point, Plato dared to present a lecture in public, for a wider audience, 
concerning the good, in his esoteric style, based on mathematical methods, but 
this experiment resulted in a debacle. Mathematics, the language of true 
knowledge, apparently was not suitable for spreading ideas outside the safety of 
the immunizing walls. 
Greek education included two components: musical education and 
gymnastics (Jaeger II 284), where physical exercise functioned as military 
propaedeutic. The gymnasium was a place where physical education and training 
flourished and Plato’s Academy, located in the vicinity of such a gym, was the 
perfect entourage for mental exercises, as add-on to the traditional package. To 
the classical program of education and training (aimed at a harmonious and 
balanced development of body and soul through gymnastics and music), Plato 
added mathematics as “gymnastics of the mind” (Plato, 1935 / 2000, 521 C ff.; 
Jaeger 1959 III, p. 2). That was the quintessence of the educational innovation 
that he idealised in Republic and practiced in his own school. Academics saw 
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themselves as intellectual athletes. Especially books V, VI and VII give an idea 
of Plato’s own intellectual practice. 
Another dialogue that provides insight into Plato’s actual education 
practice is Meno (1937/1999). While in Republic the outline of a complete 
curriculum is outlined, Meno stages an introductory lesson for beginners. Math 
methodology is used to analyse basic concepts at an elemental level, culminating 
in the famous mathematical exercise where an untrained student is made to 
demonstrate the theorem of Pythagoras. Probably, such an exercise functioned as 
an admission examination or intelligence test (Stenzel 1928). 
From Plato’s perspective, mathematics was ideally suited to bring about 
the mental “reversal” (µετάνοια) he aimed for. The attention had to shift from 
unpredictable Dionysian reality to the world of ideal forms, accessible only 
through intellectual contemplation, from opportunism to moral virtuosity. The 
perfect politicians whom Plato wanted to train would be willing to distance 
themselves from the political turbulence of everyday life in order to ground their 
political practice in a mathematical conceptualization of the ideal polis. 
Apollonian geometry was very suitable for this purpose because it did not focus 
attention on empirical objects, but on the properties of ideal forms (spheres, 
polyhedra, theoretical entities). Mathematics was the paradigm science and 
provided the basic building blocks for philosophical thinking (Stenzel 1972, 286 
et seq., 293). As Plato explains in Republic (522 E ff.), Mathematics encompasses 
a number of sub-disciplines. First of all, the theory of numbers, not in the sense 
of practical arithmetic, but as a fundamental field, seeing numbers as proportions. 
Next, geometry as the theory of two-dimensional objects, followed by 
stereometry – the theory of the three-dimensional bodies, as static objects – and 
ultimately astronomy (the science that investigates the regular movements of 
perfect three-dimensional mega-objects). Plato acknowledges that mathematics 
may have some applicability and practical value (for example in the context of 
warfare), but its true value is educational and concerns the edification of the soul 
(Jaeger, 1959, p. 26). As gymnastics awakens the body, pure mathematics evokes 
a mental awakening. Mathematics is the tool that allows us to transform mere 
opinion into true knowledge. 
The importance of mathematics as a core subject of academic 
(Apollonian) education is also confirmed, Jaeger argues, because it was a target 
of criticism by opponents, who rebuked Plato for encouraging his students not to 
engage in useful subjects such as rhetoric, but to squander their time on 
mathematical puzzles. This abstract trend, so characteristic of academic practice, 
was subsequently extended to other disciplines. Insofar as attention was given to 
empirical reality at all, for example to plants and animals, academic research and 
education consisted in classifying life forms, but again on the basis of the concept 
of proportionality (Plato 1925/1995), and primarily as a mental exercise. Music 
education did not mean that students learned to play an instrument, because that 
was just “technique”. They were introduced in harmony as a sub-branch of 
number theory. Leading Greek mathematicians were familiar faces in Plato’s 




academy. The stereometrics to which Plato exposed his guardians was developed 
by Theaetetus. Euclid systematised the mathematical thinking of Plato’s circle. 
Although Plato himself was not a mathematician, he was the philosopher who 
emphasised its crucial importance. 
Socrates is the main character in Plato’s dialogues (with the exception of 
Laws). He likes to mingle with non-academics in risky, exoteric exchanges of 
views, in the city centre or, even better, in the homes of wealthy Athenians. Such 
was the context in which Socrates felt at home.6 Plato’s early dialogues breathe a 
metropolitan, not yet academic atmosphere. Other texts depict intellectual life in 
a leafy sports park outside the walls, a place of relaxation, of meeting like-minded 
people: the mean, as it were, between rural nature and plebeian urbanity. 
In fact, we need to distinguish between two types of dialogues, namely 
those in which Socrates is truly given the floor, and later dialogues, where Plato 
himself is actually speaking and teaching. There are dialogues that take us back 
to the past (to the think-shop, the φροντιστήριο, Socrates’ context or discovery), 
and dialogues that depict the specificity of Plato’s own intellectual practice, using 
the label Socrates merely as a brand. The distinction between both types of 
dialogues is quite noticeable. The dialogues in which Socrates really plays a part, 
are set in localities he preferred: public places within the city walls, where large 
crowds gathered. Others are staged in gymnasiums and sports parks just outside 
the walls, with more opportunities for intellectuals to retreat and deliberate, with 
only students and colleagues as an audience. 
In the opening passage of Republic, Socrates has a recognisable voice. 
We discover him amidst a crowd of people on their way back to Athens, after 
visiting a festival in Piraeus. Then, the house of a wealthy Athenian citizen serves 
as setting for an exchange of views with outsiders. In the course of the dialogue, 
however, Socrates gradually disappears from view and Plato himself is placed 
frontstage. The entourage changes accordingly, and later chapters provide a 
window into Plato’s own Academy. Symposium, on the other hand, is firmly 
Socratic (Plato 1925/1996). The story begins in the theatre of Dionysus, which 
could host thousands of citizens, but then moves to the house of wealthy Agathon, 
who had just won the stage competition as a writer of tragedy. The “Socratic” 
dialogue Gorgias begins in a busy street and then moves to the house of Callicles. 
And in the dialogue Protagoras, Socrates is lifted from his bed while it is still 
dark and taken to a beautiful Athenian house erected around a patio. Menexenos 
is set in the busy city centre near the Agora and the dialogue Theages likewise 
begins in a busy street near the city centre. Socrates and his interlocutor then go 
to a colonnade not far from the Agora to continue the conversation (Plato 
1927/1986, 121 A). Other Socratic dialogues also unfold within the walls of 
                                                             
6 “Sein Leben verbrachte er wie viele Athener auf der Straße, auf dem Markt, in den 
Gymnasien, mit der Teilnahme an Gastmahlen. Es war ein Leben des Gesprächs mit 
Jedermann” (Jaspers 1964/1983, p. 82).  
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Athens: the Apology in the courtroom, Crito and Phaedo in prison. Charmides 
takes place in a busy school inside the city premises. 
These urban locations contrast with the more academic atmosphere of 
other dialogues. Whoever wants to develop an impression of Plato’s Academy 
should read the first pages of Lysis (1925/1996). Socrates is heading to a sports 
park just outside the walls, near a spring, where a new wrestling school has just 
been opened. The school is visited by attractive, affluent young men who spend 
their free time with wrestling, games and discussions, under the guidance of a 
qualified philosopher,7 a convincing portrayal of Plato’s Academy in its early 
days. The dialogue Euthydemus takes us to the same location, and also 
Theaetetus, in which the math genius appears as youngster, provides a viable 
image of the Academy as an environment for thinking and learning. The dialogue 
unfolds in a sports park. We see how young men get ready for a wrestling match 
(1921/1996, 144 C) on a race track. In addition to sports education, brain 
gymnastics is practiced in gymnasiums too. Visitors are introduced in geometry 
by Theodorus. A youthful Theaetetus explains what subjects he teaches 
(geometry, astronomy, harmony, numerology) and gives a demonstration of these 
exercises in a Euclidian style, using line sections and planes to solve 
mathematical problems. Sophist is conducted in the same location and also the 
mathematical dialogue Statesman, again featuring Theodorus, is situated in an 
academic ambiance, where lines are drawn in the sand and intersected in the 
middle. As noted, Meno is thoroughly Academic. In the open-air, math problems 
are solved, again by drawing lines in the sand. And while the setting of Republic 
is initially Socratic, it eventually becomes truly Platonic. Timaeus is a Platonic 
seminar from the outset, a continuation of Republic. Such seminars must have 
been conducted by Plato on a regular basis. Plato’s final dialogue, Laws, takes us 
to Crete, to the road that leads from Knossos to the Ida sanctuary.  
In the comedy Clouds by Aristophanes (1962/1988), perhaps the most 
prominent critic of Apollonian thinking, the Socratic entourage is also 
emphasized. Socrates again plays the leading role here. The portrait which 
Aristophanes draws of him is the photographic negative, however, of Plato’s 
version, but the contrast between city centre and sports park as locations for doing 
philosophy is drawn in a comparable manner. A verbal wrestling match is staged 
between two forms of logic: the good and the bad, to determine what the best 
education for young men is. The bad logic feels most comfortable in public areas, 
such as the agora, disputing in front of large audiences and mingling in loud 
conversations; The good logic, on the other hand, flourishes in gymnasiums, 
primarily the Academy, which is explicitly mentioned (1962/1988, p. 127 ff.). 
There, between plane, poplar and olive trees, young men are trained in wrestling, 
running and verbal virtuosity. While the bad logic attracts youngsters to the 
                                                             
7 “He showed me, just outside the wall, a sort of enclosure and a door standing open. 
We pass our time there, he went on” (Plato 1925/1996, 203B). 




bathhouses in the centre, the good logic points the way to the academy, to the 
sports park, the runway in the shadow of plane trees. 
Finally, in Phaedrus, the Academy is presented in statu nascendi, in its 
most recognisable form (Plato 1914/1995). When Socrates runs into Phaedrus, a 
student, they decide to deliberate about love outside the city walls. The 
conversation takes place under a plane tree, on the banks of a stream. This 
Arcadian landscape, quite suited as ambiance for love and seduction, as well as 
for contemplation and education, is an exact replica of the Park of Academus. 
Phaedrus is heading for a walk outside the walls (περίπατον ἔξω τείχους). What 
is a young aristocratic Athenian looking for on such a hot day at this particular 
location? In the first place, intellectual relaxation. He intends to learn a text by 
head which he is carrying in his hand, hoping to find optimal conditions for such 
a mental exercise. Secondly, physical effort. Socrates indicates that he is so eager 
to deliberate with the attractive Phaedrus that he is willing to follow him even if 
he intends to walk all the way to Megara and back (to the wall and back again, 
227D). The phrase “to the wall and back again” refers to the physician Herodicus, 
whose specialty were physical exercises. Outside the walls of the city, he trained 
clients in walking or running (to the wall and back again, his slogan), gradually 
increasing distance or pace. In other words, this academic primal scene revolves 
around a combination of physical and mental training (a walk outside the walls 
to further this learning by head). Teacher and student find a suitable, leafy 
location, under a large plane tree near a brook, not far from a sanctuary, an altar 
for Boreas. Again, the Academy in statu nascendi. There are other statues in the 
vicinity – it is a sacred place (230B). For Socrates, the city-dweller, this is an 
unusual situation. His dialogues are usually staged on the market square, as we 
have seen, or in homes of wealthy citizens. He leaves the city rarely or never, he 
admits. He learns from people, not from trees. Nevertheless, in pursuit of 
beautiful young Phaedrus, he now admits that this place is very suitable for 
intellectual exchange, thus giving it his blessing as the cradle of what would 
become Plato’s own school.  
Plato has good reasons to situate this scene in such an Arcadian 
environment. This primal scene legitimises his decision to establish his academy 
in such an extramural location, not far from a road, not far from a river, near a 
sanctuary. The location chosen by Phaedrus and Socrates is the prototype of 
Plato’s Academy. Socrates gives the example, Plato follows his master. Or rather, 
he presents his own decision (to establish a study centre in a park outside the city 
walls) as an endeavour which follows in Socrates’ footsteps. The anecdote serves 
to justify his innovation. In the park, he and his followers find a quiet ambiance 
for mental and physical exercises. As true aristocrats, they can afford to distance 
themselves from the masses. In Phaedrus, Plato allows Socrates to sanction this 
intellectual exodus.  
When Aristotle establishes his own school, after his return from 
Macedonia, he likewise opts for a public exercise park, a gym, the Λύκειον 
(Lyceum), an open terrain near a temple dedicated to Apollo with covered paths 
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where he lectured in the mornings.8 The “peripatetic” school is named after this 
custom of teaching while walking on these covered promenades. There was a 
sanctuary for the Muses, a building with maps and a library (µουσεῖον). 
Aristotle’s philosophical garden reflects the Apollonian model.  
This model contrasts with the gardens where Dionysian rivals did their 
thinking. The Dionysian garden of Epicurus, the magister otii, the master of 
pleasure, had a different character. Unlike the sports parks of Apollonian thinkers, 
it was a real garden, a place for pleasure rather than exercise. Pliny regarded him 
as the inventor of the city garden. As a garden philosopher he is portrayed by 
Nietzsche. Sitting pleasantly in his city garden, he criticizes his academic rivals. 
On the way to Plato’s academy, you would pass the garden of Epicurus.  
Why all this attention for the Academy as a location? Because it is not a 
coincidence that Apollonian thinking evolved in a sports park. It was the place 
where educated individuals spent their leisure time. The emphasis was not on 
rhetoric, such as in the city centre, nor on practical skills. In the city park, you 
could devote yourself to pure geometry and pure politics, and become involved 
in intellectual games and high-brow political discussions, exploring the 
geometrical foundations of an ideal polis, led by philosophers who determined 
the properties of a perfect city in the same way as mathematicians determined the 
properties of a cube or a sphere.  
Theaetetus is the dialogue which maximises the distance between public 
exercise park and city centre. The prerequisites for academic philosophy, 
according to Socrates, – but it is obvious that Plato himself is speaking here – are: 
a sufficient amount of spare time (σχολή) or, more preferably even, the absence 
of the time dimension as a disturbing factor, and the absence of uninitiated 
listeners. In the city centre, discursivity evolved under completely different 
conditions. Here, the duration and pace of the debate are constrained by external 
factors. The Academy offered discursive freedom (Ελευθερία του λόγου). True 
academics have no idea what is happening in the city centre (173 C) and spend 
much of their time studying the starry sky. The Academy is the place where 
philosophers dwell in proximity of the gods (176B). The absence (or minimal 
presence) of the time dimension also allows Plato’s dialogues to involve 
representatives of multiple generations (Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates, Theaetetus) 
in the debate as if they were contemporaries: the same conscious disregard of the 
time dimension so characteristic of Raphael’s School of Athens. 
Academic thinking proved a sustainable product. Plato’s Academy 
continued to exist for almost a thousand years, although the famous plane and 
olive trees were cut during the siege by the Romans, when Apollonian civilization 
absorbed Athens within its sphere of influence. Diogenes Laertius describes how 
                                                             
8 “[Aristoteles kehrte] nach Athen zurück als öffentlicher Lehrer und lehrte dort auf 
einem öffentliche Plätze, Lyzeum, einer Anlage, die Perikles zum Exerzieren der 
Rekruten hatte machen lassen. Sie bestand in einem Tempel, dem Apollo Λύκειος 
geweiht, - Spaziergänge (περίπατοι), mit Bäumen und Quellen und Säulenhallen belebt” 
(Hegel 1971b, p. 140).  




many generations received their education there as adults. Teachers spent their 
days on site, amidst their students. The combination of intellectual and physical 
exercise remained a signature feature. Sports were practiced naked and apart from 
philosophy, gay eroticism flourished. Socrates likewise seems to be looking for 
attractive male bodies as much as for conversation partners, in the places which 
Plato makes him visit. Platonic did not mean, as dictionaries phrase it, that the 
physical element was absent, but rather that the lover played the role of alter ego. 
The lover was a second self, belonging to the next generation. Teachers often had 
a favourite pupil, with whom they shared their campus existence and who were 
eventually appointed as successors. They formed a trans-generational unit. Gay 
erotic love facilitated the relay from one generation to the next. This was the 
context of discovery of the Apollonian style of thought.  
 
 
§ 4. From φύσις to κόσµος  
 
Φύσις was the term used by Dionysian philosophers of nature to refer to being as 
a whole. As Aristotle (1958/1982) phrases it, Φύσις meant that which moves, 
develops and perishes on its own accord, in accordance with its own principles 
of change, without our doing. In those days, human societies were modest 
enclaves amidst an immense, ubiquitous, inviolable nature. The impact of human 
activity was limited in scope, nature was experienced as awesome, and the basic 
experience or attitude invoked by nature was one of awe, a mixture of fear and 
respect. Human responsibility was confined to the human sphere. On nature as 
such, human action barely seemed to have an influence. Outdoors nature was not 
yet a subject of ethical reflection and environmental philosophy did not exist yet. 
Nature as φύσις was the primary subject of Dionysian Greek thinking. 
These philosophers were physicists. The term φύσις refers to a nature experience 
that emphasizes its unpredictable aspects. It is difficult to study nature, as nature 
is wont to hide herself (Heraclitus). This experience of the changeability and 
fluidity of nature is also reflected in the famous statement that we cannot step into 
the same river twice. The visible, changing, natural real cannot provide reliable 
knowledge. That is, Greek thinking initially thinks in a Dionysian way. We must 
understand nature as the clustering together and breaking apart of invisibly small, 
elementary particles named atoms. Under the influence of love and hate, 
attraction and rejection, the figures and landscapes we observe with the naked 
eye are temporarily formed. Four types of atoms (elements) are distinguished 
(fire, air, water and earth). Real nature is made up of hybrid entities: mixtures of 
air and water (foam), water and earth (mud), fire and earth (lava), and so forth. 
The Greek elements live on in modern science as the so-called aggregation states 
(solids, liquids, gas), while fire was comparable to what Faustian thinking would 
later call “energy”.  
In this Dionysian context a counter-movement developed: Apollonian 
thinking. This style aimed to supersede the capriciousness and unpredictability of 
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nature. Her science was pure geometry. Protagonists of this new style introduced 
a totally different understanding of nature, shifting the focus of attention from 
φύσις to κόσµος to emphasise order and harmony in nature. Apollonian 
philosophy, but also the mathematics associated with it (the geometry of 
Eudoxus, Theaetetus and Euclid) reflected a new basic conviction, namely that a 
perfect geometrical structure can be discerned in nature. This conviction (this 
basic truth) also provided guidance to politics and ethics. This new thinking style 
was destined to become the dominant one, but never uncontested. In the folds and 
margins of Apollonian discursivity, the battle continued. Apollonian logic 
continued to compete with its Dionysian rival. Dionysian thinking is less well 
documented and it is not unthinkable that representatives of the dominant 
Apollonian style deliberately tried to destroy its legacy, by literally destroying 
texts for instance. Socrates’ negative verdict concerning textuality may have 
applied specifically to the Dionysian corpus, which was committed to the flames. 
But precisely because it was the counterpart or antithetic negative, however, 
surviving instances of Dionysian thinking may help us to specify the exact nature 
of the Apollonian thinking style. The opposite is also true, in the sense that 
Apollonian textual documents (in which the rival style is represented in a 
polemical manner) became a key source of information concerning Dionysian 
thinking. Via the confrontation with rival styles, it is possible to gain a deeper 
insight into the fundamental logic, the apparent self-evidence, the apparent 
Selbstverständlichkeit of Apollonian thinking. 
 
 
§ 5. Nature as κόσµος 
 
In Timaeus, Plato explains that nature should be understood as an intelligent 
design, the work of a mathematically trained craftsman, a demiurge who, at the 
beginning of time, created order out of the chaos. Despite the variability and 
capriciousness of existing nature, the construction plan (paradigm) of the 
demiurge was rational, balanced and stable (29B). In the starry sky, this perfect 
order was still visible to some extent for the naked eye. Here, perfect (spherical) 
bodies seemed to follow perfect (circular) pathways over the surface of perfect 
immense spheres. For Plato, the cosmos is a single, all-encompassing whole in 
the form of a sphere (33B), smooth and casted with great exactness (33C), that 
contains within itself all beings, including planet Earth and its inhabitants. 
Building on this grounding idea, Greek thinkers from Plato to Ptolemy envisioned 
the macrocosm as a series of concentric celestial spheres. Over the surface of 
these perfect mathematical figures, spherical celestial bodies described their 
orbits, their circular paths. The fact that this basic idea could not so readily be 
detected in the sky at night was indeed experienced as a problem, but it did not 
result in a reconsideration or rejection of the basic conviction as such. The 
grounding idea as such was never questioned. Spherical theory was not an 
empirical (inductive) theory, but a point of departure, a conviction a priori from 




which reality was brought to the fore, putting everything in a spherical 
perspective.   
The idea that reality actually reflects a perfect geometric structure also 
applied to the microsphere. Plato assumed that the elemental particles from which 
reality is composed, should be regarded as perfect three-dimensional shapes: tiny 
pyramids, cubes, and so on. At the micro-level, the level of elementary particles, 
there should be mathematical perfection as well (32A-32D, 55B-56C). Micro-
nature, Plato claimed, was made up of perfect three-dimensional mathematical 
structures. Again, this idea did not result from empirical research (Plato was 
suspicious of knowledge coming from the sense organs), but was based on 
reflection, on a mental, intellectual vision (θεωρία). The fact that empirically 
perceived reality conveyed a rather chaotic, capricious and irregular spectacle had 
no effect on the rigidity, the apodictic import of the basic conviction that 
dominated Apollonian thinking. The perfect geometric structure of the cosmos as 
such was never a point of discussion. It was an object of contemplation, the 
central motive of speculative thinking, not the result of observation, but a point 
of departure that oriented and stimulated research. The senses were considered 
unreliable precisely because they did not clearly and undisputedly reflect the 
perfect geometric structure that simply had to be. Uninitiated humans were 
apparently unable to see the world in a proper perspective. Instead of developing 
instruments that could amplify the reliability of our senses, it was typical of Greek 
Apollonian thinking to rather rely on speculative competence. For developing a 
more technical and experimental approach, Greek science not only lacked the 
necessary technological dexterity, but also the proper logic.  
For an Apollonian thinker, to observe meant to admire. Observare in 
Latin actually means to respect, to comply with, to regard. The cosmos was 
considered with awe. Admiration was the basic attitude or mood, the basic 
perspective from which nature was explored, articulated by Ptolemy when he 
confessed that he could not look at the starry sky without sliding into a state of 
divine inebriety.9 Nature as cosmos differed from real nature, the type of nature 
Greek farmers and fishermen were dealing with in their everyday practice: nature 
as a recalcitrant environment. Nature as cosmos was the nature of the gentlemen 
philosophers, the starry sky far above us and the elemental particles, only 
accessible for the initiated mind, trained in geometry. What they admired was a 
theoretical construct, an idealisation, projected onto nature.  
This style of thinking, this logic, was decidedly unmodern. Faustian 
astronomers like Galilei or Newton also attempted to disclose the universe with 
the help of mathematics, but in their case a completely different kind of maths 
was employed – and a completely different universe emerge, a Faustian universe: 
infinite, terrifying, silent. The cosmos of Plato and Aristotle was a closed universe 
                                                             
9 “When I trace at my pleasure the windings to and fro of the heavenly bodies, I no 
longer touch the earth with my feet: I stand in the presence of Zeus himself and take my 
fill of ambrosia, food of the gods” (Boyer 1968, p. 158). 
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of limited size. Infinity for Aristotle was not a physical reality. The Faustian 
universe is infinite. Ptolemy could not perceive the cosmos without experiencing 
ecstasy, but the Faustian universe is cold and inhospitable. When Faustian 
astronomers began to envision the basic structure of their universe, the starting 
point was not the sphere, but the three-dimensional coordinate system with its 
three axes pointing towards infinity. The way in which Faustian astronomers 
perceived the universe differed profoundly from Apollonian thinking. The style 
of practicing astronomy changed radically under Faustian conditions.  
As an undercurrent of Western thinking, however, the Apollonian style 
remained influential even after her demise. Thinking styles may resurge every 
now and then, to be driven into oblivion again later on, and a remarkable example 
of this is the early work of astronomer Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) who used 
Apollonian logic to produce a mathematical model of the universe in his 
Mysterium Cosmographicum (dating from 1596). The astronomy of the naked 
eye knew five planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn). In 1543 
Copernicus introduced the idea that Earth was also a planet, but he continued to 
assume that spherical celestial bodies describe circular orbits across concentric 
spheres, with each planet circling along the 
surface of an imaginary sphere. The 
universe is spherical, he argued, because, 
of all forms, the sphere is the most perfect, 
being a complete whole, best suited to 
enclose all things. “Hence no one will 
question the attribution of this form to the 
divine bodies” (1543/1978, p. 8). This is 
Apollonian logic in optima forma. 
 The discovery that there are six planets, 
because Earth is a planet, inspired Kepler 
in his attempt to combine Plato’s five 
perfect three-dimensional solids with the 
six planetary spheres, placing the five 
solids (pyramid, cube, etc.) in the 
interspaces between the six spheres. In 
other words, the universe represented a perfect (harmonic) geometric structure. 
For young Kepler, the universe was still a cosmos, a beautiful mathematical 
artwork. This mathematical fantasy (a compromise between Apollonian and 
Faustian thinking) failed to concur with the facts, however, and had to be rejected, 
but became an important step towards Kepler’s ground-breaking discovery that 
the orbits described by planets are ellipses, a Baroque idea: the ellipse being a 








§ 6. Apollonian ethics 
 
Apollonian ethics is likewise grounded in geometry. Apollonian ethics operates 
more geometrico – in a mathematical fashion. Meno is famous for its treatment 
of the theorem of Pythagoras, but it is actually an introductory ethics lesson. The 
question is what virtuousness is and whether virtue can be taught. To answer such 
a question, Socrates/Plato reverts to maths, starting from a hypothesis “as 
mathematicians do” (86E). This same mathematical approach can be encountered 
in Aristotle’s Ethics (1926/1982), the Apollonian ethics handbook par excellence. 
Contemporary readers such as Martha Nussbaum (1986) read this text from a 
quasi-self-evident, but in fact very contemporary viewpoint, positing a distinction 
between humanities and exact science, between esprit de finesse and esprit de 
géométrie. Nussbaum emphasises the difference between the two, between moral 
sensitivity and scientific accuracy (p. 290 ff.). Her characterisation of ethics as 
something non-scientific is based on the contemporary distinction between 
humanities and science, a distinction which is completely un-Aristotelian, 
however, and, when applied to Aristotle, anachronistic, as Nussbaum herself 
admits (p. 245). One of the drawbacks of such a reading is that it overlooks the 
mathematical dimension of Aristotle’s ethics, whilst that dimension is 
emphatically present: it is the core of his approach.  
While Aristotle wrote a Physics in which mathematics seems more or less 
absent, his Ethics is profoundly mathematical. This is understandable when we 
realise that we are dealing with Apollonian ethics. Aristotle admits that ethics 
cannot achieve the same level of precision as Apollonian geometry (1926/1982, 
I. iii, 1-4), but that does not prevent him from treating ethics mathematically. 
Indeed, Aristotle claims that ethics has its own level of precision. Mathematics 
and ethics are not incompatible and he emphatically uses Apollonian mathematics 
to define core ethical concepts. The good is determined as the middle between 
excess (hyperbola) and deficit (ellipse). Bravery relates to recklessness and 
cowardice as a circle relates to a hyperbola and an ellipse. Proper action hits the 
middle (στοχαστική του µεσου). This determination of the good as the middle 
between excess (υπερβολή) and deficit (έλλειψης) builds on Plato – cf. Plato’s 
Statesman (283C) or Republic (587C), where he discusses whether happiness is 
achievable by employing mathematical means. Aristotle is more willing than 
Plato to make concessions to actual practice, however, indicating that the good is 
not exactly in the middle. Strict, rigid justice is corrected by equity. 
Aristotle’s concept of justice is further elaborated via the mathematics of 
proportionality, as developed by Eudoxus, member of the Academy and teacher 
of Aristotle, whose work is represented in book V of Euclid’s Elements. 
Distributive justice is a matter of proportionality. The distribution of goods must 
be tailored to someone’s social rank. Aristocrats are a relatively small group, but 
of great social value. It is therefore legitimate that they claim a relatively large 
share of assets. During his discussion, Aristotle used a diagram with the lines AA’ 
and BB’ representing persons and the lines CC’ and DD’ representing their share, 
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so that AA’: CC’ = BB’: DD’ (V. iii. 6-8). We find this type of thinking about 
distributive justice also in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae. Justice is 
proportionality, geometrically defined.10  
Faustian thinking, as we will see in later, entails a reversal of values. 
Faustian physics is unthinkable without mathematics, but in Faustian ethics, 
mathematics seems virtually absent – if not entirely. Kant (1763/1971), for 
example, – a Faustian thinker because the chronic tension between duty and 
inclination is his starting point –, attempted to clarify the distinction between 
good and evil using a Faustian mathematical invention: negative numbers. 
According to Spengler, these number are Faustian because they no longer 
correspond to things we can touch manually or count with our fingers (as in the 
case of natural numbers). Although the insertion of the number 0 (symbolising 
the gap that is left behind by an absent thing, e.g. an egg or a pebble) was the 
commencement of mathematics proper (disconnecting a number from a tangible 
item), negative numbers take this one step further. Logic and mathematics 
relinquish the reality principle in order to be transformed into a pure and apodictic 
form of λόγος, which is then imposed on reality. Negative numbers exist because 
of the existence of mathematical symbols, of the symbolic order. Without the 
minus sign (without the signifier), a negative number would not exist. Kant now 
states that by using modern mathematical symbols (like +, – and 0), the moral 
quality of an action can be determined. If in an individual there are ten units of 
desire to violate a duty for instance (–10) and twelve units of willingness to act 
in accordance with this duty (+12), while in another individual there are three 
units of desire (–3) and seven units of compliance or responsibility (+7), then, in 
spite of appearances perhaps, the moral quality of the act is greater in the first 
case than in the second. As a Faustian philosopher, the conflict between duty and 
inclination is what counts, and in the first case that conflict is tenser than in the 
second. However, we are dealing with a completely different ethical logic here. 
Proportionality and the golden mean have given way to conflict and struggle as 
the basic Faustian starting point. 
 
 
§ 7. Ridiculing spheres  
 
Apollonian mathematics was an elite pursuit, practiced in locations where young 
gentlemen spent their free time without bothering themselves with practical 
applications. Politics was likewise conducted to allow mathematically skilled 
guardians to function as the inner circle of the spherical state. Apollonian love is 
Platonic love, in a spherical sense, and Plato devoted one of his most impressive 
literary achievements to Apollonian eroticism, especially apt to illustrate the 
importance of spherical thinking, namely Symposium. My discussion builds on 
                                                             
10 “Medium in justitia distributiva sumitur secundum geometricam proportionem…”. 
(Aquinas 1922, Pars Secunda Secundae, Questio LXI). 




Jacques Lacan’s comments, in one of his seminars under the heading “La 
Dérision de la Sphère”: ridiculing the globe (Lacan 1991/2001). 
Like other dialogues, Lacan argues, this dialogue is the result of cerebral 
registration. Contained in the memory of listeners, it followed the route of verbal 
transmission before being put to paper. Place of action is the home of an aristocrat 
named Agathon who won a literature prize, in a theatre that could host thousands 
of spectators. That is the reason for the meeting. On his way to the party, Socrates 
experiences a crisis: he freezes in a porch and does not want to be awakened until 
he has processed (“worked through”) his demonic inspiration.  
A symposium was a ritual conducted according to certain rules, an 
intimate competition between excited gentlemen, between elite scholars, an 
intellectual game. The dialogue therefore contains a lot of information about 
Athenian aristocratic culture. The rules stipulate that guests make contributions 
in the form of an improvised lecture, and refrain from drinking too much. Plato’s 
symposium follows this script, but is disturbed by an unforeseen disruption, an 
embarrassing event. A drunken Alcibiades (a wealthy political dandy, at one time 
Socrates’ pet pupil) enters the house with a train of friends, ignoring all rules of 
propriety. He is renowned for his seductiveness, surrounded by followers and 
spies, attractive and witty, intelligent, boisterous and adventurous. He claims to 
role of chairman to confess some anecdotes concerning Socrates, allegedly his 
erotic mentor, who introduced him into the technicalities of Apollonian love. 
Alcibiades represents spherical dandyism. He was a political adventurer who put 
his energetic drive in service of the spherical desire towards empire formation, 
the expansion of the Greek sphere of influence, but his Dionysian personality 
proved disastrous, quite unfit for realising Apollonian aspirations. 
The subject of the conversation is love; that is, Greek, Apollonian love, 
revolving around beautiful boys: the love between friends, the love of Greek 
intellectuals and dandies. It was an essential element of their intellectual culture. 
Due to the complexities and risks involved in heterosexual love, scholars found 
shelter in philosophical exercises as an erotic alibi. Apollonian love was the love 
of the school, of scholars. It was what Apollonian geometry was in mathematics: 
a simplification or idealisation, a model, compared to the disorderly, complicated 
love between men and women. The academy was a school also in this sense: a 
school of love. Students received erotic training (ars erotica as erotic exercise). 
Aristophanes is a remarkable figure among the guests and his presence 
has puzzled experts. Was he not Socrates’ archenemy, the one who ridiculed him 
and may even have had a hand in his death sentence? But his presence certainly 
has a function. His job is to criticize the spherical worldview which gave rise to 
a spherical understanding of love. The dialogue stages a competition between 
Apollonian thinking and its intellectual antagonist. According to Apollonian 
tradition, contemplation (“contemplation des astres, c’est-à-dire de la sphère”, 
Lacan 1991/2001, p. 14) involves intellectual jouissance. The contemplative 
view, the geometry of heavenly spheres, brings the observer in a state of ecstasy 
and has a pendant in the domain of love: seeing the beloved as your other half, 
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your complement. Here too, pleasure is produced by harmony and perfection, in 
a spherical sense. It is not all that easy, Lacan argues, for us to grasp the logic of 
Apollonian love. Our own ideal or paradigm of love is infused in us by the world 
of cinema. Viewed from an Apollonian perspective, however, the cinema is a 
dark, deceptive cave beguiling us with phantasms and stories. To understand 
platonic love, we must enter a completely different world. Apollonian love 
involves a couple: the lover and his beloved, who together form a perfect unity – 
in a spherical sense. Aristophanes sees it as his mission to extrapolate the 
Apollonian conception (e.g. spherical desire) to precisely that domain where this 
way of thinking runs the risk of becoming ridiculous, namely eroticism. What 
does the desire for geometric spherical perfection amount to in the realm of love? 
Symposium, Lacan argues, transports us to the second century after the 
birth of Apollonian discourse. Around 550 BC, a sudden, enigmatic bloom of 
thinking had erupted, an intellectual awakening, a moment of discontinuity, an 
epistemological leap, a creatio ex nihilo, a commencement, resulting in a 
geometrical discourse about nature. Symposium reveals that the struggle between 
Apollonian and Dionysian strategies of explanation is still ongoing. Aristophanes 
parodies Apollonian thinking by telling an Apollonian myth: a strategy known as 
gay science (Zwart 1996). He confronts Apollonian thinking with a consistent 
idea, building on Apollonian convictions, but leading to ridiculous consequences, 
taking the Apollonian style of thinking ad absurdam. Aristophanes extrapolates 
Platonic logic to the realm of eroticism. What is the inevitable consequence of 
the spherical idea if used in an Apollonian discourse about sexuality? 
Aristophanes’ contribution involves a ridicule of academic discourse by taking 
its basic logic too seriously. His parody, his farce, entails a quasi-anthropological 
description of imaginary beings that allegedly constitute the missing link in the 
history of anthropogenesis. The narrative takes us back to the beginning, the dawn 
of human history, and aims to answer the question of the origins of sexual desire.  
Once upon a time, Aristophanes tells us, humans had four arms and four 
legs. They were two counterparts, two halves, forever united. To punish them, 
Zeus sliced them into two, like boiled eggs in an Athenian kitchen, using a hair. 
A fatal panic overwhelms them. A frantic search for their lost other half sets in, 
but the two halves are no longer able to merge with each other, because of 
anatomical constrains. The result is mass extinction. Zeus takes pity on them and 
subjects surviving humans to an anatomical procedure, moving their genitals to 
the frontal side. In that way, they are still able to experience the pleasure of 
spherical fusion, albeit only briefly and occasionally. Because when they slide 
and fit into one another, with the help of their genitals, their shapes briefly 
reproduce the spherical form. Lacan notes that these bizarre, spherical super-
creatures are reminiscent of clowns in a circus, entering the stage as quadrupeds. 
In ancient comedies, such clownish creatures were a familiar sight. The grotesque 
is employed to attack the core logic of the Apollonian style, making it seem 
utterly questionable. With his parody, Aristophanes tries to tear this worldview 




apart. It is difficult to overlook the element of the spherical and circular. In the 
Greek original, the spherical form of these creatures is repeatedly emphasised. 
Aristophanes ridicules spherical thinking as such. It is not easy for us to 
realize the impact which such a story must have had at the time. A globe is the 
shape that gives pleasure to the eye. Spherical humans were proportional and 
equal to themselves. Only such a being could be truly happy, according to the 
Apollonian mindset. Circularity was the only conceivable shape or movement for 
a celestial body. Apollonian thinking was only satisfied when something 
spherical could be detected, also in the realm of love. But Apollonian thinking 
dislikes the unrest entailed in genuine desire. It prefers to be at rest, engaged in 
circularity. In Aristotle’s Physics, all bodies aim for a state of rest, which sets in 
as soon as they have found their natural place. Whereas in Faustian experience 
the emphasis is on desire and restlessness, Apollonian thinking envisions an ideal 
state without desire. The sphere is self-sufficient, enclosing everything, perfectly 
content and satisfied. It doesn’t need sense organs, it doesn’t need desire. To a 
perfect sphere, nothing can be added. By given the floor to comedy, Plato seems 
to undermine his own worldview, seems to reveal its vulnerability. The 
resemblances between Timaeus and Symposium are no coincidence. Astronomy 
plays a part in Aristophanes’ argument as well. There were three types of 
spherical beings, male, female and androgynous, each with its own affinity: sun, 
earth and moon, a correspondence which suggests a logical connection between 
Timaeus and Symposium. 
From an Apollonian perspective, however, Aristophanes’ narrative 
reflects a misunderstanding. It is half the truth. Yes, an Apollonian lover is 
looking for his “other half”, and expects that reunification will be a most joyful 
experience. This does not mean that Apollonian lovers move about in clownish 
garments to attain happiness and pleasure. The other is an alter ego, someone in 
whom a lover recognizes himself. While Dionysian thinking has a tendency of 
focussing on female rather than on male desire, the Apollonian lover is usually a 
man of around forty, at the height of his intellectual capacities. The beloved is a 
male adolescent, a student. Their relationship is intellectual, but also erotic. 
Intellectual and erotic desire reinforce each other. Erotic desire functions as a 
catalyst for intellectual pursuits. Platonic love is not a form of love in which the 
physical element is missing, but a love whose final objective is knowledge rather 
than pleasure. In addition, platonic love facilitates the transfer of knowledge from 
one generation to the next. The lover falls in love with his successor. Apollonian 
thinking associates women with intrusive physicality, boys, on the other hand, 
with chastity and purity. 
Symposium emphasises the peculiar ambiguity of dialogue as a genre. It 
tells half the truth. Aristophanes knows the spherical principle, but he is either 
unable or unwilling to apply it consistently. Aristophanes laughs at Plato, but in 
the end, the laughter is mutual. This is the result, Plato seems to be saying, when 
you vulgarise Apollonian principles: implausible narratives. Those who really 
want to be introduced into the intricacies of Apollonian love, must sign up as a 
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student. Popular laughter (represented by Aristophanes) laughs at academics, but 
these academics subsequently question the validity of comedy as a genre. The 
dialogue is a playful introduction into Apollonian thinking. The next day, during 
a serious lecture (inside the walls of the Academy, where sober, esoteric genres 
flourish) Aristophanes’ amusing mistake will undoubtedly be rectified by the 
master thinker. Symposium is self-parody, but it also parodies the parodist.  
 
 
§ 8. Apollonian thinking as civilization  
 
The smallest miscalculation in the area of politics  
annoyed me, as much as did the slightest 
 imperfection of the pavement at the villa (Hadrian)  
 
The Academy exemplifies apollonian thinking as a culture. According to 
Spengler, however, every thinking style inevitably spreads and develops into 
civilization. The Villa Adriana (Tivoli) is a complex of buildings in which 
apollonian thinking becomes visible as civilization. That is, the Villa is 
essentially the Academy, but now under different conditions, during a period of 
dramatic increase of scale: a projection of the Apollonian style on a much larger 
canvas. In this park, on a hill east of Rome, away from the hustle and the crowds, 
various buildings, including a Lyceum and an Academy were erected, as copies 
of locations visited by Hadrian during his journey to Greece. In this academic 
environment, platonic love was enacted and emperors spent their leisure time in 
intellectual forms of relaxation, including philosophical exercises, in the 
company of lovers. Stoicism is Academic philosophy, but adapted to living 
conditions on a larger scale, to life as it emerged in the context of a global world, 
the Empire. Attention has shifted from the metaphysics of the ideal polis to an 
ethic for citizens who try to survive, not in an imaginary ideal polis, but in a truly 
existing global environment. A process of dramatic expansion has evolved, but 
the thinking style is still recognizable. Platonism has been transferred from utopia 
to reality. Plato’s Academy was the ambiance of the Apollonian style as culture, 
as a small-scale phenomenon, as an idea. Attempts to realise this idea in practice 
(by Alcibiades and others) had dramatically failed at the time, but the Apollonian 
ideal survived those disasters and finally evolved into civilization in the form of 
the Roman Empire. 
This section explores the development of the Apollonian style of thinking 
from culture to civilization via architecture. The Roman emperor Hadrian (ruling 
from 117 to 138 A.D.) was a very prolific builder, responsible for the construction 
of two building that exemplify the development of Apollonian culture into 
civilization, namely the Villa and the Pantheon. The Pantheon is not only the 
realization of the spherical thought in stone, but also demonstrates the ambition 
of the Empire to assemble and encompass all ethnic subcultures and their deities 
in one spectacular building. The Villa can be seen as a reconstruction of the sports 




park of Academus, but on a grander scale. Hadrian himself, more than anyone, is 
the emperor philosopher who dedicated his reign to the construction of a 
harmonious world order. And he expresses this ambition in his creation (an ideal 
city for the guardians of civilisation). 
In 1951 Marguerite Yourcenar published her book Memoirs of Hadrian 
(1951/1977), based on a large number of written sources (texts about Hadrian and 
texts he himself had read), but also on statues and structures such as the Villa and 
the Pantheon. Her main method is that of trying to revivify Hadrian’s world and 
to experience it from within. Yourcenar enters Hadrian’s lost world. She spent a 
quarter of a century working on her masterpiece. The result is a well-documented, 
very personal but convincing image of Hadrian from close by. This document 
guides our effort to reconstruct Apollonian civilization. We will begin our 
reconstruction with the Pantheon, erected as the central building of ancient Rome. 
Why is the Pantheon a spherical building? Because it is the nucleus of a 
spherical world: politically, astronomically and culturally. In the Pantheon, 
according to Sloterdijk (1999), the societal significance of the Apollonian 
geometry of the spheres was made immediately visible. For Roman emperors, the 
spherical idea was more than just basic science. They faced the immense task of 
harmonizing an Empire of gigantic proportions from a central position. The 
Pantheon radiates power, but also acts as a theological magnet. It symbolises and 
consolidates at the centre what Hadrian sought to achieve at the periphery of the 
political artwork entrusted to him with political and military means: the unity and 
stability of the Empire as a political dome, including all peoples and cultures, 
represented by all the gods that had been granted accommodation in this giant 
structure. Court architect Apollodorus officially acted as builder, but Hadrian 
decidedly printed his stamp on the construction. It is performative, political 
architecture par excellence, meant to 
consolidate the Roman power globe. 
The dome functions as a tangible and 
politically active construction. The 
universe is concentrated into a compact 
form, a condensation of power. Heaven 
and earth are brought together in one 
overarching construction. While Plato’s 
academy excluded those not versed in 
geometry, the visitor of the Pantheon is inevitably drawn into this project of a 
global and universal geometry of the spheres (Sloterdijk 1999, p. 443). 
 The exact division of labour between Apollodorus and Hadrian is a 
controversial issue, but in Memoirs of Hadrian the Emperor’s role is strongly 
emphasized. He is supposed to have been responsible for the spherical character 
of the building. He considered Apollodorus’ plans too moderate and timid and 
decided to improve them. More than in any other building, Hadrian expressed 
himself, his vision of the world. He was a traveling emperor, often on the road, 
from centre to periphery and back, and from one peripheral location to another. 
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He moved along the radii of the Roman sphere of influence, which had assumed 
global proportions. In this way, the idea came to him that the Empire needed a 
sanctuary for all the gods. Yourcenar quotes him as follows: “For the actual style 
of the architecture, I returned to the primordial. I wanted this sanctuary of all the 
gods to reflect the shape of the earth and of the heavenly globe: the hollow sphere 
that contains everything” (p. 155). And yet, it also reflected the form of the 
ancestral huts in which the smoke of the primordial human hearth escaped 
through an opening in the roof. That is, in the Pantheon, not only the spatial, but 
also the temporal dimension of the Empire was condensed: from peasant hut to 
metropolis in one go. The circular opening in the roof also functioned as a sundial 
for recording celestial movements. It was a building in which the whole cosmos 
converged into one spatial construction.  
Hadrian was Hellenophile: he aimed to live and think as the Apollonian 
Greeks did. In Athens he felt more than anywhere at home and he did a lot for 
this city. In Athens he learned to think mathematically, in an Apollonian vein. 
Yet there is a distance between the Academia of Athens and Hadrian’s 
Apollonian civilization. The academic philosophers were pleased to study reality 
“in its pure form” (p. 26), but for Hadrian the spherical world has become reality. 
Plato also travelled, but Hadrian founded world cities during his journeys, 
ordered the construction of roads and improved legislation. “The city has become 
a state” is how Yourcenar has him summarize his achievement (p. 104). Standing 
at the tomb of Alcibiades, he realises that the world he governs is infinitely greater 
than that in which this famous / infamous Athenian lived (p. 151). Plato wrote 
Republic (the program for an ideal state), but it was for Hadrian to actually 
transform the Greek city-state into an immense Apollonian empire, notably by 
selecting and training a bureaucracy, a well-organised civilian army of guardians, 
able to defy and face the ages and to safeguard the essential.  
Under civilized, large-scale conditions, Hadrian continues to think in a 
decidedly Apollonian mode. During his travels along the borders of the Empire, 
along the periphery of his power globe, now on the banks of the Rhine, then again 
in a city in Asia, then again on the banks of the Thames, he is strengthening the 
robustness of his empire. He commits himself to the Pax Romana, which stretches 
out to anyone and everything, like the music of heaven in movement (p. 125). His 
dream is a well-ordered, harmonious world, where justice prevails in terms of 
balance between the parts, a network of proportioned proportions. Every instance 
of unfairness is like a false note in the harmony of the spheres (p. 126). 
An important question facing Apollonian emperors was the optimal size 
of the sphere, the optimal radius length. Outside the Roman sphere of influence, 
an immense barbarous world existed, but the radius of the empire could not be 
extended indefinitely without running the risk of collapse. Whilst the politics of 
his predecessor Trajan was still focused on expansion, almost as a goal in itself, 
Hadrian opted for consolidation. Standing at the border of his empire in Asia he 
says: “I envy those who will succeed in going the full 250,000 Greek stadia (so 
well calculated by Eratosthenes) which, in their entirety, will lead us back to our 




point of departure” (p. 48). Ideally, the Roman Empire coincides with the earthly 
sphere, but the confrontation with the immensity of the world, with Asia’s 
endlessness, is an unsettling experience. Building the Pantheon is like erecting a 
protective screen, an attempt to keep infinity at bay and consolidate the sphere.  
As the ultimate embodiment of spherical thinking, the Pantheon is at the 
same time a turning point. Sloterdijk quotes Spengler, as we have seen, when the 
latter not only defines the Pantheon as the ultimate sphere, but also as the first 
“mystical space”, the first, primordial mosque, the archetype of Magian 
architecture (Spengler, p. 98; p. 274). The building discloses a new, Magian space 
experience and marks the beginning, the rise, the genesis of Magian thinking, 
emerging in the form of religious epidemics of Eastern origin (Isis, Mithras), but 
eventually resulting in the Christianisation of the Empire. Christianity will 
establish its own monumental dome church in Rome. In the mosque or dome 
church, a different atmosphere reigns than in the ancient temple. It is an immense, 
Magian, enchanted cavity, a mystification of space. 
The second major building Hadrian realized was the Villa, an ambiance 
for otium and contemplation. While the Pantheon is placed in the city centre, the 
Villa is located outside the walls as an Arcadian landscape park in which various 
buildings could be found, basically a large-size replica of Plato’s Park. There 
were gardens, olive trees, covered lanes, ponds, fountains and sports facilities, as 
well as bath houses, libraries, theatres, guesthouses and dining rooms. The Villa 
is, in many ways, Pantheon’s counterpart. While the Pantheon wishes to 
emphasize the vital importance of the centre, encompassing everything in its 
magnetic field, the Villa is an open-air museum in which the provinces are 
represented. The Villa was a collage. Hadrian wanted to assemble buildings and 
locations he had seen and visited on his travels, to recollect them in one place, 
not as exact copies, but as buildings that captured and conveyed the spirit of their 
place of origin, the genius loci. The Pantheon is an abstract building, 
materialising an abstract, spherical idea. The Villa brings together the various 
cultures of the Empire in a harmonious way, on one pleasant location. The 
Emperor himself who, during his travels, had founded and restored numerous 
buildings, wanted to realize a synopsis of the buildings and locations that had 
impressed and affected him. Athenian elements could not be missed, e.g. the Stoa, 
the Academy, the Lyceum. A reconstruction of Plato’s Academy, surrounded by 
olive trees, was erected not far from the Canopus. 
Pantheon and Villa, each in its own way, represent Apollonian 
civilization at its peak. However, the supremacy of Apollonian thinking was far 
from absolute. Hadrian was philosophically educated and academically minded, 
but whenever Apollonian philosophy disappointed him, he was already open to 
“magical explanations” (p. 30), and would revert to Magian thinking when he 
found that ancient philosophers failed to appeal to him and enlighten him. His 
travels brought him into contact with scholars who dedicated themselves to the 
study of Magian arts, because the Apollonian style seemed to become 
increasingly bookish and was beginning to lose its relevance: increasingly failed 
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to articulate new experiences. From Asia, from the East, with its vast territories 
and its richness of mysterious cults, an irresistible attraction and enchantment 
arose. While the Germanic tribes in the North seemed increasingly willing to 
adopt Roman technologies and to nestle themselves in the Roman sphere of 
influence, Rome had more difficulties when it came to pacifying Jewish or other 
tenacious Eastern elements. These Eastern cultures remained stubbornly opposed 
to become absorbed into the empire. The Jewish god was unwilling to accept a 
place in the Pantheon among the other deities. Between the Emperor and the East, 
a hate-love relationship arose. The East both fascinated and unsettled him. He 
was open to oriental modes of thinking, such as reflected in the Mithras cult, but 
the chronic and bitter opposition to Roman domination, notably by Jews, revolted 
him and resulted in violent conflicts. In Hadrian’s buildings this ambivalence is 
discernible. As mentioned, the Pantheon is the first mosque, the paradigm of a 
Magian church, and the villa a collage of oriental locations.  
At times, he turned his gaze toward the North, to Germania, a wet and 
misty realm with a monotonous, grey horizon, an ocean of trees, the reserve of 
white and blond people (p. 127). In the Batavian wetlands Romans encountered 
desolate dunes, whistling grasses and stilt houses in the border port of 
Noviomagus: sad places, shapeless landscapes, a heavy sea, polluted by sand, a 
chaotic nature. This entourage was to become the heartland of Faustian culture 
many centuries later. For the time being, however, he is preoccupied with the 
promises and threats coming from the East. Hadrian is still an Apollonian 
traveller, a cosmonaut. He travels from the centre to the periphery, from one 
peripheral location to another as we have seen (London, Nijmegen, Cologne, 
Trier, Vienna, Jerusalem, Alexandria, etc.). These journeys aim to consolidate the 
Empire, improve its laws, correct inequalities, literally and figuratively, add new 
cities to the spherical network of urban locations, and absorb reality into the 
spherical state (thereby making it increasingly real). Paul is a very different kind 
of traveller. He travels from the periphery to the metropolises to spread a new, 
anti-spherical truth. Paul travels in the opposite direction, both in the literal and 
in the figurative sense. 
 
 
§ 9. The morality of the master 
 
Apollonian ethics is a particular form of ethics, representing a particular style of 
thinking, as we have seen. According to Hegel, the ancient Greeks were not yet 
moral in the modern (Faustian) sense: the Greeks had no genuine conscience (cf. 
Spengler I, p. 340). Ancient morality did not yet present itself as obligatory for 
all, it did not contain a universal imperative or Law. Rather, moral perfection was 
considered an achievement of the moral elite: the outcome of conscious exercise 
and self-formation (1971a, p. 452). Heroes of Geek morality were “plastic 
individuals”, Hegel argues, who had successfully managed to turn themselves 




into exceptional works of art.11 They were what they had managed to become. 
These virtuous individuals were self-made. 
A similar idea resurges in the ethical writings of Michel Foucault (1984a, 
1984b) who argues that human subjectivity should not be regarded a 
transcendental (extra-temporal, a priori) given, but the outcome of moral 
exercises and practices of the self (Zwart 1995). The human subject is not a 
constant, but a variable. In the course of history, various styles of moral 
subjectivity emerged, one after the other. The modern (Kantian) form of moral 
subjectivity (i.e. the conscientious, responsible, autonomous, rational subject 
presupposed by Kantian ethics) is the (temporary) outcome of a particular 
practice of the self, developed by a particular culture (German Protestantism) and 
adopted as a universal norm by a particular civilisation (Faustian civilisation). 
And yet, it still is one particular form of moral subjectivity among others, bound 
to disappear altogether (“without a trace”) before long, in order to give way to 
new and incompatible forms of moral subjectivity, whose basic features are as 
yet unknown to us. This process of morality-building is something we individuals 
are not in charge of, although in the folds and margins of dominant morality we 
may (via practices of the self) prepare ourselves for unprecedented forms of moral 
subjectivity: a different ethic, a different style of being.  
Nietzsche already emphasised the symptomatic emphasis on obedience 
in Kantian ethics. In Kant’s philosophy, Nietzsche claims, morality is articulated 
in terms of obedience to a Law. Ethics is about restrictions and prohibitions. In 
Morgenröte (Dawn of Day, 1980 KSA3), two conflicting conceptions of morality 
are juxtaposed: the Judeo-Christian conception of morality as obedience to an 
unconditional Law, and the Greco-Roman conception of morality as ascetic 
exercises, fostering self-management and temperance. The first conception 
envisions morality as a (Faustian) conflict between bodily inclinations and the 
desire to obey, resulting in a chronic sense of guilt. We remain guilty before the 
Law, unable to live up to its insatiable demands. According to the ancient 
conception, however, morality is an ascetic exercise, a permanent effort to 
refurbish body and soul so as to attain mastery over your passions. These are not 
to be exterminated, but governed in a prudent manner. By means of exercise and 
other forms of self-edification, individuals transform themselves into plastic 
individuals, thereby distinguishing themselves from the masses, setting 
themselves apart from the lower social stratums – such is the morality of the 
master. Later, Nietzsche argues, many of these ancient techniques of moral self-
formation were appropriated by slave morality – that is: they were placed in the 
                                                             
11 “Er [Socrates] steht vor uns ... als eine von jenen großen plastischen Naturen 
(Individuen) ... wie wir sie in jener Zeit zu sehen gewohnt sind, - als ein vollendetes 
klassisches Kunstwerk, das sich selbst zu dieser Hohe gebracht hat. [Z]u dem, was sie 
waren, haben sie sich selbständig ausgebildet; sie sind das geworden, was sie haben sein 
wollen… Solche Kunstwerke sind die großen Männer jener Zeit. Das höchste plastische 
Individuum ist Perikles, und um ihn, gleich Sternen, Sophokles, Thucydides, Sokrates, 
usw. Sie haben ihre Individualität herausgearbeitet zur Existenz (Hegel 1971a, p. 452). 
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service of a morality of obedience. According to Nietzsche, we presently find 
ourselves in an ambiguous situation, a “moral interregnum”. On the one hand, 
notwithstanding the efforts of Enlightenment to rationalize morality, obedience 
still remains the basic moral mood.12 On the other hand, the Judeo-Christian 
conception has declined considerably in strength, has become less self-evident, 
and something rather unexpected seems imminent. 
During the 1980s, Foucault (1984a, 1984b) addressed the question of 
moral subjectivity quite explicitly. Rather than being subjected by disciplinary 
and normalizing practices of power, Foucault now allowed for the possibility that 
individuals constitute themselves as moral subjects, through self-discipline – 
disciplina voluntatis. Self-constitution adheres to the logic of the morality of the 
master. Via temperance and exercise, these masters distinguish themselves from 
the morality of the human herd (the majority of the people, who remain at the 
mercy of their drives and passions). Practices of the self (moral exercises) entail 
self-management, turning oneself into a work of art, stylizing and organizing 
one’s drives in a certain manner. 
In Foucault’s interpretation of ancient morality, we easily recognise 
Aristotle’s version of Apollonian ethics as discussed above, with its focus on 
temperance and proportionality, entailing a mathematical logic of its own, seeing 
virtue as the mean (µέσον) between extremes, as the middle course between 
deficit (ellipse) and excess (hyperbola). Self-management entails the ability to 
steer one’s actions in the direction of the proportional mean, while exercise 
enhances the subject’s ability to hit the right middle.  
At the same time, this identification of ancient morality with the elite 
morality of the master evidently entails a series of problems. Volumes Two and 
Three of Foucault’s History of Sexuality explicitly claim to describe the history of 
ancient sexuality, but the validity of his analysis seems restricted to a particular 
moral style, namely: Apollonian sexuality, the morality (the life-style, the 
dietetics) of the higher echelons, the upper social strata: the male masters of the 
ancient Greek and Roman world. There is no confrontation with other styles or 
other options, with otherness. The morality of the lower stratums disappears into 
the background as something negative. Yet, ancient morality was not a 
homogeneous ideological unity. Rather, it was a forcefield, a moral battlefield if 
you like, where collisions between incompatible styles unfolded. In ancient 
Greece, the counter-culture or counter-style (challenging the elite Apollonian life-
style) was the Dionysian view of life as we have seen. In ancient Rome, Dionysian 
thinking resurged in the counter-culture of the grotesque, not only in the realm of 
aesthetics, but also in the realm of morality, dietetics and sexuality. The label 
“grotesque” is used here as a common denominator of the moral and aesthetical 
logic of this counter-counter, notably endorsed by the lower strata, as the style of 
thinking at work in popular morality (the morality of the masses). Whereas from 
                                                             
12 “Auch zu uns noch redet ein “du sollst”, auch wir noch gehorchen einem strengen 
Gesetze über uns” (Nietzsche 1881/1980, III, p. 16) 




an Apollonian perspective the grotesque is framed as immoral, obscene, 
uncivilised and illogical, on closer inspection the grotesque is a genuine style of 
thinking in its own right, with a logic and aesthetic of its own.  
The Russian philosopher and literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin contributed 
significantly to our understanding of the grotesque, via his thorough analysis of 
grotesque thinking in Rabelais and his world (1968) and other writings (1988). 
During the Renaissance, Bakhtin argued, the grotesque style experienced a revival 
(in the writings of Rabelais and others), but it already originated in antiquity, in 
the form of grotesque festivals (Saturnalia, Floralia, etc.) and grotesque (Priapic) 
poetry, celebrating and singling out obscene body parts (phallus, mouth, anus, 
buttocks, belly) as partial objects of carnivalesque ridicule and worship. My 
analysis of the grotesque zooms in on one particular case study: Carmina Priapea, 
a collection of eighty or so (anonymous) Latin epigrams about, dedicated to or 
giving the floor to the Roman garden god Priapus. These epigrams, notoriously 
obscene, are probably written by one author at the end of the first century A.D. 
There are notable similarities with priapic poetry by other authors from the same 
period, e.g. Martial and Catullus (Richlin 1992, Elomaa 2015). 
Priapus is a wooden statue, serving as guardian of enclosed gardens, 
punishing trespassers and thieves, subjecting them to sexual / corporeal 
punishment (notably anal and/or oral rape). Some priapic poems were probably 
used as inscriptions, as signs of warning, or as ludic versions of what today would 
be something like: “access forbidden for all unauthorised persons”. Whereas the 
content of the poetry is emphatically sexual (mostly dealing with the size and 
performativity of protruding phalluses), there is another striking feature which is 
important here, namely the fact that these poems consistently follow a 
recognisable logical scheme. Most if not all of these short poems entail a 
syllogism. Grotesque thinking is not illogical, but other-logical (allo-logical).  
Inscriptions above the entrance to ancient gardens was far from 
exceptional. Remember the famous words “Let no one ignorant of geometry enter 
here” (Μηδείς άγεωµέτρητος είσίτω), allegedly inscribed above the entrance gate 
of Plato’s academia: geometry literacy as admission requirement. Know your 
geometry, or you will be a nuisance to us and likely to make a fool of yourself. 
In Priapus’ case, the various degrees of corporeal punishment to which 
trespassers would be subjected (increasingly harsh in the case of recidivism) also 
served educational purposes and even functioned as initiation rite. Trespassers 
would be educated, not by preaching (predicare) but by rape (pedicare), – a 
difference of only one letter (“una littera”, a slip of the tongue) as Priapus points 
out (in Poem 7). The logical structure of this corrective penal practice is quite 
straightforward: if (you are so bold as to enter and plunder this garden), then 
(sexual punishment is imminent). Action inevitably implies reaction.  
The link between erotic literature and logic is far from remarkable. The 
writings of Marquis de Sade were likewise famous for their rigid and irresistible 
logic (pushing atheism to its logical conclusions), and the same goes for Sacher-
Masoch’s oeuvre. As Gilles Deleuze (1967/2007) pointed out, the latter’s novels 
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and stories follow a strict logical scheme. They should be considered “pornology” 
rather than pornography, although in this case the (female) executioner is the one 
who is trained and educated. Priapus is likewise a therapist offering treatment to 
the betterment of his patients, e.g. dissatisfied women, lusty catamites, impotent 
males and thieves. These epigrams entail a warning: all trespassers will be 
punished (∀A ⇒ B). Think twice before you enter.  
Thus, priapic punitive practices were dictated by a priapic syllogism: in 
the case of theft, you will be punished with anal or oral rape (All thieves will be 
sodomised; you are a thieve; ergo, you will be sodomised). Notably, the focus 
was on the three bodily orifices (mouth, anus, vagina) and on the phallus as an 
“orifice-filling” organ (Richlin 1992, p. 131). I will pedicate (sodomise) a boy, 
fuck a girl, and reserve the third punishment (irrumation) for adult thieves, 
Priapus points out (Poem 13). Poem 22 likewise conveys an anatomy of priapic 
punishment. There are three options; if the thieve is a woman, Priapus will stick 
his mentula in her vagina; in the case of a boy, he will penetrate the buttocks; in 
the case of an adult male, he will thrust his mentula in the trespasser’s mouth. 
Poem 28 entails a similar message: theft will be punished with anal rape, but 
should this prove insufficient, Priapus will strike higher (i.e. irrumation as an 
even heavier punishment, employed in the case of recidivism). In other poems 
(23, 58), the curse of Priapus entails that the male thief will never again find a 
sexual partner (either woman, catamite or boy). May his erect mentula throb 
against his navel in vain! And thieves who point their middle-finger at Priapus’s 
threatening figure, thinking his mentula to be merely a piece of painted wood, 
will be irrumated by the landlord himself (Poem 56). When Priapus (after having 
thrust his phallus into the stoutest thieves) no longer functions, however, he 
himself is treated quite disrespectfully: his sickle will be taken away and his 
member will be cut off, so that he will resemble an emasculated adept of Cybele 
(Poem 55). Finally, his wooden corpus will be cut to pieces (Poem 26).      
In her book The Garden of Priapus, Amy Richlin (1992) convincingly 
argues that Foucault, in his two volumes on ancient morality, actually wrote a 
history of elite male sexuality, focussing on recommendations for lifestyle and 
diet, on writings by nutritionists: a dietetic directed at a wealthy, elite, male, 
upper-class audience. What Foucault left out, she argues, was the Roman real, the 
aesthetic of priapic humour and the obscene: sexuality as it was practiced by the 
lower strata. Here, the popular, ithyphallic garden deity Priapus played a crucial 
role. Therefore, the Carmina Priapea as a collection of obscene (anti-Apollonian) 
little poems (“versiculi”), fit for a garden wall – as low-brow graffiti – not for a 








§ 10. The logic of the grotesque 
 
“O Priapus, faithful protector of orchards, warn off the thieves  
with thy red-painted amulet” (Poem 72) 
 
Priapus was an ithyphallic deity, as we have seen, worshipped in the form of a 
wooden statue erected in the middle of a walled garden, with a sickle and an erect 
phallus (the embodiment of bellicose pride) as attributes, threatening thieves with 
anal or oral rape. Devotees would offer small presents, or short erotic verses, 
hoping for something in return (e.g. restored potency or erotic success in dealing 
with male clients). The Carmina Priapea consist of poems dedicated to Priapus, 
but also poems which give the floor to the god himself, as a “talking phallus”, the 
embodiment of what, in post-structuralism, is known as phallogocentrism 
(Richlin 1992, p. xvii). In the garden of Priapus, one may speak freely. The use 
of obscene terms is not forbidden here (high-brow inhibitions are superseded). 
You may call “a cunt a cunt, a prick a prick” (Poem 29).   
Priapic statues served multiple functions. First of all, they served as road 
signs, guiding travellers through labyrinthian rural landscapes – cf. Poem 30: “O 
Priapus, with your sickle and your impressive part, please show me the way to the 
fountain” (probably, the traveller needs water to cleanse his mouth after 
irrumation). Secondly, priapic statues served as scarecrows, as signs of warning 
and as punishing device against thieves, threatening them with sexual harassment. 
Finally, they served as objects of worship, placed in the middle of the garden as 
an obscene shrine, where worshippers could deposit modest ex-voto offerings, 
such as apples (Poem 21, Poem 53, probably as a metaphor for buttocks), but also 
wooden phalluses (Poem 34) and waxen apples (Poem 42). Visitors also dedicated 
poems to Priapus, as we have seen. Priapic (obscene, jocose) epigrams (“carmina 
plena ioci”) could be scrawled on garden walls (as priapic graffiti, comparable 
perhaps to the kind of poetry we nowadays encounter in toilets in bars). This 
practice is mentioned in one of the two introductory poems to the series (Poem 2): 
 
…quidquid id est, quod otiosus 
templi parietibus tui notavi, 
in partem accipias bonam, rogamus 
whatever it is that I, in my leisure, 
have scrawled on your temple walls,  
I request you, accept it in good favour 
 
Such shrines attracted (nightly) visitors (male and female) yearning for phallic 
jouissance, or hoping to receive treatment for their impotence. If Priapus answered 
their petitions, they would leave signs of gratitude. In Poem 37, a visitor has 
injured his penis (during an erotic battle) and asks Priapus for a cure to prevent 
amputation (“curatum mentulam sine sectionem”). Priapus grants his wish. Ergo, 
he leaves a tablet with a facsimile of an erect, red-coloured penis on the altar. But 
the shrine could also function as a low-brow theatre where lovers practiced 
intercourse in multiple positions described by famous (mostly female) authors of 
sexual manuals, such as Philaenis and Elephantis (let us practice “tot figuras, quas 
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Philaenis enarrat”, Poem 63). Although the collection of priapic epigrams became 
a book, they were not meant for, nor considered worthy of a book (“horto carmina 
digna, non libello”, Poem 2). Priapic poetry forcefully defies its status as literature 
(Elomaa 2015). The poetry is not poetry, the book is not a book. This garden 
poetry (where garden = a collection of poems) is not (“non”) fit for virgins, and 
the Muses were not (“nec”) called upon to assistance the poet, for it would have 
been improper to lead them to Priapus’ mentula.  Therefore (“ergo”), please accept 
these low-brow verses for what they are. If Priapus fails to be of help, the 
disappointed devotee will turn his back on him (“vale, Priape: debeo tibi nihil”, 
as it is phrased in the final poem in the series: Poem 83). 
Priapus was also the patron of female erotic performers, such as 
Thelethusa, a famous “circulatrix” (itinerant athlete and dancer, Poem 19), or 
Quintia, a famous performer at the Circus Maximus, who dedicated her 
“weapons” (cymbals, castanet, tambour) to Priapus, hoping they would continue 
to bring about erections among her male audience (Poem 27). Such women were 
slaves who earned their freedom through erotic performances, and the poetry 
informs us that Thelethusa performed at the Via Suburra, a lower-class district in 
ancient Rome. To show her gratitude to Priapus, she left an ex-voto on his altar: 
a wooden phallus (the partial object of worship) encircled with a golden crown 
(Poem 40). In Poem 50, a lover likewise promises to crown Priapus’ mentula with 
garlands, if the girl of his dreams will finally grant him her favours. 
As indicated, the Priapic syllogism works like this. All thieves sneaking 
into this garden will be punished (sodomised); You are a thief, sneaking into this 
garden; Therefore (“ergo”), you will be sodomised. This syllogism, often 
involving variants produced with the help of negations (“non”, “nec”), is at work 
for instance to the first lines of Poem 15: 
 
Commisso mihi non satis modestas 
quicumque attulerit manus agello, 
is me sentiet esse non spadonem. 
Whoever plunders with dishonest hand  
This little field committed to my charge,  
Will discover that I’m not a castrate 
 
We also recognise it in other poems, e.g. Poem 31 (If you steal from this garden, 
then the weapon of my belly will stretch your anus) or Poem 59 (If you come as 
a thief, then you will leave dishonoured: “si fur veneris, inpudicus exis”). A thief 
caught for the first time will be sodomised. If caught again, Priapus will irrumate 
him (a heavier punishment). If caught for the third time, he will be both sodomised 
and irrumated (e.g. Poem 35: semel: pericabo; idem: irrumabo; tertia: et hanc et 
illam / pedicaberis irrumaberisque). Indeed, all thieves who are caught repeatedly 
(Poem 44) will suffer irrumation ((∀A ⇒ B). Thus, a priapic statue conveys a 
straightforward message: beware of the phallus (“Cave mentulam”), thief. If I 
catch you, I will pierce you with my pole and stretch your anus (Poem 11). The 
task of protecting the garden is entrusted to Priapus, and his “watchman” will 
widen your behind and make your anus wider (“laxior”): by entering and exiting, 
thereby repeating the illegal treatment of the garden (Poem 52).  




In some of the poems, however, we find Priapus complaining that his 
threats have the opposite effect: the prospect of sexual punishment itself attracts 
and lures “cinaedi” (catamites) into the garden (“ad poenam”, Poem 51). For 
them, anal punishment (rather than fruits or vegetables) is inviting. They adhere 
to the (inverted) logic of desire, so that it is not the fruit, but the punishment that 
allures them. Therefore, if someone steals just for the love of punishment (“amore 
poena”), Priapus will ignore him (Poem 64).  
The garden of Priapus may also serve as a site where poetry is written, 
and where jocose poets are expected to leave some gay and playful poems 
(“versus iocosos”) on Priapus’ altar (Poem 41, Poem 47). In several poems, apples 
are interchangeable with, or function as a metaphor for poems (Poem 60), so that 
poems are sublimated apples (“poma”). Should the poet involved consider low-
brow priapic poetry beneath his standing, let them mingle with the erudite 
(Apollonian) literati, but Priapus will make sure that he will do so with a widened 
arse (Priapus will “make him feel”).     
Thus, there are various logical scenarios. The visitor may either be a thief 
(who wants to steal the forbidden fruits, literally), or a woman (who either seeks 
phallic enjoyment directly – using Priapus’s statue as a phallic device – or 
indirectly, by making offerings to Priapus, in the hope of attracting lovers or 
customers), – or a sodomite (seeking enjoyment, someone for whom the 
punishment itself is the enjoyment sought). What these visitors have in common 
is that they all suffer from a lack of enjoyment. They are all lured towards a statue 
that exhibits what is normally concealed (the object a, psychoanalytically 
speaking). The garden is the locus of the rustic god, a place for poetry or offerings, 
where short priapic poems are written on walls or tablets, or attached to branches 
of apple trees (Poem 2, Poem 49, Poem 61). It is a logic of reciprocity: do ut des, 
you gave to me, I gave to you; I will bring you an offering, if you grant my desire.  
Unlike other gods, Priapus is ugly. The object of desire, however, is not 
his body as such, but a “partial object”, a particular attribute: his protruding 
phallus, signalling the phallic enjoyment visitors crave for, while threatening 
criminals with impalement. Aristotle’s famous adage that all human actions and 
practices seem to aim at some good (∀x ⇒ y), also applies to visitors of Priapus’ 
garden, albeit in a subverted, parodied manner, as the good is not something 
Apollonian (e.g. happiness or virtue), but rather an obscene object. Those craving 
for phallic jouissance can either be males – who became impotent or injured their 
penis; cuoad castrationem, as Lacan phrases it (1975, p. 47) –, or women (who 
either desire sex with a statue or beseech it to enhance their prospects), or 
sodomites. Thus, several types of visitors can be distinguished: the adult thief 
(“fur”), the married woman (“matron”), the erotic performer, who considers 
Priapus her patron, the girl (“puella”), who wants to shed a glance at the phallus, 
and the boy (“puer”), who becomes initiated through sodomisation. It is a place 
where discourse (text) is produced in the form of prayers or poems.  
In short, the grotesque has a logic of its own. This is ascertained by the 
frequent use logical terms in priapic poetry (“non”, “nec”, “ergo”, etc.). Most if 
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not all priapic epigrams entail a syllogism, a logical argument as we have seen: if 
(you plunder this garden), then (you will be punished); or: all deities (∀x) are 
equipped with a weapon, a signature attribute; I am a deity; ergo, I am equipped 
with my signature attribute (my ruby wooden phallus). I will now elaborate these 
aspects in more detail, using concrete examples to exemplify how the grotesque 
(priapic) logic works, starting with the syllogism of deterrence. Subsequently, I 
will zoom in on the legal dimension (the logic of property and reciprocity: do ut 
des), the logic of joyous comparison, and the logic of phallic desire. 
The syllogism of deterrence is discernible in multiple poems, as we have 
seen, as a basic scheme which allows for multiple variations with the help of 
logical terms. The epigrams scrawled on garden walls entailed a straightforward 
rationale. If you enter illegally, this is what will happen. If you intend to steal the 
fruit, consider the weight of the mentula which will be thrust into you (Poem 69). 
If you plunder the garden, then you will be taught a lesson and become “learned” 
(“doctus”, Poem 71), as I pierce my member exactly through your middle (Poem 
74) – notice how Apollonian thinking is consistently parodied in all these threats. 
If someone profanes this rural piece of property, he knows what logically follows 
(“quod sequitur”, Poem 82). It will be his own doing; he asked for it; he himself 
wanted this. It is the logic of criminal justice that later became sublated in Hegel’s 
Logic (1830/1986, § 140, p. 277): the criminal is entitled to punishment. Criminals 
may see the punishment as an infringement on their integrity, but at closer 
consideration the punishment is the logical consequence of their own wilful act. 
They asked for it. It is not Priapus who is misbehaving, it is the thief’s own doing. 
Priapus enacts the logic entailed in the act initiated by the thief himself. Ergo: 
think twice before you act! The thief is the Agent, the initiator ⇒  forcing Priapus 
into action ⇒ resulting in a product: the punishment “enjoyed” by the thief. 
The difference between moral education (“predicare”) and Priapus’ 
method (“pedicare”) is only one letter as we have seen (Poem 7). When this letter 
is obliterated, the priapic syllogism starts to function, and the punishment is 
inflicted (preferring actions to words: Facta, non verba). Felony results in 
corporeal punishment, as a form of atonement: I will sodomise you, thief 
(“Pedicabere, fur,”, Poem 35). In the case of recidivism, the punishment will 
become increasingly severe: If you enter for the first time, I will sodomise you 
(pedicare). If you enter for the second time, I will punish you more severely, by 
forcing my phallus into your throat (irrumare). If you enter for the third time, I 
will punish you most severely (pedicare + irrumare: A ⇒ B ⇒ A+B. Other 
watchmen are requested not to hinder Priapus as educator. Poem 14: 
 
Quid mecum tibi, circitor moleste? 
ad me quid prohibes venire furem? 
accedat, sine: laxior redibit. 
Why do you bother me, meddlesome watchman?  
Why do you hinder the thief from coming to me?  
Let him approach: he will return “laxior” 
 
Punishment is a transformative experience. “Laxior” means “wider” (literally, 
after anal sex), but also refers to a transformative experience. The thief is not just 
chased away. He has learned his lesson, he is converted, in accordance with the 




pedagogy of pedicare. The syllogism can be perverted, however, namely when 
the felony is committed because the visitor wants the punishment (considering 
himself entitled to it). 
 The Carmina Priapea constitute a playful exploration and investigation 
of the logic of the grotesque. This is confirmed by the ample use of logical 
signifiers such as “ergo”. The first Poem in the series puts it like this. Playfully 
have I written these verses attesting thee (a pun on testes), o Priapus. These poems 
are worthy of a garden, not of a book (i.e. they constitute low-brow, not high-
brow literature). Nor have I invoked the Muses to this unvirginal spot. Therefore 
(“ergo”), whatever I have idly jotted on the walls of thy temple, please accept it, 
I pray. All deities have poems written for them praising them in fitting style by 
devotees (∀A ⇒ B); you are a deity; therefore (ergo), you are entitled to poems 
in fitting style, please accept them. 
In some poems (e.g. Poem 14), we encounter a friendlier Priapus, now 
the most hospitable of all gods. Religious restrictions which are normally in place 
do not apply to Priapus. Come hither, approach my little altar, even if you have 
spent the night with a girl or visited a brothel. I am just a lower-class, rustic, open-
air deity, fully exposed to inclement weather. Ergo, it is permitted to enter all who 
will. In ancient religious culture, those who recently had intercourse or had visited 
a brothel were considered unclean. In Priapus’ case, this is not an obstacle at all. 
General clause: “All visitors are allowed to enter, except those who recently had 
sexual intercourse”. In my case, this clause does not apply, the negation is 
negated. Ergo, all visitors are allowed to enter.  
The term “ergo” also occurs in Poem 77. Obstacles are put in place to 
ward off thieves, therefore Priapus – who used to sodomise trespassers “usque et 
usque et usque” (encore and encore and encore) – is suddenly out of employment. 
Yet, although Priapus has grown old, he is still able to “perforate” thieves (“ego 
perforare possum”, Poem 76). By building high fences, obstructing the passage, 
a new generation of gardeners is making it impossible for thieves to enter. 
Although this may at first glance seem helpful to Priapus, it actually puts him out 
of work. While he had been diligently cleaving the buttocks of thieves, he is now 
no longer able to do so, standing there idly day and night. Ergo, he is now the one 
who is punished into forced abstinence, no longer able to carry out his duty. The 
syllogism “If you enter here unlawfully, then you will be sodomised” no longer 
functions, the logical machinery has come to a stop, preventive measures are 
blocking the way. The priapic logic is suspended, there is no more room any more 
for making up one’s mind. Trespasser are no longer “free” to violate the norm. 
The dilemma is no longer in place, and replaced by a physical fence. The guardian 
(“circitor”, who literally walks or circles around) hinders thieves from entering 
Priapus’ garden (i.e. from falling into the trap). If and only if this obstacle is 
removed (if this negation is negated), the thieve will return home “laxior” (with 
a wider anus) than he came. Those who prevent thieves from entering the garden 
by erecting a big fence, hinder Priapus instead of helping him. Therefore (“ergo”) 
the one who was wont to cleave the buttocks of thieves ever and ever and ever, 
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now stands unemployed, like an abstinent lute-player. The syllogism has been 
obliterated, and although this may seem a more “rational” design, beneficial to 
all, involving a minimum of suffering, there is still a price to pay: Priapus and his 
logic are now the ones who suffer. 
The legal dimension of the Carmina collection addresses violations of 
property. Although the owner (master, “dominus”) himself is mostly absent, there 
is a steward (warden, curator, “custos”) who employs Priapus as an instrument of 
deterrence, a punishment device, barring the entrance. This steward is entitled to 
enjoy the fruits (Latin: “usufructus”, cf. Lacan 1975, p. 10) of the property 
entrusted to him (although this does not imply a right to destroy or waste that 
property). In other words, these poems address the relationship between Law and 
jouissance. In Poem 24, for instance, Priapus points out that the warden mandated 
the care of this garden to him. And you, thief, shall be punished. Because of a 
cabbage? Because of a cabbage! Crime will be punished, even if the punishment 
(anal rape) seems disproportional. Priapus will plunge his foot-long phallic 
sceptre (Poem 25), which ladies and kings like to hold in their hands and 
catamites (“cinaedi”) yearn to kiss, into the thief’s abdomen (“intra viscera 
furis”), until Priapus’s testicles (witnesses) reach up to the thief’s anus and the 
pole up to his navel.   
The legal framing of this treatment is confirmed in Poem 15: 
 
dicat forsitan hoc: 'tibine quisquam 
hic inter frutices loco remoto 
percisum sciat esse me?', sed errat: 
magnis testibus ista res agetur.  
Here, in this lonely place among the 
bushes. The thief will say to himself, “No 
one will know that I have been thrust 
through.” He will be mistaken; my 
testicles will act as weighty witnesses 
 
While the phallus serves as the instrument inflicting the punishment, the testicles 
literally serve as witnesses, for the same Latin word testis means both “witness” 
and “testicle”, and Roman comic authors like Plautus liked to play with this 
double meaning. Testicles are witnesses: testis. The term testis comes from 
“three”, the witness being a “third” party, while testicles give witness of a man’s 
virility. The connection with testicles may have been the practice of holding 
someone’s genitals while swearing an oath (speak nothing but the truth).   
Many priapic poems entail negotiations and transactions, moreover. Take 
for instance Poem 3, where a lover is imploring anal intercourse: give me what 
Jupiter gave to Ganymede (i.e. anal intercourse), comparing it to what frightened 
brides grant their husbands on a wedding night: 
 
quod virgo prima cupido dat nocte marito, 
dum timet alterius volnus inepta loci 
What on the wedding night the bride gives 
to her husband, dreading the hurt that 
could be inflicted in a different part. 
 
Richlin (1992, p. 16) cites a similar passage from Seneca the elder. The bride’s 
fears on her wedding night result in allowing the husband anal intercourse. 




 The marriage bed is a legal site, giving rise to claims and negotiations 
about legal entitlements. Think of Lohengrin, for instance, where Elsa claims to 
be entitled to know her husband’s name before granting him intercourse. In 
priapic poetry these negotiations may involve displacement (“Verschiebung”): 
anal intercourse as a compromise or concession, whereby the bride offers the 
orifice that is normally offered by boys (serving as sex toys for adult males). 
Thus, according to Priapic logic, married women (“matronae”) may concede to 
play the role of a boy (“puer”) to forego physical harm or pregnancy.  
In Poem 16, a boy places his “apples” (buttocks) on Priapus’s sacrificial 
table, expecting something in return. This logic of reciprocity is captured in the 
Latin adage Do ut des “I give that you may give”. In ancient Rome, a votum was 
a vow made to a deity, conveying the contractual nature of Roman religion. We 
often encounter this kind of deal in priapic epigrams, e.g. in Poem 5: 
 
Quam puero legem fertur dixisse 
Priapus, 
versibus his infra scripta duobus erit: 
'quod meus hortus habet sumas inpune 
licebit, 
si dederis nobis quod tuos hortus habe 
The conditions which Priapus and the boy 
agreed to, are listed in this distich: You may 
freely plunder my garden exempted from 
punishment 
If you give to me what your garden 
(buttocks) contains in return 
 
Or Poem 38: 
 
pedicare volo, tu vis decerpere poma; 
quod peto, si dederis, quod petis, accipies 
I want to pedicate; you to pluck apples.  
If you give what I desire, you will receive 
what you desire.  
 
At the same time, it is clear that the legal dimension often involves an element of 
parody, as an inherent dimension of grotesque poetry (Zwart 1996; 1999). Priapus 
is a deity, albeit not a lofty (Olympic) one, but a lowly and rustic one. A rustic 
landscape adorns itself with wooden icons. His sign (attribute, signifier) is the 
phallus, a “partial object”, an “organ”, functioning both as an instrument of 
deterrence and as an object of desire. He is a guardian protecting a shrine, like 
a Dvarapala placed near the entrance to Buddhist or Hindu temples, often 
portrayed as a warrior or fearsome giant, usually armed with a fearsome club. 
Priapus is part of ancient garden architecture.  
 In Poem 1 it is explained that neither (“non”) Diana, nor (“non”) Vesta, 
nor (“nec”) Minerva (three lofty virgin deities) dwell here. This is the shrine of a 
rustic phallic god, represented by a wooden statue (i.e. not a marble one), painted 
red (the phallic colour) and equipped with a fully exposed, erect mentula. 
Therefore (“igitur”), either cover it up (i.e. close the book) or continue to read 
(enter the garden). Two types of deities are distinguished in this poem: the lofty 
ones (the Olympians, immortalised by Apollonian sculpture) and the obscene. 
Ergo, it is up to you, make up your mind: either enter (i.e. read this shameless 
collection of artless verses), or opt out. 
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 In some poems (e.g. Poem 6), Priapus threatens girls or boys that, 
although he is made of wood, he will capture them and keep them captured, 
burying his phallus into them, up to the seventh rib (Poem 7, perhaps a parody on 
the seven stages of initiation in Dionysian mystery cults). In Poem 10, however, 
a girl simply ridicules him and laughs at him. Priapus concedes that he is made 
of wood, not sculptured by a high-brow Apollonian artist, but hacked by a lowly 
servant from a piece of wood, a forked tree. Still, he is willing and able to initiate 
her in phallic jouissance. 
In Poem 9, in response to a question addressed to him, Priapus compares 
himself with the Olympian gods. Question (“questio”): why are your obscene 
parts displayed without cover? Why is your phallus, your mentula, ostensibly 
visible? In his reply, Priapus compares his phallus with the instruments which 
lofty, Apollonian deities likewise carry with them as their signature attribute. Ten 
deities are listed one by one, much like a “catalogue” (Michalopoulos 2017). 
Poseidon does not conceal his trident, nor Mars his sword, nor Pallas her spear, 
nor Apollo his golden arrows, nor Diana her quiver, nor Alcides his club, nor 
Bacchus his Thyrsus. No god (“nullus deus”) conceals his weapon (“telum”). 
Why, then, should Priapus hide his mentula? Without his weapon, he would be 
unarmed, defenceless (“inermis”). The poem has the form of a “question” and the 
syllogism is clear: All gods carry their instrument, visibly on display (∀A ⇒ B); 
Priapus is a god (=A); ergo, Priapus is entitled to his instrument (⇒B). Idem in 
Poem 34: every god (∀A) is endowed with a distinctive attribute; Priapus is a 
god; ergo, Priapus is endowed with his distinctive feature. In fact, no god is 
“mentulatior”, better equipped (the hyperbole of parody). We encounter the same 
argument in Poem 20: All Gods (Mars, Minerva, etc.: ∀A) have an attribute, a 
weapon (“telum”); Priapus is a god; ergo, Priapus is entitled to his obscene 
attribute, his weapon, his phallus. Later, in Christianity, martyrs likewise carry 
their iron grills and dissected breasts with them. This is Priapus’ attribute: 
unpolished and direct, while the attributes of the Olympians (trident, spear, etc.) 
may count as phallus Ersatz. Obviously, a phallus is not a weapon in the sense a 
trident or spear or quiver is. It is an obscene organ, a partial object, belonging to 
his body, yet sticking out, as a detachable part. 
In Poem 14, Priapus once again compares himself to other gods, but now 
to emphasise his being different. Come hither, no obstacles apply. Other gods 
impose all kinds of conditions, not me. Poem 39 contains another variant of the 
same syllogism: all deities are beautiful (of pleasant shape: ∀A ⇒ B), Priapus is 
a deity, but lacks (“carere”) beauty (¬ B); therefore, he is compensated with a 
magnificent phallus (that which all girls and catamites desire most, Poem 43). 
Priapus loves to parody the heroes and heroines of Homer and other epic tales. 
Should a thief want to know the punishment he will receive, this can easily be 
derived from a puzzle, by connecting the first syllables of the names of famous 
epic heroines and heroes (Penelope, Dido, Camus, Remus) = pedicare (to 
sodomise, Poem 67). The thief may consider himself epically brave and daring 




by entering the garden, but he will be taught that he is not. Priapus is an illiterate 
rustic, but he knows his classics: Homer is all about cunts and pricks (Poem 68).  
Heraclitus (Fragment 93) states that Apollo neither speaks nor hides (his 
message), but gives a sign (οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σηµαίνει). Priapus’ 
message, however, is rather straightforward. No need of vaticination (“augure 
non opus est”): the mentula simply exercises its proper function (Poem 43).  
In poems directed at female visitors, a similar syllogism is involved: All 
women desire to secretly visit my garden, to glance at my phallus or even use me 
(∀A ⇒ B); You are a woman (=A); Therefore, you want to make use of my 
phallus (after dusk, unseen, ⇒ B). Maidens who avoid looking at the erect 
phallus, cast an askance (“obliquis”) glance at it (Poem 73), averting their eyes 
from the very thing they long to feel inside them (“intra viscera habere 
concupiscis”, Poem 66). One day it may be of use to them.  
Sometimes the oversized wooden phallus is openly on display, but it may 
also require an offering before it can be seen sticking out, boasting that this 
mentula would have satisfied Penelope (Poem 68). Women, eager to shed a 
glance on Priapus’ imposing phallus (“magnam metulam”) are discouraged from 
reading the lewd verses (“impudica verba”) inscribed on the wooden statues 
(Poem 7). Keep away from these verses, married women, but they eagerly glance 
at his mentula (the object a; that which one cannot ignore, Poem 8). They too 
have to make a balanced decision. There are pros and cons to consider. There is 
a phallus to behold, but also the risk of being exposed to lewd verses. Think twice 
before you enter. One female worshipper offers images borrowed from an 
obscene volume written by Elephantis, imploring Priapus to imitate with her all 
the sexual positions depicted there: please do it like this (Poem 4). Elephantis was 
a female poet, author of a famous sexual manual. According to Suetonius, 
Tiberius owned a complete set of her works. Old women also come to Priapus for 
sex during the night, and engage in a “fight” between two partial objects: mouth 
and phallus (Poem 12; Poem 32). If they are willing to pay, Priapus ignores their 
age and treats them like a girl (Poem 57). Male visitors may go there to 
masturbate, using their hand for a mistress (poem 33).  
The Priapus statue functions as an “apparatus of jouissance”: jouissance 
is fitted out (appareillée) (Lacan 1975, p. 72) with a device. Although Priapus 
first and foremost functioned as a signpost guiding the way, these statues could 
also be used for phallic pleasure (after dusk) or corporeal punishment. All these 
functions are linked up with language, Lacan argues. The signpost speaks to us, 
indicating the right direction, but the statue may also convey a promise or 
warning. Direct physical use sublimates into poetry and prayers. Priapus is first 
and foremost a signifier. It is a rural production site whose fruits include poetry. 
Some poems are directed to thieves, others to sodomites, still others to women: 
the Priapic version of an ἐπιθαλάµιον, a song written for the bride to accompany 
her on her way to the marital chamber, the bridal bed, one of these apparatuses 
for jouissance consolidated with a legal status. According to Aristotle, our needs 
are satisfied by activity, by excitation (ἐνέργεια), while activity yields pleasure 
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(Lacan 1975, p. 80). Indeed, multiple activities are involved in Priapus’ garden. 
First of all, there is pleasure in seeing: seeing phalluses, glancing lustfully at 
them, or deriding them. There may also be the pleasure of direct physical contact: 
the pleasure of friction, of corporeal activity producing heat. Castration is referred 
to on several occasions: “Beware of my phallus, for you will find out that I am 
not a castrate”. And yet, there is the fear that his phallus may be cut off. When 
thieves steal his sickle, not to use it, but to humiliate the god, this is a symbolic 
castration, a cause for laughter. Visitors turn to him because something is 
blocking their phallic function, so that there is a gap between desire (the craving 
subject: $) and the object (a). More precisely: this is the default, and visitors need 
Priapus’ help to make it work, whether they are female performers (Theletusa, 
Quintia) or male lovers. This is precisely where poetry comes in. Phallic 
jouissance entails the pleasure of reading. Poetry is the product of a particular set-
up: the garden as a poetry workshop. The poetry is logically consistent: logical 
poetry, for that is what poetry should be. Parmenides’ poetry likewise was logical 
poetry, a logical discourse on being and nothingness captured in verse, but it was 
the discourse of an Apollonian Master (i.e. metaphysics). The Carmina Priapea 
contain logical poetry of a more practical nature: dealing with legal and ethical 
aspects of horticulture and sexuality. It captures the logic of managing an orchard 
which also functions as a shrine, a sex school and a school of obscene poetry.  
The Renaissance is considered a problem, as we have seen. Superficially 
speaking, it is a resurge of the Apollonian style (an interregnum between the 
Magian and the Faustian style), but actually, it is also the return of the grotesque 
Apollonian counterpart, from medieval festivals up to Rabelais. The Renaissance 
is the return of a collision between incompatible styles. In the history of painting, 
the return of the grotesque is known as mannerism, with its carnal lushness and 
its fleshy, muscular bodies. Mannerism is an anti-classical (anti-Apollonian) 
movement, emphatically challenging Apollonian virtues such as balance and 
modesty (Van Tuinen & Meiborg 2015), eventually even culminating in 
ecclesiastical obscenities: the corporeal intrusiveness of the Baroque. 
  




Chapter 3. Waiting for the dawn: Magian thinking 
 
I have come into the world as a light, so that no one  
who believes in me should stay in darkness (John 12:46). 
 
In the previous chapter, Apollonian thinking was introduced via an artwork (the 
School of Athens), a location (the Academy) and a joint meal (Symposium). The 
basic word κόσµος determined the metaphysical profile of this style. We also 
payed attention to Apollonian ethics and, after focussing on Apollonian thinking 
as culture, attention shifted to the Roman Empire as Apollonian civilization. This 
chapter, dedicated to Magian thinking, follows a similar route. We will 
characterize Magian thinking via an artwork, a location and a meal. And after 
discussing Magian thinking as culture, we will continue with Magian civilization. 
We will pay particular attention to the fate of the word κόσµος, undergoing a 
striking reversal of meaning, a dramatic devaluation. Cosmos is still translated as 
“world”, but what is “world” from a Magian perspective? How does Magian 
thinking allow the world to appear?  
 
 
§ 1. What is “world”?  
 
The archetypal Magian meal, the Magian counterpart of the Apollonian 
Symposium, is the Last Supper: an event described in the Gospel of John with 
the greatest intensity. It is a Magian event that immediately reflects the distance, 
the world of difference between both styles. Five of the twenty-one chapters of 
the Gospel of John are dedicated to this event. Jesus is given the floor almost 
uninterrupted. At the beginning of His monologue, He immediately pronounces 
the word that we have come to regard as a grounding term of Apollonian thinking, 
namely, κόσµος: “Jesus knew that His time was coming and that He was about to 
return from the world (εκ τοῦ κόσµου) to the Father” (13: 1). The manner in 
which the word cosmos is used (pronounced, almost) reflects the profound 
distance that separates the Magian from the Apollonian mode of thought. For 
Apollonian thinking, the word κόσµος expressed the perfect order that was 
intellectually discernible in the universe as an all-encompassing sphere, the very 
opposite of a dark and unintelligible chaos. The human intellect could navigate 
this sphere via contemplation. In John, however, the term κόσµος still refers to 
“world”, but now conceived as a realm of darkness, and this shift of meaning is 
symptomatic of the fact that the author is a Magian thinker in a rather outspoken 
way. His world is the very opposite of clarity and order, it is a realm of confusion, 
contamination and apostasy. In other words, the term κόσµος has been 
devaluated, has acquired a negative value. It is a world in which the intellect no 
longer feels at home.  
In his essay Vom Wesen des Grundes, Martin Heidegger (1929/1967) 
already emphasised the significance of this shift. More than any other 
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philosopher, Heidegger acknowledged that the world does not always reveal itself 
it the same manner. While the Greek term κόσµος expressed a basic experience 
of being as a whole, the Christian term κόσµος (“world”) rather tells us something 
about the basic mood of those involved. In Saint Paul’s epistles, κόσµος indicates 
a particular attitude, namely of a humanity that has distanced itself from God. 
And the same goes for the evangelist John, who (as Heidegger notices) uses the 
word κόσµος remarkably often, but as an indication of the extent to which 
humankind has turned away and became estranged from God. In other words, 
κόσµος no longer stands for order in the world, but indicates the disorder which 
now holds sway over human existence. The tonality of human existence has 
fundamentally changed, as if a dramatic, collective mood swing has affected 
humanity as a whole. A sombre shadow has spread over human existence. In other 
words, a dual shift in meaning has occurred, not only from positive to negative, 
but also from world as clarity to world as a label for the human condition. 
Darkness has not obscured the starry sky. Rather, darkness has fallen over 
mundane existence. And in this frightening obscurity, a light is suddenly ignited.  
For Plato, the cosmos was the gleaming sphere that became visible for whoever 
managed to escape from the Dionysian cave of myth. For John, paradoxically, 
the cosmos itself has become a dark cave, in which only the word and presence 
of Jesus now appears as a shimmering light, spreading a guiding clarity in an 
ambiance of confusing obscurity. 
Whenever John the evangelist speaks about the world, this shift of 
meaning is ostensibly discernible. We must not envision the world as a particular 
domain, enclosed by a sphere of larger radius. Although Jesus says, “You are 
from below, I am from above” (8:23), these terms should not be understood in a 
geometrical, astronomical sense. Heaven cannot be located astronomically. 
Rather, the world and the Kingdom of Heaven are described in terms of darkness 
and light. During the Last Supper, Jesus explains how the term world must be 
understood. He will leave this world and return to His Father (13: 1). He has come 
into this world (κόσµος), but the world hates Him (7:7; 15:18). He is the light of 
this world and came to save this world (3:17), and whoever follows Him will no 
longer walk in darkness, but may follow the light of life (8:12). Before long the 
world will no longer see Him, but He asks His disciples to await His return, 
sending them out into the world to disseminate the truth. Before Pilate, he speaks 
the famous words “My Kingdom is not of this world” (18:36). 
There is an artwork that succeeded in capturing the Magian atmosphere, 
the mood and ambiance of the Last Supper in a remarkably convincing manner, 
as a counterpart of Raphael’s School of Athens. I mean the fresco that Leonardo 
da Vinci (1452-1519) painted in the refectory of the Dominican Monastery near 
the Santa Maria delle Grazie in Milan. While Raphael wanted to immortalise the 
Academy, Leonardo’s fresco revivifies Jesus and His followers as a primordial 
spiritual community. The world, visible on this fresco as architecture, is obscure 
and non-spherical. The ceiling is flat, though the structure is still reminiscent of 
the inside of the Pantheon. It is a flat version of a Pantheon that lost its vertical 




dimension and suffered a spatial bereavement. The Magian, mysterious, dreamy 
atmosphere is reinforced by the techniques Leonardo employed. The fresco, as it 
seems, was not painted for eternity and is exposed to the undermining impact of 
the damaging world. The artwork reflects abandonment. It seems to want to 
disappear and to erase itself. As if only care and piety can save it. 
The poet Wordsworth visited the fresco during his Italian trip and this 
experience served as inspiration for a sonnet (1994, p. 342-343) explaining how, 
although damps have marred this work, the Saviour’s calm, ethereal goodness 
and grace do not fail to awe, neither the elements nor the beholder. The 
annunciation of the truth made to the Twelve survives, in forehead and reposing 
hand, but also in the artist’s eternal work. The sonnet enacts the struggle between 
the Last Supper as an elevated scene, and the dreary, thawing world. The world 
manifests itself as the Real, in the form of damp and moisture, something which 
over time severely seems to damage the work’s integrity. In spite of these 
encroachments, however, the magical, mysterious aura of the work remains 
effective. Face to face with a brutish, entropic environment, Jesus’ hand and gaze 
reflect the message that His kingdom is not of this world. The Magian message 
itself, discernible as it were in Jesus’ countenance, remains unaffected.  
The fresco shows us the precarious and temporary presence of light in 
obscurity. The disciples are clearly shocked by Jesus’ announcement that one of 
them is about to betray Him. They gather in four groups of three. In a Magian 
artwork, such numerical ratios have meaning. In the Last Supper, Da Vinci 
succeeded in capturing the Magian mood or spirit in a most lucid and convincing 
manner. He worked on this masterpiece between 1495 and 1498. The damage that 
was done over time emphasizes the distance between Magian thinking and the 
present. It requires some effort to try and enter the lost world of Magian thought. 
It has faded – but not beyond recognition or repair. In Da Vinci’s artwork the 
mildness of Jesus dominates, but as a Magian figure he also is a shadow blending 
into the background. The gospels describe, besides a loving Jesus, also a demonic 
Jesus who, when the disciples have embarked and night sets in, meets them as a 
spectre hovering over the water, even inviting one of them to come to him, almost 
causing him to drown (Mt 14:25-31). Jesus seems to take pleasure in the 
conviction that only a few will be saved (Mt 19:25). The Magian style has its 
sinister, ghostly aspect. 
 
 
§ 2. The coming of the Kingdom 
 
The grounding term of Magian thinking is not world (κόσµος), but Kingdom; The 
Kingdom of Heavens: Βασιλεία τῶν Οὐρανῶν. The gospel tells us how Jesus 
roams Galilee surrounded by followers to proclaim His message. Matthew 
describes how one day, he leaves his birthplace Nazareth, where he worked as a 
carpenter, to settle in a fishing village on the lake. From that moment on, He 
begins His preaching (4:7). But what is it that he actually preaches? His message 
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can be condensed into one compact formula: “Repent and convert, the Kingdom 
of Heaven is near.” That is what He tells those who cross His path. But what is 
meant by “Kingdom of Heaven”? Jesus answers this question by means of 
parables. “A farmer went out to sow his seeds...” (13: 3). 
He uses two genres. His disciples receive the message in an esoteric 
version, although they often find it difficult and struggle to understand. For wider 
audiences, He uses a more accessible style, in the form of parables. The fact that 
Jesus does not put any of his ideas in writing (except for some words written in 
sand) is not all that astonishing. His esoteric teachings could only be transmitted 
verbally, to a small group of elect initiates. Moreover, it was a very concise and 
simple message: a limited set of compact formulas, explained with the help of 
simple stories, taken from everyday life, appealing to and easily remembered by 
illiterate listeners. The meaning of these parables is that we need to prepare 
ourselves for an event that we cannot bring about ourselves, but which will 
thoroughly transform the existing world and puts everything in a completely 
different light. What seems important now, such as the worldly question whether 
we should pay taxes to the emperor, will prove extremely trivial. A new order is 
imminent. Jesus calls upon His listeners to prepare for this event, the coming of 
the Kingdom. That is (in short-hand) His gospel. It is especially good news for 
those (fishermen, craftsmen, day labourers) who lead a simple life. For the rich 
and rulers of this world, the prospects are not so good, because what seems of 
value will lose all value. 
This devaluation of the existing world in view of the approaching 
Kingdom is clearly expressed in Jesus’ dismissive attitude towards architecture. 
When one day he leaves the temple of Jerusalem, the largest, most impressive 
building in the whole region, of wondrous size, one of his disciples says: Look, 
Teacher! What massive stones! What magnificent buildings! (Mc 13:1). It is the 
astonishment of a young man from the province who visits (perhaps for the first 
time) the big city and is still easily intimidated.13 The temple as an edifice must 
really have been very imposing in terms of scale and size. Jesus, however, puts 
the building in a different perspective, already envisioning its destruction. He 
assures His followers that no stone will remain on top of the other and He will 
repeat this message later on, when they have climbed the Mount of Olives later 
that day: a shady hill east of Jerusalem overlooking the temple. The catastrophe 
which He predicts will first and foremost affect architecture. Jesus is not 
impressed by impressive constructions, for He lives in the expectation of a 
spiritual Kingdom. When facing architecture, He articulates what Hegel will later 
designate as the position of negativity. This negative attitude towards 
metropolitan buildings, already negating them before they are actually 
                                                             
13 This confrontation of simple folks with the big city is a repetition of a ‘typical’ event 
that repeatedly occurred in the course of history. Sloterdijk describes the origins of this 
experience as follows: “Wir mussen uns ganz in das Erstaunen eines Urmenschen 
versetzen, der zum ersten Mal inmitten der Landschaft diese Masse von Stein und Holz 
erblickt” (1999, p. 106). 




demolished, it clearly a symptom of His renunciation of the world as such, and 
deserves our attention. At what locations did Jesus dwell?  
Again, we need to distinguish two types of locations: esoteric and 
exoteric ones. The temple, despite its religious function, became contaminated by 
worldly influences. Therefore, it is a place where polemical dialogues with 
outsiders take place. The esoteric, more intimate forms exchange among initiates 
took place elsewhere. 
 
 
§ 3. Primordial scenes 
 
Jesus of Nazareth was an itinerant preacher with a message so simple that it has 
become extremely difficult for us to really comprehend its meaning: the Kingdom 
of Heaven is at hand. The message was announced on the road. His sect was 
initially referred to as the guild or the society of the Way. The gospel was spread 
in the open air: on the banks of Lake Galilee, on a hill, in simple homes of friends 
in villages alongside the road, where they made a stop. The gospel was a purely 
wordy affair without architecture, liberated from all worldly weight.  
Jesus and His followers have no source of income. To provide for their 
living, they are dependent on others, on invitations, as a company of travelling 
vagrants. After many wanderings through the province, Jesus inevitably reached 
the end of his journey: Jerusalem, the capital, to face the confrontation of 
provincialism with the establishment. In the temple and at other crowded places, 
Jesus presents His teachings in a polemical manner. The debates concern issues 
related to textual interpretation. How should the Bible be read? But the actual 
doctrine is secretly shared and proclaimed, within a much smaller circle of 
devotees. The activities notably revolve around two specific locations, namely 
Mount of Olives and the cenacle (cenaculum), the room on the upper floor. Mount 
of Olives, like the Academy, is a park-scape with olive trees, east of the city, from 
which Jesus views the temple complex: a perfect location for someone calling 
upon his followers to critically assess the big city with its buildings, a perfect spot 
from where to launch His critical comments. His criticism not only concerned the 
discourse that flourished at the temple as a public forum for deliberations, but 
also the worldly (Apollonian) architecture that made this type of discourse 
possible. What was the upper room?  
The evangelists Mark (14:15) and Luke (22:12) describe the locality 
where the Last Supper took place as ἀνάγαιον, a hall on the first floor of a house. 
In the Vulgate this term is translated as coenaculum. After His death, the disciples 
still gather there, near Zion Gate, in the southern part of the city. An upper hall 
has indeed been found on this very site, which presumably dates from the first 
century A.D. and has traditionally been regarded as the place in question. On 23 
March 2000 this site was visited by Pope John Paul II. 
  Styles of Thinking 
 
100 
The Acts of the Apostles describe how the disciples travel on foot up and 
down between Mount of Olives and the upper hall,14 but sometimes they also 
expose themselves to the public podiums near the Temple. We can compare this 
situation with the habits of the academics. On Mount of Olives and in the upper 
room they were among themselves. Here Jesus preached to His own circle of 
adepts. At other locations, other genres were practiced: the parable, the 
interrogation. In the upper hall, Pentecost took place. The temple, an architectural 
achievement of significance, precisely as an architectural highlight, evoked 
ambivalent feelings in Jesus and his followers. On the one hand, he explicitly 
refers to it as the house of His Father and the building therefore strongly appeals 
to him. He realizes that here, the ultimate test (the final tribulation) will take 
place. Here he will have to prove his credibility. On the other hand, this hyper-
building, erected in Apollonian style, fills Him with aversion and revulsion.  
 
 
§ 4. Jesus versus architecture 
 
Jesus was not at all favourably disposed towards architecture, as a decidedly 
worldly art, an expression of leading thoughts captured in marble. This negative 
attitude is most clearly noticeable in the gospel of Mark, the oldest of the gospels. 
Jesus literally proclaims that large buildings will break down. While staring at 
impressive buildings such as the temple, He envisions a future situation in which 
they are absent; He already sees their absence, a future in which these monuments 
of stone have been wiped away. Jesus is an archaeologist of the future, discerning 
ruins instead of buildings. Jesus Himself prefers to dwell in the open air or in 
simple houses of ordinary people.  
A similar scene is described in the gospel according to Matthew. After 
Jesus has left the temple in Jerusalem, He says to His disciples: “‘Do you see all 
these things?’ he asked. ‘Truly I say unto you, not one stone will be left on 
another; every single one will be thrown down.’” (24:2). A big city means big 
architecture, huge Apollonian establishments. The attitude of a Magian itinerant 
preacher towards Apollonian architecture is outspokenly negative. Every 
building, and especially the building, the temple itself, will be destroyed. He 
proclaims it as a catastrophe, but at the same time he clearly takes delight in this 
prospect, phrasing it as a ‘good’ tiding. When Jesus adds that He will rebuild this 
impressive construction in three days, this doesn’t mean that He sees himself as 
an architect or master-builder. That was the ambition of his antagonists, the 
Roman governors, the emperors, notably Hadrian. The phrase must be taken 
figuratively. Jesus was not a temple builder, and architecture didn’t appeal to 
Him. He had given up on it as it were. Rather, the statement quoted referred to 
                                                             
14 “Then the apostles returned to Jerusalem from the hill called Mount of Olives, a 
Sabbath day’s walk from the city. When they arrived, they went upstairs to the 
room where they were staying [and] joined together in constant prayer” (Acts 1:12-14)  




the temple of His body.15 His church, His religion could do without such 
buildings. Yes, Jesus is in the habit of visiting the temple, but at the same time 
He already anticipates its obliteration. He looks at the present from the 
perspective of the future. The temple functions in the gospel primarily as an 
entourage for polemics with the theological establishment. It is not a place where 
the message is truly and genuinely proclaimed. Those things happen elsewhere, 
in the localities where Magian thinking in statu nascendi originated. Early 
Christians visit the city centre primarily for polemics. Esoteric preaching, meant 
for an audience of devotees, takes place at different, less splendid sites.  
The provocative scorn that Jesus displays in His aversion to architecture 
is all the more remarkable when we consider the construction He was actually 
dealing with. Herod’s temple was an immense building, a world miracle. The 
temple as such, already quite huge, was part of an impressive complex of 
buildings covering the whole plateau and made from white stones in Corinthian 
style. The structure was dominated by high pillars, about a thousand, decorated 
with gilded vines. According to Jewish historian Josephus, visitors were stunned 
by the grandeur of the temple and her colonnades (1969, Book XV). Especially 
for those who, like Jesus, approached the complex from the East, the building 
looked gigantic. On the south side were the peristyles where teachers addressed 
their following. Here, too, was Solomon’s portico (στοά), where Jesus conversed 
with his opponents and where His followers likewise gathered after His death.16 
Just like Stoic philosophers gathered at the στοά ποικίλη in the centre of Athens 
near the Acropolis, the Jewish schools and sects gathered in the immediate 
vicinity of a sanctuary. In this metropolitan, Apollonian environment, quarrels 
between schools and sects were staged. Socrates debated in such a location with 
rivalling sophists, Jesus with the Scribes. However, the coming of the Kingdom 
was neither determined by nor dependent upon the outcome of such debates. The 
spiritual dawn would spread throughout the empire on its own accord. Faith is a 
matter of grace, not of arguments or discussions (cf. Augustine, De civitate Dei, 
XXII, 7). Still, hearts can be opened by wordings used on such occasions. The 
spirit works (as a spiritual infection) via words and deeds.  
We must therefore not imagine the Kingdom of which Jesus spoke as an 
earthly city with temples and walls, quite the contrary. The temple Jesus wants to 
erect is of a spiritual nature, beyond architecture. The existing temple will perish 
– from the perspective of the existing world a catastrophe, but from a Magian 
perspective the beginning of something completely new. There is no continuity 
between the Kingdom and this world. The Kingdom is not a worldly empire (it is 
                                                             
15  The church is built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets, with Christ Jesus 
himself as the chief cornerstone (Ephesians 2:10). 
16 “And Jesus was in the temple courts walking in Solomon's Colonnade” (John 10:23); 
“All the people were astonished and came running to them in the place called 
Solomon’s Colonnade” (Acts 3:11); “The apostles performed many signs and 
wonders among the people. And all the believers used to meet together in Solomon’s 
Colonnade” (Acts 5:12). 
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not of this world) and will not take root or feel at home in the buildings of 
Apollonian civilisation. In His vision, architecture is lacking. His faith was one 
of villages and country roads.  
It was Paul who introduced the metropole into Christianity, and 
Christianity into the metropole. He dispatched his letters to Christian 
communities in metropolitan areas. With him, Christianity became a big city 
phenomenon: became civilization. The city of Rome, where Peter and Paul came 
to their end, would not have attracted Jesus. Jesus was not drawn to Rome. 
Because of this migration to the big city, the attitude of early Christianity (as a 
key representative of Magian thinking) towards architecture inevitably began to 
change. The civilization of Magian thinking inevitably gave rise to the birth of a 
Magian style of building. It is the purpose of this type of architecture to create a 
Magian, mystical, awe-inspiring space, where the presence, the divinity of the 
divine, can be experienced as shimmering light floating into the darkness. The 
primordial Magian building is the Pantheon, as we have seen. Although this 
building began as the completion of Apollonian architecture, it is at the same time 
the first man-made mystical ambiance. At the time this unique construction was 
taking shape, Oriental (Magian) religious movements began to pervade Rome.  
Spengler sees the Pantheon as the archetype of Magian architecture, as 
“the first mosque” (p. 98, p. 274). Hadrian wanted to copy works he had seen in 
the East.17 Centuries later, after the fall of Constantinople, a similar event occurs. 
The Hagia Sophia can be transformed into a mosque without destroying the 
architectural construction as such. Byzantine and Islamic architecture have the 
same ambition: creating a mystical space, referred to by Rudolf Otto as das 
Numinöse. The inside of a dome is reminiscent of, and reflects the sublimity of 
the starry sky. The Pantheon materialises a Platonic conception, but also 
represents a turn towards a radically different style of thinking, which already has 
begun its ascent. In these mysterious cavities (spiritual enclaves in a worldly 
environment), certain ritual gestures and spiritual experiences become possible. 
Conditions are created for unworldly moods to evolve: commemorating the Last 
Supper as the primordial experience, the transformative event. Before analysing 
the profile of Christian civilisation in more detail, I will first try to find out more 
precisely what happened in the localities described above, when the gospel was 
still, in the terminology of Spengler, culture. What were Jesus and his followers 
doing and experiencing in their cenacle? And what kind of discussions were 




                                                             
17 “Das Meisterwerk aber, die früheste aller Moscheen, ist der Neubau des Pantheons 
durch Hadrian, der hier sicherlich … Kultbauten nachahmen wollte, die er im Orient 
gesehen hatte” (I, p. 274). 




§ 5. Transubstantiation 
 
During the Last Supper, Jesus articulates a Magian worldview. He is about to 
leave the hateful world, but at the same time hints at His return. The highlight 
event is a simple Magian gesture enacted by Him: take this bread and eat, it is my 
body: Hoc est corpus, a phrase which was travestied into Hocus pocus later on. 
He likewise offers wine, His blood (Mt 26:26-28; Mc 14:22-24; Lucas 22:17-20). 
In the gospel of John, the overall description of the scene is even more detailed 
and engaging. Jesus refers to Himself as the bread of life. Whoever eats and 
drinks will partake in eternal life (Joh 6:51-56). The philosophical terms for what 
takes place is transubstantiation, meaning that bread and wine as material 
substances undergo a profound ontological transmutation. Although nothing 
seems to visibly change, their value and meaning changes dramatically. Their 
ontological standing has been altered in a sudden, leap-like fashion. For a Magian 
readership, it is a climax, a highlight of intensity and participation. For those who 
have distanced themselves from it, it is a bizarre scene, a mystification, a 
misunderstanding. Diderot (1769/1951) will remark that the transformation of 
wine and bread into flesh and blood is a natural process known as metabolism, 
which does not involve any “galimatias”. But Diderot is undeniably a Faustian 
thinker, who has lost contact with the world of Magian thinking.  
Transubstantiation means that the significance of a certain object 
dramatically changes. Another word for transubstantiation is sublimation. An 
example of sublimation is money, say: a coin. The value of a coin is not 
determined by the materials from which it is produced. As soon as a piece of 
metal becomes a coin, it becomes part of a financial (symbolic) circuit, and 
changes abruptly. It acquires a value which it did not have as a piece of metal, 
which could also have been used for other purposes. Whoever argues that the 
symbolic value is fictitious, ignores the reality of the value dimension, the 
symbolic order as a crucial dimension of human existence. This dimension 
precedes the coming into existence of the coin as a coin, making it possible. Due 
to this dimension, a piece of metal becomes a carrier of value. Coins have a 
certain intrinsic value (e.g. golden coins), or can be used to produce guns in times 
of war, but in order to circulate, currency value differs from material value. The 
coin as such is merely a vehicle, the real value is determined by a symbol, a 
currency symbol, minted by someone who has the authority to do so and whose 
stamp it bears. The tangible coin is never completely identical with its value or 
meaning. It carries the portrait of the emperor, sending it out into the world as 
His coin, as a piece of propaganda. By using the coin, we acknowledge the 
emperor as the rightful ruler of our world. The portrait reinforces the validity of 
the coin, while the coin reinforces the sovereign’s sovereignty. According to 
Magian thinking, a piece of bread can acquire spiritual meaning only in the 
context of a Holy Mass, conducted by a priest, acknowledged by Rome. It takes 
Faustian thinkers like Luther to flatly deny or even question such a truth (self-
evident, according to the logic of Magian thinking).      
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The Roman Empire was the golden age in the history of the coin. The 
coin could function optimally in an Apollonian ambiance, as reflected by its 
circular shape, allowing it to circulate within (and at the same time delineate) the 
political sphere of influence. The coin represented the worldly empire, 
determined the radius of its power. All this explains Jesus’ disdain and contempt 
for the coin. The Magian coin no longer desires to circulate. Magian coins desire 
to become transmuted into a treasure.   
Another example of transubstantiation is the artwork, whose value is not 
primarily determined by the materials from which it is made (and this even 
applies to artworks made from gold or ivory or marble or jade). The artist adds a 
cultural surplus, via his signature. The first artists were shamans and a painting 
by Leonardo da Vinci still retains something of the miraculous. Value is created 
through art. A random coagulation of various types of paint will fail to create 
meaning, although this will be challenged by modernism later on. In the hands of 
the artist, the material thing undergoes a transfiguration. 
Transubstantiation or sublimation also play a decisive role in love, 
notably in Magian forms of love, such as courtly love. Physiologically speaking, 
human beings are not that different from one another. In principle, all bodies 
function more or less in similar ways. Physiologically speaking, apart from 
conditions such as age or illness, our anatomies are more or less identical. In 
every single human body, the same organs, genes and proteins can usually be 
found. But the experience of love points in a different direction, putting the 
beloved body in a completely different perspective. Although the beloved body 
may not be exceptional in a biochemical way, a lover may exclusively want to 
experience intimacy with this particular body, to which some very unique 
characteristics are attributed, singling it out from and setting it apart from others. 
The beloved body may even be experienced as untouchable or inviolable. Due to 
the experience of love, the body’s value increases dramatically. There is 
something Magian about falling in love, and something of the Magian tends to 
survive in instances of intimacy, for those who are sensitive to it of course.  
It is possible to reduce phenomena of love to biochemical or 
physiological mechanisms and processes, and this is exactly what Faustian 
authors will try to do. In purely physiological or biochemical descriptions, the 
Magian dimension is indeed absent, obliterated as it were. In the Magian 
experience, physiology only plays a secondary role, and the spiritual dimension 
is the decisive one. The object is sublated into something out of the ordinary, 
something irreplaceable.     
The paradigm of Magian love is courtly love, love from a distance, 
romantic yearning. The physical encounter is postponed instead of consumed, 
and precisely this deferral, this distance in place and time, increases the value of 
the desired object, transfiguring it into something of unspeakable value. The 
status of the desired object is decidedly unique. Thus, to the physiology and 
biochemistry of love, a mysterious dimension is added, a value which may even 
pervade the clothes worn by the beloved, as well as the words he or she utters. 




Everything will share in this mysterious aura. Magian love, ideally, equals 
celibacy. Physiology vulgarises the love experience, because the focus of 
attention is now drawn towards the merely physiological, or even the obscene, 
from which Magian desire tries to immunise the object. Magian love is poetry 
rather than biochemistry.  
Contemporary readers will probably see the relationship between Jesus 
and Mary Magdalena as a sexual relationship. For the Magian reader, the special 
value of their relationship resides precisely in the absence of the coital moment. 
“Consuming” their love would put the extraordinary value of the intimate 
friendship between Jesus and Mary at stake. They sublimate their love. What is 
entailed in this is not a marriage but a spiritual bonding.  
To all things of value, there is a Magian aspect. Even an author as 
unmistakably Faustian as Karl Marx was forced, in a famous section in Das 
Kapital, to emphasise the mysterious character of the value dimension, up to the 
point of commodities being transformed into a fetish. On the one hand, the use 
value of most things is more or less evident, Marx argues. In addition, however, 
as market items (commodities), things acquire exchange value as well: the price 
paid in the case of purchase. However, that price is not determined in the first 
place by its use value. Brand may be important, or particular forms of jouissance 
hinted at in commercials. But where exactly does this mysterious value come 
from? Marx discovers a moment of discontinuity, a leap from practical value (use 
value) to exchange value (market value), as if things undergo a sudden 
transfiguration once they are offered on the market for sale. Marx (of all people) 
discerns metaphysical niceties that seem to resists rational (Faustian) analysis (p. 
85). And this is what he refers to as the fetish character of value. A fetish is like 
an object touched by a beloved person, something unreachable, perhaps even 
bringing consumers into a pathological state of craving. The object is infected, in 
a positive sense. A Magian moment is involved. There is always something, a 
value dimension, which is mysteriously added, which puts things in a different 
light (the seductive light of the shop window where commodities are on display). 
For the art lover, it is the artist who adds value by placing his or her stamp on the 
things he or she produces, in the form of a signature, literally and / or figuratively 
(as signature may also refer to specific features of technique and style). 
This mysterious ability of human beings to discern or introduce value and 
meaning into the world, transcends the purely material dimension. Precisely this 
is what is at stake during the Last Supper. The wine and bread that Jesus shares 
are everyday items that suddenly receive a completely different, symbolic 
meaning, creating a spiritual community (still celebrated today during catholic 
mass). Whoever emphasises that a biochemical analysis of this transfigured bread 
or wine will not reveal any measurable change, misses the point completely. Also, 
the chalice on whose surface Jesus leaves His fingerprints, later used by Joseph 
of Arimathea during the crucifixion to collect the blood dripping from His body, 
becomes an object of worship and desire. The chalice becomes the Grail – at least 
for those readers of the gospel who are susceptible to experiencing the Magian 
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dimension. This type of event, this transformation or sublimation, plays a crucial 
role in Magian thinking, and distinguishes the every-day (profane) from the 
sacred. The Magian event is something which befalls us, something that calls 
upon us, overwhelms and unsettles us, but which cannot be caused or brought 
about by us. Rather, our activity consists in preparing ourselves for such an event: 
the readiness is all. 
Although the value dimension as such is not a characteristic feature of 
the Magian experience, the Magian style intensifies it, pushes it to the extreme. 
Jesus was a carpenter, Peter and John were fishermen, while Paul repaired tents, 
but in the light of the value dimension, such activities lose their meaning. Those 
involved may continue such professions after their moment of calling 
(conversion), but the tonality of their existence has changed and from now 
something of a completely different order is at stake. The old world has lost its 
meaning. Only from this perspective can we understand some of Jesus’ polemical 
confrontations with the establishment, discussed in the next section. 
 
 
§ 6. Jesus’ laughter 
 
…and the scorn of his laugh rang free (Ezra Pound) 
 
While in the upper room the intimate dimension culminates in transubstantiation, 
in public places another type of discourse developed. Mark describes a famous 
discussion between Jesus and the Pharisees. The colonnade of the temple 
complex was a perfect entourage for this type of conversations. His opponents 
confronted Him with tricky questions. This probably was a kind of intellectual 
game between protagonists of the various sects represented there. Especially 
newcomers were tested in this manner. One tricky question was: should one pay 
taxes to Rome? This was a classic problem, giving rise to different opinions 
among competing groups. With such questions, they tried to corner Him. A 
dangerous question, a trap. A denial would bring Him into conflict with the 
worldly powers, a confirmation with the religious establishment. Jesus answers 
with a witticism, in the style of the ancient Cynics: “Let me see the coin. Whose 
portrait does it bear and whose inscription? The Emperor’s? Well, then render to 
Caesar what is Caesar’s and to God what is God’s” (Mark 12:14; Matthew 22:21). 
The coin derives its value and meaning from the symbolic order wherein it 
circulates. The coin already belongs to the Emperor. From the perspective of the 
Kingdom, this makes it a meaningless, worthless object; not at all an item of 
concern. Use it, but with equanimity, do not attach any value to it. Do not allow 
yourself to be trapped by it. Followers of Jesus may pay their taxes, precisely 
because such action is irrelevant and trivial. The Kingdom of Heaven devaluates 
the value of money put into circulation by worldly powers. This scene contrasts 
with what happens during the Last Supper. Here, exactly the reverse movement 
is discernible. Simple objects taken from everyday life, such as wine and bread, 




acquire a value (in the light of the coming of the Kingdom) that can no longer be 
expressed in terms of worldly coins. 
Jesus reveals a whole new value dimension, enacts a transvaluation of 
values. The seemingly valuable coin becomes worthless while things which seem 
of moderate value (use value) suddenly undergo an increase in value. The coin 
devaluates, the everyday item sublimates. During the Last Supper there is an 
atmosphere of intimate solemnity, which contrasts with the humour with which 
Jesus confronts the scribes. He solves a risky situation with a “formidable” joke 
(Lacan 1986, p. 115), masterfully avoiding dialectical pitfalls. Humour certainly 
plays a part in debates with outsiders. When it comes to questioning established 
truths, the category of the comical plays a decisive role (Zwart 1996). The 
dialogues staging Socrates in discussion with the Sophists, are highlights of 
comical world literature: philosophical comedies in fact. In the case of Jesus, the 
comical dimension is less obvious perhaps. Indeed, there is even discussion 
among experts about whether Jesus laughed at all (Morreall 1983, Hyer 1981). 
What is laughter? 
Kant describes humour as follows (1790/1971, A 222). When someone 
becomes entangled in a difficult situation, bystanders catch their breath. They try 
to follow the thoughts and actions of the person concerned. Suddenly, because of 
a witticism or a joke, the problem is suddenly annihilated. By this unexpected 
turn of events, the mental process is interrupted, resulting in a sense of relief. 
Thorax and diaphragm relax. The bystanders laugh.  
The polemics between Jesus and the Scribes seems to be in accordance 
with this scheme. Jesus, who supposedly never laughed, replies to His opponents 
in a humorous fashion. However, we are so used to serious readings of the gospel, 
that it has become difficult to discern the element of humour at work here. Jesus’ 
reply must have amused bystanders, they must have laughed. Is it permissible to 
pay taxes? At first, they hold their breath. Whoever says A or B puts himself in 
trouble, either by opting for collaboration or by stirring resistance. Jesus saves 
the situation by annulling the problem, allowing it to disappear, turning a 
theological trap into something utterly trivial. The relationship with worldly 
powers is presented in a different light. For the true believer, all this is really of 
no concern. Truly religious persons are not involved in this. It does not really 
matter. An unsettling dilemma has suddenly imploded. A different mood or state 
of mind is made possible by jokes. It is precisely because of this joke that His 
opponents begin to realise how dangerous Jesus really is. 
During Last Supper, witticisms are completely lacking. At esoteric 
locations, we enter the realm of solemnity. Plato’s dialogues (staged in public 
venues) were more humorous than intellectual deliberations evolving within the 
inner circle of mathematically trained scholars. The coin touched by Jesus loses 
its value, while bread experiences sublimation. The coin belongs to the Emperor, 
and the emperor is this coin, is present in this coin. Without money circulating, 
empire-building would be unthinkable. The emperor exists because of the 
symbolic order which supports it. The true believer, however, does not belong to 
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this world. In the upper room, Jesus and his disciples open up a new dimension 
of existence which will become increasingly important during the centuries to 
come. They insulate themselves in this fold where the coming of the Kingdom 
announces itself. Here, its advent is experienced for the first time. Bread and wine 
become important entities. Jesus is this bread and wine. He is present in them.  
 
 
§ 7. Christianity as civilization  
 
Jesus addressed small groups of people, gathering in a house as confidants, 
although sometimes He would face larger crowds, but His preaching remained 
culture. The transition from culture to civilization is recorded in the Acts of the 
Apostles and accomplished by Paul. The latter no longer addresses the inhabitants 
of places like Capernaum, Nazareth, Emmaus or Bethany, as Jesus did. He rather 
reaches out to the Christians of Rome, Corinth and Ephesus, Christians living in 
ancient metropolises. Jesus spread His message orally, Paul rather opts for 
epistolary communication. He preaches via letters. Jesus travelled country roads, 
Paul prefers the important routes of traffic and communication, either by land or 
by sea. From Corinth he dispatched his letter to the Christians of Rome, while 
composing his letter to the Corinthians in Ephesus. Jesus visited His followers in 
towns and villages, but in the days of Paul, Christian churches had begun to settle 
in big cities, replacing Aramaic as a regional language by Greek as the lingua 
franca, the language of scholars. In each and every respect there is increase of 
scale. Jesus’ wanderings eventually ended in Jerusalem, a provincial capital. 
Those of Paul ended in Rome, the centre of the world. Here, Christianity had to 
compete with other religious mass movements of the Magian era, such as Isis and 
Mithras cults. Like gnosis, these are truly Magian movements, on the level of 
civilisation, no longer constrained by spatial or ethnic attachments. Peter, at the 
beginning of the Acts, focuses exclusively on Jews, but at the end of the Acts, 
Paul’s outreach coincides with a significant part of the Roman sphere of 
influence. Soon, a whole empire becomes spiritually imbued.  
The big city is something very different compared to the rural landscape. 
World History basically unfolds in cities, on a metropolitan stage, according to 
Spengler. In villages, no history is written. Only at the time of Saint Paul, 
Christianity becomes history – world history. The big city is the stage where big 
politics is enacted, where science, social interaction and finance evolve. Only in 
a metropolitan world, Christian literature becomes a subgenre of world literature. 
There is a fundamental resemblance, regardless of time and place, between 
villages anywhere in the world. Here, a “general human pattern” (Romein 1954) 
establishes itself. All villages are similar to some extent. The city, however, is a 
phenomenon of a completely different order, e.g. the contrast between the misery 
of bad neighbourhoods and the splendour of the city centre. Inhabitants of a world 
city are no longer a people, but a multi-ethnic population. 




An important moment in the transition from culture to civilization is 
Pentecost. The spirit descends on His followers, and they experience a state of 
divine madness: All are filled with the Holy Spirit and begin to speak. At that 
time, Jews had settled in various regions and linguistic communities, so that 
multiple languages and dialects could be heard in Jerusalem (the city as a social 
heteroglossia, as Bakhtin phrases it). But now these illiterate apostles seem to be 
infected by this multiplicity, they seem to speak and address bystanders in 
multiple languages. An important question in the Acts is whether Christianity has 
an ethnocentric or a global mission. Will the good tidings only concern Jews, or 
is its scope much broader: is it the onset of a movement of global significance? 
What the Pentecost experience makes clear is that the gospel is independent of a 
specific language. The gospel is not written in a holy language, but in a lingua 
franca, and therefore translatable and transplantable. The gospels are constantly 
translated, in Latin, Gothic and so forth, and such translations of the Christian 
message even results in a renewal of the language in question. Of several 
Germanic languages it can be said that they only became a language, in the sense 
of a national language, thanks to the translation of the gospels.  
The followers of Jesus were fishermen and farmers of the Aramaic 
countryside who passed on these stories and statements verbally. Jesus 
apocalyptic message was, that the end of the world was near. In Acts of the 
Apostles we read how Peter and John healed a man who had been paralyzed for 
forty years. They practice Magian medicine, through haptotherapy, or by uttering 
a phrase. Thereupon they are questioned by Jewish scribes, who were astonished 
by the boldness (παρρησία) of these uneducated men (ἄνθρωποι ἀγράµµατοί καὶ 
ἰδιῶται, Acts 4:13). Paul, however, spoke the metropolitan language of the 
literate. Christianity was becoming “civilised”. A final confirmation of this was 
the book De Civitate Dei by Saint Augustine. This intellectual, who came of age 
in an Apollonian environment, experienced the force of Magian thinking. 
Following the example of Paul, his style of thinking is urban, civilised. Augustine 
lived in metropolises like Milan and Hippo and De Civitate Dei envisions a divine 
metropolis, a city that is ever more splendid than the centres of Apollonian 
civilization. Worldly cities like Rome proved vulnerable. By contrast, God’s 
metropolis will supersede them. Augustine had been familiar with the Apollonian 
worldview during his youth, but never fully identified himself with this doomed 
perspective. Eventually he rejects the very concept of a spherical world. In De 
Civitate Dei, he rejects the idea that there could be antipodes inhabiting the 
southern hemisphere of a spherical earth. This logical and inevitable consequence 
of spherical thinking is brushed aside as an absurdity (Book 16, Chapter 9). The 
world is a sphere, he “knows” that, and at the same time he no longer really grasps 
the implications of this truth. Magian preaching entails a rejection of the spherical 
idea. Spherically is no longer endorsed, no longer followed consistently down to 
its most radical consequences. Augustine sees the world differently, as a 
cavernous space where a battle between light and darkness is raging.  
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There are two worlds, according to Augustine: the worldly and the divine 
one. The question what the city of God exactly amounts to, is not that easy to 
answer. It is a future event, a coming. God’s metropolis is inhabited by the elect. 
Eternal bliss reigns there and it is Sunday interminably. Source of inspiration is 
the Book of Revelation: I saw the holy city, the New Jerusalem, descending from 
heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband (21:2). It is a sublimated, 
transfigured Jerusalem, a change far more radical than optimisation: it is a 
transubstantiation of the idea of the metropolis as such. Matter becomes 
transfigured. The new world consists of precious stones and precious metals. 
Matter has undergone a sudden, alchemical change. On the other hand, the city 
of God is already among us, within us, present in our faith, in the ethos of true 
believers, regardless of whether they are carpenters or fishermen. This invisible 
city is a decisive factor in history, providing a sense of meaning and direction (in 
this seemingly meaningless theatre of violence and sexual reproduction). 
Believers already live their lives in the expectation of the coming of this 
Kingdom. A future event already affected the lives of Jesus’ followers. They 
already lived under the sway of the dawning Kingdom, and did not want to have 
any part in the Pax Romana. They were awaiting the coming of a transfigured 
city (Hebrews 13:14). Peter and Paul travelled to Rome to witness the destruction 
of the spherical world. 
 
 
§ 8. Islam as civilization 
 
Christianity arose during a period of disorientation, allowing an influx of oriental 
religions into the Roman Empire. Christianity began as a movement of resistance 
against global political realism, but became gradually transformed into a 
movement that aimed to contribute to restoring political stability. Christianity 
became a global movement. Many centuries later, a similar event came about, in 
what was even more a hinterland than Galilee. Around 610, an Arab merchant 
had an overwhelming religious experience on a mountain near Mecca. Arab tribes 
were experiencing a profound transformation process. Their traditional nomadic 
existence was giving way to a more lucrative and extended trade economy. This 
new culture needed a new ideological superstructure. The traditional ethos was 
geared to a situation of permanent struggle for existence. Virility, fate and self-
sacrifice constituted important concepts. The ancient tribes acknowledged 
multiple gods, with Allah as the chief deity. Mohammed took over some elements 
of traditional religion, but transformed this moral culture into a belief system that 
not only proved able to unite the Arab tribes, but even constituted the foundation 
for a Magian civilization.  
Mohammed initially faced the same situation as Jesus and His first 
followers. At first, he believed that his message was tailored to his own ethnic 
group. Gradually, he began to realize the broader significance of his calling. In a 
remarkably short period of time, his new religion developed into a far-reaching 




phenomenon. The rise of Islam occurred relatively late, but the pace of its spread 
indicated that the Oriental world was ready for Magian civilization. This explains, 
according to Spengler, the spectacular swiftness of Islam’s dissemination across 
different continents. He gave the Arabs a spirituality that was consistent with their 
traditions, but which at the same time could serve as source of inspiration for a 
theocentric empire which reached from the Himalayas to the Pyrenees 
(Armstrong 1994, p. 159). Islam spread with unprecedented speed: Syria (634), 
Damascus (635), Egypt (641), Carthage (647) and Spain (710) were overrun, and 
almost Paris even (732). This phenomenal success, according to Spengler, shows 
how much Islam was a timely message, and how much of the East was craving 
for the advent of a Magian civilization.  
What is a Magian religion? Traditional religions are bound to specific 
locations such as mountain peaks, rivers, lakes and springs. The divine is 
indigenous. For a Magian religion, this is no longer valid. Where two or three are 
gathered in God’s name, a Magian church is present. Rome as the centre of the 
Roman Empire became the centre of Magian Christianity, with Constantinople as 
its rival. At first, Christianity distanced itself from Rome. There was no rapport 
whatsoever between the grand city and the new faith. Magian religion spread via 
its rituals, such as baptism or the breaking of bread. These rituals could, in 
principle, take place anywhere, in whatever ambiance, but when it comes to 
literally replacing previous religions, it makes sense to erect churches on the sites 
of former sanctuaries.   
In Magian thinking, the battle between light and darkness is central. But 
if God is almighty, how can evil pervade the world? It is a temporary condition 
of obscurity. Important Magian concepts are resignation, patience, submission, 
prayer, spiritual exercises and grace. Islam literally means submission. Not we, 
the Almighty brings about the anticipated change. We cannot enforce the 
Kingdom’s arrival. In Arabic and Germanic tribes, the Magian conversion 
entailed a dramatic break with the heroic morality of unconditional refusal to bow 
your head. A Magian religion entails a transvaluation of all values. Only God can 
genuinely act.  
Mohammed experiences a captivating presence and commences to recite 
his verses. He listens, as a recipient of the text. In this way, one of the greatest 
spiritual works of all time comes into existence. He was illiterate and recited what 
was revealed to him (Armstrong 1994, p. 164). Others wrote it down, compiled 
it. A problem for Western readers is that the sublime beauty of Mohammed’s 
Arabic is considered untranslatable. The overwhelming power of the language 
played a major part in Islamic conversions. Mohammad’s religion incorporates 
ancient thoughts, but allows religiosity to unfold on a large scale. New beacons 
appear in the landscape, accompanied by a shift of attention towards verticality: 
the relationship between believers and their God. The world is a desert, we are 
strangers in foreign territory. Through daily prayer, believers keep in touch with 
God and with the place where God revealed himself, like a telegraphic 
connection. The Word spreads via art, through calligraphy, architecture and 
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horticulture, as testimonies of God’s splendid majesty. Instead of the sphere (the 
god of the philosophers), the cube-shaped Kaaba (“cube”) provides a sense of 
orientation to worshipping Muslims. 
 
 
§ 9. Magian morality 
 
Magian thinking experiences an unbridgeable distance between good and evil. 
The individual plays a passive role, waiting for the dawn. Magian thinking 
cultivates this attitude of waiting, awaiting the end of the established order, whose 
days are numbered. Magian individuals remain strangers to this obscure 
ambiance, under the sway of forgetfulness. The Magian mindset anticipates a 
sudden, dramatic change. Individuals can be instrumental to the downfall of the 
establishment and the commencement of a new order, but cannot enforce this 
event, for history ultimately does not depend on the decisions of individuals. 
Involvement of Magian individuals in society remains without any real 
commitment. Inwardly they are already citizens of another Kingdom. This idea 
inspires Magian politics (waiting for the cataclysm), but also Magian architecture, 
aimed at creating sacred enclaves amidst a meaningless world.   
In Magian medicine, physicians are benefactors who heal by the touch of 
their hands or other Magian techniques (Speak one word only, and I will be 
healed), but ultimately it is a matter of grace: your faith has made you well. 
Without God’s help, all medical activity is pointless. It comes down to suggestion 
and charisma. 
In the domain of ethics, Magian thinking manifests itself in an attitude of 
Gelassenheit. At first, individuals inhabit a wasteland, obeying rules without 
reflection. But then, all of a sudden, conversion sets in. Outwardly, nothing seems 
to change, but the inner transition is all the more dramatic. Converted individuals 
apparently continue to accept the establishment. Apparently, they take part in the 
circulation of goods, but inwardly they have forsaken the world and turned away 
from it. They are inconspicuously preparing themselves for the coming of the 
Kingdom. Jesus’ confrontations with the established order are symptomatic of 
this disdain, for example with regard to food ethics. Jewish food ethics was very 
strict. It was only permitted to eat animals with split hoofs that chew the cud. 
Everything else is considered unclean (Leviticus 11: 2-6; Deuteronomy 14: 3-8). 
The products of unclean animals are symbolically infected. By not consuming 
them, the individuals concerned demonstrate their allegiance to their ethnic 
Jewish faith. Also for the Sabbath, strict rules applied.  
In the preaching of Jesus, we find a very different tone of voice (Zwart 
2000). Do not worry about what you eat or drink, that is of no concern, the 
Kingdom is more important than food. What goes into someone’s mouth doesn’t 
defile him (Matthew 5:11). Whatever enters the mouth goes into the stomach and 
is excreted, but the things that come out of a person’s mouth (e.g. evil thoughts) 
come from the heart and defile him (Matthew 5:17-18). Jesus transgresses dietary 




laws provocatively. He eats and drinks with prostitutes, tax collectors and sinners 
(Matthew 9:11). From the perspective of the Kingdom, dietary laws have no 
meaning. The prevailing theological fashion is to emphasize continuity between 
Judaism and Christianity and to minimize the distance between Jesus and his 
cultural environment. Jesus was a rabbi, of course, that is true, and it is true that 
Luther was a monk. The essence of the gospel, however, is precisely the moment 
of discontinuity. What Jesus preaches is of a completely different order. 
Contemporaries (both followers and representatives of the established order) 
acknowledged this. Jesus may not have had the intention of establishing a Magian 
world religion, but that is not the point. His preaching brought about the genesis 
of a Magian religious movement. 
Jesus is also a Magian physician, relying on Magian techniques such as 
faith-healing: covering the eyelids of the blind with saliva. One word will suffice 
for a miraculous cure. Your faith has healed you. For Jesus, healing is not a 
recovery of balance or harmony, nor is it the result of a therapeutic intervention. 
It is a matter of faith.  
This also applies to his medical ethics. The gospel of John describes a 
cure in a bathing facility with a portico. A sick person had been waiting there for 
thirty-eight years, but Jesus simply says: Get up, take your stretcher and go. The 
man’s health is restored immediately. It happens on a Sabbath, however, and this 
makes it a violation, from the perspective of established morality. For Jesus, 
however, all this has no meaning any longer, as the advent of the Kingdom is 
imminent. Whenever He is attacked, He responds with Magian arrogance. This 
is just the beginning: He will revivify the dead, Sabbath or no Sabbath, if God 
wills it. This is Magian medical ethics. The doctor is a benefactor, with only one 
technique, charisma, suggestion. And Magian patients know what it means to 
wait. For a Magian patient, a life spent in waiting is more edifying than healing 
as such (Lidwina of Schiedam). 
 
 
§ 10. Magian love 
 
The gospel of John is the gospel of love. Contemporary readers interpret love 
from the viewpoint of contemporary convictions, but evangelical love is of a 
different style. When we read that John was the beloved disciple with whom Jesus 
associated intimately and confidently (notably during the Last Supper, when John 
rested against His breast), contemporary readers may define this in terms of 
homosexuality, while the relationship between Jesus and Mary of Magdalen is 
easily interpreted as an erotic relationship in the sexual sense. It has become 
difficult for us to acknowledge that what we are dealing with here is love in a 
Magian sense. The most well-known form of Magian love is courtly love: love at 
a distance, under the sway of postponement. Even during the final moment, when 
they see each other for the very last time (under earthly circumstances), and Mary 
is about to embrace Him, Jesus emphatically tells her not to touch Him (John 20: 
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17), as He has not yet risen to the Father. His transubstantiation has not yet been 
completed, and would be disturbed by the moistness of her touch.  
Courtly love distances itself from any remnants of obscenity or bestiality. 
Biochemistry and physiology are transformed into a more exalted love game. 
Sexual intercourse must give way to love at a distance, pure desire. Erotic craving 
becomes an exercise in abstinence. Love is sublimated into poetry and music, and 
gives rise to a culture of chaste gestures, such as kissing someone’s hand or 
forehead (courtly gestures par excellence). Love is protected from earthly stains, 
while satisfaction and consumption are postponed into a distant future, so that 
sincerity can be put to the test and lovers can prove themselves worthy. And when 
the moment finally dawns that they may approach each other and experience their 
physical proximity and unity, it will be without any hint of obscenity. Courtly 
love found its way into monasteries, where it has had a major influence on 
mysticism, on mystic poetry, both female and male, transforming fierce longing 
(no longer of a corporeal nature) into sublime poetry. Courtly love is sublimation, 
a form of enhancement or upgrading. The love object is exalted, and becomes 
literally sublime.  
In chemistry, sublimation means the transition from a solid to a gas state, 
bypassing the liquid stage. In ordinary love, flesh is converted into something 
which is moist, literally (vaginal secretion, sperm), but courtly love evaporates as 
passion becomes spiritual. This explains Jesus’ chastity during the Noli me 
tangere scene. He has not yet risen, is not yet fully cleansed of earthly stains. 
Physical contact is too earthly and would infect Him. Their love will never be 
consumed. They exert a mutual Magian attraction, something spiritual or 
telepathic. Chaste love can also be found in later Magian heroines such as 
Hadewijch of Nijvel. It is not carnal sex that they are after, but spiritual 
enlightenment which arises from a love that goes much deeper and is more 
vibrant, according to these experts, than anything that usually goes under the 
name of love. Our frame of reference may be too contemporary to appreciate the 
true depth of Magian desire. Modern lovers claim the other. There is always a 
moment of taking-possession-of, of physical and mechanical friction, and all this 
is inherent in Faustian love. The Magian style is magnetic, telepathic. 
As stated, an important aspect of Magian love is the moment of 
sublimation, when the loved one is deprived of his or her physiological dimension 
and turned into something remote. The evangelical garden scene is the paradigm 
of Magian love, while courtly love is a revival. It is an ars erotica, literally, as 
love becomes art, a stylisation of desire, a practice of ascetic abstinence, but now 
as self-renunciation (Lacan 1986). Those concerned awaits an endless prelude, 
an interminable series of tests, to prove their love and dedication. It is a service, 
a systematic edification of desire – resulting in the idealization or elevation of the 
object, who becomes something increasingly unique, priceless and elusive. The 
eventual unification with the object is depicted as a sudden moment of grace, 
when the object of desire suddenly gratifies the lover’s craving, but it is union 
beyond anatomy. In the meantime, the lover must satisfy himself with courtly 




techniques such as an occasional glance, but most of all with poetry and music: 
the love of the troubadour and the monastic nun. 
Courtly love found shelter in monastic settings, but it is not something 
which definitively belongs to the past. This type of eroticism resurges in 
experiences of infatuation (Lacan 1994, p.88, p. 109, p. 122). In the behaviour of 
desperate lovers, we find traces of cultivation and regulation, a willingness to 
follow certain procedures or rules: techniques of self-containment, of postponing 
or relinquishing physical satisfaction, reminiscent of the theatre of courtly love. 
The beloved other, the object, is untouchable and inviolable. A touch is already a 
risky affair, as the love experience may become tainted with physicality, reduced 
to something normal, rather than becoming something exquisite. Falling in love 
entails an idealisation and elevation of the object into something decidedly 
fascinating, beyond comparison, while satisfaction can only be brought about as 
an act of grace, not as something to be expected, but as a sudden gift. Faustian 
love revolves around the physiological dimension, so that the object no longer 
hypnotises the subject.   
  
 
§ 11. Magian chemistry 
 
The gospel of John begins and ends with an alchemical operation or 
transubstantiation. Jesus performs His first miracle at the wedding in Cana, 
although His time has not yet come – and for an alchemist, considerations of 
timeliness tend to be crucial: wait until the opportune moment (midnight, full 
moon, etc.). Apparently, in the case of Jesus, such a strict observance of 
precautionary measures is of less importance. The subject has already achieved 
complete purity and is therefore less dependent on external conditions and 
constellations. He changes water in wine, almost unnoticeably: an abrupt and 
sudden change, not a chemical process involving fermentation. And it is not just 
a change, but an amelioration. He turns water into something more valuable, 
namely (good) wine. He creates value. During the Last Supper, there is another 
miracle: bread becomes flesh, wine becomes blood; sudden, abrupt changes; 
occurring without any visible cause or effort. It is not a chemical reaction, but a 
matter of grace and faith: a ritual gesture. Jesus adds value, with one simple 
gesture: sublimation. It is Magian chemistry, alchemy. What is alchemy? 
Alchemy is often considered as the pre-history of modern chemistry. 
Alchemists worked with bottles and substances, with vials and ovens. But what 
did alchemists do? First of all, they believed that everything in nature is involved 
in a process of purification. Nature is striving towards perfection as a final state. 
Stones have an inherent desire to change into precious stones, and metals are 
striving to become precious metals. Hybrid substances want to become pure, 
anything unstable aims to become stable, what is lifeless wants to come alive. In 
their laboratories, alchemists attempt to accelerate the process, which is taking 
place since time immemorial. This gives meaning to their laborious activities. An 
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alchemist is a minister naturae, a servant of nature. Unlike Faustian chemists, 
alchemists realise that they are ultimately dependent on grace, on the willingness 
of nature to reveal herself. Nature cannot be forced to do so. Patience is of pivotal 
importance, and timing is even more important. The experiment can only succeed 
when God or nature literally grant the alchemist the privilege, at the decisive 
moment. An alchemical experiment is therefore not replicable. It is a unique and 
singular event. The alchemist will never be able to accurately indicate which 
actions led to the desired outcome. Something else, something extraordinary is 
always involved. And there is another important difference. Unlike chemistry, 
alchemy is subject-dependent. Chance of success depends on the purity of the 
subject. Besides purifying their substances, alchemists must first and foremost 
purify themselves. Alchemistic operations are part of a program of self-
improvement. Alchemy is psychotherapy, a spiritual exercise, a practice of the 
Self. Everything is aimed at purification, κάθαρσις.  
For alchemists and other subjects given to Magian beliefs, fundamental 
correspondences can be discerned between the various spheres of reality: between 
the mineral, the herbal, the animal, the stellar and the human sphere. Everything 
is interconnected, not through causality, but via parallelism and concordance. The 
various realms of reality mirror one another. In the alchemical laboratory, purity 
of substances and of humans reinforce each other, reflect each other. Alchemy is 
a Gesamtwissenschaft. It is not a form of proto-chemistry, it is also astrology, 
mineralogy, metaphysics and Bible study.  
Everything in nature tends towards sublimation. Whatever is ill, wants to 
become healthy, whatever is lifeless wants to come alive. From the perspective 
of alchemy, resurrection is not at all an absurd idea. Purity of the subject in 
question will be an important factor, but we remain dependent on divine 
intervention. To prove themselves worthy, the alchemists quoted the gospels 
during their work, crucial formulas borrowed from sacred texts, notably the 
gospel of John. Outsiders, lay persons, less fluent in these “dead” languages, 
easily got the impression that these practitioners, these adepts, were producing 
meaningless phrases. Hocus pocus Pilatus pas comes from Hoc est corpus and 
sub Pilato passus, phrases not only uttered during alchemical experiments, but 
also by priests during Mass. The miracles of Jesus and alchemical experiments 
were both Magian practices.  
Another example of a Magian research field is astrology. This is how the 
gospel describes this practice: “After Jesus was born in Bethlehem in 
Judea, during the time of King Herod, Magi from the east came to Jerusalem and 
asked, ‘Where is the one who has been born king of the Jews? We saw his 
star when it rose and have come to worship him.’” (Matthew 2:1-2). A 
remarkable stellar phenomenon must correspond with, and therefore announces 
(not: causes), a similar event in the sublunary human realm. Therefore, the 
appearance of an exceptional star signifies the advent of a terrestrial novelty, such 
as the birth of Christ. And therefore, this phenomenon is to be investigated with 
utmost precision (ἀκριβῶς, Matthew 2:8). The star points the way, as a kind of 




Magian GPS. For these magi, all this is obvious, it does not need an explanation; 
their worldview builds on correspondences of this kind.  
The final, ultimate miracle is resurrection. What is transient and 
perishable gives way to what is pure and immortal. Jesus receives a “glorified”, 
transfigured body. His followers will likewise experience resurrection on 
judgement day. They will receive a heavenly (transubstantiated) body. What was 
transient will become imperishable. Paul says, “We will all be changed, in an 
instant (ἐν ἀτόµῳ)”, in a fraction of a second. In a twinkling of an eye, the dead 
will be raised unperishable. It is not a process which takes time, but a sudden 
transformation, only taking an atom, a quantum leap of time. What is brought to 
the fore here (the prospect that is opened up), is an alchemical transfiguration or 
transmutation. In Christianity, the alchemical climax is omnipresent. There are 
footsteps that can no longer be erased, like the footprint of Jesus in a small church 
along the Via Appia (Quo Vadis?). St. Peter’s cathedral in Rome is strictly 
speaking the tomb of an illiterate fisherman from Galilee – sublimation. The body 
is perishable, but refashioned into an imperishable, priceless building. The 
everyday and the corruptible, become inconceivably valuable. 
Eventually, however, alchemy will be drawn into a Faustian cultural 
climate. What begins as Magian science, become increasingly Faustian in the end. 
Alchemists in their laboratories are becoming increasingly active, and begin to 
take the initiative. Instead of waiting for nature to unveil herself, they try to 
enforce it. Goethe’s Faust enacts this turning point: the moment when alchemy 
becomes a Faustian endeavour. Alchemy forms a bridge between Magian and 




§ 12. Waiting  
 
The Magian God is omnipotent and even more powerful than the Apollonian 
Demiurge who transformed obscure chaos into an ordered cosmos. Nature in the 
sense of creatio is a creation out of nothing. God is almighty. Augustine is a more 
“Magian” theologian than his opponent Pelagius, who emphasises freedom of 
will. The quintessential Magian activity is waiting – waiting for the advent of the 
Kingdom, the coming of the groom. However, it is a rather particular form of 
waiting, involving a particular attitude towards the time dimension. It is about 
readiness, about keeping yourself ready for the inevitable. The earth has been 
profoundly damaged, but will undergo transfiguration. Salvation will come at the 
appointed time. The Magian mind lives in the expectation of the end. Magian 
physics does not think in terms of causal relationships, because there is only one 
cause: God (causa sui). 
A typical feature of Magian religion is the reliance on sacred scripture, 
which, however, has to be deciphered. Only the true believer knows what is 
meant. Special techniques are developed to reveal hidden meanings, in the 
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context of research practices such as numerology (number mysticism), or Magian 
cryptology. Just as alchemy was both a facilitating and an inhibiting factor for 
modern chemistry – facilitating because of the development of laboratory 
instruments, but inhibiting because Magian thinking blocks the development of a 
truly experimental approach –, numerology both facilitated and inhibited the 
development of modern (Faustian) algebra. Numerology was a special branch of 
biblical interpretation. At the same time, it encouraged the development of new 
number systems, such as the logarithmic scale. Michael Stifel (1487-1567), a 
supporter of Luther and fascinated by the properties of numbers, used a 
logarithmic scale and exponentials to determine the date of the apocalypse on the 
basis of the Book of Revelation, replacing letters with numbers: a procedure 
explained in Ein Rechenbuchlein vom Endchrist: Apocalyps in Apocalypsim (A 
Book of Arithmetic about the Antichrist: A Revelation in the Revelation), 
published in 1532 and predicting that the world would end one year later. 
The first centuries A.D. were the golden age of Magian movements such 
as the Isis cult, the Mithras cult, early Christianity, Gnosis, Kabala (a Magian 
form of Judaism, much given to number mysticism) and finally Islam. The basic 
message was the assurance that the Kingdom was imminent. What is lacking in 
Magian thinking is the concept of an autonomous subject. Only God truly acts. 
The Faustian mindset involves a transition from a style of thinking based on 
correspondences (between celestial and earthly events, but also between words 
and numbers, etc.) to causal thinking, while the cause is, in fact, the researcher 
himself, the independent variable who, consciously and actively, manipulates the 
object (the dependent variable) in order to control it. In the beginning is the deed: 
that is the essence of the experimental method. 
 
  




Chapter 4. Scientia experimentalis: Faustian thinking 
 
§ 1. Onset 
 
Faustian thinking is characterized by dynamic unrest and a desire for height. The 
cathedral is the Faustian edifice par excellence, according to Spengler: petrified 
Faustian mathematics. From the perspective of the styles-of-thinking concept, 
one wave connects cathedral building with the Apollo project (Wachhorst 2000). 
St. Peter’s Dome, a spherical building, is a product of the Counter-Reformation. 
It expresses a desire to hold on to a spherical form, but is at the same time a 
reinforcement of the Faustian Will to power, a gigantic and dynamic edifice. The 
Faustian principle, once brought to life, seems unstoppable and will continue to 
push through – not only in architecture, but first and foremost in the modern 
natural sciences. 
After the year 1000 A.D., but especially in the 13th and 14th century, a 
new style of thinking announces itself, referred to by Spengler as Faustian. Nature 
becomes the target of experimental research with the help of technical 
contrivances. Science becomes intimately connected with technology. The 
experimental method originated in a monastic setting (Grant 1974) and prepared 
the way for the modern natural sciences, as well as for modern technology. 
Natural science and technology are now inextricably linked, forming a Faustian 
alliance. The modern machine, as the embodiment of this energetic, dynamic way 
of thinking, was originally conceived in Gothic monastic cells. Members of 
mobile monastic orders, such as Albertus Magnus and Roger Bacon, were the 
first machine builders and Petrus Peregrinus was fascinated by the phantasm of a 
perpetuum mobile: the archetype of mechanics, the one thing which all great 
machine builders up to Captain Nemo are trying to achieve. This desire is also 
expressed in terms such as “automobile” and “automatic”. Scientists build optical 
and mechanical instruments to manipulate nature (technological interventions as 
the independent variable), and to measure nature in a precise and reliable way 
(the natural phenomenon as the dependent variable). From now on, to observe is 
to measure. Faustian physics begin with studying magnetism and gravity: natural 
phenomena with a tinge of the magical. Both magnetism and gravity were 
experienced as occult phenomena, as mysterious forms of influence. The gradual 
obfuscation of this Magian dimension in Faustian research practices (the 
disenchantment of magnetism and gravity) required hard work, and perhaps we 
should see it as an interminable process which was never really completed. 
Quantum physics for instance was fascinating precisely because it mobilised 
lingering discontent in Faustian determinism, because it addressed phenomena 
which seemed to take us beyond the causality principle, in the deterministic sense 
of the term.  
The gothic style, Spengler argues, was a restless striving for height, a 
proliferation of stone, a desire to emancipate from nature: the childhood stage of 
the industrial era. A historical thread unfolds from Notre Dame to Eiffel Tower. 
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In mathematics, Faustian thinking gives rise to the concept of infinity. The Greek 
cosmos was a world on a human scale. The Faustian universe is inhuman and 
frightening in its immensity and emptiness: frighteningly immense. The basic 
mathematical concept which allows astronomers to disclose this type of space is 
no longer the sphere, but the coordinate system, developed by Descartes: with 
axes of infinite length, starting from an arbitrary centre and stretching out into 
infinite space. 
Another Faustian phenomenon is the modern, industrial city. Before the 
dawning of the Faustian era, religious orders such as the Benedictines established 
their monasteries in rural areas, in wildernesses, but Dominicans and Franciscans 
settle in big cities. In Paris, Oxford and Cologne they build their universities. 
Jesuits are city dwellers, attracted by big urban centres to teach and work. 
Eventually, the big city becomes the ideal ambiance for typically Faustian human 
types: the worker, the bureaucrat, the engineer.  
The core concept of Faustian thinking is the will to power. Whereas 
Apollonian astronomers admire the perfect geometry of the spheres, Faustian 
scientists want to control and manipulate the universe. Faustian science is driven 
by the violent ambition to conquer reality in an energetic and aggressive manner. 
Research animals and human subjects are subjected to experimental trials which 
always entail an element of violence: it is a damaging type of research, bent on 
subjection. It is by damaging the body that Faustian scientists strengthen their 
sway over bodily existence. The will to know is a manifestation of the will to 
power. Medicine does not want to serve but to control the body. Power (rather 
than peace or harmony) is the grounding concept of Faustian politics. To establish 
a centralistic nation state, to enforce recognition, that is the idea, and the state is 
a machinery bent on control and mobilisation of the population. Power is what 
Faustian thinking strives for. 
For Apollonian thinking, to observe and understand meant to admire, but 
this attitude of respect for nature now gives way to an active, manipulative style 
of perception and observation, culminating in the development of modern 
(Faustian) research laboratories: setups designed by researchers to increase their 
power over the real. In their laboratories, nature is forced to reveal itself under 
closely monitored circumstances, as a series of causal relationships that can be 
captured in measurements, formulas and curves. The primordial Faustian 
instrument is the camera obscura, a component that we find embedded in all 
optical instruments more or less. All optical contrivances contain (are designed 
on the basis of) a camera obscura. The laboratory as such is a camera obscura, a 
dark room, designed to keep reality at bay, only allowing tiny samples of light, 
matter, life, etc. to enter, samples that can be easily manipulated and controlled. 
Rather than being overwhelmed by the glittering, noisy, messy real, scientists 
create an artificial ecosystem which they can master, and where they can conduct 
their research with the help of precision instruments. Science no longer trusts the 
naked eye. Apollonian contemplation displayed a strong dislike of technology. 
Tools (indeed: even books) were suspect. The practical interaction with reality 




was delegated to the lower social strata. Faustian science, by contrast, would be 
unthinkable without labour and technology. Science and technology enter into a 
Faustian pact: they become intimately connected, and the one becomes 
inconceivable without the other. In order to really understand what Faustian 
thinking is about, however, we have to start at the beginning: Paradise lost.  
 
 
§ 2. Commencement: Paradise lost 
 
Faustian thinking has a striking interest in Paradise, regardless of religious 
denomination, for it applies both to Catholic and to Protestant Faustian thinkers. 
The Dominican Thomas Aquinas and the Puritan John Milton both tackled the 
Paradise theme, albeit at different stages of the history of Faustian thinking. The 
Paradise theme is, among other things, the story of the transition from Magian to 
Faustian thinking. 
Paradise is an ecosystem in which organisms are optimally adapted to 
their environment. Genesis 2 is an oriental fairy tale, set in a miracle garden where 
labour and death are unknown and everything is set for pleasure. Naked and 
uninhibited, Adam and Eve fully enjoy each other, for they have nothing else to 
do. They have nothing on their minds, their lives lack challenges and projects. 
The forbidden fruit triggers desire, and as soon as they consume it, the spell is 
broken. All of a sudden, they find themselves under radically different 
circumstances: on earth as Faustian humans know it, a place of toil, hardship and 
labour, of suffering and violence, where existence is experienced as harsh. In his 
Summa Theologica, Thomas devotes ample space to the original situation of 
innocence in which Adam and Eve once dwelled, as noble savages. He presents 
a touching fantasy concerning physical life under paradisiacal circumstances, in 
statu innocentiae. Life was innocent, unspoiled. Life was a joy. There was 
nothing unbecoming to the human body, neither smell nor sweat, and even 
excrements had nothing repulsive about them. Love was enjoyed to the full and 
without putting honourableness at stake. 
In this miracle garden, this Magian idyll, this product of oriental 
imagination, God introduces a new dimension: the ban, the prohibition. When 
Adam and Eve finally eat from the forbidden tree of knowledge, they are not 
motivated by hunger (for they have plenty to consume), but by sheer desire, 
triggered by the ban. The prohibition as such provokes lust, the threat of 
punishment is what sparks their desire, as Dutch poet Joost van den Vondel 
phrases it in Adam in Exile. Prohibition puts an end to the innocence of pure 
pleasure and introduces a contrast between duty and inclination.  The magic 
garden suddenly disappears to make way for a human-unfriendly, Faustian 
landscape where humankind makes a living through hard menial work and 
chronic struggle.  
But it is also the beginning of progress and humanisation, of history and 
freedom, according to Kant (1786/1971). Strictly speaking, Adam and Eve lived 
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the life of animals, were guided by their senses, by smell and taste. It was only 
when, instead of merely consuming, they were facing a dilemma and had to 
determine which path to follow, that their eyes were opened and the world 
assumed a completely different face. Humans became aware of rationality and 
morality. The exodus from the carefree but onerous garden, the sultry Paradise, 
the calm passivity in which the first people were forced to dream away their lives, 
was a liberation. The desire for a golden age, a state of simplicity and innocence 
where people lose themselves in idleness, is unreasonable, says Kant. 
In Paradise Lost, John Milton’s version of the story, we are confronted 
with a similar transition: the abrupt emergence of a Faustian universe whose sheer 
dimensions are utterly frightening. The migration from the Magian garden to the 
challenging Faustian landscape coincides with a sudden change in the experience 
of space as such, a dramatic increase of spatiality. Paradise is a garden, a park, an 
ambiance of human size. After the Fall, Satan suddenly discovers an immense, 
frightening distance between heaven and hell. Overnight, the world has become 
unimaginably big. He discovers a terrible, wild and dark abyss, a vast vacuity, a 
wasteful depth. It is telling that on the eve of the fall, Adam and Archangel 
Raphael engage in a discussion concerning the size of the world. Adam expresses 
his discontent in the geocentric universe and has taken an interest in 
heliocentrism. He is, as it were, ready for heliocentrism, and already begins to 
experience the universe as being extremely large.18 Raphael tries to discourage 
this: the heavens should remain the object of contemplation and admiration. He 
admits that the spherical worldview (the desperate attempt to hold onto the sphere 
as a basic structure) is laughable from a heavenly perspective, but he urges Adam 
to consider the gigantic expanse of the universe as a symbol of God’s sublime 
nature. These unfathomable spatial dimensions should not inspire astronomical 
research, but rather humility (p. 294). This attempt to calm down his budding 
inquisitiveness has a temporary effect (Adam goes to sleep peacefully), but 
cannot conceal that his experience of space displays a fundamental change – it is 
becoming Faustian. And Faustian space is incomparably larger than the spherical 
one – large beyond comparison. 
 
 
§ 3. Copernicus: how large is the universe? 
 
Copernicus represents a crucial moment in the migration from Magian to Faustian 
space, Kant argues. The transition from a geocentric to a heliocentric worldview 
was a second Fall, an exodus out of an imaginary, familiar world on a human 
scale, the “magic circle” of phenomenological experience (Teilhard de Chardin 
                                                             
18 “When I behold this goodly frame, this World / of Heav’n and Earth consisting, and 
compute / their magnitudes, this Earth a spot, a grain / an Atom, with the Firmament 
compar’d / And all her numberd Starrs, that seem to roule / Spaces incomprehensible, 
for such / Their distance argues…” (Milton, 1962, p.292) 




1959). We still have the sensory impression that the sun revolves around the earth, 
but thanks to modern science we are able to withdraw ourselves from the power 
of this sensation and bracket immediate experience. Thanks to reason we can put 
naive receptivity aside, transcend it. Appearances prove deceptive. Thanks to our 
freedom of thought, we can leave the Magian cave of geocentric thinking behind 
and acknowledge the sun as the true centre of the solar system. We are able to de-
centre ourselves as subjects. This Copernican revolution, transcending 
empiricism, has major consequences. The spherical, Magian worldview is 
doomed, but its heliocentric rival can only hold true if the universe is 
unimaginably large. Only when the distance between the sun and the earth, 
compared to the distance between the sun and the (other) stars is negligibly small, 
can it be true that the earth revolves around the sun. Because otherwise the 
circular movement of the earth around the sun would have to be visible in the 
position of the fixed stars (the parallax problem). 
This does not mean, Spengler emphasizes, that Western humanity 
suddenly realises, thanks to Copernicus, how immensely large the universe is. 
Quite the contrary, heliocentrism presupposes a Faustian intuition concerning the 
infinity of the universe. The Copernican revolution was not yet a real break with 
Ptolemy, according to Spengler, but rather a hesitant articulation of a new world-
experience. Aristarchos of Samos had already defended the hypothesis that the 
earth revolves around the sun in ancient times, but because he continued to view 
the cosmos in Apollonian terms, as a kind of sphere, his hypothesis did not hold. 
Copernicus’ thesis confirmed the Faustian sense of the immensity of the world, 
the idea of a boundless space. Only in a Faustian-sized universe can the 
heliocentric hypothesis survive as a convincing theorem.  
In 1543, the Copernican revolution had been an inconspicuous event. His 
publication hardly caused a stir. Not only because of the esoteric and 
mathematical style of his writing, but also because he was not really the 
revolutionary he is so often considered to be. In important respects, his universe 
remained spherical. He makes important concessions to the Apollonian sense of 
space, as part of the Renaissance as an Apollonian revival, so that he continues 
to imagine the universe in terms of perfect circles, concentric spheres and 
epicycles. He still endorses the phantasm, as Lacan phrases it, that we should 
think the universe as a series of concentric spheres (1991/2001, p. 114). 
With Apollonian astronomers, Copernicus shared the basic (quasi-self-
evident) conviction that celestial bodies follow perfect orbits. In the early work 
of Johannes Kepler, nature as κόσµος was allowed to shine once again, as we 
have seen. The “Copernican revolution”, according to Lacan, is a historical 
fiction. Copernicus still wanted to reduce the movements of celestial bodies, even 
those of a “wandering” planet (ἀστήρ πλανήτης) to circles. His heliocentric thesis 
was a desperate attempt to bring the movements of these straying stars in 
correspondence with the Apollonian phantasm of a geometrically perfect 
universe. The Copernican cosmos still sounded Pythagorean. The silent, icy, 
empty universe of Pascal is still very far away. The difference between 
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Copernicus’ (in many respects still neo-Apollonian) spatial experience and the 
Faustian universe of Galilei and the later Kepler, was the telescope – the powerful 
instrument by means of which Faustian investigators gained access into the 
depths of the cosmos, forcing the Apollonian veil to be lifted. It was an 
instrument, moreover, whose results required Faustian mathematics: an algebra 
suitable for calculating immense distances, an algebra which could handle 
astronomical numbers. 
The spheres were shattered and the universe became infinitely immense. 
The famous aphorism by Blaise Pascal concisely expresses this astonishing 
experience: “Le silence éternel de ces espaces infinis m’effraie”, – the eternal 
silence of infinite space frightens me (1660/1958, 206/201). In one phrase, Pascal 
expresses the horror infini by which contemporary astronomers no longer seem 
to be bothered at all, but which constituted a disconcerting experience when the 
Faustian universe began to emerge. Natural scientists realized that the universe is 
infinitely large, empty, silent and cold – that was their epistemological Fall. In a 
perfectly harmonious universe, the Creator’s hand had been omnipresent. In the 
Faustian Universe, the subject no longer feels at home. It is only thanks to a 
compensating religious experience, – the inner certainty that God exists 
(compensating for the undeniable Faustian truth) –, that Faustian souls are able 
to endure the infinity and loneliness of the universe. The thesis of infinite 
spatiality and the complementary thesis of the sublime greatness and 
omnipotence of God, are both equally valid for Faustian minds. The Faustian 
image of God is likewise characterised by distance and inaccessibility. The divine 
presence in natural reality that the Faustian mind-set gave up, returned in Faustian 
faith. Stringent and demanding (“heavy”) Faustian theology, with its rigid and 
far-reaching normative claims, expressed by a frightening voice of conscience, 
by a rigid, demanding Über-Ich, counterbalances the frightening insight that the 
earth is only a small , dark, inconspicuous mass, circling through an infinitely 
large universe, surrounded by an atmosphere that becomes rapidly thinner as 
height increases, as Pascal demonstrated in air pressure experiments he designed, 
– eventually giving way to an abiotic, icy, uninhabitable void. The Faustian world 
is composed of mass and Mass, of force and faith. The inevitable result is an 
extremely strict, Faustian form of religiosity, a theology of rigorous moral 
principles and rigid dogmas. 
As spiritual explorers, Jesuits were prominent officials in the process of 
Faustian globalisation, but at the same time they were paradoxically driven by 
the idea that the sphere could be restored, tirelessly striving to rearrange the 
scattered geographical points around a re-established spiritual centre. The process 
was nevertheless unstoppable. The static sphere became a dynamic network, and 
the order of the Jesuits became a paradigmatic embodiment of this. Jesuits gave 
an important impulse to processes of globalization (Aveling 1981). They not only 
opposed the Reformation (as a symptom of nationalised Christianity), but also 
the nationalisation of education. Jesuits preferably taught in Latin. The Societas 
Jesu relied on rigorous self-discipline and could do without monasteries, without 




the protective immunisation provided by abbey walls. Through efficient use of 
human resources and training programs, this militant society managed to acquire 
enormous power and influence. The society was active worldwide, in a wide 
range of professions. Education in particular was a domain of conflict between 
global Jesuits and the nation states, who wanted to put educational institutions 
firmly in the hands of the state, in order to produce a nationalist bourgeois elite.  
The Copernican revolution did not immediately put an end to spherical 
thinking. Rather, it unleashed a revolution that continued to require a great deal 
of intellectual work over the centuries. These efforts must nevertheless be 
understood as the result of a moment of commencement, “eine auf einmal zu 
Stande gebrachte Revolution” (Kant 1781/1971, p. 25). The new style has to 
prove itself, prove its credibility. Kant himself is an important protagonist of the 
Faustian style, who mercilessly tries to discredit nostalgia for Magian styles of 
thinking, which he dismisses as intellectual infatuation (“Schwärmerei”). In 
Träume eines Geistersehers (1766/1968), “Schwärmer” Swedenborg is his main 
target, whose rational mysticism constitutes a revival of Magian thinking: 
nostalgia for a Magian “Paradise” (p. 923, A3). Swedenborg distinguishes an 
outer person (who participates in everyday social intercourse) and an inner person 
(who participates in another, spiritual world). This inner person, repressed in most 
modern individuals, enables Swedenborg to clarify the hidden meaning of Bible 
texts and to develop his parapsychological and telepathic capacities. Kant tries to 
show that such a discourse does not meet the rigid criteria imposed by the 
Faustian program of intellectual self-discipline. Enlightenment has nothing to do 
with tolerance, for it only tolerates that which meets the criteria of reason as 
determined by Enlightenment. The tone of Kant’s writings are reminiscent of the 
way in which the Dominicans once fought the Magian Cathars a few centuries 
earlier, and Thomas Aquinas fought a similar battle in his Summa contra Gentiles.  
In Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton (1796/1968) Kant 
chooses a more difficult target, the arch-Schwärmer Plato. What disappoints him 
in Plato is the atmosphere of admiration and intoxication, as the intellectual mood 
this type of thinking sooner or later gives rise to, notably in its Magian (neo-
Platonic) version. Kant is annoyed by authors who associate philosophy with 
initiation and inspiration, with knowledge of spiritual “secrets” and profound, 
divine intuitions. Philosophy is hard, discursive labour, Kant argues, and he is 
annoyed by the lofty, exalted tone of voice, already present in Apollonian 
thinking, but pushed to its extreme in Magian discourse. Plato is the arch-
Schwärmer, as said, the father of infatuation, because he placed the origin of basic 
concepts in a divine intellect, which implies that a philosopher may trust his 
intuitions. As a truly Faustian thinker, Kant sees philosophy as intellectual labour 
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§ 4. In the beginning was the deed 
 
The Phenomenology of the Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 
1831) contains a famous passage, of decisive importance for understanding the 
Faustian style of thinking, namely his dialectical analysis of the interaction 
between Master and Servant (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft). Hegel’s analysis 
clarifies the relationship between lofty, Apollonian, aristocratic knowledge 
(contemplation) and the more active style of thinking, the hands-on knowledge 
practiced by Faustian workers – that is, by natural scientists working in 
laboratories (= workshops). The Master, according to Hegel, does not interact 
directly with unruly reality. He leaves the active handling and manipulation of 
matter to the Servant. The Master-gentleman devotes himself to enjoyment of 
things. This combination of contemplation and pleasure determines the 
epistemological profile of his views, of which Apollonian speculation is the 
textbook example. It is abstract thinking, not aimed at generating concrete 
applications for social practices such as architecture, arable farming or artisanal 
production. The Master enjoys beautiful things, the starry skies bring him into 
ecstasy, theory is more important than practice. He spends his leisure time in 
considering heavenly orbits and the metaphysics of the divine. The actual, 
productive handling of matter is avoided, because the material and the concrete 
are considered messy and impure.  
The mindset of the servant, on the other hand, is pragmatic from the 
outset. At first, the servant does not think scientifically. He works on behalf of 
the (contemplating) gentleman, who is developing deep insights concerning the 
basic structure of being. Initially, the servant does not act on his own initiative. 
His practical interaction with reality is primarily based on experiential 
knowledge. Genuine scientific knowledge, insight into the how and why, is 
lacking. As far as knowledge is involved, it concerns practical insights that can 
be transferred via imitation and repetition. Knowledge is accumulated though 
incremental innovation – learning by doing.  
The quintessence of Hegel’s analysis, however, is that sooner or later, a 
shift will inevitably occur. The master alienates himself from material things. 
Although he enjoys resting his eye on things, his knowledge remains superficial. 
Concrete interaction is missing. He cannot put his views to the test. He consumes 
things, they offer no resistance, as resistance and recalcitrance have been crushed 
by the work of the servant. The master is confronted with the products of the 
latter’s labour and lacks the knowledge gained in a practical context of 
conducting hands-on labour. The servant is really involved in things. He works 
with matter and thinks with his hands. “Manipulation” comes from manus (hand). 
The servant manipulates until the results of his actions manifest themselves (De 
Rougement 1936). Perfection and progress are achieved through anonymous 
technical improvements.  
For a long time, progress remains undocumented, manifesting itself in 
concrete optimisations of performance. Instead of consuming things, the servant 




is committed to maintain and improve things. And these things are upgraded by 
labour. His knowledge of things is on the one hand more violent (effectively 
gaining control over them, grasping and affecting them), on the other hand more 
intimate (he becomes familiar with and sensitive to them, his practices become 
attuned to them). He observes the consequences of his work as they manifest 
themselves in concrete things. Instead of consuming them, he sustains them by 
modifying, domesticating and taking care of them. In the context of this 
dialectical process, the labouring consciousness develops into a form of thinking 
that is considerably more robust, epistemologically speaking, and more effective 
than the detached, contemplative mindset of the master. By actively modifying 
things, causal relationships become visible in objectivity itself. Practical thinking 
begins as servitude, but emancipates and develops into experimental (Faustian) 
practice, driven by the Will to Power. Masters and their knowledge become 
increasingly irrelevant: useless ballast, like the Palace at Versailles. Absolutism 
gives way to liberty, equality and fraternity. 
In Hegel’s Phenomenology, Faust himself is described as the scientific 
individual who distances himself from established knowledge (1807/1973, p. 270 
ff.). According to Hegel, Goethe’s drama deals with the conflict between an 
ambitious but disappointed researcher on the one hand and authoritative, 
generally accepted forms of knowledge on the other, between epistemological 
“Befriedigungslosigkeit” and “die Lebendigkeit des Weltlebens”. According to 
Faust, existing science dramatically fails to capture the Real and has become 
utterly impotent. Scholarly knowledge became a prison cell. Faust wants to 
escape his library, he wants “hinaus”. Science wants to become Faustian, desires 
to transform itself into an active, worldly and experimental knowledge practice. 
If the goal is to gain real knowledge, we must be prepared to accept significant 
risks – that is the Faustian epistemological morale of the story.  
The famous Faustian phrase “Zwei Seelen wohnen, ach! in meiner Brust” 
(1113) also applies to Goethe himself. On the one hand, he is still fascinated by 
a neo-Apollonian (neo-classical) culture, a world of beauty, clarity and harmony. 
In addition, as an aesthetic shadow, however, there is a competitive affinity, albeit 
more hidden: Goethe’s sensitivity to Gothic culture, as the first stage of Faustian 
thinking. When young Goethe (with his neo-classical sense of taste) was first 
introduced in Strasbourg to the “monstrous” Gothic style exemplified by the 
famous cathedral – which seems to mimic the power and darkness of a primordial 
forest – the intimidating construction constitutes a test, a challenge. He climbs 
the tower to triumph in the struggle against his fear of heights (Safranski 
2013/2015, p. 79). The Gothic cathedral with its extravagant decorations at first 
repels, but gradually captivates Goethe’s imagination (Williams 1998/2001, p. 
10). He manages to overcome his cultural prejudices and he quickly becomes 
obsessed with the Gothic (Faustian) style. His lifelong fascination with alchemy 
is also part of this Gothic complex. His masterpiece Faust captures the moment 
when Magian alchemy becomes Faustian science, a worldly, transformative 
knowledge practice.   
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The alchemist Doctor Faustus was a contemporary of Paracelsus. Just 
like in Milton’s Paradise Lost, God allows the devil the opportunity to put Faust 
to the test, to subject him to a moral experiment. The devil (Mephistopheles) 
manages to persuade Faust to leave his mysterious cave. It is midnight. Faust is 
dwelling in his Gothic, late-medieval cell. He experiences discontent and 
struggles with a mid-life crisis. Faust, a renowned scholar, a workaholic, is used 
to labouring in seclusion well into the night. Thus, he managed to master all the 
disciplines practiced at that time. He made a name for himself, made it to master 
and doctor, but when he is honest with himself, he must admit that he actually 
knows nothing, that his knowledge is bookish, meaningless knowledge, devoid 
of practical relevance. This type of knowledge is literally negated overnight. It is 
dead and sterile, fails to provide insight into the real. When his collaborator 
Wagner persuades him to take a walk (it is springtime) it becomes clear how deep 
the crisis is, how depressed Faust is. The alliance with the devil vigorously 
awakens him.  
Via his Faustian decision, his willingness to take risks, Faust enacts (and 
even serves as a model for) modern science as a Faustian endeavour. Spengler 
emphatically identifies the scientific style that Faust represents as Faustian. It is 
an extremely ambitious and decidedly violent form of research, first and foremost 
dangerous for the researchers involved. Faust is the literary counterpart of the 
legendary gothic monk Bertold Schwarz who discovered the diabolical powers 
of gunpowder in his late-medieval monastery cell, thereby killing himself, falling 
victim to an explosion. Faust is the prototype of the Faustian scientist who is 
willing to use violence in order to force a breakthrough. 
Faust is a historical drama, but it is not so difficult to update Goethe’s 
masterpiece and to connect it with scientific developments in his own era. Faust 
is a critical confrontation with the Faustian natural sciences, emerging in the early 
19th century. The Faustian pact with the devil becomes a metaphor for the moral 
and physical damage that researchers involved expose themselves to. They will 
have to pay for their will to know with their health, or even their lives. Galileo 
allegedly damaged his eyes with his research into sunspots, – see for instance the 
play which Bertolt Brecht (1978) devoted to his case. Historians dispute the truth 
of the story, but this does not alter (but rather confirms) its concordance with the 
archetype of the Faustian scientist. 
A well-documented example is the case of Isaac Newton. Although the 
“visible” Newton became best known for his work as a mathematician and 
physicist, the “hidden” Newton was active as an alchemist for many years. For 
those who are willing to read his life-story clinically rather than hagiographically, 
it is not difficult to see that we are dealing with a man who began to behave more 
and more strangely as the years went by. Moments of deep crisis are apparent in 
his life-story. Very unproductive and sterile years alternate with periods of 
extreme productivity and creativity, such as the wonder year 1666. There are 
times when a strange intellectual paralysis seems to take hold of him. That has its 
reasons. Biographer Westfall (1980) explicitly links Newton’s behavioural 




problems with the way he conducted his research and the risks to which he 
exposed himself as a researcher, especially in the context of his alchemical 
studies. He used his sense organs, his tongue and nose, his sense of taste and 
smell, as instruments for determining substances, even when heavy metals or 
other toxic compounds were concerned. He inhaled toxic fumes. For years he 
exposed himself to physical dangers. Posthumous research into Newton’s hair 
revealed that it contained significant concentrations of heavy metals, many times 
higher than normal. Newton had been poisoning himself, with dire consequences 
for his health and personality. Driven by the Faustian will to know, he exposed 
his body to chronic damage. 
Newton was not alone in that respect, far from it. He shared his methods 
with other chemists, such as Karl Scheele (1742-1786), who worked in the same 
manner and likewise identified chemical compounds (such as hydrogen sulfide) 
by tasting and inhaling them, and he also paid the price for it, poisoning himself. 
Scheele, Paul Strathern (2000) writes, suffered from extremely painful forms of 
rheumatism, along with many other ailments that were almost certainly caused 
by his laboratory practices. He attached much importance to identifying the 
substances he isolated or produced in his laboratory with his unprotected senses, 
without the use of special techniques. He interacted with his object directly. In 
his laboratory notebooks, he described how hydrogen cyanide tasted: an 
extremely toxic substance. An important discovery of Scheele was the effect of 
light on silver compounds. With that, he actually prepared the way for modern 
photography, a typical Faustian technology, with allows us to get hold of things, 
freezing reality into objectivity, capturing it. However, a high price was paid for 
this discovery: he undermined his health (Strathern, 2000, p. 198). Scientists 
working under unhealthy laboratory conditions often developed a professional 
psychopathology referred to as hysteria chemicorum by Justus von Liebig (Zwart 
2005b). Experimental research was far more dangerous than reading books, and 
laboratory techniques were not yet very sophisticated. 
Bible texts, especially the gospel of John, played a major role in 
alchemical research practices as we have seen. Faust attempts to retranslate the 
opening lines of this Gospel. At first, he waits for inspiration (illuminatio) by the 
holy spirit, hoping for a moment of grace, in accordance with the Magian strategy: 
we must wait for the truth to reach out towards us. But then he decides to use a 
more active strategy, he violates the text, thus arriving at the most famous 
sentence from Goethe’s drama: “Im Anfang war die Tat” (1237) – a bold and 
Faustian translation indeed. He then closes the book again – he no longer needs 
it. The new science is an active, experimental science. Faust stops reading and 
translating and makes a new start, by experimenting: thinking with his hands. The 
abrupt, daring translation made this praxis possible, legitimises it.  
Faust is not only about Faustian science, but also about Faustian love. 
Faustian desire no longer wants to wait, it is violent and culminates in the 
violation of the other, or even in the death of the beloved object. Faustian love is 
still in its virulent stage here, and did not have the chance to stabilise as yet. It is 
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an outbreak, after a long period of ascetic self-renunciation. The will to power 
manifests itself as the will to own and consume the object, even if the beloved 
one is thereby seriously harmed. Restless desire and damage are indeed part of 
the Faustian complex, but other, compensating elements are still missing in the 
cascade of pleasure experiences that Goethe’s drama stages. Without a strong 
sense of responsibility (and the violent conflicts between duty and desire that 
result from this), the image of Faustian love is not yet complete. 
In Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons, Yevgeny Bazarov is a Faustian 
scientist who submits large numbers of frogs to vivisection, considering them as 
model organisms for biomedical research. And when he encounters the woman 
of his life for the first time, he exclaims: “What a magnificent body ... Shouldn’t 
I like to see it on the dissecting-table!” (1861/1965, p. 155). This is Faustian 
eroticism pur sang.  
 
 
§ 5. Newton’s shed 
 
Isaac Newton (1642 – 1727) was an arch-Faustian researcher, although even his 
research practice had Magian undercurrents as we have seen. To study the 
phenomenon of light, he comes up with a paradoxical design: he withdraws into 
a dark, light-proof room, a shed exempted from daylight, and drills a small hole 
in the wall. He reduces the phenomenon of light to a minimum, something which 
he can fully control and manipulate as much as possible, for example by breaking 
it with the aid of a prism so that it diffracts into a spectrum. Instead of leaving the 
phenomenon intact (“untouched”), Newton actively investigates it by isolating 
and manipulating it. The whole purpose of an optical experiment is to control 
light – hold a moonbeam in your hand, as the musical nicely phrases it. Precisely 
for that reason, he is criticized by Goethe: he damages the phenomena. Goethe 
himself starts from everyday observations, showing more restraint and more 
respect for the phenomenon as it reveals itself to us on its own accord.  
Kant, however, unequivocally sides Newton. Human reason only 
understands what accords with its own principles, Kant claims. Science forces 
nature to comply with these principles. Newton is not at all a passive observer. 
He forces nature to answer the questions he is asking and to manifest itself under 
the conditions he designs, determines and controls. He forces nature to speak his 
(mathematical) language, forces her into his format, considers the natural 
phenomena in function of circumstances he himself can adjust. On the basis of 
this experimental set-up, he is able to control and – therefore – understand the 
phenomenon of light. The mathematics he is using in his experiments is no longer 
the mathematics of ideal geometrical figures, but a dynamical mathematics, with 
the concept of the function as its core. The horizontal axis indicates what, in 
Faustian terms, could be called the deed: the independent variable, the 
investigator’s own actions and interventions. The effects of these actions become 
visible along the vertical axis. This mathematical understanding of measurement 




and experimental design gives the researcher power over the phenomena. What 
Newton makes visible is that we can capture enigmatic, apparently Magian 
phenomena, from tidal ebb and flow up to the movements of celestial bodies, with 
the help of a handful of letters from the alphabet, with the help of one simple 
formula. The alchemist awaits the moment of grace, but the Faustian investigator 
enforces this moment of revelation and discovery – his experiment is replicable. 
From now on, method (procedure) determines the conditions. 
And yet, a Magian residue resides in Newton’s research practices. The 
cornerstone of his theory of gravity is Magian. Like love, gravity is a mysterious, 
inexplicable form of influence that works from a distance (actio in distans), a 
strange form of attraction, comparable perhaps to Goethe’s elective affinities 
(Wahlverwandtschaften). Ebb and flood are the result of water being attracted by 
the moon, as if we are still dwelling in a Magian world. At the same time, this 
mysterious influence is now compressed into a formula, so that the phenomenon 
of gravity can be calculated and predicted. Isaac Newton is a divided subject, 
consisting of two epistemological personalities, just like Faust: “Zwei Seelen 
wohnen, ach! in Meiner Brust”. On the one hand, he is the Faustian discoverer of 
the differential calculus, a powerful tool for analysing the results of the 
experiments he is conducting. On the other hand, he devoted many years of his 
life to Magian research practices such as alchemy and Bible cryptology: the latent 
epistemological inverse side or back page of his research.  
Two works of art by Joseph Wright of Derby (1734-1797) demonstrate 
the contrast between the Magian and the Faustian style, namely An Experiment 
on a Bird in the Air Pump from 1768 and The Alchemist in Search of the 
Philosophers Stone from 1771. The painting from 1771 shows an alchemist in his 
Gothic study – similar to Faust’s cell. The disorder in his laboratory symbolizes 
the lack of a straightforward methodology. In despair, he uses a multitude of 
procedures and instruments, making his experiment utterly non-replicable. We 
see the (very old) alchemist precisely at the moment when he (finally) discovers 
the element phosphorus – without really knowing what he is doing. He 
experiences this event as a moment of grace. Nature finally comes to his rescue. 
The researcher has devoted his entire life to this apparently hopeless project, 
whose positive outcome seems to seriously damage him, however, for he seems 
to be struck with blindness. It will be a difficult task for the young students 
observing him to replicate this feat.  
The (young) scientist in the painting from 1768 adopts a completely 
different style of working. He has his affairs in order and knows exactly what he 
is doing. He uses a pump to create a vacuum in a laboratory flask. He creates an 
unnatural situation. He uses a test animal, a bird. When the bird almost 
suffocates, he can open a flap, so that the animal will probably survive the 
experiment. However, this moment of “compassion” does not diminish the 
violent nature of the scheme. Everything is focused on manipulation and control, 
on calculated procedures. It is clear that this is not a singular or unexpected event, 
but that a validated protocol is closely followed.  
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The experiment allows truth to appear. Wright’s artwork perpetuates a 
truth event. The experiment is a replication of an original discovery preceding it. 
It demonstrated the relationship between truth, experimentation and art. The 
artwork reveals the moment of truth captured by the experiment. What we see is 
not a particular event, but Faustian thinking as such. Martin Heidegger (1889 – 
1976) emphasizes the ambiguity of the concept of truth. On the one hand, truth 
means correspondence (adequatio) between theory and reality. According to 
Heidegger (1927/1986), however, this is a restricted and even obfuscating 
interpretation of truth, and his entire oeuvre is one persistent attempt to articulate 
a different understanding. In a more original sense, according to Heidegger, truth 
means bringing forth. In order for thoughts and propositions to adequately reflect 
reality, reality must first of all be opened up. A style of thinking is a fundamental 
way of experiencing reality, of bringing reality to the fore.  
A style of thinking conveys a fundamental answer to the question 
concerning the mode of being as a whole. For the Dionysian style of thinking, 
being is φύσις: immense, all-encompassing, impenetrable. For Apollonian 
thinking, being is κόσµος, a perfect order. For Faustian thinking, being equals 
objectivity. If we see being as an aggregate of things with qualities, we use a 
particular grammar, speak in a particular key, pertaining to a particular style of 
thinking, allowing us to approach and experience reality in a certain way. At 
present, the emergence of a completely new way of perceiving, speaking and 
thinking seems imminent – a new way of thinking that will make the world appear 
in a completely different light – perhaps a way of thinking that will be more 
respectful of things, allowing us to encounter them in a more poetic manner. 
Faustian thinking sees all animals as research animals. The laboratory animal is 
a form of animalhood that is very closely linked with the Faustian style of 
thought, the Will to Power.  
A style of thinking implies a certain sensitivity to those aspects of the 
world that reveal themselves in such a way that it seems to align with and confirm 
this style of thinking. We should not see ourselves as mere recording devices, for 
we are imbued with historicity. The way we think and the way reality appears to 
us are two dimensions of one and the same interactive process. Heidegger refers 
to the moment when reality is brought to light for the first time as ἀλήθεια 
(1927/1986). It means “truth”, but in the sense of non-concealment. Before 
scientific research allows us to develop theories that correspond to the facts 
(objectivity), this objectivity must first be revealed and experienced in a certain 
manner: made accessible for research, so that ἀλήθεια precedes adequatio. 
Correctness can only be achieved if reality is allowed to reveal itself in a certain 
way. There can only be truth in the sense of adequacy when a certain style of 
thinking has already established itself. In the light of this style of thinking, certain 
ideas about reality can be adequately demonstrated.  
The emergence of a style of thinking, the awareness of its convincing, 
converting power is the truth event thematised by Heidegger as ἀλήθεια. A 
dimension of reality that was previously inaccessible or hidden, becomes 




accessible. It is the moment when we first become aware of the world in this way. 
From now on, reality forces itself upon us in this manner. Without a style of 
thinking, there would be no world, and it is the world itself that manifests itself 
in this way, at a certain point in history. Our way of experiencing the world is 
profoundly historical. Things present themselves to us in such a way that they 
invite and encourage certain practices of inquiry, and it is our style of thinking 
which makes the world light up in front of us in a particular manner. Magian art 
does not merely use different techniques than Faustian art. Magian artists 
experienced the world in a profoundly different manner. 
This also explains why Heidegger pays so much attention to the moment 
of commencement of a style of thinking: the beginning, the decisive moment of 
ἀλήθεια. Everything that follows from this is mere adequacy: hard intellectual 
and manual work, no doubt, to ensure that reality is disclosed on the basis of this 
grounding idea. Endless series of experiments will generate adequate statements 
about reality, but ultimately, they aim to demonstrate the validity of a particular 
way of thinking. The idea of an experiment as such is already grounded in the 
conviction that we can produce reliable knowledge about nature by systematically 
modifying and objectifying nature. The moment of ἀλήθεια has the character of 
an epistemic leap, a moment of discontinuity. It is seeing and thinking at the same 
time. All the rest merely amounts to working through. However, as the distance 
between the starting point and the subsequent events increases, we become the 
victims of forgetfulness: we forget how our way of thinking and perceiving is one 
particular way of thinking and perceiving, obfuscating other possibilities. The 
original moment (the epistemic leap or fall) gradually falls into oblivion, is no 
longer open to reflection and contestation, until a new basic conviction emerges 
that challenges it, perhaps resulting in a transvaluation of all values.  
From where do these basic convictions, these decisive thoughts 
originate? According to Heidegger, being itself invites us at a given moment to 
discover and approach reality in a certain way. For example, he states that it is 
not true that Greek (Apollonian) thinking destroyed the mythical (Dionysian) 
style of thinking. The latter vanished from the scene because mythical nature 
herself withdrew herself from us.19 The disconcerting experience that Pan was 
dead, enabled a rational way of thinking to take advantage of the situation. On 
the other hand, we are the ones who make this event possible by grasping the 
opportunity provided. It is something which comes over us, overcomes us, but at 
the same time it happens via us.  
At a certain point, however, from a styles-of-thinking perspective at least, 
Heidegger’s understanding of the relationship between science and art becomes 
problematic. According to the styles-of-thinking approach, a particular style of 
thinking will manifest itself in multiple cultural domains, simultaneously more or 
                                                             
19 “Es ist ein Vorurteil zu meinen, der µῦθος sei durch den λόγος zerstört worden. Das 
Religiöse wird niemals durch die Logik zerstört, sondern immer nur dadurch, dass der 
Gott sich entzieht” (Heidegger 1954, p. 7). 
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less. These manifestations will mutually enhance and reinforce each other. 
Moments of ἀλήθεια can loom up in different domains, also in the realm of 
science. When Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek spots microbes and spermatozoa for 
the first time through his microscope, an unknown world lights up, a window 
looms up in front of him. According to Heidegger (1957) however, art plays a 
privileged role here. Only artworks allow moment of ἀλήθεια to occur. The 
artwork allows things to appear in a certain manner, reveals a world. Through the 
artwork, a world is opened up, things are brought to the fore. In contrast to art, 
science is a derivative phenomenon: the systematic development of a truth 
already disclosed by art. Rembrandt’s Anatomical lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp 
(1632), for instance, should not be seen as a representation of anatomical 
procedures, but as an artwork that makes this practice possible. Art reveals a 
world for science to explore, while the latter is unable to accomplish this truth 
event by itself. True art is a grounding of truth, a moment of commencement, 
ahead of science. Science itself does not think, at least not in the genuine sense 
of the term (Heidegger 1954, p. 4).  
This view, which ascribes to art a more profound and original relationship 
to truth, is at odds with a styles-of-thinking approach. According to the latter, 
moments of ἀλήθεια may occur in various practices, in various cultural domains, 
and research practices are emphatically included. When Charles Darwin reveals, 
in The Origin of Species, that the natural world is a struggle, a struggle for 
survival, while others were still describing nature as an idyllic environment, he 
allowed the world to appear in a new light. He saw nature with very different 
eyes, namely as struggle, and this new vision constituted the basis for an 
impressive research program, which is still unfolding. The same experience 
emerged in other domains. In art, romanticism gave way to realism (e.g. the 
naturalistic novel). In politics, conflict and struggle were suddenly seen as 
constituting the basic momentum of reality: struggle between individuals 
(liberalism), between classes (socialism), between ethnic groups (racism). 
Nietzsche likewise discovered that all reality is Will to Power. We cannot say that 
art took the lead in this. The new experience of reality was articulated by various 
“seismographs”, in multiple contexts, more or less simultaneously.  
Thus, when Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek, with a self-made microscope, 
spotted microorganisms in ditch water for the very first time, that was a moment 
of ἀλήθεια. He did not merely represent what he saw (adequatio). He first had to 
bring this new world out in the open, he had to create a window into a microbial 
world. He still had to learn to see and portray this new-found objectivity, albeit 
relying on technical instruments instead of on the naked eye. Due to this initiative, 
nature was allowed to manifest itself in a completely new way, as a microbial 
planet. The beautiful drawings he produced of microorganisms are scientific 
artworks, but we cannot say that the eyes or gaze of the artist preceded the eyes 
of the scientist. Rather, we discern something like co-originality and proximity. 
The artist and the scientist working side by side, as imaginative and inquisitive 
individuals. In the novel Girl with a Pearl Earring, Tracy Chevalier (1999) 




describes the friendship between Anthonie van Leeuwenhoek and Johannes 
Vermeer. They lived in the same neighbourhood (a case of Nachbarschaft 
between art and science) and shared their interest in optical experiments. 
Chevalier describes how Vermeer uses a camera obscura to analyse colour and 
light. Vermeer produced two paintings in which scientific practices are portrayed: 
The Astronomer (1668) and The Geographer (1669). In both artworks, the focus 
is on making the world accessible. The scientists involved, surrounded by 
instruments, are extremely concentrated: they embody intentionality. The light 
suggests that they are portrayed at the very the moment when they experience a 
kind of revelation, seeing things with new eyes. These artworks portray ἀλήθεια. 
It was probably Van Leeuwenhoek who posed for both portraits (Seymour 1964; 
Schwartz 1966; Fink 1971; Hockney 2001), – proximity (Nachbarschaft) 
between science and art. 
While Van Leeuwenhoek and Vermeer were working on their optical 
experiments, on the other side of the pond Isaac Newton was experiencing his 
wonder year, his annus mirabilis, 1666, almost exactly at the same time. He too 
designed experiments involving light, in the same manner as Vermeer more or 
less, in accordance with the same basic conviction. Light (optics) was what these 
three explorers had in common: a painter, a naturalist and a physicist. Their basic 
rapport with light was quite comparable. They were intrigued by the same 
phenomena, their intentionality converged. They used lenses and cameras to 
modify and diffract light in various ways, analysing it, using it as a point of 
entrance, a window into the real. Interestingly, Vermeer’s Geographer displays 
a striking similarity with the famous etching of Faust by Rembrandt from 1692 
(Wheelock et al., 1995, p. 174). Both works of art perpetuate moments when the 
Faustian style of thinking seizes the researcher involved. 
Chevalier describes the moment when the maid Griet, the main character 
of the novel, stands face to face with the camera obscura as an artefact. Vermeer 
invites her to look into the camera, to expose herself to this new way of seeing, 
facilitated by optical techniques. “The camera obscura helps me to see in a 
different way,” he explains. She accepts the invitation and he asks her what she 
sees. Initially, she seems intimidated by this unknown and even perverse, 
voyeuristic device. She suspects that it is part of a seduction strategy. The device 
brings them, literally and figuratively, closer together. It is an initiation. The 
device is indeed perverse and perverting, but in a literal, original sense. The image 
that lights up in the camera, is an inverted world. Vermeer explains that what she 
sees is an “image” of reality. The camera obscura makes it possible to manipulate 
and analyse this image. “What is an image, sir? It is not a word I know” (p. 62). 
The new way of seeing is so new, so esoteric, that words like “lens”, “projection” 
and “image” seem a secret language. The new view, with a strange new jargon 
accompanying it, has not yet established itself, has not yet entered mainstream 
discourse. Griet is not simply shown some images: she is initiated into a new way 
of perceiving.   
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The microbiologist Van Leeuwenhoek and the artist Vermeer, both living 
in Delft, were pioneers, their initiatives are equal-original. Vermeer is the Van 
Leeuwenhoek of painting, Van Leeuwenhoek the Vermeer of biology. 
Chevalier’s novel can be read as an extremely lucid and meticulous description 
of the emergence of a new observational style in two different domains, natural 
history and visual arts, in the 17th century. Vermeer’s studio is an alethotoop, a 
truth site. Scientists and artists both use optical instruments, inviting or forcing 
nature to manifest itself in a new way. A new reality appears on these pages and 
paintings. They use the same techniques to make this event possible, but we 
cannot say that Vermeer had a head start. There is like-mindedness, proximity 
(Nachbarschaft), as congruent practices were flourishing in the Netherlands at 
that time.  
In his later essays about technology, Heidegger (1962) explicitly 
concedes that technology is a power that discloses the Real. Moreover, he 
emphasizes that technology should not be seen as mere application, as a 
derivative of natural science, but that natural science is essentially and inherently 
technical. For Heidegger, technology has primacy, which explains the Faustian 
profile of the modern science, relying on technicity to overwhelm and completely 
control the object. First manipulate, then observe. Without technology, scientific 
experiments would be unthinkable. Van Leeuwenhoek’s research starts with 
technology: the construction of the microscope. At the same time, however, 
Heidegger argues that technology is an exploitative and impoverished style of 
disclosure. Nature is reduced to raw materials: a resource, a standing reserve. Our 
era is essentially technical, in other words: Faustian, so that we are at the mercy 
of technical, Faustian thinking. We cannot realize a turn towards other ways of 
bringing forth ourselves, we cannot decide to think differently: we do not have 
the authority as it were. We have to wait for a fundamental turn (“Kehre”) when 
a new possibility, a less violent (post-Faustian) relationship with the world 
presents itself. We have to wait for a new style of thinking and acting, poetical 
rather than technical. Quite in line with the styles-of-thinking concept, Heidegger 
states that we cannot simply decide to create a new style.  
Faustian natural sciences are inherently technical, but does that mean that 
they exclusively and necessarily play an obfuscating role? Or can they play a 
revelatory role as well? It should be noted, in this context, that Heidegger’s 
position towards Spengler is an ambiguous one. He sees Decline of the West as 
an elaboration of Nietzsche’s (Faustian) interpretation of being as will to power, 
but criticises Spengler for seeing philosophy as one particular expression of the 
Faustian spirit among others (architecture, art, science, etc.). And this, Heidegger 
considers an enslavement (“Verknechtung”) of philosophy, symptomatic of 
contemporary (Faustian) civilisation (1930, p. 200). 
The styles-of-thinking approach does not treat art as a privileged domain 
compared to, say, politics, architecture or science. Moments of revelation occur 
in other practices as well. And there is technicity in art as well. The moment of 
ἀλήθεια which we discern in Vermeer’s artistic experiments, is intimately related 




to the world-disclosing activities of Van Leeuwenhoek and Newton. After 
Newton’s wonder-year, we see light with different eyes. The element or medium 
that reveals everything else, that makes everything visible, assumes a different 
role. Van Leeuwenhoek adds a whole new dimension to our world, namely the 
microbial dimension, the realm of microbial existence. Similarly, a whole world 
of light and space manifests itself in Vermeer’s artworks. These three technology-
dependent forms of world disclosure mutually elucidate and reinforce each other. 
The same style, the same basic conviction speaks to us via these activities, in art, 
natural history and optics. The optical instrument opens up and illuminates a new 
world. Vermeer’s artistic practices are technology-driven. The style-of-thinking 
concept removes Heidegger’s technophobic bias. As soon as we draw attention 
to the context of discovery, we discover genuine moments of commencement in 
multiple domains, not only in philosophy, and not only in art. While a younger 
Vermeer still echoes a Magian experience of being in his artwork Christ in the 
house of Martha and Maria (1655), with its diffuse colours and shapes, he 
immortalises the Faustian experience of being in his highly accurate, detailed and 
discrete artwork The Geographer. In these later works, he not only pays close 
attention to technological contrivances and scientific instruments, such as the 
compass and the globe, but he also uses scientific technologies to capture (quite 
eloquently and convincingly) the style of thinking that is inherent in these 
scientific practices, depicted in this work of art.  
 
 
§ 6. A world of supra-human scale: the temporal dimension 
 
The essence of the Copernican revolution is not the claim that Planet Earth 
revolves around the sun, but the realisation that the size of the universe is 
unimaginably and incomprehensibly large. Epistemic resistance (discontent in 
heliocentrism) was primarily a response to the metaphysical implications of 
Copernicus’ thesis. The same applies to another narcissistic offense the Faustian 
worldview had in stall for us, as Sigmund Freud (1917/1942) phrases it, the 
“second” Copernican revolution, this time emerging in the life sciences: Darwin’s 
theory of evolution. Humans are not, as the Paradise story suggests, the crowning 
glory of creation, but a temporary outcome of ongoing evolutionary processes: 
an animal among animals. Here again, however, the disconcerting truth of 
Darwin’s theory does not concern the thesis that, from an evolutionary viewpoint, 
humans are naked apes. It may have become difficult for us to experience the 
hesitation that seized Darwin and his contemporaries (and not exclusively his 
opponents). The unsettling insight was that Darwin’s theory of evolution can only 
be true if nature has enormous expanses of time at her disposal. Like the 
heliocentric revolution, the Darwinian revolution was accompanied by a dramatic 
increase in scale, this time in the temporal realm. Darwin says it plainly; it is the 
philosophical content of his work: nature is unimaginably large – “We 
continually forget how large the world is” (1859/1985, p. 309).  
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For centuries it had been the experience of breeders that, although it is 
possible to produce new varieties, we cannot change species. This experience was 
extrapolated to nature as such, but where breeders work in time-spans of decades, 
or centuries at most, the natural evolutionary process takes place on a different 
scale, in a different time dimension – it takes millions of years to sculpt a new 
species. The amounts of deep time that nature has at her disposal are 
unimaginably large: “Nature grants vast periods of time for the work of natural 
selection” (p. 147). They transcend the boundaries of human imagination. These 
“incomprehensibly vast periods of time” (p. 293) were far beyond the traditional 
temporal horizon. Our world is a world on supra-human scale. What Darwin tries 
to impress upon his readers is that evolution is only thinkable if we realise that it 
takes place in a completely different time zone than human time: “long intervals 
of time”; “long lapses of time”; “vast intervals of time” (p. 299); “enormous 
intervals of time” (p. 310); “very long periods, enormously long as measured by 
years” (p. 437). This is the basic insight that seized Darwin during his inter-
continental journey: “A man must for years examine for himself great piles of 
superimposed strata, and watch the sea at work grinding down old rocks and 
making fresh sediment, before he can hope to comprehend anything of the lapse 
of time, the monuments of which we see around us…” (p. 294); “what time this 
must have consumed!” (p. 295).  
There is a second insight, no less Faustian, that made the idea of evolution 
possible. When Darwin embarked on the H.M.S. Beagle, he was a theologian, 
still inclined to discern harmony in nature. Upon returning home, he had learned 
to view nature in a completely different way. When he wrote his book, he had 
learned to see struggle, fierce competition and violence in nature.20 What he had 
discovered was the proliferating urge of nature, expressing itself in competition, 
reproductive drives, killing fields and bottle-neck survivals. Darwin’s book 
introduces a new way of looking at nature. After some initial hesitation, his point 
of view is adopted because it is timely, in accordance with the spirit of the time. 
The spirit of competition is in the air, is everywhere. Political movements see 
Darwin’s “realism” as a moral justification for their political ideology (Van den 
Berg 1984). Capitalists and liberals were enthusiastic about Darwin, but Marxist 
readers as well. Not only Marx and Engels themselves (the latter read Darwin’s 
book shortly after it was published). The leading Marxist Karl Kautsky (1907) 
explicitly pursued a synthesis of Marxism and Darwinism. He saw class struggle 
as a continuation of the natural struggle between species. Darwin’s book also 
became a source of inspiration and moral justification for capitalism: a 
justification of a view of society based on social competition between individuals, 
                                                             
20 “We behold the face of nature bright with gladness, we often see superabundance of 
food; we do not see, or we forget, that the birds which are idly singing round us mostly 
live on insects or seeds, and are thus constantly destroying life; or we forget how largely 
these songsters, or their eggs, or their nestlings, are destroyed by birds and beasts of 
prey; we do not always bear in mind, that though food may be now superabundant, it is 
not so in all seasons of each recurring year...” (1859/1985, p. 116). 




a struggle for social existence in which the favoured and privileged would 
triumph, and rightly so. 
National Socialism was also inspired by Darwin. In Mein Kampf, Adolf 
Hitler likewise describes history as a struggle for life and death between ethnic 
varieties of humans, and he wanted his fellow-Arians to become more aware of 
this undeniable fact of history and nature. Bible Book Genesis now becomes a 
tale of reproduction, proliferation and multiplication (off-springs that will 
multiply until they become as numerous as stars in a desert sky), but also selection 
and elimination: God as a breeder and destroyer of human varieties, carefully 
selecting favoured strands while consciously eliminating others, as is indicated 
by the subtitle of Darwin’s book, and we should notice its Biblical ring 
(“Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life”). As was already 
indicated, philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche articulated this same Faustian view 
when he depicted human civilisation as a merciless, unscrupulous and tyrannical 
proliferation, but also as an extremely creative and productive struggle. 
 
 
§ 7. Faustian civilisation: the world according to Jules Verne 
 
In terms of Oswald Spengler, Newton represents Faustian thinking as culture, a 
small-scale phenomenon. Faustian civilization settled in Western metropolises in 
the 18th and 19th century, proliferating from there into a global form of existence. 
On the one hand, these cities were old strongholds of Gothic (early Faustian) 
origin, now undergoing profound transformations and evolving into industrial 
cities, such as Paris. On the other hand, we see the rise of new Faustian 
metropolises, new urban centres such as Liverpool and Manchester, meticulously 
depicted my Friedrich Engels (1845/1962) in his The Condition of the Working 
Classes: materialisations of the Faustian principle, monstrous cities that embody 
mobility, expansion, productivity, social disruption and mass pollution. At that 
point in time we are really entering the Faustian era of mobilization and 
globalization. The grounding, enabling condition of this process is the emergence 
of the Faustian, fossil-fuelled machine. And the author who saw and expressed 
this as no other, Sloterdijk (1999, p. 836 ff.; p. 895) argues, was the hyper-
productive novelist who devoted a large part of his extensive oeuvre (92 novels) 
to machines and their world-disclosing, globalising and mobilising impact: Jules 
Verne. The motto of the anti-imperialist machine builder Nemo concisely 
summarises the Faustian experience: Mobilis in Mobili, mobile amidst mobility. 
According to Sloterdijk, this is the epochal formula which captures the essence 
of an entire era in words (1999, p. 895). 
Jules Verne (1828 - 1905) is an author whose oeuvre entails a systematic 
analysis of Faustian civilization. He is sometimes discarded as an author of 
children’s books, which is partly the result of adaptations to which his novels 
were subjected, although it may also be due to the fact that in his books the 
psychological dimension is sometimes underdeveloped. As psychologists of 
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bourgeois mentality, contemporaries such as Tolstoy (1828 - 1910) and Ibsen 
(1828-1906) clearly outcompete him, but Verne is pre-eminently the author who 
turned the Faustian machine into a literary subject. His novels revolve around 
machines and closely related phenomena such as industry, metropolises, 
technoscience and the mentality of the engineer. 
Novels by Jules Verne are set in two types of locations. Start and finish 
are situated in large industrial centres, in Faustian cities: Liverpool, London, 
Paris, Hamburg, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore or San Francisco, large-scale 
constellations of labour and capital during the second half of the 19th century. 
From there, journeys of adventure are organised into unexplored areas: polar 
regions, obscure places in Africa or South America, or even towards the Moon. 
In this mobility drive (this urge to explore new forms of mobility across rivers 
and oceans, through the air, or even into space) the Faustian desire for expansion 
manifests itself. Heroes visit formerly inaccessible and uninhabitable locations 
that become accessible and habitable thanks to ships, submarines and airplanes, 
thanks to Faustian machines. Verne is fascinated by new forms of energy that 
begin to attract a lot of attention in his time: electricity first and foremost.  
Verne is the photographic negative of his contemporaries Tolstoy and 
Ibsen as it were. In The Lady from the Sea (Fruen fra havet), Ibsen describes how 
the unapproachable Norwegian fjords coast is made accessible for tourism by 
English steamships: δεινός (tremendous) on the outside, but extremely 
comfortable (with bar facilities etc.) on the inside (Zwart 2015a). In his novel 
Anna Karenina, Tolstoy likewise describes how Russia is opened-up by the steam 
trains that suddenly connect cities such as Moscow and Saint Petersburg. This is 
a genuine Verne-novel theme: the train as a Faustian machine (both frightening 
and comfortable) that makes completely new forms of mobility possible. This 
train is the Α and Ω of Tolstoy’s masterpiece, the starting and ending point of the 
story, for the novel begins and ends with the arrival of a train in a train station. 
The novel itself, however, is largely devoted to the psychology of modern 
marriage, not something Verne was very much concerned with, – although there 
are some marriage scenes in some of his novels, such as Kéraban the Inflexible 
(1883), a novel about a Black Sea journey, which includes a narrative about a 
recently divorced Dutchman.  
Something similar applies to Ibsen’s dramas. Arrival and departure of a 
Faustian steamship in a Norwegian coastal town is the start and end point of a 
play that deals primarily with marital psychology. Verne’s novels are 
complementary to this setup. He also describes Victorian couples, but marriage 
psychology is not his greatest talent. Although his novels start and end with 
relational problems (deferred engagements, unhappy marriages, etc.), the true 
protagonists of his novels are invariably machines. And he usually prefers 
celibate men as a crew. Tolstoy expresses fear of the machine. There is fear in 
Verne’s books as well, but this fear neither applies to machines nor to women, it 
applies to marriage as such: not misogyny but misogamy (Moré 1963). 




Prior to the arrival of the machine, journeying through Europe was slow, 
time-consuming, laborious and uncomfortable. Thanks to steam trains and 
steamboats, it becomes possible to travel around the world in eighty days, 
provided the subject is prepared to accommodate his style of thinking, his 
experience of time and space to the logic of the machine. In Tolstoy, the demonic 
aspect of the machine is the dominant aspect. The train makes the liaison between 
Anna and Vronsky possible, but it is first and foremost the monster that destroys 
the heroine’s life. We do find this ambivalence in Verne as well. Although 
enthusiasm for the machine is dominant, there is a recessive dimension. Verne 
does have an eye for the demonic, sinister side. Primarily, he emphasizes that 
machines increase mobility, making life more comfortable, enabling 
unprecedented forms of transport, but the Faustian aspect of technology also 
gives rise to disruption and pollution (Zwart 2005c).  
Verne devoted a novel to a mobile machine that he himself got to know, 
the Great Eastern, a giant steamship with the dimensions of a floating city that 
brought him to the United States (Verne 1871). A sublime machine, also called 
Leviathan: immensely large and sophisticated, a ship of oceanic dimensions, that 
moved across the oceans with majestic calmness. A fascinating, but also 
monstrous phenomenon that literally destroys human lives. Crew members are 
killed by the machine and the Faustian creator of this industrial 
Gesamtkunstwerk, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, dies of exhaustion a few days 
before the first voyage. A mega design, δεινός in all respects, a “metal mountain”, 
a “steel mass”, a “mysterious power”, a “floating city”, built to connect 
metropolises (Liverpool, New York) and continents (Europe, America) with each 
other, transporting thousands of passengers to colonize the frontiers of the 
Faustian empire, but also laying transatlantic telegraph cables on ocean bottoms. 
A vessel that is more powerful than humans. “I thought machines were made to 
serve people,” Verne writes, “but the reverse turns out to be the case.” An 
immeasurable yard, a whole army of workmen is needed to manufacture this 
machine in Liverpool. It is a synthesis of heavy industry (engine rooms) and 
Victorian comfort (a palace-like hotel): an archetypal Faustian machine, the 
embodiment of energy and restlessness. In New York, Verne continues his 
journey in a comfortable steamship that travels up the Hudson River, a mobile 
hotel that visits the land where the heroes of Fenimore Cooper (1826/1992) had 
roamed through “impervious forests” on foot, not that long ago.  
Verne’s ambivalence towards machines must also be understood in the 
context of his relationship with Jules Hetzel, his publisher, whose social program, 
in which science and technology played a decisive role in propagating progress, 
was waiting for a workaholic like Jules Verne to exploit. Indeed, “Progrès” was 
his key signifier, and Verne was exactly the author he needed. This workhorse, 
mercilessly exploited by his liberal and progressive publisher, was forced to 
produce two books a year (92 in total), while Hetzel received most of the 
revenues. In an early novel about the city and the machine, set in Paris in 1960, 
Verne had wanted to reveal the threatening, apocalyptic, dystopian aspects of 
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modern industrialism (1863/1994), – featuring a main character named Michel 
who frantically searches for literature in a world where only books about science 
and technology can be found – but this manuscript was resolutely rejected by 
Hetzel. In the 1860s, he persuaded Verne to emphasize the progressive aspects of 
machines, although the shadow side was never completely absent. After Hetzel’s 
death, there is a striking change of mood. Verne becomes a gloomy, pessimistic 
author who primarily perceives science and technology as a merciless threat to 
human happiness and global ecology. But if we read his books carefully, this 
aspect was always there.  
 
 
§ 8. Experiments on a grander scale 
  
In the ninety or so novels that Verne produced, most of them entitled 
Extraordinary Voyages, a Faustian design can consistently be discerned. All these 
novels are structured like an experiment. The journey to the moon is literally 
described as an “experiment” without precedent.21 The crew members of the 
moon capsule are research subjects themselves, while test animals are also on 
board (a dog dies during one of the tests). The lunar journey is not only an 
experiment, but also makes a large number of experiments possible, for example 
concerning weightlessness. The occupants spend an important part of their time 
experimenting and carefully record their findings in a scientific notebook.22 
Technology creates ideal conditions for lunar science. It enables this team of 
researchers to study the moon very closely, from nearby. The moon capsule is an 
artefact that makes whole new forms of scientific inquiry possible, enabling the 
emergence of a completely new form of scientific experience. It is a machine that 
makes a (previously inaccessible) dimension of reality accessible. The pioneers 
not only design and build but also inhabit their voyaging optic instrument (their 
voyager). Human existence used to be relatively rural and static, taking place 
within one dimension, namely on earth. In Verne’s novels, engineers develop 
machines that open-up new dimensions and mobilise humanity, represented by 
an avant-garde of scientifically trained or autodidactic pioneers. Faustian 
machines make sea, air and space accessible, but the same applies to underground 
depths: caves and corridors become accessible to humans, as well as apparently 
inaccessible areas in the heart of darkness, the most interior regions of Africa. 
The typical Verne machine is a dynamical machine. Most of these 
machines are themselves constantly in motion. They are manned mobile 
observatories and laboratories, that make innovative research possible. 
Researchers imprison themselves in their instruments, and this is how they then 
embark on a long, adventurous journey. Scientists are not only the ingenious 
                                                             
21 “Une tentative scientifique sans précédent dans les annales de la science” (Verne 
1870, p. 1). 
22 “Ils passaient leur temps à faire des expériences” (Verne 1870, p. 210). 




developers of these machines, but also the ones who (with a truly Faustian 
contempt for lethal dangers) expose themselves to series of novel experiences 
that become possible, thanks to these machines. The experiment takes the form 
of a journey and the machine that makes the new research practice possible is 
usually a vessel (a submarine, a hot air balloon, an aircraft, a rocket). The basic 
mood, the basic attitude towards science is enthusiasm, but Faustian desire and 
anxiety always play a role, such as fear of Faustian landscapes: cold, dark 
emptiness, abiotic nothingness, apparently uninhabitable. Several of his books 
are set close to or even beyond the polar circle. In Verne novels, there are always 
moments when scientific travellers find themselves in frightening isolation, 
trapped in a void, in abiotic darkness, where even Genesis never dawned. “No 
living creature animated this vast, dead loneliness,” as Verne phrases it in Hector 
Servadac, a story about an incredible space journey (1877a, p. 200). 
Science is present in Verne’s stories in two ways. On the one hand, 
science makes the experience possible. On the other hand, science is made 
possible. To give an example: the journey to the moon is made possible by 
ballistics, – a Faustian science par excellence, allowing experts to calculate 
exactly how artillery can exterminate as many victims as possible. This same 
science can also determine the exact speed the capsule must have to leave Planet 
Earth, and which orbit it must describe to reach its goal (the moon) at a specific 
point in time. Once the capsule has been launched, however, a new type of 
scientific practice becomes possible, a new form of selenography (moon 
cartography). Until then, the moon’s surface had to be studied and mapped from 
a distance. Gigantic telescopes on mountain tops 
could only partly bridge the distance between earth 
and moon. Thanks to ballistics, the moon can now 
be approached up to a few kilometres and the 
moon’s surface can be examined very closely and 
carefully, and from a comfortable position, because 
these proto-astronauts still look like gentlemen in 
their Victorian study. A new form of scientific 
experience is made possible. It becomes possible to 
check mainstream orographic insights regarding the 
surface of the moon and to improve them drastically 
on the spot if necessary. There are no authorities for 
these travelling experts. A more reliable way of 
observing is suddenly practiced, resulting in a more 
reliable lunar map. The Mappa Selenographica by De Beer and Moedler from 
1830 can be drastically adjusted thanks to the moon voyage. Ideal conditions 
(unprecedented physical proximity) make extreme and unprecedented levels of 
precision possible. Faustian science forces itself upon the object. Respectful 
distance is no longer an issue.  
On the one hand, a considerable amount of scientific knowledge and 
technical expertise is required to construct Captain Nemo’s Nautilus in Twenty-
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thousand Leagues under the Sea (1870). On the other hand, thanks to this 
wonderful underwater observatory, new forms of scientific research are possible, 
not only in physics, but also in oceanography, marine zoology and archaeology. 
Pneumatic knowledge is needed to construct the balloon with which Samuel 
Ferguson and his fellow passengers hover over Africa for five weeks, but the 
balloon also makes new and more reliable geographical explorations possible. 
Thanks to machines (trains, submarines, balloons), humans can observe their 
scientific objects more or less directly, from a close distance, with the naked eye 
or from behind a screen. These machines are windows into formerly inaccessible 
environments, even into the past. Thanks to these machines, the researchers are 
able to go “to the things themselves”, as it were. The balloon is both a means of 
transport and an observatory: “And the map of Africa is unfolding beneath our 
feet” (1863/1992, p. 25). The traditional method of practicing cartography 
(exploration on foot) is not only slow, dangerous and uncomfortable, but also 
provides less reliable information. Such explorers were swallowed by their object 
as it were. Machines makes it possible to optimise the geographic observations 
of Burton, Speke and other explorers. In the trip to the North Pole, which Verne 
(1866) describes in The Adventures of Captain Hatteras, a new type of scientific 
enquiry becomes possible: meteorological and physical research at extremely low 
temperatures. Doctor Clawbonny (the scientist on board) describes the polar 
regions as “a vast laboratory” where unique and groundbreaking research under 
low temperatures can be performed (1866, p. 80).  
Around the World in Eighty Days (1873) is likewise an experiment. 
Thanks to new Faustian machines (e.g. steam trains and steamboats), it should 
theoretically be possible to describe an orbit across the earth’s surface and to 
return to the place of departure within exactly eighty days. The question is to what 
extent such calculations comply with the practice of Faustian transport. To what 
extent do mathematical calculations correspond to physical reality? Can 
correspondence be ensured between Faustian thinking and the real world? The 
usual view is that “in practice” such a journey will inevitably take more time, due 
to so-called “unforeseen circumstances”, but perhaps these can now be reckoned 
with as well? Phileas Fogg wants to prove that what is theoretically possible is 
also practically feasible, provided that the person involved knows how to behave 
like a clockwork or calculator himself, remaining totally indifferent to scenic, 
cultural, touristic and erotic attractions. Does time really take as long as we think, 
based on mathematical calculations? If we travel long distance at a high speed, 
do we indeed arrive exactly on time?  
The outcome of this experiment (somewhat surprisingly perhaps) is that 
time is relative, to some extent: time depends on movement, on the mobility of 
the observer. Mobility is bound to have an impact on time. Whoever travels long 
distances, by making a journey around the globe for instance, in an Eastward 
direction, will win 24 hours upon returning home. In The ABC of Relativity, 
Bertrand Russell (1925/1969) describes an experiment with two clocks on two 
trains that move away from each other at very high speed. The time measurements 




will inevitably deviate. This intuition, that new forms of mobility and speed have 
an impact on time perception, forms the basis of Verne’s novel, decades before 
Einstein came up with this idea. The art of novel writing precedes science.  
Thus, the machines designed and manned by Verne’s scientific heroes 
are mobile laboratories for conducting experiments, epistemological devices that 
make it possible to practice science under optimal conditions. Those involved 
constantly carry out observations, while continuously taking notes. Thanks to 
Nemo’s submarine, Professor Aronnax has to completely revise the 
oceanographic monograph with which he made a name as a scientist. He recovers 
from his mid-life crisis, caused by epistemic stagnation, as mainstream 
oceanography had reached its limits. Finally, he is able to provide more reliable 
information.23 To make genuine progress, we have to submerge ourselves, using 
the submarine as a window into the world of marine phenomena. Before joining 
the hunt for the Nautilus, Aronnax had experienced epistemological malaise. He 
had been wasting his time, giving interviews and offering advice. Thanks to 
Nemo’s submarine, he is able to make an epistemological leap, to revolutionise 
his field, lift it to a higher plateau, a more comprehensive level of performance. 
The Nautilus enforces an epistemic breakthrough. Aronnax no longer needs to 
study the deep sea from a great distance, on the basis of sparse and questionable 
data, he can now study living nature alive, vis-à-vis as it were, as a living 
laboratory, from behind a floating screen, inside a technological eye that allows 
him to see in the dark. Thanks to the journey, he is able to publish a scientific 
bestseller. The submarine, this ingenious artefact, makes a more advanced and 
reliable form of scientific research possible because it opens up a new dimension 
for experience and mobility. Nemo’s Nautilus is like a manned and floating optic 
instrument, an artificial body, manned by Nemo as a Faustian homunculus.  
In Journey to the Centre of the Earth (1864), semiotics (cryptology) 
enables scientific travellers to decipher an alchemical cryptogram, while geology 
and mineralogy show them the way through the dark interior of Planet Earth. 
These sciences make new experiences possible in areas such as evolution theory, 
speleology and palaeontology. The main characters want to experimentally prove 
the validity of Humphry Davy’s theory, who claimed that the interior of the earth 
consists of cavities. They discover lost worlds, inhabited by prehistoric life forms, 
that once existed on the terrestrial surface, but became extinct millions of years 
ago. They spot plants and animals that were replaced by other life forms. These 
travellers can directly witness distant phases in the history of evolution, frozen as 
it were, with the naked eye. Their journey through the interior of Planet Earth is 
in fact a journey back in time, upstream evolutionary history, an introductory 
course into palaeontology. An extinguished Jurassic world is preserved in a cave-
like time capsule, an underground theatre or cinema, where a Jurassic opera is 
unfolding: strange sounds, strange actors, against the backdrop of a strange décor, 
– a genre taken up later by authors such as Arthur Conan Doyle (1912) and 
                                                             
23 “J'avais maintenant le droit d’écrire le vrai livre de la mer” (1870, p. 420). 
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Michael Crichton (1990/1991; 1995/2002). Verne’s lively descriptions of the 
battles among huge, voracious monsters set a model for these later writers. Under 
extreme circumstances, in far-off, isolated, inaccessible places, evolution follows 
different pathways, or was even put on hold. And then, all of a sudden, the spell 
is broken and the travellers are back on earth.  
We find similar “regressions”, similar journeys backward in time, in 
several other Jules Verne novels. Besides anticipating the emerging future, they 
also allow us to explore the past. On the one hand, Verne’s heroes use advanced 
vehicles (fast and comfortable trains, helicopters, luxurious cruise ships), but in 
novels such as The Courier of the Czar (1876), we notice a steady regression, in 
the sense that the mobility becomes increasingly pre-Faustian, until the 
protagonist walks on foot again, struggling through limitless plains, the Russian 
arch-symbol (Spengler) – a landscape abandoned by machines. 
 
 
§ 9. Staffing and anxiety 
 
Verne’s mobile machines are staffed by Faustian types: an engineer, a worker, a 
journalist, a banker’s son. Typically, there are three crew members aboard the 
machine: the scientist who designed the experiment, his dedicated assistant, and 
a critical reviewer, a sceptic who vehemently refuses to believe in the feasibility 
of the experiment and who can only be convinced by finding his disbelief 
experimentally refuted. He is invited to attend the experiment in person. This will 
put a stop to his criticism. And then there is the general public: newspaper readers, 
who enthusiastically become acquainted with the set-up of the test and who 
respond with massive enthusiasm when the scientific travellers return safely: 
well-fed and in good health, ready to publish their report. A Verne voyage results 
in a sensational scientific bestseller – a Verne novel. 
We find this division of roles in Robur the Conqueror (1886), for 
instance. The novel describes an experiment designed to settle an interminable 
dispute between two scientific principles. The question is whether the future of 
aviation will be based on the principle “Lighter than air” (balloons) or on the 
competing principle “Heavier than air” (helicopters and other types of aircraft). 
Robur kidnaps two critics and forces them to witness, against their will, on board 
his vehicle, how the experiment settles the dispute to his advantage. “What is this 
series of tests we have to take part in?”, they exclaim (1886, p. 86). In other 
novels, the scientist is actually the sceptic who, together with his faithful 
assistant, is taken on board by a scientific genius, as happens in Twenty Thousand 
Leagues under de Sea (1870), where genius Nemo forces his guest – Professor 
Aronnax, the most renowned naturalist and oceanographer of his time – into the 
role of student. The professor becomes a pupil. Nemo shows him the epistemic 
limitations of mainstream science. His ingenious machine makes it possible to 
practice various branches of research under optimal conditions. Nemo has long 
solved all the major issues that leading scientists are still discussing, and he’s in 




need of an elite audience, reduced to a minimum, consisting of one single expert, 
accompanied by a faithful servant and a brawny whaler. At the same time, he has 
no need to publish his results. The genius doesn’t need recognition, doesn’t have 
to defend his insights before the scientific forum. This Faustian Übermensch is 
driven by contempt for formal academic reviews, with the exception of Aronnax 
perhaps, the most talented and broad-minded of them all, but still handicapped 
by the obvious limitations of university research. Whoever wants to study the 
oceans must leave urban scholarly environments such as Paris behind, and dive 
into the ocean as a living lab.     
In Journey to the Centre of the Earth (1864), the main characters discover 
how monstrous life forms from bygone eras managed to survive in the earth’s 
crust, in a protected environment: a gigantic, womb-like cavity. It is the first 
paleontological monster novel, the first dinosaur novel. Two monsters fight each 
other: a struggle for life and death. The monster archetype is omnipresent in 
Verne. We find various monsters in Twenty Thousand Leagues under de Sea 
(1870). First of all, the submarine itself is considered a deep-sea monster. Later, 
the people on board come face to face with an octopus, a school of sperm whales, 
a giant shell and other deep-sea marvels. The monstrous is always there. In other 
novels (1865; 1866; 1877a), protagonists play with monstrous, astronomical 
numbers. Scientists enter into a discussion about the weight of planets until 
laypersons witnessing them finally exclaim that such numbers are beyond human 
comprehension (1866, p. 218). In the lunar voyage (1865) we find similar 
versions of this typical scene and in Hector Servadac (1877a), the travelling 
companions are literally made mellow by astronomer Rosette’s explanations 
bulging with astronomical numbers. Rosette provides a quick course in Faustian 
astronomy, lecturing on periodic and non-periodic comets, on chances and risks 
of anyone travelling through space, on the history of astronomy and on the 
likelihood of the Earth and a comet colliding (1: 281 million). Rosette calculates 
during the day, while making acute observations at night. In short, we are dealing 
with a scholar who knows how to create optimal conditions for his science, even 
under the most unlikely circumstances, who feels perfectly at home among the 
most intimidating phenomena, thanks to his fluency in the mathematics of 
astronomical numbers. His mathematical skills allow him to decipher cosmic 
datasets as if they were a Rosetta Stone. His lectures culminate in expositions 
about trillions, quadrillions and sextillions: “The earth weighs six quadrillion 
kilograms, a 25-digit number, the sun 2 quintillion, a 31-digit number, Jupiter, 
2000 quadrillion kilograms, 28 digits…” – in short: Faustian mathematics.  
The South Pole is the archetype of an immense, silent, freezing, 
unapproachable mother. The Faustian desire to conquer this mother is what keeps 
the Nautilus moving (like an electric sperm cell) en route through the world’s 
oceans. Once the target is reached, she threatens to choke the Nautilus and 
swallow it. Blue veins are visible on her spotless white skin. The people on board, 
trapped in her icy embrace, run out of breath, of oxygen. In the last moment, they 
manage to escape from this claustrophobic intimacy. In the capsule in which the 
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journey to the moon is made, fired by a giant, phallic cannon, we likewise 
recognize a spermatozoon, on its way to a celestial, maternal body, emphatically 
and repeatedly referred to as “mother”. 
In The Black Indies, about mining in Scotland, the mine is “the corpse of 
a pre-worldly monster” (1877b, p. 15), but also an immense maternal body. Mine 
corridors are veins. Thanks to the safety lamp, an invention by Humphry Davy, 
the mine has become accessible for human presence, even resulting in habitation 
and migration. An underground city has evolved. The experimental moment 
occurs when a girl, who has spent her entire life in this unworldly environment, 
is suddenly exposed to normal conditions (daylight, sea air, urban sights) so that 
her supervisors can experimentally determine how her body, her sense organs, 
her mental mood, respond to all this. She is consistently presented as a research 
subject, whose behaviour is closely monitored.  
The Begum’s Fortune (1879) describes a monstrous industrial city that is 
developing at an explosive pace, seriously polluting the environment. It is 
structured like a panopticon, around a “cyclopean” central construction, from 
where the evil genius Schultze permanently monitors the human resources put to 
work in his perfectly organised metropolis. His ingenious experiment falters in 
the end because one of his heavy bombs explodes prematurely, causing him to 
freeze to death on the spot, resulting in the inevitable collapse of the monster city. 
Industrialization and nationalist collisions (e.g. between France and Germany) 
are converging dimensions of the Faustian process. In an age of nation-building 
and expansion, industrialisation inevitably results in large-scale conflicts, armed 
confrontations between modern states, and massive killings.  
Scientists are heroes in Verne’s novels, but they do have a sinister side. 
Technology always casts its destructive shadow. Scientists know how to survive 
under extremely difficult circumstances, thanks to their courage, imagination and 
expertise, but also their accuracy and reliability. Scientific research is a moral 
vocation. Precision, reliability and disinterestedness (never taking their own petty 
interests into the equation), those are decisive scientific virtues. The Adventures 
of three Russians and three Englishmen in South Africa (1872) emphasises the 
extreme precision and meticulousness which persevering scientists manage to 
preserve under extreme circumstances, but the collateral damage is immense. 
Machines are never an unequivocally liberating force in Verne’s books. 
They open up new dimensions for human mobility, for migration and 
colonisation, but this usually results in confinement in quasi-monastic research 
institutes, where life is spent in celibacy. This is related to Verne’s personal 
situation. Like his heroes, he led a comfortable and well-nourished life in a 
lifeworld of limited size, a room where he toiled on his interminable series of 
books, day after day. His imagination made him quasi-mobile, but in the end his 
heroes end up living in cells remarkably similar to Verne’s own office: a camera 
obscura, a cave dwelling in which a workaholic spent his days and nights, as a 
manuscript spitting machine.  




Besides enthusiasm for science, archetypal anxieties also play a role: fear 
of abandonment, claustrophobia, fear of monsters and explosions. Notably, we 
notice fear for the astronomical expanses of the Faustian universe, for the utterly 
dark, extremely cold, abiotic nothingness that extends beyond our comfortable, 
but extremely small and vulnerable terrestrial environment. Verne’s work echoes 
Pascal’s aphorism: “The eternal silence of these infinite spaces terrifies me” 
(Compère 1991). The mobile machine is a homely microcosm, a temporary 
dwelling, a technological cell in the middle of an inclement environment. 
Eventually, the machine collapses and supreme nature again takes possession of 
an abandoned landscape.  
Not only the immensities of the natural environment are threatening. In 
the background, an additional threat is unmistakably noticeable, the looming 
threat of a massive, violent clash of competing political powers. Their Will for 
Power will take possession of continents, but also of scientific achievements. 
Scientists will be expropriated in the context of a global arms race. In Verne’s 
novels, scientists manage to overstep nationalistic sentiments of envy and 
competition by working together. In Facing the Flag (1896), a honest scientist 
knows how to prevent a superbomb, developed by a scientific genius, from falling 
into the wrong hands, realising that avoiding the inevitable catastrophe will only 
be a temporary triumph. Anxiety and unease emphasise the Faustian ambiance 
surrounding the technological works of art produced by Verne’s engineers. It is 
truly remarkable that Nietzsche and Verne were contemporaries, and that 
Nietzsche (born in 1844) was actually so much younger than Verne (born in 
1828). Although allegedly a Faustian thinker, coining the adage “Will to Power”, 
Nietzsche shunned industrial centres and preferred to dwell in tourist resorts 
while rereading ancient Greek texts. Verne analyses precisely those dimensions 
that are remarkably underrepresented in Nietzsche’s writings, where the Will to 
Power seems to feel most at home: technology, labour, industrialisation. There is 
an obvious link between Nietzsche’s aversion towards Gothic, late medieval 
monastic culture and his aversion towards the world of the Faustian machine, as 
the real embodiment of Faustian power.  












Each style of thinking style builds on its own guiding idea, which realises itself 
in multiple cultural domains. In the preceding chapters we have outlined the 
profile of three styles of thinking. The focus was primarily on the initial moment 
of commencement, the “birth of”, the original articulation. In this chapter we opt 
for a comparative approach. We will indicate how the three styles actually take 
shape. Next, we will focus on how these styles of thinking affect our basic 
categories of time, space, causality, subjectivity and objectivity. Finally, we will 
return to the beginnings (“vade retro”), to specific moments and locations where 
the genesis of a particular style first came to express itself. Following Peter 
Sloterdijk (2004), we will analyse these locations as “alethotopes” (ἀληθής + 
τόπος), places where fundamental insights were articulated for the first time.  
 
 
§ 1. Domains of thinking (1): research 
 
Mathematics – Mathematics is considered the “first science”, for it expresses, in 
an abstract manner, the experience of time and space entailed in a particular style 
of thinking. According to Spengler, we cannot meaningfully speak about the 
history of mathematics. The Apollonian number concept differs decisively from 
Magian conceptions, and Magian conceptions from Faustian ones. A mutual 
comparison reveals the contrast between these styles: a confrontation between 
incompatible forms of mathematics.  
In archaic or mythical thinking, mathematics is closely linked with 
rituals. The mythical number is an ordinal number, indicating a sequence, a 
ranking, an arrangement. Geometric patterns play an important role in the staging 
of ritual scenes. Mythical thinking distinguishes sacred and profane, female and 
male numbers. The number seven is sacred, e.g. the seven Sages who were 
involved in the mythical beginnings of Apollonian thought. In very early 
Apollonian thinkers (such as Pythagoras), such mythical elements still play an 
undeniable role. 
In Mesopotamia and Egypt, practical forms of mathematics were 
developed, practices of calculation and measurement, involving practical skills 
and techniques, suitable for solving specific issues, such as questions of 
distribution in the context of agriculture or inheritance (Boyer 1968). This 
mathematics supported administrative practices such as taxation and land 
distribution. The first truly scientific form of mathematics was Apollonian 
(Euclidian) geometry.  
Apollonian mathematics is essentially geometry. It does not use numbers, 
but letters from the Greek alphabet. Mathematics analyses the properties and 
proportionalities of perfect geometric shapes, it is a systematic logic of ideal 
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proportions, with the regular polyhedrons and spheres as highlights of perfection. 
Regular polyhedrons are therefore discussed in the crowning chapter (Chapter 
XIII) of Euclid’s Elements, the handbook of Apollonian geometry. Apollonian 
mathematics, like Apollonian ethics, thinks in terms of right measure and 
proportionality. Apollonian acoustics investigates optimal harmonic proportions. 
Apollonian mathematics only works with natural integers. The limitless, the 
infinite is anxiously avoided. The irrational number (the infinite decimal 
fraction), such as the perplexing number √2, formed an impregnable obstacle for 
Apollonian number thinking. There is a deep metaphysical fear of the infinite, the 
Dionysian abyss of limitlessness. It is no coincidence that Dionysian thinking was 
fascinated by the non-harmonic, the rhythms of intoxication.   
The Apollonian nature of ancient Greek mathematics is also its 
weakness. Apollonian mathematics is not based on practical experience, but on 
rigorous demonstration. The mathematical proof (Q.E.D.) is an Apollonian 
invention. At a certain point, however, Apollonian geometry appears to be 
complete. Once the properties of perfect three-dimensional figures have been 
exhaustively described, the end has been reached. Apollonian geometry itself 
assumes a spherical shape: a closed system of limited size. It will not expand 
endlessly, for example by developing new number types. That explains why the 
Greeks, as Dijksterhuis phrases it, were unable to further develop a realm of 
inquiry “which they had for the most part created themselves, and for which they 
had demonstrated an exceptional talent” (1950/1989, p. 54). The Greeks were 
able to count, of course, but this was not regarded as genuine science: it was not 
something that befitted gentlemen. Making calculations was manual labour, slave 
labour, and was called logistics, a practical skill, a technique, something for 
Servants, not for Masters to pursue, and it was not seen as resulting in genuine 
knowledge. The use of letters as numbers impeded the development of their 
mathematical skills, and also deprived the Apollonian Greeks of the possibility 
to work with indeterminate numbers, for which we employ letters (a, b, c; x, y, 
z). The Greeks, according to Dijksterhuis, were curtailed by their lack of interest 
in practical applicability. They were not interested in addressing concrete 
problems arising from handling practical issues, from hands-on interaction with 
reality, so that they never got to study change mathematically. This lack of 
attention to practical issues aligns with the Apollonian aversion of the ephemeral 
and the diffuse.  
Hellenistic Greek algebra, developed in the metropolis Alexandria, was 
of a completely different nature. It was Magian mathematics: number mysticism, 
basically. Algebra, an important product of Magian thinking, began its career as 
an auxiliary pursuit in service of astrology and numerology – deciphering the 
movements of heavenly bodies or canonical texts. Number relationships were 
used to decipher hidden messages in sacred scriptures, or to predict the future on 
the basis of the apparently meaningless constellations and apparently erratic 
movements of planets. The Magian number is a mystical number, but it may also 
be a chronological number, the numbered year, where certain years acquire 




special significance. A recent revival of this was the anxiety which spread when 
the year 2000 was approaching, an event (the end of an aeon) which was notably 
expected to create havoc in computers and computer networks around the world: 
a mild version of similar anxieties which arose in a late-Magian ambiance when 
the year 1000 was at hand. Important inventions of Magian thinking are the 
abacus and the calendar. Magian thinking expresses the age of the cosmos in 
terms of millennia, and wants to capture the beginning and end of the world in a 
number, starting from a symbolic event, such as the founding of a city, and ending 
in a cataclysm. This type of algebra is basically number mysticism, while Magian 
astronomy is basically astrology, and Magian chemistry basically alchemy. 
Metaphysics becomes theology. Thinking means: ascending and spiralling 
towards the sublime. 
Faustian mathematics is emphatically non-Euclidean. The core concept 
of Faustian mathematics is the function, which expresses a dynamical 
relationship, evolving over time, between variable quantities over which the 
researcher aims to acquire full control, supported by the function concept. By 
modifying the independent variable (along the X-axis), he is able to influence the 
dependent variable (a score along the Y-axis). By reducing the emission of 
greenhouse gases such as CO2, climate change may be controlled through geo-
engineering. Faustian thinking is convinced that it is us who determine the 
climate on earth. This leads to an enormous expansion of the function of 
conscience: we humans, equipped with mathematical equations, are suddenly 
responsible for everything that happens. 
Faustian mathematics produced entirely new number types, or rather: 
number worlds, such as negative and irrational number, exponential numbers and 
logarithmic numbers. First and foremost, however, Faustian mathematics is 
fascinated and obsessed with astronomical numbers: unimaginably large, 
reflecting the unimaginable depth and vastness of a Faustian universe. To that 
end, non-Euclidean geometry was created. This fascination for the unimaginably 
large is complemented by a similar fascination for the extremely small.  
Descartes developed a new form of geometry based on a non-Euclidean 
element: the point. What he described was a number world instead of a world of 
bodies. Apollonian mathematics repressed infinity, but Faustian mathematics 
discerns infinity everywhere, also in the inter-spaces between numbers. Until 
then, there had only been one number between 1 and 3, but for Faustian thinking, 
the number of numbers between the numbers 1 and 3 is infinitely large. Faustian 
mathematics is pre-eminently a mathematics of extremely large or extremely 
small numbers. Leibniz called his infinitesimal calculation a mathematical 
microscope. It is an active form of mathematics which thinks in terms of 
operations, transformations, functions and projections. The Faustian number 
expresses an interaction, a dynamical relationship. In the end, Faustian 
mathematics results in a hyper-complex and hyper-abstract form of thinking, 
giving rise to astonishingly complex number worlds or numberscapes.  
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Apollonian mathematics was practiced in broad daylight. Faustian 
mathematics is preferably practiced at night. Faustian mathematics transcended 
the confines of Apollonian spherical thinking. The Faustian universe is infinite, 
and, as Spengler rightly emphasizes, the infinite is was already discovered in the 
so-called Middle Ages, by Cusanus and others. Cusanus already understood that 
a circle with an infinitely large radius is an infinite straight line, and the same 
goes for a triangle with an angle of 180 degrees.  
The Faustian sense of scale, distance and time also results in accurate 
clock-works. Thomas Aquinas already discusses the clockworks (horologia) of 
his era (1922, Pars 1a2ae Q XIII 2). The concept of function describes changes 
over time, and often requires the use of a clock. The physical experiment studies 
change. The boundless, expanding, icy universe is the primordial symbol of 
Faustian thinking, according to Spengler. Fundamental Faustian concepts are 
power and energy. The Faustian world is a religious world, moreover, and the 
Faustian God is an omnipotent sovereign. Prominent Faustian mathematicians 
were deeply religious. All major mathematicians (Pythagoras, Plato, Kepler, 
Newton, Leibniz) are religious, Spengler emphasizes, and their mathematical 
work expresses profound religious intuitions. What is striking in the Faustian 
concept of God, however, is the supra-human scale, the rigour, both in questions 
of morality and in question of dogma: absolute transcendence. Faustian theology 
is dogmatic. We are completely dependent on Divine justice, as Luther, the 
Faustian theologian, argued. We cannot mitigate His verdict with the help of good 
works or indulgences. But the most Faustian of all Faustian concepts is the 
exponential curve, the symbol of human responsibility for global disruption.  
Physics – Apollonian physics is basically statics – a form of physics in 
which the temporal dimension is absent or irrelevant, and which does not include 
time measurements (there is no X-axis as it were). Archimedes experienced his 
εύρηκα breakthrough, his epistemological euphoria, in a pre-eminently static 
situation: in a bath tub, in a state of immobility. His own body was a laboratory 
prop, and subjected to an experiment. His alethotope was a thermotope. 
Core themes of Magian physics are phenomena such as magnetism and 
ebb and flow. Time is now millennial and cyclical. The grand idea of Magian 
physics is influence at a distance, actio in distans, invisible attraction, e.g. 
attraction by the moon as a phenomenon of gravity, but also elective affinities in 
chemistry. Magian natural science has an eye for the influence that heavenly 
bodies exert on each other – and on us. This interest in mysterious forms of 
influence also gave rise to astrology, but the same idea is retained in Newton’s 
concept of gravity: a fascinating example of how a Magian component is 
integrated into a Faustian theorem (focussed on control). Faustian researchers are 
divided subjects, as indicated by the famous line from Goethe’s Faust: “Two 
souls, alas, are dwelling in my breast”. In spite of Newton’s decisive 
contributions to Faustian thinking, he remains a Faustian ego combined with a 
Magian, complementary alter ego, persevering in a Magian style of thinking. His 
concept of gravity is a Magian “stain” or “scar” if you will on Faustian physics. 




The force of gravity is just as incomprehensible to a truly Faustian mind as the 
forms of influence that astrology wanted to study (a Magian research field par 
excellence). The idea of gravity is an affront to Faustian thinking, a relapse into, 
a concession to, the Magian worldview it wanted to supersede. 
Faustian physics is dynamics first of all, closely linked to exact time 
measurement and the concept of function (modifying conditions, indicated by the 
X-axis, and measuring the effects of these modifications, represented by the Y-
axis). The primal aspect of reality that Faustian investigators must try to control 
is time, with the help of precision devices. Faustian physics is experimental 
physics, and inherently technical: dependent on technical contrivances. Nature is 
no longer studied in the open air or with the naked eye. Laboratories are 
established: settings for exerting maximal control over nature, embodying the 
Faustian will to power. This also applies to the particle collider at CERN, where 
the smallest subatomic particles, borderline cases of what might still be 
considered matter, are smashed and destroyed. It is a theatre of spectral, ghostly 
appearances, spotted at the very moment of their disappearance, leaving a misty 
trail in supersaturated vapour: the ultimate Faustian device, although once again 
some ghostly, Magian stains or remnants can be detected. On the quantum level, 
the behaviour of elementary particles is not completely deterministic, which, of 
course, constitutes another affront to Faustian thinking.    
According to Carl Gustav Jung, this dual nature of Faustian physics must 
be considered as something inevitable (Zwart 2019; Zwart 2020a). Whereas the 
Faustian ego is striving for control, by making reality calculable, ensuring the 
triumph of determinism, there is always this ghostly shadow of unpredictable 
otherness or noise. Even when Faustian consciousness seems to be at the height 
of its dominance, the interminable struggle against pre-Faustian (Magian) ideas 
continues. Magian ideas may suddenly resurge at the heart of Faustian practices 
and theorems. According to Jung, we must remain sensitive to this chronic 
collision between the conscious and the unconscious, the visible and the 
obfuscated dimensions of scientific research. This already applies to the scientia 
experimentalis that emerged during the Gothic (early Faustian) era. While 
numerous scholars were still copying and studying and commenting authoritative 
texts, there was an intellectual undercurrent of experimental thinking. Albertus 
Magnus (1193 – 1280), for instance, commented on Aristotle (his official 
teaching assignment, his daily work), but he also practiced alchemy. In the 14th 
century, this undercurrent began to surface as experimental scholastics, as Gothic 
natural science. In modern times, alchemy gave way to chemistry – on the level 
of consciousness. Yet, alchemical ideas (as the unconscious of modern natural 
science) continued to exert considerable influence. Not only in the sense that 
Kepler, Newton, Boyle and other leading natural scientists secretly practiced 
alchemy, but especially in the sense that modern natural scientists, even in the 
19th and 20th Century, were influenced by alchemical ideas.  
One of Jung’s pet examples is the famous dream reported by Friedrich 
August von Kekulé (1829-1896), who discovered the structure of benzene (C6H6) 
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after falling asleep while being immersed in this problem, and dreaming about a 
snake biting its own tail – a well-known alchemical symbol named Ouroboros. 
This led him to the understanding that benzene has a ring structure – a “late 
triumph”, Jung writes, of an old alchemical thought that finally reaches its 
scientific goal (1946, p. 179). Even in Mendel’s experiments, alchemical ideas 
about dominant and recessive factors were at work, adopted from Joseph Gottlieb 
Kölreuter (1733-1806) and others (Zwart 2008).  
The relationship between alchemy and modern science was the central 
theme in the correspondence between Jung and Nobel Prize winner Wolfgang 
Pauli (Jung 1953/1974; Meier 1992; Lindorff 2004). According to Jung, the 
dreams produced by this prominent microphysicist, who was also a prolific 
dreamer, reflected a plethora of alchemical reminiscences (Zwart 2020a). Jung’s 
friendship with Pauli is important also for other reasons. Around 1900, Jung 
argues, an important mutation occurs in the history of thinking. The principle of 
causality is being challenged by quantum physics. Faustian determinism no 
longer applies on a very small scale. In the period that Freud published Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920/1940), physics in the form of quantum physics 
moves beyond the principle of causality, or at least beyond its classical, 
deterministic interpretation. There is a dimension of the real, beyond the causality 
principle, where unpredictability must be accepted as far as the behaviour of 
elementary particles is concerned. For Jung, Pauli is the one who exemplifies this 
change. On a conscious level, he makes an important contribution to the 
emergence of post-deterministic physics, while his unconscious produces an 
impressive amount of dreams that indicate how unconscious ideas affect modern 
scientific thinking “from a distance” as it were. During periods of transition, when 
one style of thinking gives way to another, obfuscated forces resurge to the 
surface, Jung argues. During such an interregnum, scholars experience a short-
lived moment of intellectual lucidity: an epistemological clearing. The shadowy 
side of the intellect, that which had been suppressed by the dominant style of 
thinking, now manifests itself. This happened literally in Goethe’s drama Faust. 
When the canonical wisdom of the library is about to make way for experimental 
science, there is a demonic interregnum, where Mephistopheles is in charge. For 
a period of time, scholarly consciousness is under the spell of this “medicine 
man”. No wonder that quantum physicists, during a famous gathering at the 
Research Institute of Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in April 1932, performed a Faust 
parody, with Pauli in the role of Mephistopheles and the “object”, the (almost 
weightless) neutrino particle in the role of Gretchen. 
The transition from Apollonian to Magian thinking was likewise 
accompanied by moral and epistemological turbulence and, according to Jung, 
the 1920s and 1930s must be understood in similar terms. He saw National 
Socialism basically as a resurgence of the Wotan cult. The ancient god awoke 
from his millennial slumber. Archetypes that normally lead a shadowy existence 
may suddenly and temporarily seize power, under the influence of “medicine 




man” Hitler. Such moments of euphoria inevitably end in catastrophe: the 
collapse of the Roman Empire, the religious wars, the collapse of Hitler’s Reich.  
During his second half of his life (after his fortieth year), Jung gave in to 
his chronic fascination for alchemy: an obscure and mysterious tradition that had 
arisen in a Magian (Hellenistic) context, but continued to exert its influence (both 
stimulating and inhibitory) on Faustian science. At the time, alchemy was more 
or less completely written out of the official historiography of science. It was 
actually not permissible for academics to become seriously involved with such a 
theme. It was delisted from the scholarly agenda. Alchemy was either kept in the 
dark or referred to in a pejorative sense: the necromancers as an obstacle against 
Enlightenment, without really trying to explore this world of thought. Among the 
scholars who contributed to a revival of interest in alchemy was Hans-Eduard 
Fierz-David, professor of chemistry in Zurich and a friend of Jung, author of a 
history of chemistry (1945/1952) in which he paid due attention to alchemy. He 
dedicated his study to Jung, with whom he shared this fascination. According to 
Jung, dreams of modern scientists reveal that we are still familiar with this way 
of thinking, even when conscious familiarity is lacking. Archetypal ideas 
continue to be part of the context of discovery of scientific research, especially at 
decisive moments of crisis and transition.  
An interesting case is Robert Julius Mayer (Jung 1916/1960, p. 76), a 
physician who, in his spare time (as an autodidact) practiced natural science and 
eventually became famous for discovering the law of conservation of energy, one 
of the most important scientific discoveries of the 19th century. Het was seized by 
the idea that energy manifests itself in various forms (“transmutes”) but can never 
be destroyed, when he embarked as a young physician to the Dutch East Indies. 
An experienced sailor informed him that sea water is warmer after a heavy storm. 
This comment made him think. The critical moment followed shortly after the 
landing in Surabaya where he was overwhelmed by the idea that would change 
his life (Ostwald 1909). It was an experience of conversion, similar to the one 
Paul experienced on his way to Damascus. The idea which suddenly seized him 
resembled an intellectual intoxication, a moment of inspiration and insight, of 
jouissance. The new conviction would never let go of him. In fact, the idea 
destroyed his life. It became an obsession. It was an “Anschauung”, a 
fundamental view which placed everything in a different light, an intuition which 
proved difficult to express at first. Recognition would take a long time. 
Upon returning home, Mayer continued to further explore and 
substantiate his idea. For example, he noted that when we fill a bottle with water 
and shake it firmly, the temperature of the water rises. In fact, what he had 
discovered was an everyday experience. When we rub our hands in times of frost, 
we apply the law of conservation of energy. Movement is converted into heat. 
After an earlier manuscript was rejected, his classic publication appeared in 1842 
– but no one took notice of it. He started to worry. His wife became increasingly 
annoyed by the fact that he only seemed to live for his idea, stubbornly 
maintaining that he had made an important discovery which no one seemed 
  Styles of Thinking 
 
158 
willing to acknowledge. In 1850 he jumps out of the window during a sleepless 
night, seriously injuring himself. He is taken to a psychiatric institution. There, 
he refuses to admit that the story of his important discovery is a delusion. He 
disappears from view and his publications are ignored. Rumour has it that he died. 
His discovery proved absolutely toxic.  
What exactly happened to Mayer, Jung wonders. What was the origin of 
his idea? Why did this idea, despite the resistance Mayer encountered, continue 
to exert such a fatal attraction? Jung answers that it was the resurgence of a time-
old idea, which had surfaced before, in the wheel of fire symbol present in many 
religions, but also in the Dionysian concept of energy or fire as articulated by 
Heraclitus (1916/1960, p. 77), who believed that an eternal fire animates the 
world, constantly altering in shape. For Jung, this explains the demonic power of 
Mayer’s idea. Under Faustian conditions, the idea was brought to life again, by 
chance observations, assuming a new meaning. Not as item of contemplation, but 
as the grounding momentum of the Faustian era, intimately involved in all things 
Faustian: in labour, steel, machines, fossil fuel and heavy industry.  
Chemistry – Building on the work of Jung, Gaston Bachelard (1884 – 
1962) distinguishes three styles of thinking in the history of chemistry (Zwart 
2019; Zwart 2020b). Modern (Faustian) chemistry is preceded by alchemy, its 
Magian predecessor, and succeeded by a new form of molecular chemistry (from 
1900 onwards) based on quantum physics and new research techniques such as 
spectroscopy. Meanwhile, in the life-world of everyday experience, outside the 
laboratory, ideas from previous epochs continue to flourish. Literary authors, the 
spokespersons of everyday experience, make ample use of archetypal ideas. The 
epistemological rupture that makes Faustian chemistry possible is not only a 
historical, but also a biographical concept. Every chemist has to re-enact this 
collective conversion which historically took place in the second half of the 18th 
century, when chemistry became a modern, Faustian science. Nonetheless, some 
alchemical concepts can still be discerned in modern chemistry. 
One important idea associated with chemistry is the archetype of the 
explosion. In novels and movies about chemists or chemistry, explosions are 
likely to occur. Pre-modern chemistry revolves around the idea of fire, situated 
in the oven: the heart of the alchemist’s workshop (Bachelard 1938/1949). Fire is 
associated with homeliness and familiarity, but also with enthusiasm (bonfires). 
Archaic, primordial thinking, according to Bachelard, basically comes down to 
free associations (reverie) while staring at a fire.24 To familiarise ourselves with 
pre-Faustian forms of thinking, we may travel back in time to our own archaic 
period, during childhood, to re-examine our own infantile experience with regard 
to the phenomenon of fire.  
In early childhood we are confronted with a prohibition, a taboo: we 
should not touch the tempting flames. Starting a fire is a privilege of the father, 
according to Bachelard. The child wants to appropriate this privilege, wants to 
                                                             
24 “Pour l’homme primitif, la pensée est une rêverie” (p. 44). 




democratise fire, but the social order will offer firm resistance, because fire is not 
only fascinating, but also dangerous, for the person concerned, but also for others 
involved. Bachelard speaks about the Prometheus complex in this context, the 
chemical variant of the Oedipal complex. Fire belongs to the father, who has the 
exclusive right to ownership, representing the frightening aspect of humankind 
as a most terrible creature (δεινότατον), capable of subjugating this frightening 
(δεῖνος) element, fire. The complement of the Prometheus complex is the 
Empedocles complex, representing the death drive: the desire to leap into a 
consuming fire, preferably from the edge of a volcano, in order to be cleansed 
and reborn: the desire for a cosmic death, a fusion with the universe and the 
elements. Besides Hölderlin’s Empedocles, the novel She by Rider Haggard 
(1887/1991) can also be regarded as a modern rendition of this idea. Fire is the 
spark that introduces discontinuity between humans and the rest of nature, 
between humans and other animals. During the archaic epoch, the process of 
domestication actually begins with the domestication of fire. The self-
domestication of humans literally takes place around the hearth, the camp-fire. 
This archaic experience is never extinguished completely and continues to flare 
up in later historical epochs. 
Another archaic association is the affinity we intuitively perceive 
between fire and sexuality, between generating fire and producing children: the 
experience of a friction that sets us on fire. In the case of sexuality too, friction 
results in a rise of body temperature, a moment of de-freezing. Fire and children 
are made in the same way, at least according to the logic of archaic thinking. 
Many of these core ideas are still very much alive in Magian chemistry, also 
known as alchemy. Here, sexuality is seen as a chemical reaction and vice versa. 
In both cases, selectivity is important. Humans are not aroused by anything or 
anybody. A mystical rapport has to come about, a secret affinity must be at work, 
in reaction to a triggering feature (a particular gaze, a particular gesture, etc.). 
The synthesis of a chemical compound in vitro was referred to by alchemists as 
a “chemical wedding”, indicating that erotic desire (love as a universal force of 
attraction) was guiding the behaviour of chemical substances. Alchemists 
postulated the existence of a universal force (love, φιλία) to explain chemical 
processes. One particularly interesting example of this association between 
chemistry and sexuality is Goethe’s novel Wahlverwandtschaften (“elective 
affinities”), whose title indicates that both human individuals and chemical 
substances have an intuitive preference to form bonds with certain individuals (or 
substances) rather than with others. His novel is an experimental arrangement 
(“Experimentalanordnung”, Safranski 2013/2015, p. 508) 
It wasn’t until the end of the 18th century that chemistry became a 
Faustian science, on a par with Faustian physics. In documents written during the 
early 18th century, electricity is still seen as fire and as a mysterious erotic force. 
Bachelard quotes a French chemist who developed a sexology of electricity, 
describing it as an erotic substance, and the female lower abdomen as a cavity 
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filled with electrically charged organs. According to Bachelard, this is still a 
product of (Magian) associative thinking: fire = electricity = sexuality.  
As indicated, the chances of success of alchemical experiments depended 
not only on the purity of the raw materials with which the alchemists worked, but 
especially on the moral purity of the alchemists themselves. Chemical operations 
were conducted in service of moral self-enhancement. The aim of alchemical 
operations was κάθαρσις – purification, both of the object (the chemical 
substance) and of the subject (the alchemist). As a Magian practice, alchemy 
relied on associations. The various regions of cosmos (the stellar sphere, the 
animal kingdom, the vegetable kingdom, the mineral kingdom) mirror each other. 
Stars are heavenly flowers, flowers are terrestrial stars. The earth is a body 
equipped with orifices and veins. The sunflower is associated with the sun.25 In 
everyday language, but notably in poetry, such associations or correspondences 
are still very much alive. Poets such as Baudelaire are linguistic alchemists: they 
work miracles with words.  
Modern Faustian science had to rigorously distance itself from this 
associative, intuitive style of thinking. As an epistemological psychotherapist, 
Bachelard wants to offer guidance to science. Scientific consciousness had to 
cleanse itself of all pre-Faustian associations and alchemical reminiscences. 
Where the Id of alchemy was, the ego of modern Faustian science shall be, that 
is the credo of the scientific revolution. It is certainly no coincidence that Victor 
Frankenstein, the main character of Mary Shelley’s novel, became enthralled by 
alchemy (1818/1968). To become a scientist, these alchemical affinities had to be 
supressed. The novel describes a failed epistemic therapy, a faltered conversion. 
An epistemological prohibition is required to block access to the world of Magian 
associations. Only then can the ego be emptied and reborn as a true scientist. 
Mary Shelley’s novel depicts the return of the repressed. Alchemical ideas 
continue to work and Victor basically decides to use the new powerful 
instruments of Faustian chemistry to realise an alchemical idea: the fabrication of 
a homunculus in vitro with the help of a flash of lightning.  
Meanwhile, around 1900, another scientific revolution sets it, so that the 
challenges are getting even bigger. The epistemic rupture between research 
laboratory and poetical experience intensifies. As a philosopher of science, 
Bachelard criticises Sartre, for instance, who referred to the wave-aspect of 
electrons as their “feminine” and the particle-aspect as their “masculine” 
dimension (Bachelard 1951, p. 192). Philosophy should put a stop to such 
projections, such sexualisations of quantum physics. Philosophers should not act 
as belated alchemists, retaining a pre-scientific way of thinking. We must 
surgically remove such misguiding preconceptions, Bachelard argues (1953, p. 
18), resulting in a reformation of the intellect. 
                                                             
25 Cf. Michel Foucault, 1966, p. 32 ff. An attempt to revive this style of thinking is The 
language of herbs by Mellie Uyldert (1961), which lists (the medicinal properties) of 
herbs of the sun, the moon, Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn. 




Biology – Apollonian biology equals classification, while classification 
equals hierarchy. A perfect introduction into Apollonian classification is Plato’s 
Statesman (1925/1995). As Plato explains, classification is essentially the cutting 
of a line into two halves, preferably intersecting the line exactly in the middle 
(262C, 265A) with on the one hand the category that we want to separate (higher 
in value), on the other hand the other, less valuable half. Classification thus means 
drawing a line in the sand while making a section in the middle. Subsequently, 
one of the halves is divided further by again dividing a section through the middle. 
For instance, a line representing humans may be divided into two parts, Greeks 
and barbarians. Along these lines, we may divide living from non-living entities 
by cutting a line right through the middle. Similarly, the class of biped animals 
can be divided into featherless and feathered bipeds (with humans being 
featherless bipeds), and so forth. Aristotle was a master in classification, but 
always on the basis of criteria that nature herself provided. An auxiliary science 
of classification was anatomy. Apollonian researchers are not inclined to conduct 
research on live animals. The concept of an experiment is alien to Apollonian 
thinking. This geometric method differs from Faustian classification: ordering 
chaos by introducing criteria adopted by the researchers themselves (e.g. the 
number of stamens in flowers), while contrivances (microscopes, etc.) are often 
required to determine these characteristics.  
The Magian animal is a fabulous animal. Paradise is populated by such 
animals, e.g. friendly lions, while the unicorn is perhaps the most typical product 
of Magian fabulation. We encounter such animals in mythology, but also in 
heraldry. Moby-Dick is a Magian animal, resurging in and disrupting a world 
where whaling had evolved into a Faustian industry, with whaleships serving as 
mobile slaughterhouses. The maniacal captain who hunts the white whale is a 
Faustian hero who embodies the nihilism and negativity of Faustian thinking and 
wants to destroy (annihilate) the object of his fascination and aversion, namely 
Moby-Dick as a Magian relic: that is his mission and duty, even if this results in 
self-destruction. Melville’s novel depicts the merciless struggle between Faustian 
civilization and Magian ideas, under Faustian conditions: a brutish struggle for 
survival, resulting in exploitation and decimation of both humans and whales, 
until only nothingness remains.  
Faustian biology is vivisection. A guilty conscience on the side of the 
researcher is an inevitable aspect of the constellation, for the experimentalist is a 
divided subject, torn between the will to know and a rigorous sense of personal 
responsibility for animal suffering. In order to acquire knowledge, he is forced to 
do something which is inherently evil, resulting in a conflict between 
epistemological demands and the voice of conscience (Zwart 2016). In order to 
really understand the animal, the latter must become a research animal. 
Performing an experiment inevitably means damaging the animal, killing it even. 
The laboratory animal is completely in the hands of the researcher. The animal 
lab is a sadistic universe. But increasingly, humans are turned into lab rats as well. 
Foucault (1975) describes how thousands of human bodies were brought together 
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in army barracks, factories and prisons, where they were to be transformed into a 
reliable, productive work force in support of the industrial revolution. These 
settings became laboratories of power, where individuals functioned as research 
subjects, exposed to the gaze of surveillance, to examinations and measurements, 
to training programs and dietary regimes: technologies developed for the purpose 
of producing useful, accountable, employable human beings. Georg Büchner’s 
drama Woyzeck (written in 1836) stages for the very first time a completely new 
type of role played by human beings, namely that of an experimental research 
subject participating in a trial explicitly designed to demonstrate a theory, to 
systematically examine a hypothesis (Zwart 2013a). The ultimate aim of this 
theory is to predict and control human behaviour. Büchner was a biologist who 
conducted research on cranial nerves, and in his literary drama he envisioned the 
emerging arena of experimental psychological inquiry. 
Faustian biology is an active form of thinking. But Faustian biology also 
means thinking on a grand scale, seeing living nature are an evolutionary process 
spanning billions of years. And like human history, this natural process is driven 
by struggle: the struggle for existence. Human history is an intensification of this 
struggle for existence, and this intensification and acceleration is due to the 
disruptive development of technology. Technology allows the Faustian will to 
know to overcome the recalcitrance of the real. Faustian biology is inherently 
technical, is biotechnology.  
 
 
§ 2. Domains of thinking (2): faith, hope and love 
 
Religion – The Apollonian God is an architect, a demiurge who turns chaos into 
cosmos: a harmonious paradigm for human architects and politicians, for 
mathematically trained aristocrats. When Plato visited the oracle at Delphi, what 
was whispered into his ears was a mathematical problem he was able to solve. 
The oracle had converted to Apollonian thinking. 
The Magian God is a transcendent God who already determined, at the 
beginning of time, when the existing world will vanish, to give way to something 
completely different: the Kingdom of Heaven. He is also the God of grace, on 
whom we completely depend. The Magian attitude to life introduces an 
unbridgeable gap between the exterior person (the citizen, dwelling in the 
mundane realm) and the interior, spiritual person, devoted God. The gospel of 
Luke begins with a census. The initiative is taken by the Emperor. Joseph and 
Mary are obedient, but at the same time completely indifferent. They are not 
interested in the Emperor at all, they place their trust in God. The census does not 
interest them in any way, it is an event bereft of purpose, and only meant to create 
optimal conditions so that God’s Will be done (they are transported to the right 
location). Precisely at the moment in time when the powers of this world seem at 
the height of their power, expressing itself in intimidating buildings, the light 
shines into the world and Magian faith begins to spread: the message that the 




advent of the Kingdom of Heaven is imminent. For the Magian subject, worldly 
powers are meaningless. The worldly kingdom may destroy the human body, but 
this body will be resurrected, by the grace of God, and awake in a glorified state. 
Jesus’ message is a very simple one: the kingdom of heaven is at hand, it is within 
you. Anyone who understands what this means, has understood the logic of 
Magian thinking. This new empire is not of this world. It is a spiritual community 
of like-minded people, silently yearning for something which is radically 
different. Magian subjects will rejoice upon hearing this message, which is sheer 
folly to the wisdom of this world, and it is bad news for the powers of this world. 
The star observed by the Magi (Mt 2: 2), did not announce the birth of a king, but 
the birth of a style of thinking. They used Magian techniques to announce the 
time and place of this dawning moment as accurately as possible.   
The Faustian God is defined by dogmas. Unbelievers are heretics. 
Faustian theology is essentially dogmatic. The Faustian credo is: Credo quia 
absurdum. The Faustian subject is willing to abandon rationalism on the basis of 
a Faustian wager: the gamble that God exists. Apollonian gods are gods of the 
day: light gods. Faustian gods are forces of darkness. They represent what Hegel 
calls the night of the world. The Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas has the 
structure of a cathedral, not only because of its size and its heavy content matter, 
but also because of the vertical orientation, the architecture at work: the central 
nave, with side aisles, the strong dogmatic pillars on which its rests. The Faustian 
believer is defined by nocturnal yearning: Saint John of the Cross, author of the 
spiritual poem Dark Night of the Soul, describing a path through darkness towards 
an unknown destiny. We ourselves are this darkness, when we see each other in 
the eyes. God dwells in nothingness, and atheism is unmistakably a motif of 
Faustian thinking (Hegel, 1807/1970, p. 172), for notwithstanding the triumphal 
proclamation that God does not exist, the atheist sooner or later realises that God 
is omnipresent, so that he unintentionally but inevitably becomes obsessed with 
the God he denies. God becomes his symptom. The Faustian atheist wants to 
convert, but his texts continue to be tainted by the name of God, as an ineradicable 
stain, a secret symptom of chronic doubt. The Epicurean gay atheist is a figure 
which belongs to the Apollonian past.  
Architecture – Architecture, according to Spengler, provides an optimal 
mirror for studying a style of thinking. Great architectural artworks capture the 
spirit of the time (its grounding concept) in stone. A style of thinking is made 
tangible when it becomes incorporated in architecture. The archetype of 
Apollonian architecture is the Greek temple: Euclidean mathematics 
immortalised in stone. The Pantheon is the ultimate Apollonian structure, a 
temple that is actually no longer a temple but a mystical, Magian space: a temple 
which is at the same time Mosque. The Pantheon is a boundary: an attempt to 
capture and reconcile two basic ideas, the Apollonian and the Magian experience 
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of space.26 The archetype of Magian architecture is the grand Dome 
(Christianity), the grand Mosque (Islam). The Pantheon is the Ω of Apollonian 
and the Α of Magian architecture. When Jesus of Nazareth went about preaching, 
a Magian architectonic style did not yet exist. He travelled through a landscape 
where Apollonian buildings had arisen, the kind of architecture he detested, and 
his verdict was a negative, antithetical one. And yet, he discerned in Peter the 
“rock” on which the edifice of a new faith would be erected. Even the Jewish 
temple in Jerusalem was essentially an Apollonian structure. Therefore, Jesus 
predicted that this immense building would soon collapse. The Magian Al-Aqsa 
mosque would replace it, creating optimal cavernous conditions for a new type 
of religious experience.  
The archetype of Faustian architecture is the cathedral: a forest of stone 
in which the Faustian desire for height manifests itself. The Magian house of 
prayer is cave-like, but Faustian pillars resemble immense tree trunks with 
branches. Light enters through stained glass windows, as if filtered by foliage. In 
comparison with the Gothic (that is, Faustian) cathedral, Saint Peter’s is a hybrid 
construct, a partial return of Apollonian and Magian ideas, but precisely in its 
powerful immensity it is unmistakably Faustian – apparently without wanting to 
be like that. Saint Peter’s Dome is a style conflict in stone. A truly Faustian desire 
expresses itself in the intimidating height and immensity of this building. Even 
though the Dome was intended to be spherical, there is a Faustian desire for 
height, so that the dome is supra-spherical. Saint Peter is a synthesis if you will 
of Magian and Faustian drives, but radiates a Faustian Will to Power. That is why 
Paul Rée insisted on writing his anti-encyclicals inside this building, as Lou 
Andreas-Salomé informs us in her Lebensrückblick (1968).  
A typical Faustian building is the lighthouse, preferably erected on a 
gloomy coast, a key element in Verne novels. Faustian architecture expresses a 
desire for height, of which structures such as the Eiffel Tower are emblematic 
icons. The emphasis is on verticality, on social mobility. Ibsen’s play Master-
builder Solness is a Faustian drama about desire and anxiety concerning height, 
climbing the social ladder by designing tall buildings (Zwart 2014b). Perhaps the 
most Faustian of all buildings is the skyscraper, the supreme symbol of corporate 
capitalism, of America itself: the Finger of God (Glynn 2001/2011). Manhattan 
has always been a skyscraper utopia and in 1989, eight of the ten tallest buildings 
were still located in the United States. Yet, today, all of the world’s tallest 
buildings have been built elsewhere. Alfred Speer’s art deco Berlin would have 
been ultra-Faustian, but remained a Faustian dreamscape.  
Politics – Apollonian politics established a polis, a city-state, of 
Apollonian proportions. The Roman Empire (Apollonian civilization) aimed to 
include the whole world inside its sphere of influence. In the cold, barbaric 
regions of the Germanic North, very little could be gained. Germanic visitors of 
                                                             
26 Peter Sloterdijk speaks about architecture as “[Eine Kraft] die nicht so sehr ihre Zeit 
in Gedanken fast, sondern die Gedanken der Zeit in Bauwerke” (1999, p. 438). 




ancient Rome, astounded by the city’s wealth, wondered what the murderous 
Roman legions came looking for in their dreary regions. The desire of the Empire 
was to expand its limits, to increase the radius of its sphere of influence, but this 
was not necessarily motivated by considerations of economic gain. It was fuelled 
by a basic conviction that could not be called into question. 
The basic idea of Magian politics is the Two Kingdoms theorem. The 
interior person or interior castle, as Teresa of Ávila phrased it, belongs to another 
Empire. The dawning of this Empire is an event that overcomes us, happens to us 
– we are completely unable to make it happen. Magian believers are waiting for 
and preparing themselves for the demise of the existing and the coming of a 
completely different world. In the meantime, Magian believers may do good 
deeds, but they cannot bring the great event closer, nor accelerate it. We are not 
entitled to the coming of the new dawn. Virtuousness merely increases our own 
preparedness for the arrival of the New Jerusalem. This means that Magian 
individuals are divided subjects: they are part of two incompatible realms: the 
visible realm (doomed to ruin) and the realm of God: the community of true 
believers, awaiting what is upcoming: waiting for…  
The materialization of the Faustian principle in the political domain is 
the Nation State, which became increasingly powerful, centralised and 
nationalistic in the 19th century and increasingly began to dominate the daily lives 
of citizens via “biopolitics” (Foucault 1976). The state is an immense machinery 
for mobilising populations for economic and military purposes. It entails the 
nationalisation of education and health care, of art and government, even of 
science and religion. Internally, the state becomes a pervasive force and 
externally, the state becomes imperialistic. Faustian unrest unleashes mobility, 
while fossil fuel machines make new forms of mobility possible. Studies that 
Michel Foucault published in the 1970s constitute a genealogy of the Faustian 
state. Discipline and Punish (1975), for instance, analyses the technologies of 
power that nation states developed to discipline, nationalise and educate the 
population via schools, the army and the psychiatric ward (Zwart 2013a). 
Foucault meticulously describes multiple techniques for exerting Faustian power 
in barracks, factories and classrooms. He describes how Faustian discipline 
refashions the bodily movements and motor skills of the individuals involved. 
The state even appropriates and redefines basic existential categories such as 
time. In coalition with big industry, the nation state determines when the working 
day starts and the retirement age sets in. State power proliferates via supervisory 
bodies and evolves into bio-power: a set of population policies that considers 
humankind as an economic resource, – although the Faustian logic will often only 
partially realize itself and will continue to face stubborn populist resistance in 
various social practices (Achterhuis 1998, p. 27). 
Even language becomes nationalised. Martin Luther embodies (as an 
obedient rebel) a paradoxical boundary zone. On the one hand, he represents 
resistance and was responsible for introducing the language and vocabularies of 
the lower social stratums into written and printed discourse, including a plethora 
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of obscene elements. At the same time, he created a unified German language, 
thereby unifying Germany in a cultural sense (although political unification in 
the case of Germany would be considerably belated). Luther’s intervention is 
driven by a Faustian impetus, but at the same time his theology incorporates 
Magian components, such as the anthropological theorem of humans entailing 
two personae: a worldly (political) subject and a spiritual (converted) one.  
Something similar can be noticed in Communism many centuries later 
by the way. On the one hand, Communism seems hyper-Faustian, and the 
Socialist State aims to determine, pervade and refurbish all aspect of life. At the 
same time, there are some Magian moments at work, such as the idea that the 
state will wither away once the paradise of justice and salvation has dawned, and 
the idea that revolution will be a spontaneous event, especially endorsed by the 
more radical branches of communism, e.g. council communism. According to 
council communism, the revolution is not something which is actively brought 
about in a voluntarist manner by a communist party (as an avant-garde of 
professional revolutionaries), as Lenin argued. Rather, it should be envisioned as 
an emerging event for which the workers of all countries must prepare 
themselves, but which cannot be enforced top-down. It will be brought about by 
inner necessity. Political interventions can neither cause nor prevent the coming 
of the revolution. Workers employed in Faustian factories are called upon to 
prepare themselves for this inevitable event. Therefore, Friedrich Engels was 
quite right to emphasise the congruence between Socialism and early 
Christianity, in his rereading of the Book of Revelation (Engels 1883/1962). 
Although techniques for calculating and predicting Judgement Day have now 
become obsolete, Engels argues, the relevance of this book for nineteenth-century 
readers consists in that it shows how Christianity took hold of the masses as a 
spiritual epidemic, just as modern socialism did. It also indicates how early 
socialism still retained some traces of Magian thinking, which became 
increasingly obfuscated in later, increasingly technocratic (i.e. Faustian) versions 
of State Communism and Social Democracy. 
Economy – The most decisive invention of Apollonian economics was 
the metal coin. Coins tend to have a perfect geometric shape and the Roman 
Empire would have been unthinkable without the use of coins. Once minted, they 
spread across the empire, as the emblem of imperial power, and a tangible 
testimony of the Pax Romana. Coins symbolised imperial politics, which is why 
mendicant teachers such as Jesus of Nazareth detested them. For Jesus, the coin 
is a worthless object: render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and unto God what is 
God’s. Jesus spread the word, the Roman Empire spread the coin.  
Do not collect treasures on earth, Jesus tells His followers, but Christian 
churches and monasteries later became treasuries, because the treasure is the 
archetype, the basic symbol of Magian economic thinking. The Apollonian coin 
circulates, but the Magian treasure results from secret accumulation of sublimated 
entities in consecrated spaces, with the Holy Grail as ultimate showpiece. Magian 
fairy tales (Thousand and One Nights) inevitably lead the way to treasures, 




hidden in Sesame-like cavities. “Talents” are buried in fields. All things of value 
are part of a treasure. The Faustian archaeologist who develops a fascination for 
Magian cultures, is a treasure hunter. In the Magian archaeological stratum, 
treasures are waiting to be found. The Faustian desire is to bring these hidden, 
frozen treasures into circulation once again, even if this requires theft.  
An important Faustian innovation in the domain of economics is double-
entry bookkeeping: debit and credit, the economic variant of the function concept 
in Faustian experimental physics. Here too, numbers express relationships and 
operations. The treasure becomes capital, is liberated as it were, so that it can be 
circulated and invested. From a Faustian perspective, hidden treasures are 
worthless. Capital materialises in ways that reveal its Faustian nature: in the form 
of factories and machines. Treasures grow steadily or freeze, but capital increases 
exponentially: doubling every so often. The exponential curve or function 
symbolises the Faustian thirst for spectacular growth. Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels revealed the Faustian nature of capital, which expresses itself not only in 
relentless exploitation of human resources, but also in various other historical 
phenomena, from gold rush up to large-scale environmental pollution. 
Exponential curves reflect how capital intensifies the metabolism between 
humans and nature.  
Medicine – Apollonian medicine urges us to live in harmony with nature: 
in accordance with nature, because nature means order, a state of balance and 
health that we must also seek to realise in our own physical existence. Apollonian 
medicine is exemplified by the doctrine of the temperaments, striving for balance.  
The core element of Magian medicine is the search for a panacea: the 
substance that heals all ailments. Magian medicine relies on suggestion. Jesus 
heals by laying his hand on someone, perhaps after spitting in it, or by uttering a 
phrase. Jesus says it, literally: Your faith has healed you.  
Faustian medicine aims to dominate the body, healing it by controlling 
it. Faustian surgical interventions always lead to damage, causing detrimental 
side effects. Faustian medicine exerts medical power. Driven by the Will to 
Power, Faustian medicine develops powerful contrivances, such as X-ray 
devices, resulting in a full disclosure of the body, making it transparent as it were. 
When Nietzsche speaks about philosophising with a hammer, he means: thinking 
by using a reflex hammer and a stethoscope: devices for asking questions, 
enforcing the body to respond to diagnostic queries.  
These differences can also be found in medical ethics. Apollonian ethics 
is Hippocratic: an ethic of prudence and restraint. Nature must do the work. In 
case of doubt (and this is mostly the case, of course), refrain from action (in dubio, 
abstine). Above all: do no harm. It is a passive form of medicine, advising patients 
to go on a pilgrimage, or to follow an optimal diet, or to find the right climate. 
The Magian doctor is a charismatic benefactor, and the core concept of 
medical ethics is caritas. The virtuous patient is someone who can wait patiently, 
entrusting his health to caring hands and experiencing suffering as a test of faith.  
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Faustian ethics wants to control life at all costs. If death is inevitable, 
there is the Faustian will to determine the moment of death ourselves 
(euthanasia). The backdrop of medical interventions is a pervasive struggle 
between physician and nature. Nature is no longer the source of balance and 
health, but the cause of the disease, the enemy (Zwart 1994). The Faustian doctor 
wants to act, wants to take risks, assuming the role of a medical hero who dares 
to cross boundaries. Faustian ethics must curb the medical Will to Power.  
Ethics – Apollonian ethics seeks the good measure: temperance, the 
golden mean. Enjoy with moderation. Courage is the middle position between 
cowardice and recklessness, while generosity is the middle between thrift and 
waste. Justice means a proportional distribution of goods: the wealth of an 
individual must be in proportion to his value for the polis. Equity can be 
geometrically determined, as Aristotle demonstrates.  
The core moral attitude of the Magian style of thinking, however, is 
resignation. Christians are expected to imitate Christ. Human existence is an 
exercise in resignation. Good deeds and an ascetic lifestyle do not hasten the 
advent of the Kingdom of God in any way, that is up to God the almighty to 
decide. Asceticism means that the individuals involved are preparing themselves 
for the inevitable event, the coming of the Kingdom. 
A key characteristic of Faustian ethics is the interminable struggle 
between duty and inclination, between responsibility and desire. The Faustian 
Über-Ich is extremely demanding and harsh. Faustian ethics is an active form of 
ethics, focussed on what we actually do. The crucial question is “what should I 
do?”, – with an emphasis on both “I” and “do”. The moral subject is supposed to 
act. Even indecision counts as a form of action. It is impossible to fully live up to 
a Faustian sense of duty. We cannot realise the categorical imperative in practice. 
Faustian ethics entails a struggle for recognition in a competitive arena. The 
Faustian subject really wants to make a difference. 
Love – Apollonian love is symmetrical. The beloved is our other half, our 
alter ego. Beauty is proportional, adheres to the golden ratio as a mathematical 
idea, and the fusion with the other puts the phantasm of completion into practice. 
Discussions about desire in ancient culture refer to this model. According to 
Lacan, this sexual practice (this ars erotica) assumes a pre-established harmony 
between what lovers want and what the beloved has to offer (1994, p. 15). By 
subjecting ourselves to a training program, by managing our drives, happiness 
can in principle be achieved. According to Lacan, what ancient ethics teaches is 
that we should moderate, cultivate and manage our drives. Ancient practices of 
παιδεία sculpt the natural drives into perfection and entail auto-plasticity, 
adapting oneself to the demands of culture, modelling desire, enabling individuals 
to function optimally and happily (Lacan 1978, p. 107), a kind of dressage (Lacan 
1966, p. 588). Certain segments of body and soul were subjected to special 
training programs, much like learning to play a musical instrument. The 
Apollonian subject was an ethical virtuoso. Perhaps we still see this in top pianists 




for whom, as Nietzsche phrases it, virtue consists in painstakingly educating each 
and every finger: dactylic ethics (1980, KSA2, I, § 196).  
Magian love entails the willingness to wait, waiting for a sign of love, 
even if this means waiting in vain. The purpose of desire is the unio mystica or 
spiritual ecstasy. Magian love has the structure of an endless foreplay and is 
similar to alchemy in that it entails a sublimation of the object. To the extent that 
the object is impossible to reach, its value, its power of attraction increases. 
Magian love requires a lifelong attitude of servitude, but the outcome remains 
uncertain, and cannot be enforced, as waiting means waiting for a sign of 
benevolence or mercy. Love is an exercise, a test, a “trial” (“épreuve”) allowing 
the lover to prove the exceptional qualities of his love (Foucault 1994a). The other 
is invisible, exalted, always at a distance: a fabulous, mystical object. The 
medium of love is poetry. In each and every poem, this type of love is enacted. 
We love the one whom we would not dare to touch. Due to the trial of abstinence, 
the beloved Other is transubstantiated into something that is both inviolable and 
irresistible. From a distance, the Other exerts a very strong attraction on the 
craving subject. Magian love is a spiritualised form of craving for what gradually 
becomes unspeakable and unimaginable.  
In Faustian love, the physiological dimension is placed upfront, albeit 
coupled with a sense of responsibility, with ethical imperatives, so that the 
Faustian lover is a divided subject, always in a state of conflict: an artist for 
instance who has to choose between his art and his muse. Art is erotic art, and 
highly competitive. Wagner’s Tannhäuser stages a contest between Magian 
(courtly) and Faustian (physiological) love. The former is represented by 
Wolfram von Eschenbach, who sings his hymn of praise to the Evening Star, 
while Faustian love erupts in the song that is performed by Tannhäuser himself. 
His love is restless and insatiable. During his sojourn in Venus’ Cave, he is too 
close to the Thing, and the proximity becomes claustrophobic, but the Magian 
ethos of patience and distance is likewise unbearable. The advice is to try a 
Magian technique: a pilgrimage, penitence at a distance, but in the end, he cannot 
resolve the conflict.  
Apollonian love is an exercise in self-restraint, as we have seen, but the 
Faustian lover wants to control the beloved Other. Desire inevitably results in a 
struggle for recognition, a battle between the sexes. And while the Magian object 
is untouchable, the Faustian object is like a laboratory animal, subjected to 
physical erotic experiments. Turgenev’s novel Fathers and Sons describes an 
erotic “regression”. When the Faustian scientist Yevgeny Bazarov, who subjected 
large numbers of frogs to vivisection, for the first time faces the woman with 
whom he is destined to fall in love, he exclaims: “What a magnificent body ... 
Shouldn’t I like to see it on the dissecting-table!” (1861/1965, p. 155). What this 
prototypical vivisectionist does not say, but what he probably wanted to say, is: 
during coitus. Gradually, however, despite Bazarov’s Faustian ethos, he falls 
completely under the spell of this alluring object. The woman hypnotizes him and 
drives him into frenzy. The moment of coitus is postponed again and again and 
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finally does not happen at all. The integrity of her body forbids it, her body 
becomes sublimated, acquiring a value that is beyond comparison with the bodily 
features of other mortals.  
A telling chapter in the genesis of Faustian love is Shakespeare’s Hamlet. 
Both Jacques Lacan (2013) and Jan Hendrik van den Berg (2003) point to 
Hamlet’s puritanism, his aversion to sexuality, his negative attitude towards 
women. Freud (1900/1942) also has an eye for this Puritan moment, framing it as 
Hamlet’s Sexualabneigung. Hamlet, Lacan says, is not a rebellious teenager, but 
remarkably docile (Lacan 2013). He does as he is told, does what others expect 
from him. His obedience is feigned, however. In reality, he is waiting for an 
opportunity to act. Both Claudius and Hamlet try to restore the symbolic order, 
which is temporarily facing a state of crisis after the death of the king. In the early 
career of monarchs, there is a precarious moment: the symbolic order has to be 
reset, and the young prince is not yet acknowledged as the one who has the power. 
Initially, the new monarch looks unreal. A Prince must pass over corpses to 
become a legal sovereign. Hamlet will have to kill if he wants to become king 
(and the questionable justification of this act of violence is that he is prompted to 
do so by a ghost). Princes must commit a crime before they can do good. This is 
the political setting. 
Hamlet studied in Wittenberg, the cradle of European Protestantism. 
Hamlet is not the Renaissance Prince people often take him to be, quite the 
contrary, – in Wittenberg, Hamlet became a puritan. The problem is not Hamlet’s 
‘oedipal’ desires towards his mother. Rather, Hamlet has problems with his 
mother’s desire as such. He wants her to moderate herself. Hamlet preaches 
abstinence, imploring her to give up her desires. That is what he tells his mother, 
a worldly, Renaissance aristocrat for whom life means pleasure. His mother still 
wants to enjoy life for a while. Her son, however, spoils palace parties with 
offensive remarks. He hates beer drinking, sex, partying, all things mundane – 
and knows only one desire, he is obsessed with death. The following quote clearly 
indicates how insultingly he treats his all too worldly mother: 
 
Good night, but go not to my uncle’s bed, 
Assume a virtue, if you have it not, 
Refrain tonight… 
And that shall lend a kind of easiness 
To the next abstinence… (III 4) 
 
Thus, the young puritan Hamlet addresses his Renaissance mother. Claudius is 
likewise a Renaissance figure, but Hamlet is a completely different type. Not a 
feudal wolf who wants to kill a rival. Quite the contrary, he tries to put an end to 
feudal games. His desire is to establish a completely different type of power. 
Another author to consult when it comes to understanding the logic of 
Faustian thinking in issues of love and marriage is Immanuel Kant, who made 
two quite telling comments in this respect. First of all, he defined sexual 




intercourse as the reciprocal use of the sexual organs and capacities of another, 
thereby reframing marriage (which, from a Magian perspective, is considered a 
sacred union) as a transaction. As to erotic desire, Kant argues as follows. 
Suppose that someone claims to experience a craving for sexual pleasure of such 
intensity that he cannot possibly resist the temptation. Yet, if gallows were 
erected outside the bedroom where intercourse is supposed to take place, and if it 
is pointed out to him that he will be hanged immediately after satiating his 
passions, would he not be able to control his sexual urge? We need not long doubt 
what would be his answer, Kant argues, in his Critique of Practical Reason 
(1788/1971, A54). Lacan, however, rightly observes that Kant apparently fails to 
notice something very important. Why would this lady, this “object”, trigger such 
a strong desire in the first place? Isn’t it precisely because the gallows are there 
(1986, p. 131)? Isn’t it precisely the prospect of capital punishment which triggers 
such a Faustian, self-destructive drive? Whereas the Magian subject respects the 
inviolability of the object, Faustian desire is precisely a longing for excess. 
Faustian love craves for dangerous liaisons. 
Civil marriage, i.e. Faustian love as civilisation, is a synthesis of both 
dimensions: of the formal, contractual dimension (as defined by Kant) with 
Faustian desire which, without this domestication, would be disruptive or even 
life-threatening for both parties involved, as enacted in the story of Faust and 
Gretchen. This disruptive dimension is also convincingly articulated by Oscar 
Wilde in his Ballad of Reading Goal: “each man kills the thing he loves”. Civil 
marriage is based on mutual consent by craving and divided subjects, a dialectical 
unity of struggle (for power) and recognition (of each other’s autonomy). The 
other is a real other, with a desire of his or her own, so that this marriage results 
in a life-long process of conversation and negotiation, a struggle between duty 
(responsibility, the stabilising factor) and “inclination” (Faustian desire, the 
disruptive factor): a combination of attraction (bonding) and the strive towards 
disentanglement. This explains why the dialectic of bourgeois marital existence 
is such an inexhaustible source for drama and novels. Ibsen and Tolstoy were 
born in 1828, just like Jules Verne. They analysed civil marriage in all its finesses. 
In their eyes, marriage is literally a drama. In Ibsen’s female characters, there is 
a secret desire for a completely different type of existence. Whereas she seems 
able and willing to adapt herself to her bourgeois, Victorian environment, there 
is a latent, hidden, “other” other, who tries to liberate herself from these Victorian 
restrictions, longing for a completely different type of lover, a completely 
different style of life. The turning point is a moment of confession. The bourgeois 
drama starts with a situation of discontent and culminates in remarkable 
frankness. Marriages tend to be unhappy because it seems impossible to live up 
to the other’s desires. 
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Verne is the photographic negative of Tolstoy and Ibsen as it were. With 
the possible exception of Van Mitten’s unfortunate marriage (1883/1885),27 he 
has never been able to describe a credible marriage. In Verne, marriage is either 
completely absent (in the sense that his main characters are bachelors) or 
extremely cold-blooded (in the sense that the desire seems to be completely 
absent). In short, marriage appears to him as an impossible situation.  
Psychoanalysis starts with a series of bourgeois love histories: Breuer and 
Anna O, the Dora case. The marriage situation raises ambivalence, and is not 
wholeheartedly endorsed by the unconscious. Consciously or unconsciously, the 
marriage partners continue to crave for a completely different kind of partner, an 
unknown possibility that suddenly reveals itself. The manifest position of the 
conscientious ego is secretly undermined by unconscious desire. 
Foucault (1976) distinguishes two types of discourse concerning 
sexuality, namely ars erotica and scientia sexualis. Whereas the former 
flourished in Ancient and Oriental (Apollonian and Magian) societies, the latter 
is typical of the West. Ars erotica does not distinguish between what is prohibited 
or allowed, but rather strives to increase the intensity of pleasure through 
stylisation of desire. Modern Western culture, on the other hand, has produced a 
scientia sexualis with confession as its main technique. This technique was 
developed in a Gothic monastic context and optimised to perfection by the 
Jesuits. Later, in the 19th century, it was adapted to the demands of modern 
scientific discourse. The psychoanalytic technique of free association is an 
intensification of the requirement to tell everything about sex. Freud himself 
agrees that analysis is a radicalisation of confessional practice, as patients are not 
merely expected to confess what they know about their own desire (avowing their 
sins), they must even give away what they do not yet know or do not want to 
know about themselves (Freud 1926/1950). In these two models, as fleshed out 
by Foucault, we easily recognise the profile of Apollonian and Magian sexuality 
(moderation, ascetic exercise, stylisation) versus Faustian sexuality. Apollonian 
sexuality is all about measure and moderation: a harmonious use of pleasure, 
Magian desire is about rituals, Faustian desire is disruptive. 
An important moment in the genesis of Faustian sexuality is the fourth 
Lateran Council (in 1215) that turned confession into a general practice. 
According to Foucault, it marked the beginning of a sexuality discourse, as a 
monastic confessional practice was transferred from monastic culture into 
Faustian civilisation. The issue was discussed in close relation with the struggle 
against the Albigenses or Cathars, who adhered to Magian ideas, both in 
theological and in sexual matters. There is a clear affinity, in terms of style of 
thinking, between Cathars and troubadours (spokesmen of courtly love), two 
movements that caused havoc in the same region, in Southern France, more or 
less at the same time. In other words, during this crucial council, the Church 
                                                             
27 “Look here Van Mitten, frankly now, I think you are very cool about your wife”. 
“Cool! The expression is even too warm, if applied to my regard in that quarter”. 




unleashed a polemic against Magian rivals while endorsing a Faustian version of 
the true faith. Confession became an instrument in the struggle for self-control, a 
technique for disciplining human desire. Confessional practice introduced the 
figure of the Faustian priest. While the power of the Magian priest was based on 
suggestion (silent forms of influence, involving concise phrases), the power of 
the Faustian priest is based on excessive verbalisation of desire by the speaking 
subject. When Freud later replaces hypnosis with his famous talking cure, the 
Faustian style of thinking had evolved into Victorian civilisation. 
 
 
§ 3. Categories of thinking 
 
Time – A key characteristic of the Apollonian experience of time, as Spengler 
explains, is that it is focussed on the present. In comparison with Magian and 
Faustian time, the Apollonian temporal dimension seems under-developed. 
Sundials do not lend themselves to exact time measurement, nor do water clocks 
(a rarity, by the way, a technical curiosum). Events are dated in terms of the years 
in which the Olympic Games took place. A person’s age is indicated in cyclical 
terms, in terms of stages of life. When we are able to mention a Greek author’s 
date of birth at all, this often required quite some expert research, meticulous 
reconstructions by modern historians based on vague indications. Apollonian 
historians describe recent events. The past that lies further away is already 
mythological. Events that are worth preserving for posterity, are memorised, but 
clad in narratives. What applied to the Apollonian dimension of space also 
applied to the temporal dimension: it is a world on a human scale. The focus is 
primarily on the present. Past and future do not extend into infinity. The cosmos 
turns in circles and sooner or later, all celestial bodies will return to their position. 
Plato speaks in his Timaeus about the “Platonian” year: the period of time it takes 
for celestial bodies to complete their movements in concordance. It may take 
thousands of years for celestial bodies (sun, moon, planets) to arrive at the same 
positions as they are today (36.000 years, according to Plato: an enormous 
expanse of time, for Apollonian thinkers), but it is still a circular movement back 
to the beginning. There is no precise timing. In Plato’s dialogues, philosophers of 
different generations are presented as contemporaries. Academic activity 
involves competition between local schools, but it is never a race against the clock 
as is the case in Faustian scientific competitions. 
The difference with the Magian experience of time is quite significant. 
The present has little meaning for the Magian frame of mind. Past and future are 
more important. The temporal horizon stretches from the moment of 
commencement (genesis) to the moment of fulfilment (judgement day). The time 
dimension is dramatized, moreover. The future is coming towards us, as the 
dawning of a new world. Time as we know it will come to an end, will be 
abolished. The present is under the sway of preparedness, it is a preparation for 
the coming of a major transition. The present is of interest only insofar as certain 
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signs announce the coming of the Kingdom of God. The perfection that 
Apollonian thinkers aimed to realise in the present is projected onto the future. A 
craving for perfection and sublimation is at work, but to exist means to await 
salvation. The world is anticipating a divine intervention, a moment of grace. 
Alchemists try to accelerate the time-consuming process of sublimation in their 
laboratories. Their desire is to compress the time dimension, to make a leap 
towards perfection.  
The Faustian time dimension is immense. Space and time have now 
expanded into infinity. Faustian thinking experiences time as a logarithmic scale: 
a process of acceleration is discernible, both in natural and in human history, and 
the Faustian symbol par excellence is the exponential curve, reflecting unsettling 
growth and growing unrest. The present is a moment of crisis and we are 
constantly on the eve of collapse. Magian historians are hagiographers, but 
Faustian historiography entails an objective, detailed, meticulous description of 
the past, an effort to strengthen our grip on the past through accuracy and 
precision. The dramatic increase in scale that characterizes Faustian spatial 
experience is also reflected in the Faustian concept of time. Faustian biology is 
not only biotechnology (active thinking, producing knowledge via interventions), 
but also evolutionary biology. The epistemic condition of possibility for the 
concept of evolution is the Faustian sense of time. Human time, the time of human 
history, would be insufficient for evolution to be plausible. Evolutionary 
processes require incredible amounts of deep time. Compared to evolutionary 
time, human time (measurable in years, decades or centuries) is insignificant. 
Space – The Apollonian world is a world on a human scale. Distances 
between celestial bodies can be expressed in terms of thousands of kilometres. 
For the Magian mind-set, the magnitude of the world already increased 
dramatically. Precisely in this astonishing magnitude, God’s magnificence stands 
out. Notably the vertical dimension of spatiality has increased, as Magian 
thinking tends to put less emphasis on the horizontal (worldly) dimension. God 
is “in excelsis”, in the heights, and one can be a Christian, Jew or Muslim 
anywhere on earth. The Mormons who founded Salt Lake City were looking for 
a place so desolate that no one would be interested in claiming it: no man’s land 
— anywhere. It is there that the city of God descends from above. The mind of 
believers is oriented upwards, along the spiritual axis. This is exemplified by the 
position of the stylite (from στῦλος, pillar) or pillar saint, who has already begun 
to move upwards, like a human cursor, along the vertical axis (Sloterdijk 1993).  
The spherical concept was not undisputed in ancient times. Atomists saw 
the universe as a centreless void, in which particles wandered aimlessly about and 
clumped together. After Magian thinking had expanded the universe notably in 
the vertical direction, the spherical cosmos was finally shattered to give way to 
the Faustian concept of an infinite universe. The great globe was dead and the 
“Irrfahrt der Punkte” began, as Sloterdijk phrases it (1999, p. 134). The seclusion 
of the spherical world gave way to frightening emptiness: das Ungeheure. On 
Planet Earth as a concrete terrestrial environment, relentless struggle rages, not 




only between species, but also between camps, between Reformation and Contra-
Reformation, between a modernist (rationalist) conception of nature (as a 
reservoir of resources) and a romantic conception of nature (as a sublimely 
expanded natural landscape). Nature is constantly both protected and damaged. 
Faustian nature is a battleground in all respects, also between visions of nature. 
According to Sloterdijk, the current environmental catastrophe must be 
seen in the light of this fundamental transition. Humankind had left the protective 
sphere and we now create our own climatic conditions. In a Faustian 
environment, we are no longer at the centre, no longer “im Mittelpunkt eines 
Kreises” (Freud 1917/1942, p. 133). According to Sloterdijk, discontent in 
civilisation originates in the decline of spherical spatiality and the collective 
experience of “stress” to which this gives rise, as we find ourselves confronted 
with a dark, silent, uncanny, aimless universe: a Faustian universe adrift. Lacan 
considered “cosmonauts” (Russian space travellers) a misnomer because the 
cosmos no longer exists: spacecraft is launched into a decidedly Faustian space 
(Roudinesco 1993). Faustian experience entails a dramatic up-scaling of all 
dimensions of experience, notably space and time. The universe has become 
immensely large. Faustian imperialism goes much further than the Pax Romana, 
the desire to include the whole inhabited world into one political sphere of 
influence. Faustian imperialism also, or even preferably, appropriates the 
unexplored realms. According to the heroes in the novels of Jules Verne, there 
are no uninhabitable areas, only uninhabited ones, as yet. Faustian desire wants 
to populate the apparently uninhabitable. It is a quest for a Newfoundland, 
preferably uninhabited.28  
Causality – Archaic thinking does not yet think in terms of cause and 
effect, according to Hegel (1969). Nature and consciousness did not segregate as 
yet. Nature is not yet “other”. During Archaic prehistory, humans developed 
techniques to influence nature, but these were not based on insights into causal 
relationships. By means of certain phrases and gestures, shamans conjured the 
unfathomable powers of nature. They interacted with nature via songs and music, 
creating an acoustic ambiance in which a dialogue unfolded. Hegel speaks of an 
imaginary powerless power over nature. The difference between sorcery and 
                                                             
28 As Doctor Clawbonny phrases it: “I can’t believe any land uninhabitable; man, by 
many sacrifices, and for generations using all the resources of science, might finally 
fertilize such a country …  Without doubt! If you were to go to the celebrated countries 
of the world, to Thebes, Nineveh, or Babylon, in the fertile valleys of our ancestors, it 
would seem impossible that men should ever have lived there; the air itself has grown 
bad since the disappearance of human beings. It is the general law of nature which 
makes those countries in which we do not live unhealthy and sterile, like those out of 
which life has died. In fact, man himself makes his own country by his presence, his 
habits, his industry, and, I might add, by his breath; he gradually modifies the 
exhalations of the soil and the atmospheric conditions, and he makes the air he breathes 
wholesome. So, there are uninhabited lands, I grant, but none uninhabitable.” (Verne 
1866) 
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superstition is that in the latter case, consciousness is already modern insofar as 
it tends to interpret reality in terms of cause and effect. For indeed, superstitious 
consciousness perceives causality everywhere. Random events become 
connected with each other. Where rationality fails, superstitious consciousness 
relies on fantasy and associations. 
In Jung’s writings we encounter a like-minded analysis of archaic 
thinking. He describes the human psyche as a nocturnal landscape and 
consciousness as a cone of light illuminating parts of it. Worlds light up in this 
darkness that we left behind without completely renouncing them. At times, we 
venture into the twilight. He also compares the human psyche with a house. Each 
floor accommodates its own world of thinking. We dwell on the floor of 
contemporary thinking, but may descend. The lowest, subterranean floor is the 
world of archaic thinking. The archaic mind perceived other connections in 
reality than we do, using different methods to fathom the real. When the archaic 
mind wonders whether a certain plant is edible or inedible, healthy or unhealthy, 
this style of thinking relies on correspondences: “sun plants are healthy”. Archaic 
thinking is geared to nature as a wilderness – it is “the science of the jungle” (Jung 
1932). Wilderness encourages this type of thinking. Causal or experimental 
thinking only works when we have acquired sufficient technical power over 
nature. As an archaic explorer, the shaman is an expert of chance events, an 
archivist who wants to predict future events on the basis of an extensive data 
collection. He discovers hidden patterns in seemingly coincidental events and 
circumstances. Another characteristic of archaic thinking is that thoughts and 
experiences are projected on the outside world, as powers or demons. Archaic 
psychology is demonology.  
For Apollonian thinkers, the principle of causality entails that every 
change has a natural cause: Apollonian thinking is a priori convinced of that. 
However, the main form of causality is of a teleological nature. The perfect order 
is implicitly already there and wants to realise itself. The perfection that already 
manifests itself in reality, has to achieve its true fulfilment. Things may not yet 
have found their natural place. The final state is a situation of stillness and rest, 
of circling forever. This situation has yet to arrive, but the world is underway to 
balance. Beyond balance, there is no future. This also applies to thinking itself. 
The dynamic that emerges in thinking is a desire for a state of contemplation and 
completion, of fulfilment and wisdom: epistemic stasis.  
Magian thinking acknowledges only one cause for everything, God, the 
all-cause. All other forms of causality are illusory. Even our own subjective 
actions cannot count as cause, for the central category is divine grace. There is 
only one true cause, namely God, who controls everything. From a great distance, 
He exerts his decisive influence. And our thoughts, to the extent that they are 
meaningful, are the thoughts of an immense pneuma in which we participate. 
Faustian thinking is extremely causal, and causation has become a 
pervasive force. Faustian causality is deterministic. That is why the will to power 
manifests itself as the will to know: whoever knows the laws of the universe has 




real effective power. Laplace’s statement that if we know the laws of nature and 
the initial positions of a system, we can predict all future states, is an omnipotence 
fantasy. Determinism makes reality manageable and predictable. It is in quantum 
physics, in the uncertainty principle and the insight concerning the 
unpredictability of reality on an extremely small scale, that a post-Faustian style 
of thinking announces itself. In early 20th century physics, Faustian thinking has 
reached its boundaries. 
Subjectivity – For Apollonian thinking, the subject is a microcosm: a 
reflection of the cosmos, but on a small scale. Ideally, the microcosm as well as 
the macrocosm are in a state of equilibrium: wisdom, peace of mind. Just like 
falling bodies, the soul strives for a natural state of rest, whereby the circular 
movement is seen as a perfect final state – also for the subject. Contemplation 
means circling. Thinking in this sense is not an activity and should not be seen as 
“work”, or as individual achievements of autonomous subjects.  
Magian thinking is participation. Only the cosmic spirit really thinks, in 
the genuine sense of the word, circling around its own centre. Human individuals 
can only participate in this thinking. A thought lights up within us, but this is 
actually part of the circular thinking by the cosmic spirit. Not “I” think, but 
thinking thinks, in me. Thinking is not an individual achievement. Only the God 
of Aristotle really thinks. We think, insofar as we think, his thoughts. The cosmic 
spirit thinks in us. And this spirit can only generate consistent thoughts. Our 
thoughts are ephemeral moments in the self-contemplation of the cosmic mind.  
The birth of the Magian moral subject is the experience of being 
summoned. Before that moment, humans are caught up in a cyclical way of life, 
focused on production and reproduction: nothing new under the sun, although 
some individuals are exempted: the aristocratic elite of contemplative thinkers. A 
new dimension of subjectivity opens up in this experience of being addressed. 
The typical answer of the Magian subject is: “Here I am, Lord.” Such persons 
experience themselves as elected, their calling is an act of grace. And they 
become monks, priests or hermits in response. An overpowering awareness takes 
hold of them. This idea will henceforth dominate their lives, regardless of whether 
this results in benefit or misery.  
The starting point of Faustian thinking is the category of the autonomous 
subject. Freedom means having the capacity to do your duty, in compliance with 
obligations. In Hegel’s philosophy, the activities and achievements of thinking 
individuals are actually part of a dialectic of the spirit. Ultimately, only the world 
spirit really thinks. Yet, this dialectical process entails hard work in the direction 
of progress. Our thinking represents a particular station of thinking that will 
sooner or later become outdated. We are temporary voices articulating large-scale 
transformative processes. The world spirit is not a circling celestial body (the 
“highest sphere”), but realizes itself through arduous intellectual and practical 
activities, in which struggle prevails and only the most robust ideas manage to 
maintain themselves.  
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Objectivity – An apollonian thing is a Grecian temple, proportional and 
compete. A Magian thing is a jug, a spherical cavernous cavity, brought into 
being in order to collect and preserve precious gifts. In Magian thinking, such 
everyday items become sublimated into a Grail, with a capital letter: an elusive, 
fabulous thing, a lost object of desire. Magian things light up (omnia quae sunt 
sunt lumina), they speak out to us, summon us into reverence, gratitude and 
repentance. Thinking (λόγος) does not solely belong to humans, because λόγος is 
inherent in being. The things of Creation speak to us, conveying the awareness 
that God created them. 
The Faustian urge objectifies things, making them calculable. Things 
have lost their glamour and voice. The object is a product from now on. For 
Faustian thinking, the language of nature is a molecular language. The Faustian 
gaze reduces natural phenomena to elementary components such as genes: bio-
molecular στοιχεῖα that can be represented as letters from the alphabet, as 
dominant or recessive genetic factors (Aa, Bb, Cc), as nucleotides (A, C , G and 
T) or as elementary particles (e-, P +, H +, Ho, µ). Things no longer speak on 
their own accord. Molecules are laboratory entities. Faustian thinking reduces 
nature to elementary components with the help of technicity. Meanwhile, it 
produces its own kind of thing, the Faustian machine, which ignores, exploits and 
transforms nature. Gradually, the earth becomes transformed into a machine park. 
The technosphere absorbs the biosphere. Machines spread exponentially. 
Faustian technology is disruptive and pervasive. Faustian ontology becomes 
philosophy of technology, the ontology of manufactured neo-things. They are 
what we try to understand and control. Now that technology had domesticated 
nature, the question arises: how to domesticate technology? 
 
 
§ 4. Sites of truth 
 
An inquiry into styles of thinking tends to focus on the context of discovery, on 
the locality where truth originates. An important characteristic of initial situations 
is that those involved consciously create optimal conditions for truth to appear. 
Heidegger uses the term “clearing” here: an open space which is at the same time 
a place of seclusion. Sloterdijk (2004) uses the term alethotope, a site of truth, a 
place where humans are exposed to a new experience, suddenly brought to light 
(p. 427 ff.). A halo of clarity in a world of darkness, where truth can suddenly be 
discerned, where new insights manifest themselves for the first time and where 
those involved develop a special sensitivity for this unprecedented event. It is not 
a completely spontaneous phenomenon, as its emergence is enabled by particular 
practices in particular settings.   
The genesis of Apollonian culture in ancient Greece was due not only to 
the intellectual competences of Plato and other pioneers, but also to the genius 
loci: the ambiance, the gathering site as a condition of possibility. Building on 




Sloterdijk (2004), we will outline several truth-sites: localities where Apollonian, 
Magian and Faustian logic came into being; brewing grounds of infection. 
A truth-site is a place where a new truth is articulated, a new language is 
being forged, and mainstream information is filtered out. It is a place of silence 
and seclusion where a new mood settles itself, where epistemic purification can 
be practiced, where a new language game can be played and tested relatively 
undisturbed, where those involved can practice themselves in their new style of 
thinking. It is a fold in the established logic of thinking, where receptivity can 
arise for new possibilities of interpretation of key concepts such as “truth” or 
“world”. A truth-site is an epistemic clearing. Access is discouraged in the case 
of outsiders (Ἀγεωµέτρητος µηδεὶς εἰσίτω, “Let no one ignorant of geometry 
enter here”, the words written over the entrance door to Plato’s academy). Silence 
is an important precondition for truth to appear. In Phaedrus, Socrates and his 
student retreat to a cool and quiet environment. The cenacle room rented by Jesus 
and His followers was a location where a new religious dialect could develop, 
where it was possible to listen to Jesus without Him raising His voice, and to 
exchange fragile thoughts among the initiated. We can compare darkness with 
noise, silence with light. The truth-site is a dwelling of silence, a camera silens 
(Sloterdijk 2004, p. 384), where those involved could escape the dictatorship of 
“das Man” (Heidegger), i.e. endless talk and chatter (“Gerede”).  
The alethotope is also a “thermotope”, a cool and comfortable place. 
Plato’s Academy was a garden where athletes could cool themselves. 
Archimedes’ bath was likewise a site of clearing and cleansing, so that clear 
thoughts could emerge. The favourite locality of Jesus and his followers, the 
Garden of Olives, was also known as a cool place of relaxation, away from the 
heat and bustle. An antithetical site, a contra-place, opposite Jerusalem. In the 
upper room, Jesus washed the feet of His disciples, also in a metaphorical sense, 
removing the tainted ideas they had acquired along the way through public 
spaces. Augustine read Paul’s letters in a garden, the place where Magian 
enlightenment took hold of him, where a new type of experience seized him, 
without having to compete with other sounds.  
Nietzsche’s hypersensitivity to localities, to atmospheric and 
meteorological circumstances, his emphasis on issues of clean air and absence of 
noise, can be explained as paying due attention to alethotopology, but on closer 
inspection something seems to be missing, for an alethotope is also an ergotope, 
where those involved devote themselves to common tasks, as guardians of a 
message, for instance. This may include addressing specific questions, as a 
communal practice. Academics were athletes of logical reasoning, the Stoics 
athletes of morality. This could involve games or contests. Those dwelling in a 
truth-site were expected to collectively perform certain actions (“Do this to 
remember me”). The truth-site makes it possible for those involved to withdraw 
temporarily, or for a longer period, from the real world (which remains focussed 
on survival and reproduction), to temporarily devote themselves to loftier tasks. 
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Truth can survive without biological reproduction, it lives on in books, thoughts 
and intellectual or spiritual practices. 
Finally, an alethotope is also an erototope, in which new erotic practices 
may flourish. In an Apollonian truth-site, the relationship between pupil and 
teacher entailed an epistemic-erotic relationship. In the Magian cenacle, where 
the gospel of love was preached, a new form of love developed that differed from 
worldly love (aimed at reproduction): a shift from eros to caritas. The truth-site 
is not a village community, but a brother- or sisterhood, such as the monastery of 
Hildegard in Rüdesheim, mapping the cosmic ambiance via music and colourful 
illuminations, in order to know the ways of the Lord (scivias). It is a place of love 
in the sense of care, collaboration and comfort, where new concepts become the 
object of contemplation and devotion, such as Hildegard’s concept of viriditas 
(“greenness”) as a symbol for life, health, harmony and divine creation (Zwart et 
all 2015); places where new distinctions between true and false manifest 
themselves: novel practices of correction, clarification and revelation, places of 
gathering for coalitions of the willing, e.g. communities of individuals who seek 
out epistemic or spiritual challenges that others (outsiders) prefer to avoid. They 
may be guardians of a secret, such as the Magian Cathars, the purified ones – a 
name with an alchemical ring to it. Their truth-site excelled in world hostility. 
But the truth-site may also be a base-camp, from where a recently retrieved truth 
is being proclaimed (as in the case of the Dominicans, for whom the monastery 
served as a strategic assembly point preparing the ground for expansion). 
Multiple truth-sites can be identified in history, from Archimedes’ bath 
via the stove-heated room of Descartes and the divan of Freud to Heidegger’s 
Hütte, and although iconic representations may suggest solitary intellectual 
activity, these pioneering individuals actually personified emerging 
epistemological practices. Apollonian truth sites are connected with physical 
exercise, Magian sites entail intimacy and mutual support in facing trials and 
tribulations, while in Faustian sites experiments are conducted by teams, and 
where research equals education, involving students and trainees. The truth-site 
of Faustian thinking par excellence is the laboratory, a place of concentration and 
precision, where optimal conditions for producing and reproducing knowledge 
can be created, and where the idea may arise that, through methodical interaction, 
reality may be controlled.  
 
  




Chapter 6. Metropolitan dawn 
 
§ 1. Visible and less visible events 
 
Apollo 11 was launched on July 16, 1969 from the Cape Canaveral launch site in 
Florida. The operational management was in the hands of Mission control, 
Houston. When looking at images from the control centre (“Houston”), all eyes 
are usually focused on the “object” (the astronauts, the moon capsule, the moon), 
the focus of public attention and enthusiasm. A philosophical gaze, however, will 
opt for an oblique perspective, drawing attention to the scientists sitting behind 
their computers. By adopting a tilted perspective, mission control itself comes 
into view. Rather than in gravitation as such, we are interested in the way in which 
Newton discovered and formulated his law, and this also applies to the moon 
landing, one of the most appealing events in the history of recent technoscience. 
Our eyes and ears are not so much focussed on the astronauts, not even on 
Armstrong’s famous phrase (“One small step for man, one giant leap for 
mankind”), but primarily at the control centre itself. Because that is where novelty 
is situated, of which the moon voyage is one result among many others. 
Bringing this novelty into view requires triangulation involving the 
moon, the present and the past. In 1969, humanity was already familiar with the 
idea that, one day, human beings would set foot on the moon. Already in 1865, 
Jules Verne published his novel about a moon voyage. His novel, based on 
extensive research, was a literary thought experiment. Yet, the technology of the 
launch as such is the least convincing moment in Verne’s extraordinary voyage. 
A giant cannon fires a capsule into space with unimaginable force – a Faustian 
climax in the display of power, an incredible amplification of expansion, but the 
critical reader inevitably wonders how the moon travellers inside the capsule 
could have possibly survived such an event. A launch with such force and at such 
a speed must have been accompanied by excessive heat and an enormous shock. 
How could they breath and relax in their comfortable capsule during take-off?  
More than a hundred years later, the Apollo 11 landed on the moon. There 
are remarkable similarities concerning the extent to which Verne’s novel 
predicted the future: the shape of the lunar capsule, the material from which the 
capsule was made (aluminium), the number of occupants (three), the fact that the 
launch took place in Florida (remarkably close to the spot Verne had chosen), the 
return voyage towards the Pacific (again: improbably close to where Verne’s 
moon capsule also landed), the Americans as winners in the race for the moon, 
and so forth. Without denying the importance of these similarities, we should also 
pay attention to differences, or rather: the difference. In 1969, Verne’s Faustian 
machines (the giant cannon, the giant observatory) had given way to a decidedly 
post-Faustian contrivance of a completely different calibre: the computer – the 
device that made the lunar journey possible, but also precisely the device that was 
absent in Verne’s fictitious version. The heroes who designed Verne’s moon 
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voyage were arithmetic geniuses, who could handle complicated equations with 
ease, but in the computer age this type of expertise had become redundant.   
This is underlined by the fact that the moon landing, as a manifest event, 
and as a very visible scientific highlight, was accompanied by a more or less 
invisible counter-event, occurring exactly in the same year 1969, the invisible 
shadow event as it were, which ultimately would prove much more important 
than the moon landing itself. Really important events take place inconspicuously. 
In the same year 1969, supercomputers at four universities in the Southwest of 
the United States (UCLA, Stanford, University of Utah, UC Santa Barbara) were 
connected to each other via a network: the birth of the Internet, initially called 
ARPANET. While in Verne’s novel the moon expedition was the work of 
military engineers, of cannon builders, suddenly unemployed as the Civil War 
had ended, ARPANET was financed by the United States Department of 
Defence. The eventual impact of this event was much greater than that of the 
Apollo project. Prophets foretold that the Apollo 11 capsule heralded the fact that, 
20 years later, in 1989, the Cold War would be decided in favour of the United 
States, thereby ending modern (Faustian) warfare between nation states. Since 
then, we live in a global world where military conflicts have changed 
dramatically. The original ARPANET network was a silent moment of 
commencement, an Anfang, where a phenomenon was born that would quickly 
spread and would drastically and irreversibly change the world.  
Anyone who wants to know what it means to live in the computer age 
may pay a visit to a university campus. Probably, there are hundreds of staff and 
students working in university buildings, but almost everyone is sitting behind a 
computer screen. In fact, when we enter scientific laboratories, it is often 
extremely difficult to tell exactly what kind of discipline is being practiced there. 
Mathematicians, physicists, chemists, biologists, historians, philosophers, 
linguists, psychologists, management studies experts – they all work behind a 
computer screen, but this also applies to the janitor, the head of the human 
resources department and the Dean. Computers evolved into generic research and 
communication tools. The way in which scientific research is conducted, in all 
scientific disciplines, has been affected dramatically by the advent of ICT. Book 
shelves and racks of test tubes will not altogether disappear, of course, but they 
become marginalized and the practices in which they function have undergone 
spectacular transitions. Just as mechanical machines such as steam-engines once 
symbolised the dominance of the Faustian style, the computer is the symbol of a 
post-Faustian style of thinking. A device that was initially developed to function 
as a calculator, for which Leibniz and Pascal prepared the ground, became 
transformed into a communication device (Licklider and Taylor 1968). The 
computer is not a stand-alone entity, of course, but an element in global electronic 
networks. The computer indicates how the present world has transformed into a 
planetary network, a global metropolis. 
 
 




§ 2. The issue of scale 
 
If the claim that we have entered a new, post-Faustian, Metropolitan era is valid, 
this must also be reflected in a dramatic expansion of scale. The introduction of 
a new thinking style is accompanied by a drastic upscaling of the world as we 
know it. In the Apollonian world, the cosmos was experienced as a world on 
human scale. Although Apollonian thinking produced fairly accurate estimates 
of the size of the Earth, the distance to the stars was measurable in thousands of 
kilometres. The Magian universe already extended into a majestic sense of space, 
and the Faustian universe was experienced as infinitely large. The post-Faustian 
universe has dramatically extended once again. Space as such became dauntingly 
complex. The optical telescope became an instrument for amateurs, as 
technoscientific instruments now gather terabytes of data. The question what 
“observation” means in contemporary astronomy is not that easy to answer. We 
“see” the post-Faustian universe mainly thanks to spectacular computer 
simulations and visualisations, based on terabytes of computer-generated data, 
analysed and interpreted by robots on the basis of algorithms. Galileo could still 
invite sceptical cardinals to peer through his telescope, but that is history now. 
The new universe is a dynamic universe that bends and expands and is dotted 
with black holes. 
We notice a comparable change in the realm of the very small. 
Apollonian thinkers could only speculate about the world in miniature. Their 
science of the naked eye had no access to it, except through speculative thinking. 
Faustian thinking revealed molecules, atoms and micro-organisms. In the post-
Faustian era, attention has shifted to the subatomic level, the nanoworld. 
Nanoscience differs from Faustian science primarily, as the name already implies, 
because of the scale on which the research evolves. It is about building devices 
able to move molecular objects and position them with atomic precision (Drexler 
1986). Nanotech is an intervention that is able to play the game of very small 
things. The theory of relativity concerns a world on a very large scale, in which 
distance is expressed in light-years. Quantum physics, on the other hand, 
concerns a world on a very small scale, the realm of photons and electrons. The 
history of elementary particle physics (high-energy physics) in the 20th century is 
in fact a voyage of discovery in which smaller and smaller “particles” are spotted 
and traced, but increasingly this raises the ontological question to what extent we 
can still talk about particles or matter. The discovery, first theoretically (Paul 
Dirac) and then empirically (Walter Oelert, CERN) of a post-Faustian mirror 
world of antimatter (Fraser 2000) is the physics version of Heidegger’s phrase 
“das Nichts nichtet”. In other words, we see a drastic change in scale, both large 
and small. Making observations has become a completely different kind of praxis. 
In CERN’s particle collider, the moment of observation is reduced to a minimum: 
a tiny fraction of a second, providing crucial input for long-term research projects. 
The rest is computer work. This also applies to life sciences research. Molecular 
biology and biotechnology (since 1975) focus directly (rather than indirectly, via 
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macroscopic organisms) on genes, genomes and molecular mechanisms such as 
CRISPR-Cas9. Miniaturization is rampant also here.  
The increase in scale not only affects the object, but also the subject pole 
of the knowledge production process. Here we see the emergence of large-scale, 
interdisciplinary research programs (the Manhattan project, CERN, the Human 
Genome Project, etc.). Computer-based research results in anonymisation of the 
researcher-as-author, not only in the sense that terminology, design and 
methodology of publications are highly standardized, but also in the sense that 
the number of authors per article increased dramatically (multiple authorship). In 
many fields of science, publications with hundreds of authors can be found, in 
high-energy physics for instance, but also in genomics (Venter et al 2001). 
Authorship is a function of thinking style (Zwart 2001a). Apollonian 
authors were reluctant to entrust their thoughts to paper: they preferred not to 
write at all and opted for an esoteric style of communication, practiced among 
initiates. The Magian author was an authority, a privileged medium who acquired 
profound insights. The author’s name functioned as a guarantee of truth, a mark 
of quality and reliability: Aristotle dixit. All other authors, all normal authors, 
were mere commentators, students of Aristotle, the Master. Faustian authors, 
however, want to make a name for themselves as individuals. Writing becomes a 
struggle for recognition. The Faustian author no longer wants to remain 
anonymous, but is hypersensitive to plagiarism. Prominent Faustian authors such 
as Newton or Darwin were drawn into priority conflicts. The drive towards 
productivity and the need to make impact, resulted in Faustian inventions such as 
the scholarly journal and the printing press. 
Post-Faustian authorship generates new forms of anonymity. Author 
names now assume purely technical functions in the context of information 
retrieval, evaluations of research groups and university rankings. In many 
scientific domains, the author, if not “dead” (Foucault 1994b) is reduced to a pure 
signifier (browsed by robots looking for citations). Post-Faustian authorship does 
not affect all fields of science at the same time, however. The epidemic is 
spreading from one research domain to another. Quantum physics not only 
discovered a reality beyond Faustian determinism, but also stimulated multiple 
authorship. In other scholarly fields, the post-Faustian revolution is just arriving. 
Instead of post-Faustian, I will adopt the term “Metropolitan” in this study to refer 
to the contemporary style of thinking, emerging in all scientific and cultural 
domains. Grounding characteristics of this way of thinking (publishing, 
communicating, interacting, etc.) are complexity and convergence.  
 
   
§ 3. Complexity: the year 1989 
 
To some extent, biotechnology, resulting from the biotechnological revolution 
(circa 1975), could still be seen as Faustian. Scientists involved aimed to modify 
model organisms, more effectively and targeted than ever before. By adding or 




switching off genes, the aim was to adapt the properties of particular organisms 
to human requirements. In this way, biotechnology would allow us to re-shape 
the world at will, and to adapt organisms to our (exponentially increasing) needs 
and demands. The will to know entailed a will to improve. And yet, a new element 
is added, namely the fact that the biotechnologies employed are developed by 
nature herself, so that gene knock-outs mimic mutations, for instance, while 
CRISPR-cas9 employs a protective molecular device developed by microbes 
millions of years ago. The microbes are the real bio-engineers, and human 
engineers merely mimic the solutions they developed.  
This also applies to human self-knowledge. On November 9 1989, as 
citizens from East-Berlin flooded into the Western parts of a divided city, Nature 
published an article on the Human Genome Project (HGP), announcing that 
scientists were developing a joint data-base where they could deposit their 
sequencing materials, flanked by an article about societal issues to be addressed. 
The final preparations for launching the HGP coincided with the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall and the subsequent reunification of Germany and, to some extent, of 
Europe as a whole. Convergence was in the air, first and foremost between 
research fields, for genomics was a converging enterprise, absorbing expertise 
from physics, chemistry, biology, biotechnology, cybernetics, computer science 
and multiple other fields to understand complexity (to envision living entities as 
complex systems). The HGP wanted to map the human genome in a 
comprehensive manner based on the idea that, if only we would know our genes, 
we would finally know ourselves.  
The HGP resulted in a remarkable experience however (Zwart 2009). 
Initially, the scientists involved assumed that the human genome would contain 
at least one hundred, but probably more than three hundred thousand genes. The 
uniqueness and complexity of humankind as an intelligent and hyper-creative 
species, capable of building its own (hyper-complex) environment and able to 
survive in a technotope of its own making, should be reflected in our genome. 
Step by step, however, the number of genes decreased until something like 
22,500. The human genome is modest in size. This “narcissistic offense”, this 
“negative” result, had a positive effect as well: apparently, the complexity and 
uniqueness of humans is to be found elsewhere, in culture and history. 
Paradoxically perhaps, the HGP marked the end of genetic reductionism and 
Faustian determinism. Intelligence and creativity are emergent features that 
cannot be reduced to a limited number of genes, to a fictitious “factor X” that 
makes us human. Human characteristics are the result of a long history of 
interactions. We are to a considerable extent self-made, the product of evolving 
ways of interaction with the environment, developed long ago, based on language 
and tool-use, and now transmuting at a dramatic pace.  
In other academic fields, Faustian research strategies likewise gave way 
to more holistic approaches, trying to understand reality in terms of complex 
processes and systems. The computer is the enabling technology that made this 
shift from reductionism (Faustian) to complexity possible. Similar to how Jules 
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Verne gave voice to the Faustian era, Metropolitan technoscience also found its 
literary representatives in literary authors such as Michael Crichton (Zwart 
2015b). A comparative anatomy between the works of Verne and Crichton would 
be an interesting exercise. Like Verne, Crichton wrote a series of novels that 
constitute a literary encyclopaedia of contemporary technoscience, covering all 
the major technoscientific areas of the computer age, such as genomics and 
molecular biology in Jurassic Park (1990/1991), where paleontological species 
are transformed into research animals, kept in an open-air laboratory, a science 
park, intended as a tourist attraction of the Metropolitan era. Under Metropolitan 
conditions, technoscience becomes a global enterprise. Crichton not only focuses 
on computer-based DNA techniques and security systems, but also on the 
dynamics of technological innovation, the challenges of acquiring massive 
research funding and the role of governments such as the U.S. Department of 
Defence. Disciplines which tended to evolve slowly and incrementally, such as 
palaeontology and archaeology (Zwart 2009), suddenly experience a dramatic 
increase in pace and scale, due to the advent of new informational machines, 
acquiring societal relevance in the context of large-scale research programs 
addressing complex issues such as climate change, biodiversity and extinction. 
Under Metropolitan conditions, palaeontology radically changes, like every other 
research field.29 
The epidemiological pathway of the new way of thinking usually starts 
in areas such as mathematics, before moving on to physics and from there to other 
fields. A versatile protagonist of complexity thinking in physics was Gell-Mann 
(1994) for instance. The beginning of complexity thinking is chaos theory – post-
Faustian mathematics par excellence (Gleick 1987). In Crichton’s books, chaos 
theorist Ian Malcolm functions as a critic of Faustian thinking. For complex 
systems, containment is impossible. Crichton breaks with the age-old stereotype 
of the Faustian mathematician as a hyper-intelligent hermit who practices his 
craft of handling astronomical numbers exclusively with pen and paper. 
Malcolm’s mathematics is computer-dependent and he himself is remarkably 
extravert, outgoing and communicative.30 
                                                             
29 “Grant knew that palaeontology, the study of extinct life, had in recent years taken on 
an unexpected relevance to the modern world. The modern world was changing fast, 
and urgent questions about the weather, deforestation, global warming, or the ozone 
layer often seemed answerable, at least in part, with information from the past. 
Information that palaeontologists could provide. He had been called as an expert 
witness twice in the past few years” (p. 32); “[If] dinosaurs could be cloned – why, 
Grant’s field of study was going to change instantly. The paleontological study of 
dinosaurs was finished. The whole enterprise - the museum halls with their giant 
skeletons and flocks of echoing school children, the university laboratories with their 
bone trays, the research papers, the journals - all of it was going to end” (Crichton 
1990/1991, p. 84). 
30 “Ian Malcolm was one of the most famous of the new generation of mathematicians 
who were openly interested in ‘how the real world works’. These scholars broke with 




This shift is also discernable in our interaction with nature. For Faustian 
thinking, nature is a resource: raw materials, exploited by humans in a non-
sustainable fashion. This disruptive use of raw materials increases exponentially, 
resulting in unsettling, exponential growth curves. It is the job of the Faustian 
engineer to transform nature into something that is useful and useable, 
systematically manipulating living nature in laboratories, where biology becomes 
biotechnology (Pauly 1987). The Metropolitan bio-engineer, however, is aware 
of the complexity of nature, which we should use in a much more intelligent 
manner, more attuned to nature. Sloterdijk (2001) speaks of homeo-technology, 
compatible with nature, taking the place of Faustian allo-technology, hostile to 
nature (Lemmens 2005). One may think of developments in the field of 
biomaterials and bioremediation, the greening of industry, using micro-
organisms to run industrial processes with less energy and less waste (Zwart et al 
2015). Biotechnological miniaturization makes it possible to interact with natural 
processes and systems in a more intimate and considerate way. Faustian medicine 
poisons the body, but Metropolitan medicine aims to interact with bodily 
processes in more intelligent ways, using nanoscience for drug delivery for 
instance, while Metropolitan prosthetics produces embedded protheses, fully 
integrated into and compatible with their bio-environment. 
The year 1989 was preceded by other important turning points, such as 
the year 1969, as we have seen, but also the year 1953, when James Watson and 
Francis Crick discovered the molecular structure of DNA, composed of strands 
of nucleotides. These nucleotides actually constitute a minimal alphabet 
consisting of four letters (A, C, G and T) and these four signifiers were seen as 
constitutive of the quintessence of life. The elementary particles of life now 
seemed under our control. In that same year 1953, Jacques Lacan launched his 
famous seminar to elaborate the idea that the unconscious was structured like a 
language, and that life and human desire could be linguistically explained in 
terms of symbolic networks of signifiers. Speaking of desire, the Kinsey report 
Sexual Behaviour in the human Female was also published in 1953, and the first 
colour television went on sale. While 1953 was still saturated with events 
pertaining to the Cold War – Stalin’s death, the end of the Korean War, the 
Volksaufstand in the German Democratic Republic (DDR), the arrival in West 
Germany of a first wave of released prisoners of War (Gulag Archipelago 
survivors), President Harry S. Truman announcement that the U.S. had 
successfully developed a hydrogen bomb, the awarding of the Nobel Prize for 
                                                             
the cloistered tradition of mathematics in several important ways. For one thing, they 
used computers constantly, a practice traditional mathematicians frowned on. For 
another, they worked almost exclusively with nonlinear equations, in the emerging field 
called chaos theory. For a third, they appeared to care that their mathematics described 
something that actually existed in the real world. And finally, as if to emphasize their 
emergence from the academia into the world, they dressed and spoke with what one 
senior mathematician called ‘a deplorable excess of personality’. In fact, they often 
behaved like rock stars.” (1991, p. 72). 
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Literature to Winston Churchill – the year 1989 not only seemed to mark the end 
of the Cold War as a global Faustian conflict, but even the “end of history” 
(Fukuyama 1992) as such, giving rise to globalisation (the one-world concept) 
and the hegemony of neo-liberalism. 
 
  
§ 4. Globalisation 
 
The world became hyper-complex in other respects as well. The manifestation of 
Faustian thinking in the political domain was the nation state as we have seen. 
Although national sovereignty is formally still in place (citizens are still expected 
to pay their taxes, albeit electronically – via the computer – and in Europe in a 
new, transnational currency called Euro), its power has been severely thwarted. 
Politically, we are entering the Metropolitan era, where all countries become 
interconnected and new constellations of power define the scene, not only the 
United States and China (and to a somewhat lesser extent Russia and the EU), but 
also big global, Metropolitan tech companies, or hyper-companies, such as 
Microsoft, Apple, Google, Facebook, Amazon and others, complemented to some 
extent by the power of global NGOs and global charities. Such entities tend to be 
wealthier, more powerful and more advanced than most nation states can claim 
to be. A crisis of representation prevails, as citizens no longer consider politicians 
as their representatives. The prestige and influence of the latter has dramatically 
decreased, although female politicians (e.g. Angela Merkel, Ursula von der 
Leyen) are notable exceptions and prove more professional leaders than their 
(often remarkably bizarre or even obscene) male counterparts, e.g. Donald Trump 
or Boris Johnson. Most national governments are actors of little import in the 
emerging Metropolitan force field. The idea that developments can be directed 
by politicians is becoming increasingly questionable, and maybe Trump’s years 
in office were one desperate attempt to prove the opposite. In China, however, 
the development apparently moves in a juxtaposed direction. Here we witness a 
strengthening of central government, an imposing presence of the state, embodied 
by an Imperial father figure.  
The Faustian nation state was first and foremost a mobilization machine 
in times of war. However, warfare has also undergone dramatic changes. Wars 
are determined by computers and electronic devices such as drones. Wars are 
fought with the help of computer-controlled precision bombardments, but on 
closer inspection such victories are often unreal. While civilians pay the prize, 
the enemy often diffuses into the background, awaiting a return of the repressed, 
through acts of terror if needs be. The supremacy of the United States is an effect 
of the computer, of modern communication technologies, but there is a fatal 
weakness in this reliance on high-tech prowess, namely the American inability to 
“deal with” socio-cultural ambiance. Moreover, ICT is spreading, and China is 
superseding the West as the ICT-based superpower. While American intelligence 
is pervading the global environment, the U.S. are increasingly targeted by foreign 




disruptive ICT-based offences themselves, while its cynical international policies 
(forming a strategic axis with Israel for instance in rolling out a domino strategy 
of disruption in the Middle East: Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran) have 
irreversibly undermined its moral leadership.     
 
 
§ 5. Sexuality and religion 
 
Faustian marriage was a struggle between formal responsibilities and latent 
desire. What is happening to sexuality and desire under Metropolitan conditions? 
One possible starting point is the question raised by Michel Foucault (1976): why 
do we so vehemently claim that we should liberate our repressed desires, while 
in fact human discourse on sexuality has proliferated during the Faustian era, and 
scientists examined sexuality in a prolific manner, encouraging individuals to 
confess and express their sexual feelings and identities? Why do we so 
persistently claim our sexuality to be subject to repression? What he envisioned 
was an alternative way of speaking about and practicing eroticism, namely in 
terms of lifestyle and practices of the self. The Freudian interpretation (as the 
“highest stage” of Victorianism) continued to emphasise the importance of 
repressed desires (homoerotic and otherwise). Lacan represents a Metropolitan 
turn, zooming in on the fascination (artistic, cinematic and otherwise) for the 
phallus (male or female) as an enigmatic “object a” (Zwart 2019). 
In the Metropolitan era, perversions are reframed as “fascinations”, as 
part of a lifestyle. Myriads of websites are available for sharing and cultivating 
digitised cravings. During the Victorian era, the obscene was located elsewhere, 
had to withdraw into specific locations such as brothels, where “aberrations” were 
practiced. Or they were projected upon distant historical eras (say, the court of 
emperor Nero). The Metropolitan ideal is the inclusive equivalence of all options, 
celebrating non-mainstream otherness as LGBT and “queer”. Insofar as 
traditional values connected with marriage are still acknowledged by neoliberalist 
ideologies, this is motivated by economic, pragmatic or pedagogic arguments. 
The family structure has certain economic and psychic advantages and 
disadvantages, according to the experts. 
What is traditionally referred to as the “emancipation of women” is 
reframed as inclusiveness and diversity. In principle all professions are open to 
both sexes, including those of professional soldiers or professional boxers. 
Statistics indicate a steady growth of women in managerial positions, although 
the pace of progress in the direction of gender equality remains an issue of 
concern. The heroine of Michael Crichton’s novel Disclosure (1993/1994) is a 
female manager who harasses a male subordinate. Patriarchal physicians are 
replaced by teamwork. The vast majority of medical students are women, and 
male gynaecologists seem increasingly oxymoronic. The real heroes and heroines 
of the Metropolitan era are transgenders. Whereas cross-dressing transvestites 
may still be regarded a Faustian phenomenon, playing a dangerous game, 
  Styles of Thinking 
 
190 
challenging and trespassing boundaries, – an ars erotica which relies on and 
therefore continues to endorse those boundaries –, transgenders stretch the 
dichotomy into a non-binary continuum where individuals freely position and 
recreate themselves, using surgical and endocrinological means to make their 
body makeable. 
Faustian religion was dogmatic. Doctrinal issues became intertwined 
with armed conflicts between emerging powers. Atheism, as a creed and as a 
negation, is a dogmatic Faustian position. Atheists armed themselves against 
religious temptations – although in some cases dramatic regressions could take 
place. The collapse of the Catholic Church, repeatedly predicted by friend and 
foe, never materialised. We may even conclude that the Church, as a decidedly 
global organisation, has much better prospects than social democracy or even the 
nation state, forces which tried to undermine the power of the Church, for instance 
by enforcing the separation of church and state. During the early modern period, 
churches were nationalised (the Reformation must also be viewed from this 
perspective) while the internationalism of the Jesuits (whose organisation 
represented an impressive power machine, independent of nation states) aroused 
suspicion. Now, the Catholic Church represents global perseverance. The 
religious “crisis” is a Western phenomenon. From a global perspective, Planet 
Earth is inhabited by billions of religious people. A large majority of the world 
population consists of more or less sincere believers. Empty churches are more 
than compensated by mass support elsewhere. The Church has often been 
considered an “anachronism”, but this did not prevent Pope John Paul II from 
contributing to the demise of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, nor did it prevent Pope Francis from becoming a figure of international 
standing, for instance when addressing issues of sustainability or global crises 
(from the Syria crisis down to COVID-19). Popes are global “players”, their 
voices reach out to global audiences. The remarkable endurance of the Church 
relies on her tendency not to adapt too much to the ideologies in vogue. It is not 
difficult to draw parallels between the present world and ancient Rome. The 
violence of the arenas has shifted to televisions and computer screens, where 
“good” and “bad” characters literally shatter each other to pieces in front of a 
mass audience (the action movie as an electronic amphitheatre). The erotic body, 
carefully hidden from view in oriental cultures, is emphatically present, 
emphasised rather than camouflaged in Western commercials. There’s obviously 
a role for the Church to play in such a boisterous media environment.  
This may explain the aversion which Catholicism continues to instil 
among allegedly “left-wing” protagonists of neo-liberalism: notably newspaper 
columnists, the preachers of the neo-liberal creed, specialised in spelling out what 
is “left” (“good”) and “right” (“bad”) for faithful devotees of ideologies which 
were once considered avant-garde (during the 1960s and 1970s) but who are now 
perplexed by a rapidly changing world. Especially the role of the Church in its 
combat against the sexual revolution, preaching monogamy as prevention, while 
at the same time being unable to prevent sex scandals in its own ranks, has been 




heavily criticised. Any sexual restrictions became themselves taboo, although the 
sexual revolution is currently counter-acted by the #MeToo movement as its 
inevitable recoil. Meanwhile, freedom of expression has eroded into “the right to 
insult”. Notably, we are encouraged to insult the devotees of religious creeds. 
Thus, paradoxically perhaps, the plea for inclusivity and tolerance reveals itself 
to be non-inclusive and intolerant of otherness in the end, as the endorsement of 
the principles of neoliberalism becomes a condition for admittance to the debate. 
The styles-of-thinking approach may help us to come to terms with this polarising 
debate by pointing out that what we are actually facing is a collision between 
cultures (trying to redefine themselves in a quickly evolving global environment) 
and the nihilistic tendencies of a late-Faustian (neo-liberal) civilisation bent on 
eliminating all ideological rivals.  
 
 
§ 6. The year 2000 
 
The year 2000, also referred to as MM or Y2K, was a remarkable year for various 
reasons, first of all because, in terms of the Anno Domini calendar, it constituted 
the turning point between the second and third millennium. But the year 2000 
proved to be more than just a nice round figure.  
Interestingly, a quite remarkable and exceptional astronomical event 
occurred in Y2K, namely the alignment of six planets (Mercury, Venus, Earth, 
Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn) on May 5, 2000. On that day, these planets found 
themselves positioned in a line with the Sun, suggesting that the year 2000 
actually marked an epochal divide in the sense that a cultural wave was coming 
to an end. To understand the significance of this year, we must first of all take a 
step backwards, to the remarkable year – annus mirabilis – 1900, when several 
ground-breaking events took place, in physics and biology, but also in philosophy 
and psychology. To begin with, Max Planck introduced the quantum concept, and 
the work of Gregor Mendel was rediscovered. Sigmund Freud published The 
Interpretation of Dreams (although the actual publication date was 1899), while 
Edmund Husserl announced the birth of phenomenology, publishing his 
philosophy classic Philosophical Investigations. Several other events can be 
added to the list, but the four just mentioned already signal the emergence of 
completely new areas of scientific inquiry, all of which greatly affected the 
intellectual landscape of the 20th century (Zwart 2013b). They herald the birth of 
intellectual movements such as quantum physics (inaugurated by Planck), 
genetics (inaugurated by the rediscovery of the work of Mendel), psychoanalysis 
(inaugurated by Freud) and phenomenology (inaugurated by Husserl). 
The year 1900 can be regarded as the new beginning – the Anfang – of 
what would be brought to completion in (or around) the year 2000. Mendel, for 
instance, had published his ideas (which anticipated the Zeitgeist of the 20th 
century) somewhat too early (Foucault 1971; Zwart 2008), namely in the 1860s, 
so that they were more or less ignored. The sudden rediscovery of his work, in 
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the spring of 1900, by three different scholars, simultaneously, but independently 
from one another, inaugurated the birth of what later came to be known as 
genetics and the gene concept, thereby also setting the scene for the rise of 
molecular biology in the second half of the 20th century, culminating in the 
discovery of the molecular structure of DNA (in 1953, during the nadir of the 
Cold War) and the sequencing of the human genome (1989-2003), a project 
whose beginning coincided with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 a we 
have seen. The symbolic near-completion of the HGP was the Press Conference 
organised in the year 2000 (June 26 to be exact). During a carefully orchestrated 
event, the draft version of the human genome sequence was proudly presented at 
the White House in Washington, before a live audience, while simultaneously 
reaching out to a global audience (Urbi et Orbi) by President Bill Clinton and 
two prominent scientists, Francis Collins and Craig Venter (Zwart 2018).  
In a similar vein, the quantum concept paved the way for the emergence 
of elementary particle physics, the discovery of anti-matter and the Large Hadron 
Collider (LHC) at CERN, where the epic of quantum physics reached its 
completion in the hunt for the illusive Higgs-boson. In synchrony with the HGP, 
this hunt likewise began in the late 1980s at CERN, with the help of a very big 
machine, the Large Electron-Positron (LEP) collider. In 2000, however, the final 
episode set in. In that year, the LEP was shut down to make way for the LHC, an 
even bigger machine, but located in the same subterranean tunnel. By now, the 
project finally seems to have achieved its goal, as the spectral Higgs-Boson has 
finally been detected. 
Psychoanalysis, grounded in, but at the same time distancing itself from 
late nineteenth-century neurophysiology, also had a significant impact, not only 
on psychotherapy, but on the humanities as such, from philosophy up to literature 
studies, as well as on human culture and human self-understanding at large. For 
decades, psychoanalysis and high-tech neuro-centric experimentalism seemed 
worlds apart, but currently we notice the emergence of research programs which 
aim to connect psychoanalytic concepts (the unconscious, repression, resistance) 
with brain research, cybernetics and linguistics. 
The year 1900 represented the resurgence of the discontinuity principle 
(Van den Berg 1977; Zwart 2002). The previous epoch (from 1700 to 1900 A.D.) 
had been under the sway of the continuity principle, indicating that nature makes 
no leaps: Natura non facit saltus, a phrase coined by Leibniz but repeatedly 
quoted by Darwin in The Origin of Species. Now, however, scientists discovered 
that nature does evolve through leap-like changes. This was notably exemplified 
by the quantum leap concept in physics and the mutation concept in biology. As 
Erwin Schrödinger phrased it in What is life? (1944/1967), mutations (jump-like, 
discontinuous changes in the genomes of living organisms) are remarkably 
reminiscent of the quantum jumps studied in quantum physics. Mutations are 
leap-like changes in the molecular structure of a gene. Therefore, mutation theory 
is the “quantum theory of biology” in a more than figurative way (Schrödinger 
1944/1967, p. 36). Both theories (quantum physics and genetics), he argued, not 




only coincide in time (p. 51), but also convey the same basic idea (Zwart 2013b). 
In neurophysiology, discontinuity is discernible in the all-or-none principle (first 
recognized in the late 19th century) which states that neurons discharge as soon 
as (and only if) a certain threshold is reached (regardless of the strength of the 
current stimulus). It represents an either/or event: the neuron either discharges or 
not (1 or 0; the trigger is either pulled or not).   
Dialectically speaking, if the continuity principle is considered the first 
moment (the thesis, i.e. the birth of modern rational thinking), then the year 1900 
constitutes the emergence of the second moment: the “negation” of the continuity 
principle, i.e. the discontinuity principle. And this implies that the year 2000 must 
be the third moment, the negation of the negation, seeing both principles as 
complementary rather than as contradictory, reconciling them on a higher level 
of complexity and comprehensiveness. A perfect example of this dialectical 
“third moment” is the punctuated equilibrium theory of evolution, which 
combines the Darwinian idea of gradual, incremental change with the post-
Darwinian concept of sudden, leap-like transitions. Both continuity and 
discontinuity can be discerned in nature, as moments of complex systems. In 
genomics, a similar “third moment” is discernible in the conviction that the 
meaning of a mutation for an organism will depend on the cellular, organismal 
and ecological environment in which it occurs, a viewpoint which acknowledges 
complexity and interaction, and takes us beyond genetic determinism.  
This development emphasises an important ingredient of the Y2K 
Zeitgeist, namely “complexity”. The 20th century is a transition process from the 
rediscovery of discontinuous change (in 1900) towards the appreciation of 
complexity (in 2000). And this transition is visible both at the object-pole and at 
the subject-pole of the knowledge relationship. At the object pole, the 
development between 1900 and 2000 can indeed be regarded as a research route 
leading from basic constituents (e.g. genes, quanta, the basic constituents of 
phenomenological experience, etc.) towards complex interacting systems. We see 
this in the shift of focus from “genes” to “genomes”, and from genetics to 
genomics and similar -omics fields, but we also see it in the shift from energy 
quanta (Planck’s discovery) to elementary particle physics (exemplified by 
CERN and other big science research settings) where worlds of astounding 
complexity (far beyond the reach of human comprehension, and only accessible 
via big computers, operated by very large research teams) are disclosed. 
A similar development can be discerned at the subject pole, moreover, 
namely from discrete discoveries made by individuals (Planck, Mendel, De Vries, 
Husserl, Freud, etc.) towards a dramatic increase of scale, involving distributed 
intelligence, global collaboration, multiple authorship and world-wide 
networking, resulting in scientific knowledge production at a very high pace 
(Zwart 2009; Zwart 2013c). This is even evident at the humanities side of the 
spectrum, where phenomenology and psychoanalysis have evolved into large-
scale areas of research and praxis. Although research is often still framed as being 
the work of Faustian geniuses, this obfuscates the extent to which research 
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actually became the work of large-size consortia involving multiple research 
institutes (both public and private) and countless, more or less anonymous experts 
(bench-workers, often early stage researchers) distributed across the globe. The 
emergence of multiple authorship and citation indexes, even in philosophy, is 
symptomatic of this trend.  
Let us now consider some remarkable events occurring in Y2K. For the 
sake of brevity (for 2000 is indeed an extremely rich and complex year) I will 
focus on just three events, although many more could be added to this list. First 
of all, on January 6 2000, the last individual belonging to the species Pyrenean 
ibex (a mountain goat of the Pyrenees) was found dead, apparently killed by a 
falling tree. Secondly, the birth of five cloned piglets was announced on March 
5, 2000 at PPL Therapeutics in Edinburgh, named Milly, Christa, Alexis, Carrel 
and Dotcom. Finally, on May 5 2000, a computer virus or worm named 
ILOVEYOU began to infect and attack millions of Windows personal computers 
around the globe, spreading quickly through electronic networks an invoking 
serious damage (far more damage than was caused by the anxiously anticipated, 
but eventually harmless Millennium bug). Do these seemingly unrelated events 
have something in common? Can they be seen as part of a meaningful 
Gesamtbild? I believe this is the case. And indeed, by seeing them as 
meaningfully related, this will help us to mutually elucidate their meaning. All 
three events. I will argue, reflect a common mood or Zeitgeist.  
As to the first event, it is important to point out that the extinction of this 
wild mammal was not the end of the animal’s tragic story. The last of the 
Pyrenean ibexes became the target of a research project, namely the endeavour to 
resurrect this extinct species on the basis of its genome. A biotechnology 
company announced (on October 8, 2000) its intention to use nuclear transfer 
cloning technology in order to clone the Pyrenean ibex back into existence (a 
process currently known as de-extinction). And indeed, on July 30 2003, a clone 
was born alive, but died several minutes later due to lung defects. Although the 
project failed to bring the species back, it did show that, in the era of genomics 
and biotechnology, extinction has now become a relative concept. Somewhere in 
the future it may work. In fact, Siberian Mammoths are the next species on the 
list (Zwart and Penders 2011), while novelist Michael Crichton had already 
extended the concept to include Jurassic fauna (1990/1991). De-extinction 
became closely connected with genome sequencing, moreover, a research 
practice exemplified by the HGP discussed above. Via genomics and other life 
sciences research areas, the sway of contemporary technoscience over living 
nature has increased dramatically. At the same time, it is clear that the astounding 
complexity of living systems still represents a challenge for the technology-
driven will to control.   
A similar message is entailed in the second example. Genomics-oriented 
technologies for cloning are used to make living nature more makeable and 
modifiable. The idea is that in the nearby future, cloned animals (notably piglets) 
may become available as resources for procuring organs (xenotransplantation). 




The piglets’ names were symptomatic as well. While Alexis and Carrel referred 
to a transplantation pioneer and Nobel laureate named Alexis Carrel (Zwart 
2001b), Dotcom evidently refers to Internet and the WWW.  
This choice of names again indicates that a connection can be discerned 
between simultaneous events in different realms (life sciences and computer 
sciences specifically). Although organisms and computers initially may seem 
completely different things, or opposites even (organisms versus artefacts), they 
have become intimately interconnected (a phenomenon known in dialectics as the 
interpenetration of opposites). The genome is basically regarded as a program or 
code, functionally comparable to computer code. And this is exemplified by the 
phenomenon (again typical of the 21st century) of the computer virus, inaugurated 
by the launch of the ILOVEYOU virus in 2000. Both organisms and computers 
can be infected by viruses: entities which are basically nothing more than 
packaged pieces of potentially detrimental and quickly replicating code. 
Moreover, computer viruses also exemplify the complexity of the contemporary 
world: the interconnectedness of everything via computer networks. A similar 
eco-systemic connectedness is discernible in nature. We ourselves are ecosystems 
(for our microbiome) dwelling within and interacting with other eco-systems, and 
the whole world is basically one interconnected ecosystem of ecosystems, one 
cycle of cycles, as Hegel once phrased it.    
This, I would argue, is the meaning of the year 2000. A new style of 
thinking is emerging. Humans evolved into a planetary species and the world 
became a global web (a noosphere) of networks and circuits, of intelligent 
systems, increasingly consisting of smart machines, while laboratories function 
as local nodes in these globalised and computerised networks. Such global trends 
at the same time remain connected with the doings and experiences of concrete 
individuals. For instance, although science has become a large-scale 
phenomenon, involving huge numbers of researchers worldwide, concrete 
individuals (research celebrities or managers of large-scale institutes or programs, 
e.g. Francis Collins, Craig Venter, Bill Gates, Steve Jobs, Jennifer Doudna, 
Emmanuelle Charpentier, etc.) give these converging research practices a face 
(literally). We should continue to pay due attention to details. I already referred 
to the playful names given to the cloned piglets (Dotcom) and the name of the 
computer virus (ILOVEYOU), suggesting a connection between eroticism and 
digital infections (computer sterility). Producers of computer viruses act in 
accordance with Freud’s dictum Acheronta movebo: these entities enter the 
system via subliminal channels, often using trespassers into the no-go areas of 
the Internet as carriers of infection.  
 
 
§ 7. The metropolis and its inhabitants 
 
Anyone approaching a city like New York, Shanghai, Singapore or Los Angeles 
from the air will be hugely impressed by the extraordinary size and complexity 
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of the urban phenomenon below: a metropolis on a scale that dwarfs the Faustian 
monster cities of the 19th century: forms of urbanity which exceed our 
comprehension and which can only be monitored by hyper-computers. How to 
oversee, understand or control such complex networks, such hyperobjects 
(Morton 2013)? At first sight it is incomprehensible that cities of this size can 
function at all. They are the emergent result of myriads of interpenetrating 
processes. Without highways, airports and airplanes, such urban networks would 
be completely unthinkable (Crichton 1996/1997), which makes the COVID-19 
paralysis such a remarkable disruptive event (Zwart 2020c). The metropolis is an 
environment whose resilience is continuously challenged by disruptive events, 
and this places high demands on its residents. They will have to be mobile and 
flexible, willing to accept the credo of life-long learning, constantly acquiring 
new skills, new communication techniques, new professions, new forms of 
technology. Who can successfully inhabit such “mother cities”? Who is the 
metropolitan “we”? 
Schelling once argued that peoples are taking turns in playing the leading 
role in the drama of history (e.g. the Egyptians, the Persians, the Greek, the 
Romans, the Goths, etc.). One by one, they all experienced their Golden Age as 
chosen people and as carriers of culture. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
Germany, France and England violently competed to assume this role. After the 
catastrophic mega-conflicts that heralded the demise of the nation state, this idea 
is no longer credible. First of all, because of the awareness (voiced by Spengler, 
among many others) that history is multi-centred, so that various groups may take 
a leading role in various regions on various continents. For instance, during the 
centuries when the Greeks experienced “their” historical moment and the Roman 
Empire came into being, the Bantu speaking people in Africa were engaged in 
their southward expansion, reaching KwaZulu-Natal and Transvaal somewhere 
between 300 and 500 A.D., while in China the Han dynasty reigned (202 B.C.–
220 A.D.). In modernity, Protestants (notably the more radical branches, such as 
the Latter-day Saints or Mormons) considered themselves as chosen people, 
allegedly replacing the Jews on the basis of a new covenant, while in Marxist 
theory, the working classes were chosen to play the role of the transformative 
avant-garde. Should we adopt this line of reasoning, the question would be which 
actor will take the lead in the Metropolitan era? Should we think of a megastate 
such as China? Or rather of global tech giants such as Microsoft and Google?  
In addition, the crucial question emerges who will be admitted and 
included in this emerging “we”. Advocates of neoliberal ideologies are not the 
only voices prone to obfuscate the mechanisms of exclusion they actually 
support. Hegel (1970) already set the stage when his fascinating dialectics of 
convergence derailed and failed to supersede his Eurocentric bias when 
discussing the African continent, so that notably these (un-dialectical) sections of 
his philosophy of history deserve to be drastically rewritten.  While some groups 
are insistently invited to join the Ark of history, others are pushed back into 
reservations (from Native Americans up to Palestinians living in Gaza or the 




West-Bank) or into metropolitan slums. How to address this challenge? While 
Magian thinking implied an ethos of patience (waiting for a divine intervention), 
Faustian thinking entailed an ethos of activism and mobilisation. Urban settings 
were a harsh industrial environment where struggle for survival reigned, but they 
also operated as emancipation machines, while other fantastic machines swerved 
like glittering capsules through oceans and landscapes to escape the industrial 
miasma. Now, we dwell in a different world.  
Some voices suggest that we have arrived at our destination, that we are 
there, that history has ended and that the world has become one. But precisely 
now we seem to have lost all sense of orientation. We inhabit a global “mother 
city” in the literal sense of the word: µήτηρ πόλις, under the sway of unstoppable 
communication and hyper-connectivity. The metropolitan ambiance is no longer 
an inhospitable environment, but rather a world of unprecedent luxury and 
comfort, from a historical perspective. The conditions under which metropolitan 
residents exist, are allegedly human-friendly and historically speaking without 
precedent. In terms of human husbandry: we are well-protected and well-fed. 
This does not mean that we are free from diseases or the consequences of ageing 
(we are not beyond biology). A litany of laments can still be heard, but that, of 
course, is part of the condition. The Faustian slogan of progress gave way to 
technocratic efforts to optimise the quality of life.  
This does not mean, however, that everyone is equally connected to the 
emerging networks, or that global innovation is as inclusive as advocates of 
neoliberalism purport it to be. Quite the contrary, the multiple dichotomies 
between participants and non-participants, between adopters and non-adopters 
are evidently increasing. Many commentators (journalists, etc.) are still looking 
for contradictions of the Faustian type, e.g. between the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, to explain why the global metropolis is not able to allow everyone to 
profit, but this still presupposes the Faustian idea of progress towards a situation 
of completion (i.e. the end of history). Somehow, on the political level, such 
commentators failed to internalise the implications of the entropy concept, 
namely that every increase of productivity and order (e.g. the creation of 
interconnected megacities) inevitably results in massive disruption elsewhere, 
notably at the outskirts. Thus, globalisation and connectivity gave rise to large-
scale deforestation, ecological destruction, military conflicts and the emergence 
of novel viral threats. While economists continue to believe in growth and the 
“good tidings” of a global market, the jungles of the Amazon are destroyed, the 
ice-caps of the Arctic are melting, and children in Yemen are starving. Faustian 
slave trade has been replaced by a very lucrative immigrant market: human 
trafficking, humans as commodity, either involving refugees seeking asylum or 
young people looking for a better future, as their countries of origin fall victim to 
erosion and disruption, while greedy metropolises keep growing. This is, in short, 
the challenge: co-creating a metropolitan world which does not result in massive 
exclusion and uprooting.  
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In short, we are facing a paradoxical situation. Inside the metropolis, the 
technocracies of optimisation go hand in hand with burn-out and fatigue. At the 
outskirts, we see destruction and degradation. On the one hand, affluent elderly 
and millions of spoiled millionaires, on the other hand viral threats and the 
ongoing erosion of education of the young. On the hand, campaigns on behalf of 
the rights of LGBT (lesbians, gay people, bisexuals and transgenders), on the 
other hand burka’s and segregation between the sexes. Increasingly, the 
privileged and the underprivileged seem to live in separate worlds. According to 
the view from inside, not everyone is willing to accept the invitation and to 
endorse the Metropolitan values, but outsiders rather arrive at the conclusion that 
biases and obstacles are endemic. From an insider (elitist) perspective, populist 
leaders are considered an obstacle. From a styles-of-thinking perspective, 
however, labels such as “populism” and “fundamentalism” are symptomatic of 
the inability to grasp what is at stake here, namely the erosion of culture by an 
aggressive and expansive global civilisation, adorning itself with epithets such as 
“tolerance”, “inclusion” and “diversity”, – slogans which actually obfuscate 
global processes of homogenisation and cultural annihilation, quite detrimental 
of course for genuine diversity. Besides biological mass extinction, languages, 
traditional skills and indigenous knowledge forms are quickly disappearing as 
well (“epistemicide”). While cultures, traditions and religions are discarded as 
outdated or even as suspect (“intolerant”, etc.), or exploited as tourist attractions 
(as thematised by Dan Brown’s novels), all humans are expected to convert to a 
new ideology (alleged “neutral”, but remarkably thin in content) and to become 
speakers of this new, but in many ways quite toxic and corrosive language.  
As to nature as the “backdrop” of the Metropolitan ambiance, exponential 
(Faustian) growth has unleashed global disasters, notably in the form of mass 
extinction and climate change, resulting in what is seen as a new geological era, 
the Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Crutzen 2002). According to this 
diagnosis, humans still place themselves in the centre as an all-powerful, hyper-
responsible actor, instigator of exponential growth curves. Climate change, 
however, is a complex process, while a global, institutional form of agency to 
counteract the threat is lacking. Can “we” still turn the tide? As a rule, 
metropolises are built in vulnerable coastal areas, where the impacts of climate 
change are immediately felt. On the basis of the synchronicity principle, it is 
inevitable that a change in style of thinking is accompanied by meteorological 
and climatic turbulence. Joint hyper-initiatives are needed to foster resilience in 
the face of disruption. Besides technoscientific expertise, however, this requires 
a deeper understanding of the historical and socio-economic factors at work. In 
other words, what is required is convergence, not only in the sense of 
collaboration between political actors, but also in the sense of convergence 
among research fields. The styles-of-thinking approach aims to contribute to this 
from a humanities perspective, seeing current collisions as clashes between local 
cultures and global civilisation, and as instances of uneven development (Zwart 




2020c). On the global political level, however, we are currently steering away 
from convergence rather than towards it.   
A fascinating window into the Metropolitan present is provided by Dan 
Brown’s (allegedly “low-brow”) novels. While Inferno addresses the disruptive 
consequence of global mobility, exponential population growth and mass tourism 
(giving rise to viral threats), Origin (Brown 2017) zooms in on the clash between 
technoscientific, ideological globalisation and religious culture (Zwart 2020d). 
Iconoclastic hero Edmond Kirsch developed an ultrafast quantum computer to 
simulate the origin of life on earth, so as to exterminate the remnants of religious 
beliefs about creation. In the prologue of the novel, Edmond pays a visit to the 
monastery of Montserrat – about 45 kilometres northwest of Barcelona, famous 
for its statue of the Black Virgin, but also for serving as the Grail Castle in 
Wagner’s Parsifal – to meet with representatives of world religions. Eventually, 
however, it becomes clear that the novel’s main character is actually a building, 
namely Antoni Gaudí’s Sagrada Família. On the one hand, it is a cathedral, a 
catholic church, the tallest one in Europe, the last of the cathedrals, a psychedelic 
forest, a jungle of columns, coloured glass and symbols and, like all cathedrals, a 
Gesamtkunstwerk, a total work of art. It is also a syncretic collage, symbolising 
the current convergence of spirituality and science, of nature and technology. 
Thus, the Sagrada Família symbolises something new, namely biomimetic 
architecture with a biological quality. With its cell-like structures, the ceiling 
resembles a complex organism viewed through a microscope (Brown 2017, p. 
454). The pillars seem to grow out of the earth and Gaudi’s tiles seem to resemble 
a primordial sea. It is an evolving building, symbolising technologies of the 
future, reconnected with nature (p. 455).  
From a styles-of-thinking viewpoint, what is especially noteworthy is 
that Sagrada Família is presented as “a flashpoint for transition” and as the 
counterpart of the Pantheon of Rome, since both are “buildings with one foot in 
the past and one in the future, a physical bridge between a dying faith and an 
emerging one” (p. 455). Sagrada Família creates a spatial ambiance where the 
Metropolitan attitude can already be experienced: the imminent convergence of 
technology and nature, and of science and religion, to supersede the current crisis 
of global disruption. Although the novel sets off with the (Faustian) conflict 
between religion and science, towards the end (during the denouement stage) 
most protagonists seem aware that the contemporary world will need religion, 
represented here by Christianity, to come to terms with emerging challenges of 
technoscience. Christianity “will survive the coming age of science, using its vast 
experience – millennia of philosophy, personal inquiry, meditation, soul-
searching – to help humanity build a moral framework and ensure that the coming 
technologies will unify, illuminate, and raise us up, rather than destroy us” (p. 
455). Indeed, it is as if, “in the struggle between science and religion, a tipping 
point has been reached”, as if both antagonists are now circling back from the 
farthest reaches of its orbit (p. 456). 
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The styles-of-thinking concept implies that basic convictions “work” in 
a convincing manner for an extended period of time, encouraging those involved 
to be open to the world in a particular manner, cultivating a particular way of 
thinking, speaking and perceiving, and seeing this as a common human 
endeavour. The Faustian idea that knowledge equals control is currently being 
replaced by Metropolitan ideas with a different morphology, including 
convergence, interconnectivity and complexity as key aspects. The identification 
and characterization of a particular style is not a matter of empirical “induction”, 
however, but rather an encouragement to see emerging developments from this 
perspective. The focus is on particular things (e.g. buildings) or events (e.g. the 
rise and fall of, say, Donald Trump) that exemplify the current condition. 
Notably, we zoom in on moments of commencement, so that Silicon Valley 
becomes the Metropolitan counterpart of the park of Academus or the Mount of 
Olives, while Gregor Mendel, working in a monastery garden, becomes for 
Metropolitan thinking what the pre-Socratics were for the Apollonian style. 
Ultimately, however, the ambition of the styles-of-thinking concept is to develop 
a diagnostic of the present and a prognostic of the future (as Hegel put it: to 
capture one’s own time in thoughts, or rather: to capture the grounding idea 
which is energetically realising itself right now). While the identification and 
reconstruction of grounding ideas of the past is already a risky task, producing a 
diagnostic of the present and a prognostic of the future is even more hazardous. 
Thinking, however, is no longer envisioned as the work of solitary heroes (with 
Spengler serving as one of the last of the Mohicans as it were), but rather as 
“distributed reflection”.  The idea that we are currently migrating, more or less 
abruptly, into a new style of thinking, is a concept that must realise itself via 
collaborative research by multiple scholars across the globe, and this study 
aspired to contribute to this emerging task. Spengler’s book articulated a 
pessimistic view. Now that we are experiencing a new daybreak, we are again 
facing grave concerns. The conviction that a new grounding idea (a new, 
pervasive philosopheme) has already presented itself, entails fascinating 
opportunities for scholarly work, but eventually needs to prove itself in real life, 
rapidly evolving on a metropolitan scale. 
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